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James Gustave Speth 
Dean, Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies 
In 1896 Svante Arrhenius published On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air 
upon the Temperature of the Ground, in which he used models to demonstrate his 
theory that emissions from combustion of coal would lead to a warming of the 
Earth. With this effort the science of climate change was born, more than 100 years 
ago. 
The politics of climate change, on the other hand, is much younger. It was not 
until June 1988, at a conference in Toronto, Canada—The Changing Atmosphere: 
Implications for Global Security—that the idea for an international convention on 
climate change was proposed. 
I doubt that the proponents of the Convention, myself included, imagined the 
magnitude or the full complexity of this proposal. In retrospect, I doubt that any 
of us, given our current understanding of the enormity and significance of the 
issues being negotiated, would have dreamed that just 15 months after the first 
intergovernmental negotiating session a Convention would have been signed and 
ratified. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change had 
been negotiated, drafted, and was open for signature by the time of the Earth 
Summit in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. By June 1993, 166 Parties had signed the 
Convention, and it entered into force March of 1994. This series of events was a 
stunning demonstration of the political momentum that was gathering behind 
the issue of climate change. 
The global negotiations that have followed in the wake of the ratification of the 
Convention have been among the most heated and comprehensive ever. More 
than any other issue, climate change and the debate surrounding it have increased 
international awareness of global environmental problems. As an issue that is per­
tinent to development, quality of life, and human wellbeing, climate change has 
been effective in convincing both rich and poor countries of the necessity of inter­
national cooperation. 
This volume has been compiled in collaboration with United Nations Devel­
opment Programme in an effort to contribute to better understanding of the con­
nections between climate change and sustainable development. The volume 
should serve as a tool for decisionmakers in developing countries, who will have 
enormous responsibilities in facing climate challenges in the coming years. At the 
same time, it is intended to be a resource for university faculty and students and 
others interested in exploring the complexities of the climate change debate. By 
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developing a perspective on climate change that is this well-rounded, the volume 
should prove valuable both to those concerned about development and those 






















Assistant Administrator and Regional Director 
Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean 
United Nations Development Programme 
The policies being formulated in developing countries today are those that will 
ultimately have the greatest impact on the environment and natural resources at 
the regional level, and on climate change at the global level. In recognition of this, 
 is focusing on capacity building and institutional strengthening, and in so 
doing, is supporting developing countries in their e›orts to acquire the means to 
become involved with the global struggle to address climate change, while simul­
taneously furthering sustainable development and poverty eradication. At the 
core of this approach is the  conviction that the best way to address climate 
change is through sustainable development. At the same time, the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change () promises to be a critical tool for sus­
tainable development. Yet, unfortunately, it seems that this connection between 
sustainable development and the climate change regime is all too often over­
looked, both politically and academically. 
Because the climate change regime is fairly new, and the system of global envi­
ronmental governance has yet to truly test its legs, much of the focus has been 
compartmentalized—giving the impression that the issue of climate change is all 
about mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. But it is not. It cannot be. First, there 
is little incentive for any country, regardless of region or economic status, to 
commit to climate change activities solely for the sake of abating emissions. This 
is especially so for developing countries, which are unlikely to sacrifice domestic 
developmental goals and priorities, such as poverty alleviation and installation of 
sustainable energy services, solely for the good of the global environment. This is 
especially critical because the consensus is that the Convention will be e›ective 
only if both developed and developing countries fulfill their common but 
di›erentiated responsibilities. Second, it has been determined that the conse­
quences of climate change are not only very real, but are already being felt 
throughout the world, particularly in developing countries, which are less finan­
cially able to manage unexpected extreme weather events. Thus, climate change 
adaptation activities must be brought to the forefront. 
Despite these realities, the resources dedicated to the specific link between cli­
mate change and sustainable development are limited. This was a driving factor 
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sion to support this volume. Climate Change and Development not only elaborates 
the linkages between climate change and the various components of develop­
ment, such as energy, abatement, technology, health, forestry, and agriculture, but 
it considers the avenues available to developing countries, and includes discus­
sions of demonstrable achievements that may be replicated. 
Further impetus for  involvement with this volume is the range of social 
and economic extremes to be found in Latin American and the Caribbean. During 
the 1990s, the region experienced a modest but uneven growth rate. The decade 
was also marked by increased, yet volatile, private capital inflows. Consequently, 
despite overall regional economic growth, there are still pockets of poverty 
throughout the region that lack social and physical infrastructure such as educa­
tion, healthcare, water, and energy services. The regional progress on poverty 
eradication in the 1990s was not sufficient to compensate for the damage done in 
the 1980s. In fact, in 1999 the number of absolute poor in Latin America and the 
Caribbean reached an all-time high of 220 million, which was further com­
pounded by increased inequity between socioeconomic groups. 
The cycle of poverty, systemic paucity, and environmental degradation has the 
potential to self-perpetuate, particularly with regard to energy services. Without 
energy, economic growth is severely limited, as employment, health facilities, and 
education services are all reliant to varying degrees on energy. Thus, in tandem 
with economic growth, leaders throughout the region have been intensifying their 
commitments to improve the quality of life for their populations. The common 
underlying theme of the policies being implemented to alleviate poverty is foster­
ing growth. For its part,  has been focusing on capacity building and insti­
tutional strengthening to facilitate the introduction of policies and systems based 
on sustainable energy generation. Further, it has been promoting and supporting 
climate change activities throughout the region. The Latin American and 
Caribbean region is in the vanguard of activities that integrate climate change and 
sustainable development.As elaborated by the Latin American contributors to this 
volume, countries throughout the region have taken significant steps that demon­
strate the region’s commitment to changing the path of development. From 
Brazil’s biomass initiative to the adaptation activities in the Caribbean, from 
Argentina’s fleet of natural gas vehicles to Costa Rica’s carbon sequestration pro­
jects, there is evidence that climate change initiatives are gaining momentum 
throughout the region. 
Thus, based on the progress that has been made, and work there is yet to do, 
 has collaborated the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies to 
produce this volume, which successfully integrates not only the broad concepts of 
climate change and sustainable development, but also the subtopics of impacts, 
financing, and flexibility mechanisms. This volume is a fundamental resource for 
decisionmakers in developing countries, whose actions to advance development 
today are destined to impact the future of climate change, and indeed, of sustain­
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Note from the editor 
Luis Gómez-Echeverri 
United Nations Development Programme 
Climate change is one of the most serious environmental problems that human­
ity faces today. According to assessments of the , the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change, developing countries will be the most seriously affected. 
Unfortunately however most of these countries are lacking the basic tools, the 
institutions and the capacities needed to cope with and mitigate its effects. Fur­
thermore, the dismal condition of poverty and deprivation under which a large 
portion of the world’s population lives provides a poor platform on which to 
embark on a major attack on climate change. 
Many in developing countries will have great difficulty addressing an issue that 
may cause a problem for the sustenance of life in some distant future when their 
principal concern is the preservation of life today. Given that the benefits of miti­
gation will not be apparent for years to come, it is understandable that paying the 
mitigating costs today is unappealing. This is a great dilemma given that develop­
ing countries have a lot to contribute to the solutions. But it is doubtful that they 
will do so under the threat of conditionalities or increased burdens. What is more 
promising is an agenda that attends to both climate change as well as development 
priorities. But the linkages between climate change and development need to be 
known and enhanced through positive action. It is often forgotten that projects 
that help countries adapt to climate change or to mitigate greenhouse gas emis­
sions can also be instrumental in enhancing good governance and in addressing 
poverty reduction and sustainable development priorities of developing countries. 
In many cases these linkages are not promoted simply because of a lack of 
knowledge. The purpose of this book is to emphasize the linkages and to promote 
a development agenda that also addresses climate change concerns. As such, it is a 
tribute to those who have already decided that better environmental behavior is 
good business, that better land use practices, reforestation, improved watershed 
management, and better infrastructure are insurance for a better life, a more pro­
ductive livelihood, and safer property. 
The science of climate change is young and full of uncertainties. The message 
of this book is that this is no excuse for promoting good management of resources 
and good environmental behavior that in turn results in adaptation to climate 
change and mitigation of . The implicit argument is that it will be difficult 
to engage most people around the world on the subject of climate change unless 
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it argues for a strengthened international cooperation system that can help 
strengthen these linkages. 
While most books concentrate either on the science or on the policy side of cli­
mate change, few try to bring issues related to both under one volume as this one. 
Thus the decision to present the subject of climate change in a way that brings 
together issues of science and the linkages to important aspects of development, 
capacity building and technology transfer, as well as policy options. 
In the last section, the book focuses on the Latin American region and some of 
its challenges and the efforts of the region to cope with the subject of climate 
change. This a region with great challenges but also with a great opportunity to do 
it right. As it proceeds to make billions of dollars of investments on energy and 
technology options in the decades to come, each decision will be a vote either in 
favor or against the environment, not only of the region but also of the globe. 
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Common questions about climate change
United Nations Environment Programme and 
World Meteorological Organization 
Abstract 
This document answers some of the most commonly asked questions about climate 
change, including whether the Earth has warmed, which human activities are con­
tributing to climate change, what further climatic changes are expected to occur, and 
what effects these changes may have on humans and the environment. 
Introduction 
Climate is the average weather, including seasonal extremes and variations, either 
locally, regionally, or across the globe. In any one location weather can change very 
rapidly from day to day and from year to year, even within an unchanging climate. 
These changes involve shifts in, for example, temperatures, precipitation, winds, 
and clouds. In contrast to weather, climate is generally influenced by slow changes 
in features like the ocean, the land, the orbit of the Earth about the sun, and the 
energy output of the sun. 
Fundamentally, climate is controlled by the long-term balance of energy of the 
Earth and its atmosphere. Incoming radiation from the sun, mainly in the form of 
visible light, is absorbed at the Earth’s surface and in the atmosphere above. On 
average, absorbed radiation is balanced by the amount of energy returned to space 
in the form of infrared “heat” radiation. Greenhouse gases such as water vapor and 
carbon dioxide, as well as clouds and small particles (called aerosols), trap some 
heat in the lower part of the Earth’s atmosphere. This is called the greenhouse 
effect. If there were no natural greenhouse effect, the average surface temperature 
would be about 34° (61°) colder than it is today. 
Winds and ocean currents redistribute heat over the surface of the Earth. The 
evaporation of surface water and its subsequent condensation and precipitation in 
the atmosphere redistribute heat between the Earth’s surface and the atmosphere, 
and between different parts of the atmosphere. 
Natural events cause changes in climate. For example, large volcanic eruptions 
put tiny particles in the atmosphere that block sunlight, resulting in a surface cool­
ing of a few years’ duration. Variations in ocean currents change the distribution 
of heat and precipitation. El Niño events (periodic warming of the central and 
eastern tropical Pacific Ocean) typically last one to two years and change weather 
patterns around the world, causing heavy rains in some places and droughts in 
others. Over longer time spans, tens or hundreds of thousands of years, natural 
changes in the geographical distribution of energy received from the sun and the 
This article is reprinted with
the permission of the United
Nations Environment Pro-
gramme and the World Mete­
orological Organization,
which co-sponsored its origi­
nal compilation and publica­
tion in 1997. 
 










10    
 
amounts of greenhouse gases and dust in the atmosphere have caused the climate 
to shift from ice ages to relatively warmer periods, such as the one we are currently 
experiencing. 
Human activities can also change the climate. The atmospheric amounts of 
many greenhouse gases are increasing, especially that of carbon dioxide, which has 
increased by 30% over the last 200 years, primarily as a result of changes in land 
use (e.g., deforestation) and of burning coal, oil, and natural gas (e.g., in automo­
biles, industry, and electricity generation). If current trends in emissions were to 
continue, the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere would double during 
the twenty-first century, with further increases thereafter. The amounts of several 
other greenhouse gases would increase substantially as well. 
The accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere due to human activ­
ities will change the climate by enhancing the natural greenhouse effect, leading to 
Because most greenhouse gases remain in the atmosphere for a long period of 
time, even if emissions from human activities were to stop immediately, effects of 
accumulated past emissions would persist for centuries. 
an increase in the Earth’s average surface temperature. This warming may be par­
tially offset in certain regions where air pollution leads to high concentrations of 
small particles in the atmosphere that block sunlight. 
The current best estimate of the expected rise of globally averaged surface tem­
perature relative to 1990 is 1° to 3.5° (about 2° to 6°) by the year 2100, with con­
tinued increases thereafter. Because most greenhouse gases remain in the atmos­
phere for a long period of time, even if emissions from human activities were to 
stop immediately, effects of accumulated past emissions would persist for cen­
turies. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (), co-sponsored by the 
United Nations Environment Programme and the World Meteorological Organi­
zation and made up of over 2,000 scientific and technical experts from around the 
Schematic view of components
of the global climate system,
some of their processes and
interactions, and some aspects
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world, published its First Assessment Report in 1990 and its Second Assessment 
Report in 1995. The second report contains over 10,000 references and is over 2,000 
pages in length. Although our understanding of some details of climate change is 
still evolving, the  report is the most comprehensive and scientifically author­
itative account of our understanding of climate change, the potential impacts on 
humans and the natural environment, the technology currently available to reduce 
human influences on climate, and the socioeconomic implications of possible 
measures to mitigate these changes. The document that follows has been written 
and reviewed by scientists who participated in the  process, and it attempts to 
answer some of the most commonly asked questions about these issues, based 
upon information contained in the  reports. A list of the scientists who pre­
pared this document is provided at its end. 
Has the world warmed? 
The globally averaged temperature of the air at the Earth’s surface has warmed 
between 0.3° and 0.6° (about 0.5° and 1°) since the late nineteenth century. The 
four warmest years on record since 1860 have all occurred since 1990. The warm­
ing has been greatest at night over land in the mid to high latitudes of the North­
ern Hemisphere. The warming during the northern winter and spring has been 
stronger than at other seasons. In some areas, primarily over continents, the warm­
ing has been several times greater than the global average. In a few areas tempera­
tures have actually cooled, e.g., over the southern Mississippi Valley in North 
America. 
Other evidence of global temperature 
increases since the nineteenth century 
includes the observed rise in sea level of 10 to 
25 centimeters (about 4 to 10 inches), the 
shrinkage of mountain glaciers, a reduction 
of Northern Hemisphere snow cover (1973 to 
present), and increasing sub-surface ground 
temperatures. Data derived from measure­
ments of tree rings, shallow ice cores, and 
corals, and from other methods of indirectly 
determining climate trends, suggest that 
global surface temperatures are now as warm 
as or warmer than at any time in the past 600 
years. 
Data from a few locations can be used to 
trace temperatures even further into the past. For example, deep ice cores and 
North Atlantic deep-sea sediments suggest that the recent warming stands out 
against a record of relatively stable temperatures over the past ten thousand years, 
with century-to-century variations of temperature seldom approaching the 
observed increase of global mean temperatures of about 0.3° to 0.6°  (about 0.5° 
to 1°) over the last century. 
Satellite-based instruments have recently measured temperatures at higher alti­
tudes (2 to 6 kilometers, or about 1 to 4 miles above the Earth’s surface), rather than 
at the surface. These observations indicate that this portion of the atmosphere may 
have cooled slightly, by above 0.1° (about 0.2°), since 1979 when the measure­
ments began. Although apparently at variance with the surface temperature mea-
Measured global surface tem­
peratures relative to the aver­
age for the 30-year period 1961
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Trends in measured surface air 
temperature over the past
century. Red circles represent
warming; blue circles repre­
sent cooling. No data are avail­
able for the large areas with
no circles. 
surements – they are not. Significant differences in short-term trends are to be 
expected between the surface and atmospheric temperatures at higher altitudes, 
because of the different factors affecting the variability and persistence of climate 
patterns at different altitudes. Furthermore, questions have recently arisen con­
cerning the consistency of calibrations of the satellite-based instruments, suggest­
ing that what was believed to be a small cooling may actually be a slight warming. 
Are human activities contributing to climate change? 
A comprehensive assessment by the  of the scientific evidence suggests that 
human activities are contributing to climate change, and that there has been a dis­
cernible human influence on global climate. 
Climate changes caused by human activities, most importantly the burning of 
fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas) and deforestation, are superimposed on, and 
to some extent masked by, natural climate fluctuations. Natural changes in climate 
result from interactions such as those between the atmosphere and ocean, referred 
to as internal factors, and from external causes, such as variations in the sun’s 
energy output and in the amount of material injected into the upper atmosphere 
by explosive volcanic eruptions. 
Studies that aim to identify human influences on climate attempt to separate a 
human-caused climate-change factor (the signal) from the background noise of 
natural climate variability. Such investigations usually consist of two parts: detec­
tion of an unusual change, and attribution of all or part of that change to a par­
ticular cause or causes. 
The concepts of detection and attribution may be understood in terms of a 
simple medical analogy. Measurement of a body temperature of 40° (104°) 
detects the presence of some abnormal condition or symptom but does not in itself 
give the cause of the symptom. To attribute the symptom to an underlying cause 
often requires additional and more complex tests, such as chemical analyses of 
blood and urine, or even x-rays and  scans. 
Early work on climate-change detection examined changes in the globally aver­
aged surface temperature of the Earth over the last century. Most studies of this 
type concluded that the observed increase of roughly 0.5° (about 1°) was larger 
than would be expected as a result of natural climate variability alone. Observed 
globally averaged temperature changes have also been analyzed away from the 
Earth’s surface. The observations used come from conventional weather observing 





























   13
 
ent factors affecting the variability of and persistence of temperatures at different 
altitudes, there are noticeable differences between short-term trends at the surface 
and those at higher altitudes. The record of temperatures away from the Earth’s 
surface, which spans only the past 40 years compared with the much longer sur­
face record, is too short for globally averaged values to provide any definitive 
information about the extent of human influences. 
The further step of attributing some part of observed temperature changes to 
human influences makes use of climate models, which have been employed to esti­
mate the climatic effects of a range of human-induced and 
natural factors. The human factors include recent changes in 
the atmospheric concentrations of both greenhouse gases and 
sulfate particles (called “aerosols”). The natural factors con­
sidered include solar variability, the effects of volcanic erup­
tions, and internal variability of the climate system resulting 
from interactions among its individual components. 
The changes in globally averaged temperature that have 
occurred at the Earth’s surface over the past century are simi­
lar in size and timing to those predicted by models that take 
into account the combined influences of human factors and 
solar variability. 
To probe the question of attribution requires the applica­
tion of more powerful and complex methods, beyond the use 
of global averages alone. New studies have focused on com­
paring maps or patterns of temperature change in observa­
tions and in models. Pattern analysis is the climatological 
equivalent of the more comprehensive tests in the medical 
analogy mentioned previously and makes it possible to 
achieve more definitive attribution of observed climate 
changes to a particular cause or causes. 
The expected influence of human activities is thought to be 
much more complex than uniform warming over the entire 
surface of the Earth and over the whole seasonal cycle. Patterns of change over 
space and time therefore provide a more powerful analysis technique. The basic 
idea underlying pattern-based approaches is that different potential causes of cli­
mate change have different characteristic patterns of climate response or finger­
prints. Attribution studies seek to obtain a fingerprint match between the patterns 
of climate change predicted by models and those actually observed. 
Comparisons between observed patterns of temperature change and those pre­
dicted by models have now been made at the Earth’s surface and in vertical sec­
tions through the atmosphere. Model predictions show increasing agreement with 
changes observed over the past 30-50 years. The closest agreement occurs when the 
combined effects of greenhouse gases and sulfate aerosol particles are considered. 
Statistical analyses have shown that these correspondences are highly unlikely to 
have occurred by chance. 
The agreements between the patterns of change predicted by models and those 
actually observed are due to similarities in large spatial scales, such as contrasts 
between the temperature changes in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres or 
between different levels of the atmosphere. It is at these large scales that we have 
most confidence in model performance. More importantly, many of the results of 
Modelled and observed 
changes in atmospheric tem­
perature, from close to Earth’s 
surface to the lower stratos­
phere. Model results are from
two sets of experiments: with
“present-day” levels of atmos­
pheric CO2 (panel a), and with
present-day CO2, sulfur emis­
sions, and stratospheric ozone
depletion (panel b). They are
given as changes relative to a
pre-industrial state of the
atmosphere. Observed changes
(panel c) are temperature
trends over the period 1962 to
1988, as estimated from 
weather balloons. All results are 
for annually averaged data and
are in units of ˚C (panels a, b)
and ˚C/25 years (panel c). The
patterns of change in panels b
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Relative importance of the vari­
ous greenhouse gases and
small particles currently in the
atmosphere. Bars extending to
the right of the horizontal line
indicate a warming effect. The
impacts of tropospheric ozone,
stratospheric ozone, and parti­
cles are quite uncertain. The
range of possible effects for
these gases is indicated by the
red bar; i.e., the effect is in the 
range of one end of the red bar
to the other. 
these studies agree with our physical understanding of the climate system and do 
not depend solely on numerical models or statistical techniques. 
There are still uncertainties in these detection and attribution studies. These are 
due primarily to our imperfect knowledge of the true climate change signal due to 
human activities, to our incomplete understanding of the background noise of 
natural climatic variability against which this signal must be detected, and to inad­
equacies in the observational record. Such uncertainties make it difficult to deter­
mine the exact size of the human contribution to climate change. Nevertheless, the 
most recent assessment of the science suggests that human activities have led to a 
discernible influence on global climate, and that these activities will have an 
increasing influence on future climate. 
What human activities contribute to climate change? 
The burning of coal, oil, and natural gas, as well as deforestation and various agri­
cultural and industrial practices, are altering the composition of the atmosphere 
and contributing to climate change. These human activities have led to increased 
atmospheric concentrations of a number of greenhouse gases, including carbon 
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, chloroflurocarbons, and ozone in the lower part 
of the atmosphere. 
Carbon dioxide is produced when coal, oil, and natural gas (fossil fuels) are 
burned to produce energy used for transportation, manufacturing, heating, cool-
The use of fossil fuels currently accounts for 80 to 85% of the carbon dioxide being 
added to the atmosphere. 
ing, electricity generation, and other applications. The use of fossil fuels currently 
accounts for 80 to 85% of the carbon dioxide being added to the atmosphere. 
Land use changes, e.g., clearing land for logging, ranching, and agriculture, also 
lead to carbon dioxide emissions. Vegetation contains carbon that is released as 
carbon dioxide when the vegetation decays or burns. Normally, lost vegetation 
would be replaced by re-growth with little or no net emission of carbon dioxide. 
However, over the past several hundred years, deforestation and other land use 
changes in many countries have contributed substantially to atmospheric carbon 
dioxide increases. Although deforestation is still occurring in some parts of the 
Northern Hemisphere, on the whole, re­
growth of vegetation in the north appears 
to be taking some carbon dioxide out of 
the atmosphere. Most of the net carbon 
dioxide emissions from deforestation are 
currently occurring in tropical regions. 
Land use changes are responsible for 15 to 
20% of current carbon dioxide emissions. 
Methane (natural gas) is the second 
most important of the greenhouse gases 
resulting from human activities. It is pro­
duced by rice cultivation, cattle and sheep 
ranching, and by decaying material in 
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coal mining and oil drilling, and by leaky gas pipelines. Human activities have 
increased the concentration of methane in the atmosphere by about 145% above 
what would be present naturally. 
Human activities have increased the concentration of methane in the atmos­
phere by about 145% above what would be present naturally. 
Nitrous oxide is produced by various agricultural and industrial practices. 
Human activities have increased the concentration of nitrous oxide in the atmos­
phere by about 15% above what would be present naturally. 
Chlorofluorocarbons () have been used in refrigeration, air conditioning, 
and as solvents. However, the production of these gases is being eliminated under 
existing international agreements because they deplete the stratospheric ozone 
layer. Other fluorocarbons that are also greenhouse gases are being used as substi­
tutes for  in some applications, for example in 
refrigeration and air conditioning. Although cur­
rently very small, their contributions to climate 
change are expected to rise. 
Ozone in the troposphere, that is, in the lower part 
of the atmosphere, is another important greenhouse 
gas resulting from industrial activities. It is created 
naturally and also by reactions in the atmosphere 
involving gases resulting from human activities, 
including nitrogen oxides from motor vehicles and 
power plants. Based on current data, tropospheric 
ozone is an important contributor to the enhanced 
greenhouse effect. However, in part because ozone is 
also produced naturally, and because of its relatively 
short atmospheric lifetime, the magnitude of this contribution is uncertain. 
Contrary to popular perception, the Antarctic ozone hole does not cause global 
warming. Instead, the global depletion of stratospheric ozone caused by  and 
other gases has resulted in a small cooling effect. 
Human activities, such as the burning of fossil fuels and changes in land use, 
have increased the abundance of small particles in the atmosphere. These parti­
cles can change the amount of energy that is absorbed and reflected by the atmos­
phere. They are also believed to modify the properties of clouds, changing the 
amount of energy that they absorb and reflect. Intensive studies of the climatic 
effects of these particles began only recently and the overall effect is uncertain. It 
is likely that the net effect of these small particles is to cool the climate and to par­
tially offset the warming of increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases. 
How do we know that the atmospheric build-up 
of greenhouse gases is due to human activity? 
Four lines of evidence prove conclusively that the recent buildup of carbon diox­
ide arises largely from human activities. 
First, the nuclei of carbon atoms in carbon dioxide emitted by burning coal, oil, 
and natural gas (fossil fuels) differ in their characteristics from the nuclei of 
carbon atoms in carbon dioxide emitted under natural conditions. Coal, oil, and 
Carbon dioxide emissions from 
the burning of coal, oil, and nat­
ural gas are shown for the
period 1860 to 1992 for three
groups of countries. 
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Measured amounts of carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere. 
natural gas were formed deep underground tens of millions of years ago, and the 
fraction of their nuclei that were once radioactive has long ago changed to non­
radioactive carbon. But the carbon dioxide emitted from natural sources on the 
Earth’s surface retains a measurable radioactive portion. As carbon dioxide has 
been emitted through fossil fuel combustion, the radioactive fraction of carbon in 
the atmosphere has decreased. Forty years ago scientists provided the first direct 
evidence that combustion of fossil fuels was causing a buildup of carbon dioxide 
and thereby diluting radioactive carbon in the atmosphere by measuring the 
decreasing fraction of radioactive carbon-14 captured in tree rings each year 
between 1800 and 1950. 
Second, scientists began making precise measurements of the total amount of 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere at Mauna Loa, Hawaii, and at the South Pole in 
the late 1950s. They have since expanded their observa­
tions to many other locations. Their data show convinc­
ingly that the levels of carbon dioxide have increased 
each year worldwide. Furthermore, these increases are 
consistent with other estimates of the rise of carbon 
dioxide emissions due to human activity over this 
period. 
A third line of evidence has been added since 1980. 
Ice buried below the surface of the Greenland and 
Antarctic ice caps contains bubbles of air trapped when 
the ice originally formed. These samples of fossil air, 
some of them over 200,000 years old, have been 
retrieved by drilling deep into the ice. Measurements 
from the youngest and most shallow segments of the 
ice cores, which contain air from only a few decades 
ago, produce carbon dioxide concentrations nearly identical to those that were 
measured directly in the atmosphere at the time the ice formed. But the older parts 
of the cores show that carbon dioxide amounts were about 25% lower than today 
for the ten thousand years previous to the onset of industrialization – and over 
that period changed little. 
The final line of evidence comes from the geographic pattern of carbon diox­
ide measured in air. Observations show that there is slightly more carbon dioxide 
in the northern hemisphere than in the southern hemisphere. The difference arises 
because most of the human activities that produce carbon dioxide are in the north 
and it takes about a year for northern hemispheric emissions to circulate through 
the atmosphere and reach southern latitudes. 
Carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere by a variety of sources, and over 
95% of these emissions would occur even if human beings were not present on 
Earth. For example, the natural decay of organic material in forests and grasslands, 
such as dead trees, results in the release of about 220 billion tons of carbon diox­
ide every year. But these natural sources are nearly balanced by physical and bio­
logical processes, called natural sinks, which remove carbon dioxide from the 
atmosphere. For example, some carbon dioxide dissolves in sea water, and some is 
removed by plants as they grow. 
As a result of this natural balance, carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere 
would have changed little if human activities had not added an amount every year. 
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exceed the balancing effect of sinks. As a result, carbon dioxide has gradually accu­
mulated in the atmosphere, until, at present, its concentration is 30% above pre­
industrial levels. 
Direct atmospheric measurements of other human-produced greenhouse 
gases have not been made in as many places or for as long a period as they have for 
carbon dioxide. However, existing data for these other gases do show increasing 
concentrations of methane, nitrous oxide, and  over recent decades. In addi­
tion, ice core data available for methane and for nitrous oxide demonstrate that 
the atmospheric concentrations of these gases began to increase in the past few 
centuries, after having been relatively constant for thousands of years.  are 
absent from deep ice cores because they have no natural sources and were not 
manufactured before 1930. 
What climate changes are projected? 
The  has projected further increases in globally averaged surface tempera­
tures of 1° to 3.5° (about 2° to 6°) by the year 2100, as compared with 1990. This 
projection is based on estimates of future concentrations of greenhouse gases and 
sulfate particles in the atmosphere. 
The average rate of warming of the Earth’s surface over the next hundred years 
will probably be greater than any that has occurred in the last 10,000 years – the 
period over which civilization developed. However, specific temperature changes 
will vary considerably from region to region. 
As a result of the warming, global sea level is expected to rise by a further 15 to 
95 cm (about 6 to 37 inches) by the year 2100, because sea water expands when 
heated, and some glacial ice will melt. 
Although globally averaged surface temperature increases and sea level rise are 
the most certain of the  projections, other effects can be projected with some 
confidence. Greater warming is expected to occur over land than over the oceans. 
However, there is evidence to suggest that the Earth’s climate has occasionally 
changed rather rapidly in the distant past. There may be similarly abrupt tran­
sitions due to human-induced climate change. These abrupt transitions raise the 
possibility of significant surprises as the world warms over the next century, per­
haps with rapid and unexpected changes in ocean currents and regional climate. 
The maximum warming is expected to occur in the Arctic in winter. Nighttime 
temperatures are expected to increase more than daytime temperatures. In gen­
eral, there will probably be an increase in the number of very hot days at mid-lat­
itude locations in summer, such as in most of North America, Europe, and parts 
of South America, with a decrease of very cold days in the same locations in winter. 
Extreme events such as heavy rains and droughts are the most destructive 
forms of weather, and the frequency and duration of these events are likely to 
increase as the climate continues to change. Increases in the global averages of 
both evaporation and precipitation are expected. In winter at mid-latitudes, 
higher surface temperatures are expected to cause an increased portion of the pre­
cipitation to fall in the form of rain rather than snow. This is likely to increase both 
wintertime soil moisture and runoff, leaving less runoff for summer. In spring, 
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The possible range of globally
averaged surface temperature
increase is shown for the 
period 1990 to 2100. (top) 
The possible range of globally
averaged sea level rise is shown
for the period 1990 to 2100.
(bottom) 
will lead to increased evaporation, which could decrease the availability of soil 
moisture needed both for natural vegetation and agriculture in many places, and 
increase the probability of severe drought. Droughts and floods occur naturally 
around the world, for example in association with El Niño events, but are likely to 
become more severe, causing water management to 
become an even more critical problem in the future. 
The most uncertain projections of future climate 
relate to changes in particular locales, as well as to how 
weather events such as tropical storms, including hur­
ricanes, typhoons, and cyclones, will be affected. This 
uncertainty results from the existence of large natural 
regional variations, as well as limitations in computer 
models and the understanding of the relationship 
between local and global climate at the present time. 
The range of estimated warming of 1° to 3.5° (about 
2° to 6°) by the year 2100 arises from uncertainties 
about the response of climate to the buildup of green­
house gases and particles, as well as the total amount of 
future emissions of these gases. Factors such as esti­
mates of human population growth, land use changes, 
life styles, and energy choices yield a range of plausible 
greenhouse gas emissions. For example, concerted 
efforts to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases would 
lead to a significantly lower projected temperature rise. 
All of these predictions are based on the assumption 
that the global climate will change gradually. However, 
there is evidence to suggest that the Earth’s climate has 
occasionally changed rather rapidly in the distant past. 
There may be similarly abrupt transitions due to 
human-induced climate change. These abrupt transi­
tions raise the possibility of significant surprises as the world warms over the next 
century, perhaps with rapid and unexpected changes in ocean currents and 
regional climate. The likelihood that such rapid changes could occur increases 
with increasing emissions of greenhouse gases. 
How reliable are predictions of future climate? 
Predictions of climate change are calculated by means of computer models that 
mathematically simulate the interactions of the land, sea, and air, which together 
determine the Earth’s climate. Our confidence in these models rests largely on their 
basis in accepted physical laws, their ability to describe many aspects of current cli­
mate accurately, and their skill at reproducing some of the important features of 
past climates. 
Climate models are based on a wealth of scientific observations and well estab­
lished laws of physics, including the laws of gravity and fluid motion, and the con­
servation of energy, momentum, mass, and water. It is this reliance on basic phys­
ical laws that lends high confidence to the prediction that a buildup of greenhouse 
gases will eventually lead to a significant alteration in the Earth’s climate. 
A second important reason for having confidence in climate models is because 
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ocean. For the purposes of predicting the behavior of the atmosphere for only a 
few days ahead, an atmosphere-only model, with no simulation of the ocean, can 
be used. This is the method employed in making short-term weather forecasts, 
whose relative accuracy demonstrates the ability of this sort of model to reproduce 
some of the important details of the atmosphere’s behavior. 
While reliable weather forecasts can only be made for periods up to ten days, 
predictability for greater lengths of time can be obtained for averages of weather, 
i.e., the climate. For example, with regard to longer periods (several years or 
more), climate models in which both the oceans and the atmosphere are repre­
sented are able to simulate the main features of current climate and its variability, 
including the seasonal cycle of temperature, the formation and decay of the major 
monsoons, the seasonal shift of the major rain belts and storm tracks, the average 
daily temperature cycle, and the variations in outgoing radiation at high elevations 
in the atmosphere as measured by satellites. Similarly, many of the large-scale fea­
tures observed in ocean circulation have been reproduced by climate models. 
It is possible for a model to simulate current climate well but still fail in its pre­
diction of climate change. So another test of models is to compare their simula­
tions of earlier climates to historical data, including the climate of the past cen­
tury. These efforts have been hampered by our imprecise knowledge of a variety 
of factors, including how humans have changed the amounts of small particles in 
the atmosphere and variations in the energy output of the sun. 
Nevertheless, using estimates of some of these factors, climate models can 
reproduce many changes observed over the last century, including the global mean 
surface warming of 0.3° to 0.6° (about 0.5° to 1°), the reduction in temperature 
differences between day and night, the cooling in the atmosphere above 14 km 
(about 9 miles), the increases in precipitation at high latitudes, the intensification 
of precipitation events in some continental areas, and a rise in sea level. Moreover, 
a climate model has correctly predicted broad features of the globally averaged 
surface cooling and subsequent recovery associated 
with the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in 1991. 
Climate models can also be used in attempts to 
reproduce the main features of prehistoric climates, 
but this effort has been limited by the scarcity and the 
indirect nature of the evidence available from sedi­
ment cores, tree rings, preserved pollen, and ice core 
data used to infer earlier climates. Even so, the models 
have reproduced some of the general features of recon­
structed past climates, such as the enhanced North 
African monsoon 6,000 to 9,000 years ago and the 
approximate level of cooling during the last ice age. 
The major weakness of models is their reliance on 
approximations of some aspects of climate. It takes too much computer time, or it is 
simply beyond the capacity of even supercomputers, to represent some of the key 
smaller-scale processes that affect climate. Even if adequate computers were avail­
able, scientists’ understanding of the detailed physics of such processes is limited.So, 
some aspects of climate are approximated, based on a combination of physical laws, 
laboratory experiments, and direct observations of climate. For example, it is not 
possible to represent the details of the formation and dissipation of clouds. The 
approximation of cloud behavior is a major source of uncertainty in climate models. 
Calculated globally averaged
surface air temperature is com­
pared to observed values over
the period 1860 to 1994. 
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The area (expressed in per­
centage) of the United States,
excluding Alaska and Hawaii,
with an unusually large
amount of total annual precip­
itation coming from extreme
precipitation events (those
with more than 5.08 cm [2
inches] of rainfall [or equiva­
lent if precipitation is snow­
fall] in 24 hours) is displayed.
The smooth curve shows the 
same data, but averaged over
periods of about 10 years. 
In summary, the fact that models are based upon the known physical laws of 
nature and can reproduce many features of the current climate and some general 
aspects of past climates gives us increasing confidence in their reliability for pro­
jecting many large-scale features of future climate. However, there remains sub­
stantial uncertainty in the exact magnitude of projected globally averaged tem­
perature rise caused by human activity, due to shortcomings in the current climate 
models, particularly in their representation of clouds. Furthermore, scientists have 
little confidence in the climate changes they project at the local level. Other uncer­
tainties, not arising from specific limitations in the climate models, such as esti­
mates of the rate of future green house gas emissions, also restrict the ability to pre­
dict precisely how the climate will change in the future. 
Are recent extreme weather events, like the large number 
of Atlantic hurricanes in 1995, due to global warming? 
As the world warms, some extreme climate events, like the frequency of heat waves 
and very heavy precipitation, are expected to increase, but it remains uncertain 
whether or not to expect changes in the frequency of some other extremes. More­
over, it is important to note that it is not possible to link any particular weather or 
climate event definitively to global warming. The causal linkage, if any, between 
the frequency of extreme events and global warming can only be determined 
through statistical analyses of long-term data, because the natural climate system 
can produce weather and climate events that often 
appear to be uncharacteristic of the recent climate. 
Data on climate extremes in many regions of the 
world are inadequate to draw definitive conclusions 
about possible changes that may have occurred on a 
global scale. However, in some regions where good 
data are available, there have been some significant 
increases and decreases in extreme events over time. 
For example, there has been a clear trend to fewer 
extremely low minimum temperatures in several 
widely separated areas in recent decades (e.g., Aus­
tralia, the United States, Russia, and China). The 
impact of such changes can manifest itself in fewer 
freezing days and late season frosts, such as have been documented in Australia and 
the United States. Indeed, we expect that the number of days with extremely low 
temperatures should continue to decrease as global temperatures rise. 
Widespread, extended periods of extremely high temperatures are also expected 
to become more frequent with continued global warming, such as the unprece­
dented high night time temperatures during the 1995 heat wave in Chicago, Illinois, 
and the Midwestern United States that caused an estimated 830 deaths. However, 
the global frequency of such heat waves has not been analyzed at this time. 
Higher temperatures lead to higher rates of evaporation and precipitation. As the 
Earth warms, we expect more precipitation, and it is likely to fall over shorter inter­
vals of time, thereby increasing the frequency of very heavy and extreme precipita­
tion events. Analyses of observed changes in precipitation intensity have been con­
ducted for only a few countries. The best evidence of increases in extreme and very 
heavy precipitation events probably comes from data in North America. In Australia, 
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from major storms has also been observed. Analyses for South Africa also show 
increases in extreme precipitation rates. In another area, China, where data have 
been analyzed for the last several decades, no obvious trends are apparent, but high 
concentration of air pollution (such as sulfate particles that can cool the climate) 
may be counteracting such changes in this region. 
There is as yet no evidence for a worldwide rise in 
the frequency of droughts. In the future, however, it 
is expected that many regions will experience more 
frequent, prolonged, or more severe droughts, pri­
marily due to the more rapid evaporation of mois­
ture from plants, soils, lakes, and reservoirs. This is 
expected to occur even as precipitation increases and 
heavy precipitation events become more common. 
Blizzards and snowstorms may actually increase 
in intensity and frequency in some cooler locations as 
atmospheric moisture increases. In more temperate 
latitudes snowstorms are likely to decrease in fre­
quency, but their intensity may actually increase as 
the world warms. Observations show that snowfall 
has increased in the high latitudes of North America, but snow accumulations 
have melted faster because of more frequent and earlier thaws. 
There is evidence of an increase in the frequency of intense extra-tropical 
storms in the northern North Atlantic and adjacent areas of Europe, such as the 
British Isles, but there has been a decrease in such events in the southern North 
Atlantic (south of 30°) over the past few decades. It remains uncertain as to 
whether these changes are natural fluctuations or relate to global warming, 
because there is little consensus about how global warming will affect these non­
tropical, yet powerful storms. 
There is little evidence to support any significant long-term trends in the fre­
quency or intensity of tropical storms, or of hurricanes in the North Atlantic during 
the past several decades. Although the hurricane frequency was high during 1995 
and 1996, an anomalously low number of hurricanes occurred during the 1960s 
through the 1980s, including those hitting the United States during that period. 
Reliable data from the North Atlantic since the 1940s indicate that the peak strength 
of the strongest hurricanes has not changed, and the mean maximum intensity of 
all hurricanes has decreased. There is also some evidence for a decrease in the fre­
quency of cyclones in the Indian Ocean during the past two decades relative to ear­
lier records and an increase in the frequency of typhoons in the western Pacific. 
Wide variations in the total number of tropical storms including hurricanes, 
typhoons, and cyclones occurring per decade have been observed, with no apparent 
long-term trends in most ocean basins. There is little consensus about how global 
warming will affect the intensity and frequency of these storms in the future. 
Why do human-made greenhouse gases matter 
when water vapor is the most potent greenhouse gas? 
The Earth’s surface temperature would be about 34° colder than it is now if it were 
not for the natural heat trapping effect of greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide, 
methane, nitrous oxide, and water vapor. Indeed, water vapor is the most abun­
dant and important of these naturally occurring greenhouse gases. In addition to 
Numbers of all hurricanes and 
the most severe hurricanes 
making landfall in the United
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its direct effect as a greenhouse gas, clouds formed from atmospheric water vapor 
also affect the heat balance of the Earth by reflecting sunlight (a cooling effect), and 
trapping infrared radiation (a heating effect). 
However, just because water vapor is the most important gas in creating the 
natural greenhouse effect does not mean that human-made greenhouse gases are 
unimportant. Over the past ten thousand years, the amounts of the various green­
house gases in the Earth’s atmosphere remained relatively stable until a few cen­
turies ago, when the concentrations of many of these gases began to increase due to 
industrialization, increasing demand for energy, rising population, and changing 
land use and human settlement patterns. Accumulations of most of the human-
made greenhouse gases are expected to continue to increase, so that, over the next 
50 to 100 years, without control measures, they will produce a heat-trapping effect 
equivalent to more than a doubling of the pre-industrial carbon dioxide level. 
Increasing amounts of human-made greenhouse gases would lead to an 
increase in the globally averaged surface temperature. However, as the temperature 
increases, other aspects of the climate will alter, including the amount of water 
vapor in the atmosphere. While human activities do not directly add significant 
amounts of water vapor to the atmosphere, warmer air contains more water vapor. 
Since water vapor is itself a greenhouse gas, global warming will be further 
enhanced by the increased amounts of water vapor. This sort of indirect effect is 
called a positive feedback. 
It has been suggested that as greenhouse gases accumulate, the atmospheric 
events that generate cumulus clouds in tropical areas would cause a drying rather 
than moistening of the upper layers of the troposphere (the lowest region of the 
atmosphere). However, observations of the current atmosphere provide evidence 
for the conclusion that on a global scale, a warmed atmosphere will moisten and 
this will enhance greenhouse warming. 
Clouds are another important factor in determining climate. The increased 
levels of water vapor in the atmosphere, as well as changes in temperature and 
The figures show model-calcu­
lated potential malaria risk
areas for the most dangerous
type of malaria parasite (P. falci­
parum). Panel a shows the aver­
age annual “epidemic poten­
tial” (EP), a measure of risk of
contracting malaria, for base­
line climate conditions 
(1931–1980). Panel b shows EP
for a mean global temperature
increase of about 1.2˚C. This 
temperature increase is pro­
jected to occur somewhere in
the time frame of 2040 to 2100. 
Both the magnitude of risk in
current transmission areas and 
the area of potential transmis­
sion are expected to increase. 
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winds, will also cause changes in clouds that will alter the amount of energy from 
the sun that is absorbed and reflected by the Earth, at some locations enhancing 
and at others diminishing the warming due to greenhouse gases. The response of 
clouds to global warming is a major uncertainty in determining the magnitude 
and distribution of climate change. 
Why should a few degrees of warming be a cause for concern? 
The most recent  scientific assessment of climate change estimated that the 
globally averaged surface temperature will increase by 1° to 3.5° (about 2° to 6°) 
by the year 2100, with an associated rise in sea level of 15 to 95 cm (about 6 to 37 
inches). These changes may lead to a number of potentially serious conse­
quences. For example, mid-and high-latitude regions, such as much of the 
United States, Europe, and Asia, could experience an increase in the incidence of 
heat waves, floods, and droughts as the global climate changes. The impacts of 
such extreme events on human welfare as well as natural ecosystems could be 
significant. 
Climate change is likely to have wide-ranging and mostly adverse impacts on 
human health. The projected increase in the duration and frequency of heat 
waves is expected to increase mortality rates as a result of heat stress, especially 
where air conditioning is not available. To a lesser extent, increases in winter tem­
peratures in high latitudes could lead to decreases in mortality rates. Climate 
change is also expected to lead to increases in the potential transmission of many 
infectious diseases, including malaria, dengue, and yellow fever, extending the 
range of organisms, such as insects, that carry these diseases into the temperate 
zone, including parts of the United States, Europe, and Asia. For example, pro­
jections indicate that the zone of potential malaria transmission, in response to 
global surface temperature increases at the top of the projected range, may 
enlarge from an area containing about 45% of the world’s population to about 
60% by the end of the twenty-first century, resulting in 50-80 million additional 
cases of malaria per year. 
It may be possible for global agricultural production to keep pace with increas­
ing demand over the next 50-100 years if adequate adaptations are made, but there 
are likely to be difficulties in some regions. This conclusion takes into account the 
beneficial effects of carbon dioxide fertilization, i.e., given sufficient water and 
nutrients, plant growth will be enhanced by an increased concentration of carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere. Changes in the spread and abundance of agricultural 
pests and the effects of climate variability were not reflected in this assessment. 
Regional changes in crop yields and productivity are expected to occur in response 
to climate change. There is likely to be an increased risk of famine, particularly in 
subtropical and tropical semiarid and arid locations. 
With 50-70% of the global human population currently living in coastal areas, 
future sea level rises, alterations in storm patterns, and higher storm surges could 
have significant effects. About 46 million people are currently at risk by flooding 
in coastal areas as a result of storm surges. In the absence of measures to adapt, 
even with current populations, a 50 cm (about 20 inches) sea level rise would 
increase the number of people whose land will be at risk from serious flooding or 
permanent inundation to about 92 million, while a 100 cm (about 40 inches) rise 
would increase this number to 118 million. If expected population growth is incor­
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Other projected changes include a disappearance of between one-third and 
one-half of the existing mountain glacier mass by 2100. Alpine glaciers are already 
observed to be in rapid retreat and many cities between 30° and 30° depend on 
these natural reservoirs for their water supply. For example, in Lima, Peru, the 
entire water supply for 10 million people depends on the summer melt from a 
glacier that is now in rapid retreat, for reasons that may or may not be related to 
global climate change. In the future, climate change could also lead to shifts in 
river flow and water supply, with serious implications for human settlements and 
agriculture. 
Climate change is also likely to affect human infrastructure, including trans­
portation, energy demand, human settlements (especially in developing coun­
tries), the property insurance industry, and tourism. 
Why can’t ecosystems just adapt? 
Climate change has the potential to alter many of the Earth’s natural ecosystems 
over the next century. Yet, climate change is not a new influence on the biosphere, 
so why can’t ecosystems just adapt without significant effects on their form or pro­
ductivity? There are three basic reasons. 
First, the rate of global climate change is projected to be more rapid than any to 
have occurred in the last 10,000 years. Second, humans have altered the structure 
of many of the world’s ecosystems. They have cut down forests, plowed soils, used 
range-lands to graze their domesticated animals, introduced non-native species to 
many regions, intensively fished lakes, rivers and oceans, and constructed dams. 
These relatively recent changes in the structure of the world’s ecosystems have 
made them less resilient to further changes. Third, pollution, as well as other indi­
rect effects of the utilization of natural resources, has also increased since the 
beginning of the industrial revolution. Consequently, it is likely that many ecosys­
tems will not be able to adapt to the additional stress of climate change without 
losing some of the species they contain or the service they provide, such as sup­
plying sufficient clean water to drink, food to eat, suitable soils in which to grow 
crops, and wood to use as fuel or in construction. 
For millions of years, species have been shifting where they grow and repro­
duce in response to changing climate conditions. Over the next century, global 
warming could result in approximately one-third of the Earth’s forested area 
undergoing major transitions in species composition. From the fossil record we 
have an indication of the maximum rate at which various plant species have 
migrated to more suitable areas: from 0.04 km/yr (about 0.03 miles/yr) for the 
slowest to 2km/yr (about 1.3 miles/yr) for the fastest. However, the projected rate 
of surface temperature change in many parts of the world could require plant 
species to migrate at faster rates (1.5 to 5.5 km/yr or about 1 to 3.5 miles/yr). Thus, 
many species may not be able to move rapidly enough to prosper. These changes 
in vegetation and ecosystem structure may in turn give rise to additional releases 
of carbon into the atmosphere, further accelerating climate change. 
Moreover, as the old vegetation dies in areas most affected by climate change, 
such as forests in northern latitudes, it is likely to be replaced by fast growing, often 
non-native species. These species commonly yield less timber, provide lower qual­
ity forage for domesticated animals, supply less food for wild animals, and furnish 
poorer habitat for many native animals. The prevalence of pest species such as 
weeds, rats, and cockroaches may also increase. 
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Humans actively and productively use and manipulate large portions of the 
land surface of the Earth, whether it be for agriculture, housing, energy, or forestry. 
These practices have created a mosaic of different land uses and ecosystem types, 
resulting in fewer remaining large and contiguous areas of a single type of habitat 
than existed in the past. Therefore it will often be difficult for plants and animals 
to move to a location with a more suitable climate even if a species were able to 
migrate quickly enough. This was not the case thousands of years ago, when 
ecosystems last experienced rapid climate change. Now, many of the world’s 
ecosystems are essentially trapped on small islands, cut off from one another and 
only capable of travel over a limited and shrinking number of bridges. As this 
increasingly occurs, more species are likely to be stranded in an environment in 
which they cannot survive and/or reproduce. 
Further complicating the response of many of the Earth’s terrestrial and 
aquatic ecosystems to climate change is the prevalence of stress from other dis­
turbances associated with resource use. In the case of trees, for example, many 
species are already weakened by air pollution. Increased concentrations of carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere will raise the photosynthetic capacity of many plants, 
but the net effect on ecosystem productivity is unclear, particularly when com­
bined with higher air temperatures or where soil nutrients are limiting. 
Among the ecosystems that are most likely to experience the most severe effects 
from climate change are those that are at higher latitudes, such as far northern 
(boreal) forests or tundra, as well as those where different habitat types converge, 
such as where grasslands meet forests, or forests give way to alpine vegetation. 
Coastal ecosystems are also at risk, particularly saltwater marshes, mangrove 
forests, coastal wetlands, coral reefs, and river deltas. Many of these ecosystems, 
already under stress from human activities, may be significantly altered or dimin­
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unep’s mission is to provide leadership and encourage partnerships in caring for the 
environment by inspiring, informing and enabling nations and people to improve 
their quality of life without compromising that of future generations. 
The purposes of wmo are to facilitate international cooperation in the establishment 
of networks of stations for making meteorological, hydrological and other observa­
tions; and to promote the rapid exchange of meteorological information, the stan­
dardization of meteorological observations and the uniform publication of observa­












   
 







Science and nonscience 
concerning human-caused climate warming 1 
J. D. Mahlman 
Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory 
NOAA, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, USA 
Abstract 
The human-caused global warming problem is now the focus of intense interna­
tional attention in many sectors of society. As we learn more about the science of the 
problem, the sense of controversy about the state of the science has actually 
increased, sharply so over the past decade. This essay highlights the fundamental 
aspects of the science underlying global warming. The vital roles of climate models 
and of climate data in sharpening scientific understanding are featured. Finally, the 
roles of controversy in the science and the sociology of this problem are addressed, 
and new insights are offered on the inevitability of future major conflicts and con­
troversies as society begins to deal with the need to either reduce the use of fossil 
fuels considerably or adapt to substantial changes in Earth’s climate. 
Why this essay? 
I am an atmospheric and climate scientist with a career-long interest in under­
standing how the climate system works. I centered my earliest research, in the late 
1960s, on direct analysis of available observations to isolate the most important 
mechanisms governing atmospheric behavior. It made me very much aware that 
the available atmospheric measurements and accompanying atmospheric theory 
are not sufficient to provide the deep quantitative understanding that is required 
to predict changes within the climate system. It was already clear to me that math­
ematical models would have to be added to gain deeper understanding and 
improved predictive skills. 
In 1970, I joined National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s () 
Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory () at Princeton University, which 
was leading the world in the new effort to use mathematical modeling approaches 
to understand the entire climate system and how it changes.  was attempting 
to include and understand various parts of the climate system, including such key 
aspects as the ocean and land-surface systems. My task was to emphasize the 
stratosphere and the climate effects of atmospheric chemistry, including ozone, a 
gas that absorbs solar and infrared radiation efficiently. I soon learned that recon­
ciling theory and observations through the use of mathematical models is essen­
tially the only way to achieve a fully quantitative understanding of the climate 
system. More importantly, I also learned that the challenges to be overcome 
1 Originally published in Annual
Review: Energy Environment,
1998. 23: 83-105. The U.S. Govern­
ment has the right to retain a
nonexclusive, royalty-free license
in and to any copyright covering
this paper. Reprinted with the
permission of the author. Visit the
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2 In this article, the term 
greenhouse warming is used to
describe the general warming
of Earth’s climate in response to
human-produced emissions of
carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gases such as
methane, nitrous oxide, and the 
chlorofluorocarbons. 
3 Arrhenius S. 1896. On the 
influence of carbonic acid in the 
air upon the temperature of the
ground. London Edinburgh
Dublin Philos. Mag. J. Sci. 41: 237­
76. 
4 Manabe S,Wetherald RT. 
1967. Thermal equilibrium of
the atmosphere with a given
distribution of relative humid­
ity. J. Atmos. Sci. 24: 241-59. 
through the use of mathematical models are daunting, requiring the efforts of 
dedicated teams working a decade or more on individual aspects of the climate 
system. 
It is this high degree of difficulty and complexity that provides significant con­
text for this personal essay on human-caused “greenhouse warming”2 and some 
of its broader implications. The climate system is sufficiently complex and all 
encompassing that there are no “all-knowing” experts on this problem. However, 
teams of talented scientists working together can, and do, become close to the 
equivalent of an encompassing expertise. I am fortunate to be surrounded at  
by a team of world-renowned scientists who are knowledgeable about almost all 
aspects of greenhouse warming. Most of the insights I offer have been gained from 
a research lifetime of fruitful encounters with this extraordinary group of col­
leagues. 
An overview of the science of global warming 
Historical setting 
Since the famous work of Arrhenius in 18963, the possibility of a net warming of 
the global climate due to increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) produced 
by the burning of fossil-fuel has been recognized. The subject matured with the 
publication in 1967 by Manabe and Wetherald4 of the first fully self-consistent 
model calculation of this greenhouse warming effect. They used a simple one-
dimensional (altitude only) model of the global atmosphere. In the three decades 
since, a tremendous amount of observational, theoretical, and modeling research 
has been directed at the climate system and possible changes in it due to human 
activity. This research strongly demonstrates that potential climate changes are 
projected to occur that are well worth our collective attention and concern. 
This considerably strengthened climate knowledge base has energized pro­
posals for aggressive international efforts to mitigate the impact of greenhouse 
warming by substantially reducing the use of fossil fuels to supply the world's 
growing need for energy. However, that same research effort has shown that, in 
projecting future climate changes, remaining scientific uncertainties are signifi­
cant. These uncertainties are regarded by many as good reason to be extremely 
cautious in implementing any policies designed to reduce CO2 emissions. Others, 
however, argue that the risks of inaction are very large and that the scientific 
uncertainties include the possibility that the greenhouse warming problem could 
well be worse than current best estimates. Thus, serious policy disagreements can 
be amplified by differing perspectives on the current state of greenhouse warm­
ing science. 
Some fundamental aspects of greenhouse warming science 
The earth is strongly heated every day by incoming radiation from the sun. This 
heating is offset by an equally strong infrared radiation leaving the planet. Inter­
estingly, if Earth were without any atmosphere, and if its surface reflectivity did not 
change, global-mean surface temperature would be roughly 33° colder than it is 
today. This large difference is due to the strong atmospheric absorption of infrared 
radiation leaving the earth’s surface. The major atmospheric infrared absorbers 
are clouds, water vapor, and CO2. This strong infrared absorption (and strong ree­
mission) effect is extremely robust: It is readily measured in the laboratory and is 















   
 
 








CO2 to the atmosphere adds another “blanket” to the planet and, thus, directly 
changes the heat balance of the earth’s atmosphere. 
Individuals skeptical about the reality of global warming have correctly noted 
that, in terms of direct trapping of outgoing infrared radiation, water vapor is by 
far the dominant greenhouse gas on earth. Since water vapor dominates the cur­
rent radiative balance, how can it be that CO2 is anything other than a minor con­
tributor to earth’s absorption of infrared radiation? Part of the answer comes from 
the well-known modeling result from infrared spectroscopy that net planetary 
radiative forcing changes roughly linearly in response to logarithmic changes in 
CO2. 
5 Thus, a quadrupling of CO2 gives another roughly 1°C direct warming over 
the direct 1°C warming for a CO2 doubling, valid for the extreme assumption that 
water vapor mixing ratios6 and clouds do not change. Interestingly, this approxi­
mate relationship also holds for a large extended range as CO2 is decreased
7 . 
It is thus hard to escape the conclusion that CO2 provides a measurable direct 
addition to the atmospheric trapping of infrared radiation leaving the surface of 
our planet. However, a simple comparison of the relative greenhouse efficiencies 
of water vapor and CO2 quickly becomes problematic because water vapor enters 
the climate system mostly as a “feedback” gas. All models and observations cur­
rently indicate that as climate warms or cools, to a pretty good approximation, the 
observed and calculated global-mean relative humidity of water vapor remains 
roughly constant as the climate changes, whereas its mixing ratio does not 8. Thus, 
as climate warms (cools), the holding capacity of atmospheric water vapor 
increases (decreases) exponentially. This is a powerful water vapor positive feed­
back mechanism – that is, a process that acts to amplify the original warming 
caused by increasing CO2 levels. With this major positive feedback, the modeled 
“climate sensitivity”9 increases by about a factor of three, to roughly 3°. 
Lindzen 10 hypothesized that this water vapor feedback effect could actually be 
negative in the upper troposphere. If this were the case, then the water vapor pos­
itive feedback amplifying effect would be roughly one third to one half less than 
that currently projected. A conceptual difficulty with making this hypothesis work 
is that the relative humidity of the upper troposphere must then get sharply and 
progressively lower as the lower troposphere warms up and moistens in response 
to the added infrared absorbers.11 Conversely, the relative humidity of the upper 
troposphere must get progressively higher if something were acting to cool the 
planet. In effect, this hypothesis states that the dynamical behavior of the atmos­
phere would change strongly in response to altered infrared absorbers. Currently, 
observational evidence remains generally consistent with the modeling results 
that project a strong positive water vapor mixing ratio feedback under approxi­
mate constancy of relative humidity as the climate changes.12 The quality of water 
vapor data in the upper troposphere, however, is not particularly good, and none 
of the current observational tests can definitively address the issue at hand – how 
the water vapor feedback might work a century from now. 
The basic story of human-induced greenhouse warming remains simple. 
Increased infrared absorptivity due to increasing CO2 and other trace gases pro­
duces a net heating effect on the earth’s surface, due mainly to increased down­
ward infrared radiation. The effect is not dissimilar to the suppression of night­
time cooling when there is cloud cover or a very humid weather pattern. The 
positive feedback effect of water vapor acts to amplify the warming effect, both 
locally and globally. 
5 Scientists at GFDL recently
performed simple one-dimen­
sional radiative/convective
model calculations of the 
effects of reducing CO2. The log-
linear relationship has been
found to hold down to CO2 con­
centrations as low as one sixty-
fourth of preindustrial levels. As
CO2 is decreased, the atmos­
phere's ability to hold water
vapor collapses and the global
temperatures drop sharply. 
6 Relative humidity is the ratio
(in percentage) of the vapor
pressure of air to its saturation
vapor pressure. The saturation
vapor pressure of air, deter­
mined from the Clausius-Clap­
eron equation of classical ther­
modynamics, is a strong
exponential function of tem­
perature, roughly doubling for
each 10°c. Water vapor mixing
ratio is the mass of water vapor
of air divided by the mass of dry
air; it is generally conserved for
a few days following an air
parcel when no condensation is 
present. 
7 See note 6. 
8 Relative humidity (see note
6) is determined in the tropos­
phere by the interplay among
evaporation at the earth's sur­
face, upward transfer of water
vapor (by small-scale turbu­
lence, thunderstorm-scale 
moist convection, large-scale
rising motion), and net removal
by precipitation. Equally impor­
tant is the local lowering of rel­
ative humidity in the tropos­
phere due to adiabatic
warming in regions of descend­
ing air under approximate con­
servation of water vapor mixing
ratio. Any appeal to a sharp
change in mean relative humid­
ity thus necessarily hypothe­
sizes a substantial change in
the dynamical behavior of the
troposphere, in this case a large
change in the motions of the
troposphere in response to a
comparatively small perturba­
tion to the thermodynamics of
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9 The term climate sensitivity
typically refers to the level of
equilibrium global-mean sur­
face air temperature increase
that the climate system would
experience in response to a
doubling of CO2. Each model 
has its own climate sensitivity,
almost guaranteed to be some­
what different from the 
unknown value for the real 
world. 
10 Lindzen RS. 1990. Some cool­
ness concerning global warm­
ing. Bull. Am. Meteorolog. Soc.
71: 288-99. 
11 Relative humidity is the ratio
(in percentage) of the vapor
pressure of air to its saturation
vapor pressure. The saturation
vapor pressure of air, deter­
mined from the Clausius-Clap­
eron equation of classical ther­
modynamics, is a strong
exponential function of tem­
perature, roughly doubling for
each 10°c. Water vapor mixing
ratio is the mass of water vapor
of air divided by the mass of dry
air; it is generally conserved for
a few days following an air
parcel when no condensation is 
present. 
12 Oort AH, Liu H. 1993. Upper
air temperature trends over the
globe. J. Clim. 6: 292-307 and
Sun D-Z, Held IM. 1996. A com­
parison of modeled and
observed relationships
between interannual variations 
of water vapor and tempera­
ture. J. Clim. 9: 665-75. 
13 Clouds are effective 
absorbers and reflectors of 
solar (visible plus ultraviolet)
and infrared radiation. Their net 
effect is to cool the planet, but
the effect is very small relative
to the 33°c "atmosphere/ no
atmosphere" difference noted
above. However, for predicting
smaller human-caused climate 
changes, the effect of clouds
becomes crucially important. 
An additional, but smaller, positive feedback is the relationship between ice (or 
its absence) at the earth’s surface and its reflectivity (albedo) of solar radiation. In 
essence, if ice or snow cover melts, the surface left exposed (ground, vegetation, or 
water) is generally less reflective of incoming solar radiation. This leads to more 
absorption of the solar radiation, thus more warming, less ice, and so on. 
Inclusion of this “ice-albedo” feedback process in mathematical models of the 
climate amplifies further the calculated warming response of the climate to 
increased concentrations of CO2 and infrared absorbing gases; it also amplifies any 
calculated cooling. Other kinds of feedbacks, both positive and negative, result 
from interaction of land surface properties (e.g. changes of vegetation that lead to 
albedo and evaporation changes) with climate warming/cooling mechanisms or 
from changes in CO2 uptake by the biosphere. 
The major source of uncertainty in determining climate feedback concerns the 
impact of clouds on the radiative balance of the climate system.13 A CO2-induced 
increase in low clouds mainly acts to reflect more solar radiation and thus would 
provide a negative feedback to global warming. An increase in high clouds mainly 
adds to the absorption of infrared radiation trying to escape the planet and would 
thus provide a positive feedback. A change in cloud microphysical and optical 
properties could go either way. Which of these would dominate in an increasing­
CO2 world? We are not sure. Our inability to answer this question with confidence 
is the major source of uncertainty in today’s projections of how the climate would 
respond to increasing infrared-absorbing gases. Furthermore, it is not likely this 
cloud-radiation uncertainty will be sharply reduced within the next 5 years, no 
matter what promises are offered, expectations are stated, or claims are made. 
Although clouds dominate the climate modeling uncertainty, other key 
processes are also in need of improved understanding and modeling capability. An 
example is the effect of human-produced airborne particulates (aerosols) com­
posed mostly of sulfate (from oxidation of the sulfur in fossil fuels) and carbon 
(from open fires). Sulfate aerosols are mostly reflective of solar radiation, produc­
ing a cooling effect, whereas carbonaceous aerosols mostly absorb solar radiation, 
producing a net heating effect. Efforts to reduce the current uncertainty are lim­
ited by inadequate measurements. Even more uncertain are the so-called indirect 
effects of atmospheric aerosols. By indirect effect we mean the uncertain role the 
presence of these aerosols plays in the determination of cloud amounts and their 
optical properties. 
Another key uncertainty lies in modeling the response of the ocean to changed 
greenhouse gases. This affects the calculated rate of response of the climate over, 
say, the next century, as well as the possibility of changed ocean circulation, a 
potential major factor in shaping regional climate changes. 
A frequently overlooked aspect of the human-caused greenhouse warming 
problem is its fundamentally very long timescales. The current rate of adding to 
the CO2 concentrations of the atmosphere is a bit more than half a percent per 
year. Thus, the time required for CO2 amounts to approach twice preindustrial 
levels is roughly a century or so, a process well underway (now about 30% higher). 
Also, the climate is not expected to respond quickly to the added CO2 because of 
the large thermal inertia of the oceans. This effect can produce delays in the real­
ized warming on timescales ranging from decades to centuries. Moreover, the deep 
ocean carries over a thousand years of thermal “memory.” Thus, it will take a long 
time for this problem to reach its full potential. 


























This great inertia in the climate is also a big factor at the other end of the prob-
lem. What if we get a climate we do not like and want our “normal”one back? Cur­
rently, the apparent net atmospheric lifetime of fossil-fuel-produced CO2 is about 
three-quarters of a century. Thus, the natural draw down of the extra CO2 would 
take a long time. Also, the gradually warmed ocean would take a long time to give 
up its accumulated heat in a climate that had been given a chance to return toward 
its essentially undisturbed state. 
Why climate models are imperfect and why they are crucial anyway 
Over the past three decades, a quiet revolution has fundamentally changed the way 
that much of the research in climate science works. Earlier, the controlling science 
paradigm was the interchange between theory and observation concerning the 
structure and behavior of natural phenomena. Today, much climate research is 
driven by the interactions among theory, observation, and modeling. By model­
ing, we mean computer-based simulations of various phenomena based on 
numerical solutions of the theory-based equations governing the phenomena 
under investigation. These combined approaches are now widespread in the phys­
ical sciences. It is significant that mathematical modeling of weather and climate 
literally pioneered this new approach to scientific research. 
Mathematical models of climate can range from simple descriptions of simple 
processes to full-blown simulations of the astoundingly complex climate system. 
Models of the coupled atmosphere-ocean-ice-land system lie close to the most 
complex limit of such models. This very complexity of climate models can lead to 
highly divergent human reactions to them, varying from “garbage in, garbage out” 
to almost worshipful. The truth is far from either of these unscientific characteri­
zations. 
Newcomers to the greenhouse warming problem tend to be unaware of the 
long and rich history of mathematical modeling of the atmosphere and the ocean. 
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, simple mathematical models were created to 
attack the weather forecasting problem. More advanced models were built in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s14 because of a strong research interest in understanding 
the circulation of the atmosphere. Shortly thereafter, the first model bearing a 
strong resemblance to today’s atmospheric models was created.15 That early 
model, as well as all of today’s models, solves the equations of classical physics rel­
evant for the atmosphere, ice, ocean, and land surface. These equations are con­
servation of momentum (Newton’s second law of motion), conservation of heat 
(first law of thermodynamics), and conservation of matter (air, water, chemicals, 
etc., can be blown around by wind or currents, changed in phase, transferred 
across boundaries, or converted chemically, but the number of atoms of each kind 
remains unchanged). 
The modeling approach thus provides high potential for fundamental tests of 
applications of these theoretical first principles. Such modeling appears decep­
tively simple: these equations are taught in high school physics. There are some 
daunting challenges, however. When coupled and applied to moving (and 
deforming) fluids such as air and water, these equations form continuum systems 
that are intrinsically nonlinear and can exhibit surprisingly counterintuitive 
behaviors. Moreover, their solution in a climate model requires a reasonably fine-
scale grid of computational points all over the atmosphere-ice-ocean-land surface 
system. In addition, important small-scale processes such as moist convection 
14 Phillips NA. 1956. The gen­
eral circulation of the atmos­
phere: a numerical experiment.
Q. J. R. Meteorolog. Soc. 82: 123­
64 and Smagorinsky J. 1963.
General circulation experi­
ments with the primitive equa­
tions. I. The basic experiment.
Mon. Weather Rev. 41: 99-164. 
15 Smagorinsky J, Manabe S,
Holloway JL Jr. 1965. Numerical
results from a nine-level gen­
eral circulation model of the 
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16 Lorenz EM. 1963. Determin­
istic non-periodic flow. J. Atmos.
Sci. 20: 130-41. 
17 Cane M, Zebiak SE, Dolan SC. 
1986. Experimental forecast of
El Niño. Nature 321: 827-32. 
18 The pinball machine is a
device designed for recreation
and amusement that allows 
the player to shoot steel balls
(of roughly 1-in diameter) into
an obstacle-strewn field of elec­
tronic bumpers that, when
struck by the ball, act to
increase the net speed of the
ball (super elastic rebound). The
playing field is slanted so that
the ball enters at the highest
point. When all five balls have
been trapped in the gutter, the
game is over. The object of the
game is to keep the balls in play
as long as possible (through
adroit use of flippers near the
gutter that propel the ball back
uphill and away from the
dreaded gutter). The longer the
ball is in play, the more it is in
contact with bumper collisions
that add to the number of 
points earned. A sufficiently
high score wins free replays.
Thus, the object of the game is
for the player's skill to over­
come gravity for as long as pos­
sible, somewhat analogous to
the efforts of ski jumpers and
pole-vaulters. 
(e.g. thunderstorms) and turbulent dissipation remain formidably difficult to 
incorporate on a first-principles basis. Worse, no meaningful steady-state solu­
tions solve directly for the average climate. In effect, the average climate in such a 
model must be described as a statistical equilibrium state of an unstable system 
that exhibits important natural variability on timescales of hours (thunder­
storms), days (weather systems), weeks to months (planetary-scale waves/jet­
stream meanders), years (El Niño), and decades to centuries (ocean circulation 
variations and glacial ice changes). Clearly, models of such a large and complex 
system are intrinsically computer intensive. Fortunately, today’s supercomputers 
are over a thousand times faster than those of 30 years ago. Because of today’s wide­
spread availability of relatively inexpensive computer power, the number of fully 
coupled atmosphere-ocean climate models in the world has increased from a few 
in the early 1980s to roughly 10 independently conceived models today. Roughly 20 
more are essentially based on these 10 models. 
Over the last half century, use of these kinds of physically based mathematical 
models has resulted in major improvements in the science of weather forecasting. 
Sharp skill improvements have been achieved in finding the useful short-term pre­
dictability in a fundamentally chaotic system (by which I mean that the details of 
weather variations become essentially unpredictable after a sufficient lapse of 
time, say a couple of weeks).16 For example, it has become almost routine to fore­
cast the intensity and path of a major winter storm system well before the surface 
low-pressure area (so ubiquitously displayed in television weathercasts) has even 
formed. 
Recently, it has become clear that slower variations of the coupled ocean-ice­
atmosphere-land surface system provide potential for finding useful predictabil­
ity on timescales longer than the couple of weeks characteristic of individual 
weather systems. The most visible example is the realization that El Niño events, 
which produce warming in the tropical eastern Pacific Ocean, may be predictable 
a year or so in advance under certain circumstances.17 The existence of such a “pre­
dictable spot” of warm ocean suggests a “second-hand” improvement of predic­
tion of seasonal weather anomalies (e.g. a wetter-than-normal California winter). 
The existence of such extended-range predictive potential in the climate system 
leads to obvious questions about such models’ validity for predicting systematic 
changes in the statistical equilibrium climate (say a 20-year running average) 
resulting from the inexorably increasing infrared-active gases that are currently 
underway. First, we must recognize that these are conceptually quite different 
things: Weather forecasting attempts to trace and predict specific disturbances in 
an unstable environment; climate projections attempt to calculate the changed 
statistical equilibrium climate that results from applying a new heating mecha­
nism (e.g. CO2 infrared absorption) to the system. Perhaps surprisingly, predict­
ing the latter is in many respects simpler than predicting the former. 
As an example of the fundamental difference between weather forecasting and 
climate change, consider the following simple and do-able “lab” thought experi­
ment that utilizes the common pinball machine.18 As the ejected ball in the pin­
ball machine careens through its obstacle-laden path toward its inevitable demise 
in the gutter, its detailed path, after a couple of collisions with the bumpers, 
becomes deterministically unpredictable. Think of this behavior as the “weather” 
of the pinball machine. Of course, the odds against success can be changed dra­



















   
 






in effect changing the “climate” of the pinball machine. By reducing the slope of 
the playing field, the effective acceleration of gravity has been reduced, increasing 
the number of point-scoring collisions before the still inevitable final victory of 
gravity. Interestingly, in this altered pinball machine “climate,” the individual tra­
jectories of the balls are ultimately as unpredictable as they were in the unaltered 
version. The diagnostic signal of an altered pinball “climate” is a highly significant 
increase in the number of free games awarded. A secondary diagnostic signal, of 
course, is a noticeable decrease in the received revenues from the machine. It thus 
is conceptually easy to change the pinball machine’s “climate.” Detecting changes 
in pinball machine “climate” and attributing its causes, however, can be easily 
obscured by the largely random statistics of a fundamentally chaotic system, not 
unlike in the actual climate. 
What do these pinball machine experiments have to do with understanding 
models of the real climate? Projections for greenhouse warming scenarios depend 
on a number of physical processes (see above) that are subtle, complex, and not 
important to weather prediction. However, people outside the climate field are 
frequently heard to say that climate models are ill posed and irrelevant because 
they attempt to forecast climate behavior that is well beyond the limits of deter­
ministic predictability and that if one cannot predict weather more than a week in 
advance, the climate change problem is impossible. Such statements are scientifi­
cally incorrect. The “weather prediction” problem is essentially an initial value 
problem in which the predictability of interesting details (i. e. weather) is funda­
mentally limited by uncertainty in initial conditions, model errors, and instabili­
ties in the atmosphere itself. In contrast, climate change projections are actually 
boundary value problems, (e.g. interference with a pinball machine’s acceleration 
of gravity), where the objective is to determine the changes in average conditions 
(including the average features of the evolution toward the new equilibrium) as 
the planet is heated or cooled by newly added processes (e.g. increased CO2). 
The differences between weather and climate models are further instructive 
when one considers how their strengths and weaknesses are evaluated. Thanks to 
massive amounts of weather and climate data, both kinds of models can be eval­
uated by careful comparison with data from the real world. In practice, however, 
the approaches to improving these superficially similar models are very different. 
The weather models are evaluated by comparing model-based forecasts, started 
up from real data on a given day, with what happened hours to weeks later. Inter­
estingly, one of the key problems with such weather models is that they can easily 
reject their initial conditions by drifting toward a model climate that is quite diff­
erent from that of the real data that was used to start up the detailed forecast cal­
culation. In effect, such a weather forecast model is deficient in the climate that it 
would produce if released from the constraints of its starting data. 
In sharp contrast, a climate model has the responsibility of simulating the time-
averaged climate for, say, today’s conditions (or for around, say, the year 1800). In 
this case, the focus of the scientific inquiry is quite different. Here, attention is 
directed toward proper simulation of the statistics of climate, such as the daily and 
annual temperature cycles forced by the sun, the number and intensity of extra 
tropical cyclones, locations of deserts and rainy areas, strength and location of jet 
streams and planetary waves, fidelity of El Niño simulation, location and charac­
teristics of clouds and water vapor, strength and location of ocean currents, mag­
nitude and location of snow accumulation and snow melt, and, finally, amplitudes 
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19 Out of many such examples,
one of the more interesting is
provided by the Department of
Energy's Atmospheric Radiation
Measurements Program. At a
heavily instrumented site in
Oklahoma (and at some lesser
sites), intensive measurements
are made of horizontal wind, 
vertical velocity, temperature,
water vapor, clouds, latent heat­
ing, precipitation, short-and
long-wave radiative fluxes, and
surface fluxes of heat, momen­
tum, and water vapor. This com­
prehensive set of measure­
ments is being used to evaluate
our current modeling capabili­
ties and deficiencies on cloud 
processes, "cloudy" radiative
transfer, convection (thunder­
storm scale), and turbulence.
These areas represent some of
the weakest aspects of the
atmospheric parts of climate
models. 
and patterns of natural variability of all of these on a wide range of timescales (days 
to centuries). 
Achieving all of this in a climate model is a daunting task because the enormous 
wealth of phenomena in the climate system virtually requires the use of judicious 
tuning and/or adjustment of various poorly defined processes (such as clouds, or 
the fluxes of heat between atmosphere and ocean) to improve the model’s agree­
ment with observed climate statistics. Such tunings and adjustments are wide­
spread, especially for the global-mean radiative balance, and are often done to 
ensure that the model agrees with the global-mean features of the climate. If this 
is not done, a coupled model started up with today’s climate will tend to drift 
toward a less realistic climate. These practices have been criticized as evidence that 
climate models have no credibility for addressing the greenhouse warming prob­
lem. Interestingly, such tunings and adjustments (or lack thereof) may have little 
to do with the ability of a model to reduce its fundamental uncertainty in predict­
ing anthropogenic climate change. Recall that the key uncertainties highlighted 
above (water vapor, cloud, and ice albedo feedbacks) revolve around how such 
properties might change under added greenhouse gases. This is a set of modeling 
problems that cannot be evaded by judicious model tuning or adjustments. Likely 
to prove much more fruitful in the long run would be improved fundamental 
modeling of the key processes that govern the most important climate feedback 
processes as CO2 increases (e.g. clouds, water vapor, ice, ocean circulation). 
Thus, the models are imperfect tools with which to make such climate change 
predictions. Does this mean we should shift our focus to other tools? Definitely 
not. Statistically-based models that use historical data are possible alternatives, but 
they are of marginal validity, mainly because the recent earth has never experi­
enced the rate of warming expected to result from the current runup of infrared-
active greenhouse gases. In this sense, the large, but very slow, global-mean climate 
excursions of the past geological epochs are instructive, but they are far from defin­
itive as guidelines or analogs for the next century. 
The above considerations make it clear that there is no viable alternative to 
coupled climate models for projecting future climate states and how they might 
unfold. The physically-based climate models have the huge advantage of being 
fundamentally grounded in known theory as evaluated against all available 
observations. There are indeed reasons to be skeptical of the ability of such 
models to make quantitatively accurate projections of the future climate states 
that will result from various added greenhouse gas scenarios. Fortunately, the 
weak points of such climate models can be analyzed, evaluated, and improved 
with properly focused, process-oriented measurements, complemented by well-
posed numerical experiments with various formulations of the climate models. 19 
In short, the use of such climate models allows a systematic approach to close the 
gap between theory and observations of the climate system. No alternative 
approach comes close. 
Why climate data are imperfect and why they are crucial anyway 
The availability of climate data in many forms is crucial in the quest to understand, 
simulate, and predict the climate system and how it might change in the future. 
Such data provide the basics for our characterizations of the time-averaged climate 
states of various statistics of temperature, pressure, wind, water amounts, cloudi­
































Most importantly, such data provide invaluable information on the natural vari­
ability of climate, ranging from seasons to decades. 
These data sets have empowered important direct insights on how the climate 
system works. For example, the observed average daily and seasonal ranges of 
mean temperature provide valuable evaluations of our theoretical understanding 
of how the climate changes in response to changed radiative circumstances (e.g. 
day to night, summer to winter). On longer timescales, indirect inferences (or 
proxy measures) provide valuable information on how ice ages and warm epochs 
appear to depend sensitively on subtle changes to the heating of Earth due to 
seemingly small variations in the precession of Earth’s orientation toward the sun 
and in Earth’s elliptical orbit around the sun. Interestingly, the onset of ice ages 
and their terminations appear to respond more sensitively to these small solar 
heating changes than are calculated by our current climate models. For example, 
the ice core records show that atmospheric CO2 lowers as the climate cools, a pos­
itive feedback effect that we do not expect to be relevant over the next century. 
However, such observations of prehistoric climates are ambiguous enough that 
they do not justify any confident conclusions that our current climate models may 
be underestimating the century-scale global temperature increase due to added 
greenhouse gases. 
For the atmosphere, there are thousands of places on earth that collect infor­
mation daily for the primary purpose of weather forecasting. Fortunately, all the 
information collected for weather purposes are also central to the needs to char­
acterize longer-term climate. Unfortunately, many kinds of key atmospheric 
information are not readily available from the weather networks. These include 
vertical velocity, radiative heating/cooling, cloud characteristics, evaporation, and 
properties of critical trace species such as particles containing sulfate and carbon. 
For the land surface,many local sites provide information on snow, water storage, 
runoff, and soil moisture. Unfortunately, the spatial coverage is far from adequate, 
and most stations provide little information on the state of the vegetative cover and 
its role in governing surface water budgets and reflectivity of solar radiation. 
For the world ocean, the data coverage is spotty and episodic relative to the 
need to characterize the state of the ocean and its role in climate variability and 
climate change. For example, we are still waiting to see the first instantaneous 
“weather map” of the internal ocean’s waves, jets, and vortices, a privilege that is 
taken for granted by atmospheric scientists. Fortunately, the ocean’s surface is 
partly accessible to measurements from earth-orbiting satellites. This allows 
remote measurements of ocean surface temperatures, sea state, and ocean height, 
a measure of integrated density over a fairly deep layer that allows some inferences 
about ocean currents. 
For all parts of the climate system, the ability to characterize long-term trends 
of key climate variables is minimally adequate at best and nonexistent at worst. 
Few climate measurement systems currently in place are configured to address 
what I call the climate monitoring requirement. 
Climate monitoring is defined here as the systematic, long-term collection of 
key climate measurements, with careful attention paid to maintenance of calibra­
tion and continuity of records for very long time intervals, and with a strong focus 
on interpretation of the data gathered.Very few current climate measurement sys­
tems satisfy these stringent requirements. This mainly is because of the fact that 
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20 It is a personal privilege to
acknowledge the pioneering
efforts of Charles D. Keeling to
ensure the presence of today's
impressive CO2 record. He has 
taught us that proper climate
monitoring is difficult, and
invaluable. Perhaps soon the
world will begin to take his
message seriously. 
such as weather forecasting, and for efforts to understand specific processes such 
as clouds or El Niño. 
So, why should we care about this climate monitoring deficiency? Who actually 
has a stake in improved climate monitoring? Climate data scientists do because 
their goal is to use the data to learn about how climate and climate change actually 
work. Climate theorists and modelers do because the current anthropogenic 
greenhouse warming projections are theoretically based, as manifested in the 
mathematical climate models (making climate change projections without 
attempting to evaluate them against the evolving real world is counter to the ethic 
of science). Policymakers do because they are already in the process of making 
policy (or nonpolicy) in the face of an imperfectly understood, but potentially very 
serious, global environmental threat. Policymakers, like scientists, always need to 
evaluate their conclusions against new information. 
In spite of the compelling needs for improved climate monitoring, not much is 
now being done nationally or internationally about the current monitoring defi­
ciencies. Even worse, many critical capabilities are deteriorating in the United 
States and elsewhere because of budgetary pressures. Why is this so? This is a ques­
tion that continues to baffle me. I suspect the answer lies mainly in the unwilling­
ness of top officials to make firm commitments to a problem that requires sus­
tained focus for many decades.20 Also, the problem suffers from its apparent lack 
of glamour. “What? No immediate payoff?” It is also possible that some may not 
feel much need to get the right answer if their minds are already made up, a phe­
nomenon not unheard of at both ends of the political spectrum. 
This summary of some of the barriers to better climate monitoring reveals a 
serious challenge that is currently producing a net reduction in the global climate 
monitoring capability at the same time that international policy negotiators are 
taking the greenhouse warming problem seriously. Clearly, improved information 
is required to guide the dauntingly tortuous mitigation (or lack thereof) of green­
house gas emissions over the next century. The emerging climate monitoring 
information can reveal that our greenhouse warming projections were either too 
high or too low. Given this information, future mitigation decisions can be 
strongly affected. Without this key information, we will be flying in the dark much 
longer. 
Role of controversy 
Context for controversy 
In most of the great political, social, and environmental challenges of our age, con­
troversy and disagreement are key features of the public dialogue. A good rule of 
thumb is that the intensity of the debate tends to be inversely proportional to the 
available knowledge on the subject. However, there are spectacular exceptions to 
this rule of thumb. Consider the pro-life versus pro-choice abortion debate. Here 
the debates are prolonged and vociferous, even though the science of reproduction 
and its prevention are rather well understood. Obviously, the continually improv­
ing scientific understanding of reproductive science will have little to do with 
changing the tone of this debate. The abortion debate is about legitimate clashes 
of value systems that new scientific understanding is unlikely to diminish. 
This extreme example provides an instructive context for understanding the 
character of the intense controversies and disagreements concerning human-





   

















troversy if increasing greenhouse gases in the atmosphere were perceived to pro­
duce an effect of theoretical curiosity – but an effect deemed irrelevant for serious 
changes in the climate. I can visualize scientists disagreeing, as they typically do, 
in scientific conferences on points of correct or incorrect explanations of various 
phenomena. A few might get passionate about their own viewpoint, but the dis­
agreements would not normally prevent the key players from going out later for 
coffee, beer, or dinner together. 
Interestingly, this is a reasonable characterization of what happens at climate 
conferences, even now. Things change, however, when a member of the scientific 
community is arguing for a political position “in the name of science.” Even in this 
case, the mood is generally polite, but the questions to the speaker are typically 
pointed and sometimes emotional. My interpretation is that working climate sci­
entists are not comfortable dealing with the unfamiliar science/nonscience inter­
face. Our instincts are to continue to fight fair scientifically and to openly admit 
uncertainty, even when unscientific weapons are employed. In effect, serious sci­
entists are trying to find the scientific truth, whereas advocates typically appeal to 
science to advance their personal agendas. This mismatch often leads to an ampli­
fied sense of “scientific” controversy, at least to an uninformed observer. 
Genuine scientific uncertainty and disagreement 
The above observations are not offered to assert that scientists should not argue. 
On the contrary, the whole culture of physical science is about disagreements and 
alternative explanations. But the discipline of science is about settling disagree­
ments using the scientific method. The very ethic of science is designed to get to 
the truth through hypothesis testing by careful experimentation. 
A good test for determining whether or not the scientific method is being used 
to evaluate assertions about the science of the problem is whether or not previous 
assertions are altered in the face of contrary evidence. Many instructive examples 
of legitimate scientific disagreement have energized new understanding in the 
light of improved information. 
The example of the physical explanation of the spectacularly large Antarctic 
“ozone hole” phenomenon is especially instructive in this context. The new infor­
mation on the ozone hole discovery changed within about 2 years the way estab­
lishment science understood ozone depletion. My own small part in that story was 
in advancing a testable hypothesis on whether the ozone hole was a natural phe­
nomenon.21 Our hypothesis (the only identified plausible “natural” alternative) 
was indeed tested and was found to be physically consistent; however, it failed by 
nearly a factor of 10 as an explanation of the sharp ozone decreases. In real science, 
if the numbers are off, the hypothesis fails. There are self-proclaimed “scientists” 
who still use terms such as “ozone-hole hoax” to describe the state of ozone sci­
ence. Clearly, such “scientists” are ignoring compellingly large and convincing 
ozone decreases, as well as the strong scientific evidence available to explain the 
decreases. 
It is important to recognize that scientific disagreement is a cornerstone of the 
scientific ethic. Contrary to our legal traditions, all theory, all models, and all data 
are, in effect, “guilty until proven innocent.” Moreover, the proof of innocence in 
science is inevitably relative. Einstein, in principle, “shot down” Newton’s laws of 
motion. In practice, however, we live our daily lives implicitly assuming the virtual 
correctness of Newton’s laws without fear that the departures from the “true 
21 Mahlman JD, Fels SB. 1986. 
Antarctic ozone decreases: a 
dynamical cause? Geophys. Res.
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22 Houghton JT, Meira Filko
LG, Callender BA, Harris N, 
Kathenberg A, Mackell K, eds.
1995. Climate Change 1995: The
Science of Climate Change.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
Univ. Press. 572 pp. 
23 Mahlman JD. 1997. Uncer­
tainties in projections of
human-caused climate warm­
ing. Science 278: 1416-17. 
24 Houghton JT, Jenkins GJ,
Ephraums JJ, eds. 1990. Climate
Change:The ipcc Scientific 
Assessment. Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change. Cam­
bridge, UK: Cambridge Univ.
Press. 364 pp. 
physics” could cause us any observable problems. Thus, we are comfortable with 
scientific understanding that is “good enough” for application to the purposes at 
hand. 
I suggest that this “good enough” principle provides useful guidance for view­
ing the human-caused greenhouse warming problem. Obviously, anything as 
complex and interactive as climate offers plenty of opportunity for legitimate sci­
entific disagreement. My own view is that the climate science community has been 
straightforward in acknowledging the significant remaining uncertainties in the 
projections of possible future climate changes. Most importantly, we still acknowl­
edge a factor of three (1.5°-4.5°) range of uncertainty in the equilibrium global-
mean surface temperature response to a doubling of CO2. 
22 In addition, I have 
asserted that there is a greater than 90% chance that a doubling of CO2 would pro­
duce a warming within that range.23 We scientists acknowledge that adding the 
effects of sulfate particles (a result of fossil fuel burning) produces an uncertain 
cooling offset effect. We also freely acknowledge that the aerosol cooling effect was 
given insufficient attention in the 1990 IPCC Report.24 
These observations strongly indicate that the great controversy about green­
house warming is not really about the uncertain state of the science. In the scien­
tific community, the uncertainty is widely acknowledged. We do, however, fre­
quently argue about the significance and validity of new claims and new results. 
The path to sharpened scientific truth is always a rocky one. 
The misuse of scientific information 
The current, highly energized greenhouse warming debates go well beyond scien­
tific controversy. They are driven by arguments that are not scientific, at least in the 
sense that practicing scientists use the term. The arguments are frequently, and 
legitimately, centered around clashes in values and priorities. Unfortunately, how­
ever, assertions are being made about climate change “in the name of science” that 
are not based on fundamental, quantifiable climate science. How is this so? There 
are many techniques available to use or misuse scientific knowledge to support 
one’s personal viewpoint, which may or may not have much to do with the lessons 
from the science itself. Actually, it is easy to “mine” the lore of climate facts to jus­
tify a particular, preset point of view. 
The most obvious misuse of climate knowledge comes from the openly stated 
uncertainties in the predicted global-mean surface temperature increase for dou­
bled atmospheric CO2. The widely accepted range of 1.5°–4.5° leads to some 
intriguing arguments. Those who are legitimately afraid of the economic conse­
quences of CO2 mitigation (who I call “Ostriches,” with their heads in the sand), 
almost independent of the scientific evidence, tend to appeal to the information 
that buttresses the case for the numbers to be at or below the low end of the range. 
“I just know the real result will be on the low side because… .”Those who are legit­
imately concerned about the environmental consequences of high CO2 levels 
(who I call “Chicken Littles,” who see the sky falling), almost independent of the 
scientific evidence, tend to appeal to the information that buttresses the case for 
the warming numbers to be at or above the high end of the range.“I just know that 
the real results will be on the high side because… .” 
Like it or not, the truth is that we do not know the truth about where the final 
answer will lie. The inconvenient reality is that uncertainty “just is.”If we knew that 
our previous best estimate was, say, on the high side, the scientific community 
  
   
 
  






   




















would most assuredly lower the best guess. It would be unscientific to do other­
wise. It is clear that well-meaning, but agenda-driven, people will still legitimately 
disagree for nonscientific reasons. In effect, these are values-driven positions that 
have little to do with the true state of scientific understanding. People who use 
such “science” to reinforce their personal opinions are not interpreting science as 
scientists understand it. 
Intriguingly, in the greenhouse warming debates, the natural variability of the 
climate system is frequently misused in a manner surprisingly analogous to the 
misuse of scientific uncertainty, as explained above. In this case, Ostriches say that 
the unforced natural variability of climate is so large that the observed warming 
trends over the past century are explainable by appeals to the natural variability 
of, say, global-mean surface air temperature. Thus, for the observed, roughly 0.6° 
warming over the past 130 years, Ostriches can properly argue that this might be a 
natural warming cycle that has nothing to do with the increasing greenhouse 
gases. However, Chicken Littles can point out that we might have been in a natural 
cooling cycle over the past 130 years, and thus the greenhouse effect is probably 
larger than it currently appears from the data. The problem with both these argu­
ments is there is no evidence to confirm either of them. That is one of the reasons 
it is very difficult to appeal to the temperature record to lower the uncertainty 
limits on greenhouse warming projections very much. Natural variability, like 
uncertainty, “just is.” No values-driven debating tricks will make this reality dis­
appear. When either uncertainty or natural variability is systematically used to 
push a prestated position, be wary. Science may just have been misused, to the net 
loss of a more rational effort to establish what is really going on in the science of 
this daunting problem. 
The key role of “official” assessments 
Over the last two decades there have been roughly a hundred or so published 
greenhouse warming evaluations and assessments. Almost all have been prepared 
by single governments or by nongovernmental organizations. Almost all have car­
ried the strong flavor of the perspectives and viewpoints of the entities producing 
them. Almost all have been virtually ignored on the global scene, apparently 
because those evaluations were perceived as not credible to entities other than 
those who wrote them. It was clear that U.S.-based evaluations, including the most 
recent one,25 were regarded with some mistrust by other countries. 
In the ozone-depletion problem, there was a similar history. This pattern was 
broken, however, with the first truly international ozone assessment26 sponsored 
by the World Meteorological Organization. This effort was empowered by a large 
increase in participation by the world ozone science community and, thus, in the 
authority of the assessment. An encouraging result was a marked increase in the 
level of attention and action by the world policy community. In contrast to the 
current greenhouse warming situation, however, ozone depletion awareness esca­
lated rapidly thereafter, with the 198527 documentation of the Antarctic “ozone 
hole,” a veritable smoking gun that showed the actual problem to be much more 
severe than had previously been predicted by the ozone science community. 
The viability of the greenhouse warming assessment process was strongly 
improved following the creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change () in 1988 and its report on Climate Change: The  Scientific 
Assessment in 1990.28 The  process substantially changed the way the world 
25 Evans DJ. 1992. Policy Impli­
cations of Greenhouse Warm­
ing. Washington, DC: Natl. Acad.
918 pp. 
26 World Meteorological Orga­
nization. 1985. Atmospheric
Ozone 1985, Assessment of Our 
Understanding of the Processes
Controlling Its Present Distribu­
tion and Change. World Meteo­
rolog. Org., Global Ozone Res.
Monitoring Proj. Rep. 16. 478 pp. 
27 Farman JC, Gardiner BG, 
Shanklin JD. 1985. Large losses
of total ozone in Antarctica 
reveal seasonal Cl0x /NOx
interaction. Nature 315: 207-10. 
28 Houghton JT, Jenkins GJ,
Ephraums JJ, eds. 1990. Climate
Change:The ipcc Scientific 
Assessment. Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change. Cam­
bridge, UK: Cambridge Univ.
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policy-making and decision-making communities deal with the greenhouse 
warming issue. The internationalization of the process led to a common platform 
in which the major contributors to this problem (essentially all human beings) can 
begin to discuss ways to cope with its implications. In spite of the predictable nit­
picking (too aggressive, too timid, too political, insufficiently political),  has 
proved to be an enormous international success, at least in my opinion. 
The  process and its assessment products were far from an instant suc­
cess. When the 1990  Report was released, it received a small mention in a 
back page of the New York Times. Almost no other newspapers picked up the 
story. In effect, it was a nonevent in the U.S. media. Ironically, the impending 1990 
 Report had been a very large event in the personal lives of the reporters who 
were covering the high-amplitude stories that were fueling the greenhouse warm­
ing controversy. The reporters had been chasing some assertions that the  
report might reach some startling new conclusions. Those of us being inter­
viewed by reporters almost daily before the release of the 1990  Report expe­
rienced a precipitous drop in the frequency of interview requests after the release. 
My colleagues and I inferred that the  Report was apparently “too dull” to 
receive major interest from the press. In effect,  was saying what climate sci­
entists had been saying for some time: The greenhouse warming problem is real; 
human-caused climate change could be substantial; the climate models are cred­
ible; and the science has significant uncertainties that must be recognized. I later 
asked some reporters about this and they acknowledged that our inferences were 
correct. Without major changes in the public perception of this problem, it was 
not seen by the reporters as being very newsworthy. In effect, the controversy was 
much more interesting “news” than the problem itself. The need of the media to 
find intense and newsy stories had unfortunately overwhelmed whatever obliga­
tions it may have had to inform its readers about the significance of the  con­
clusions. 
The evolving real greenhouse warming controversy 
In the months preceding the December 1997 Kyoto Climate Conference, a remark­
able shift occurred in the media focus on the greenhouse warming problem. A 
flurry of articles appeared in the major media that were specifically designed to 
inform the public about the science underlying greenhouse warming. Suddenly, 
the science had become newsworthy, and the obligation to educate the public had 
assumed a much higher priority. 
What drove this major shift in media attention toward this long-standing issue? 
The obvious answer was the Kyoto Conference. This assemblage of representatives 
of essentially all the nations of the world was charged with beginning the virtually 
unthinkable – changing the way the world uses fossil fuels to produce its massive 
energy demands. Suddenly, people all over the planet were involved, and green­
house warming was no longer a bit player. Quite literally, the Kyoto process itself 
was threatening to change everyone’s personal world, in possibly large, threaten­
ing, and unpredictable ways. 
The implications of the Kyoto process led to a flurry of major advertisements 
and infomercials designed to buttress and/or defend particular points of view. 
Environmentally oriented persons and groups emphasized the threats that ele­
vated levels of greenhouse gases might cause for life on earth, human and other­









   
 
   
   













and to the specific industries that produce and directly use fossil fuels. Both posi­
tions were expressing valid concerns. 
Fascinatingly, the media jumped back into the greenhouse warming problem 
at a level that substantially exceeded the level at which they had pursued the orig­
inal controversies. The media now realized that there were thousands of stories in 
the upgraded greenhouse story, phase two. 
One can understand this dramatic shift in media attention by performing a 
simple thought experiment. Imagine, by some miracle of scientific wizardry, that 
the science of greenhouse warming is now definitively complete, that climate sci­
entists can state with amazing precision the ways climate would change under any 
variety of scenarios of future atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and 
radiatively active airborne particulates. Would the greenhouse warming contro­
versies go away? Hardly. Indeed, I argue that greenhouse controversies will actu­
ally escalate substantially, for a host of readily understandable reasons. Some of the 
reasons are outlined below. 
To illustrate the first reason, assume that the “definitive” state of climate science 
is being used to evaluate the standard  “toy” scenario of ramping up to a dou­
bling of CO2 over preindustrial levels and holding it there indefinitely. Also 
assume that the midrange global-mean estimate for this problem (~3° for dou­
bled CO2) is actually the correct answer. What kinds of specific climate changes 
30might we expect to see? According to Manabe and Stouffer29 and , we 
would expect (a) land to warm more than oceans, (b) a substantial retreat of 
northern hemisphere sea ice, (c) sea level to rise more than a meter over the next 
several hundred years, (d) a sharp reduction in the overturning circulation of the 
North Atlantic ocean, and (e) substantial reductions in midcontinental summer 
soil moisture (~25%). Also, we would expect increases in the intensity of tropical 
hurricanes/ typhoons, at least for those that tend to reach mature stages.31 Sharp 
increases in summertime heat index (a measure of the effective temperature level 
a body feels on a humid day) would be likely in moist subtropical areas.32 The 
above list of changes, if realized, would place significant stresses on many aspects 
of life on earth. It is likely there would be many losers and some winners. The 
values and equity clashes resulting from this kind of a human-caused climate 
change scene are likely to be intense and long lasting. 
For the second reason to expect amplified controversy, note that there remains 
an important possibility that the actual climate sensitivity could be near the lower 
limit of the generous ranges of the current best estimates (~1.5° for doubled 
CO2). Even this lower level of climate sensitivity to added CO2 can become prob­
lematic, however. As pointed out in the 1994 IPCC Report on Radiative Forcing of 
Climate Change,33 our current fossil fuel-use social trajectory is pointing well 
toward a quadrupling of CO2 levels over their preindustrial values. At those high 
CO2 levels, even this lower level of warming response to CO2 increases, and its 
potential impacts become surprisingly “unsmall” (see the doubled CO2 effects for 
the midrange estimate above). 
A third reason is that, near the current upper limits of climate sensitivity for the 
current societal CO2 trajectory, the large projected climate changes indicate that 
the potential impacts would likely become dauntingly large.34 
The above hypothetical cases point out that there almost inevitably will be a 
growing global requirement to move toward a change in the world’s use of fossil 
fuels. That, of course, is what the Kyoto Conference was all about—to begin the 
29 Manabe S, Stouffer R. 1994. 
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7: 5-23. 
30 Houghton JT, Meira Filko
LG, Callender BA, Harris N, 
Kathenberg A, Mackell K, eds.
1995. Climate Change 1995: The
Science of Climate Change.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
Univ. Press. 572 pp. 
31 Knutson TR, Tuleya RE, Kuri­
hara Y. 1998. Simulated increase 
of hurricane intensities in a 
CO2-warmed climate. Science 
279: 1018-20. 
32 Delworth TL, Mahlman JD, 
Knutson TR. 1998. Changes in
heat index associated with 
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Clim. Change. In press. 
33 Houghton JT, Meira Filko LG,
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process of nudging the world away from its current fossil fuel usage profile in the 
interest of preventing substantial climate change. 
The Kyoto process was widely criticized for doing too much, for doing too little, 
or for being too lenient on the CO2 emissions being produced by the other guy 
(country, industry, generation…). Obviously, this “Who pays and how much and 
when?” debate is already the source of major controversy that is guaranteed to 
escalate as these “agreements” evolve toward real commitments by real countries, 
real industries, and real individuals. Now the real controversies begin. Now values 
clashes become substantive, and ubiquitous. Most of us want to ensure that our 
particular set of wants and needs are not disproportionately impacted. Equity-
driven values debates will inevitably be contentious and emotional.We thus are left 
with the conclusion that Kyoto’s real purpose was to initiate the effort to nudge us 
down from our current social trajectory that is pointing toward quadrupled CO2 
levels.35 The really hard decisions will have to be made in a future series of “Kyoto” 
conferences. 
Beyond the Kyoto process, the controversies are almost guaranteed to escalate 
further. Underlying the Kyoto approach is what appears to me to be an implicit 
assumption: We can proceed reasonably on the policy side if we can all quietly 
assume, for now at least, that an eventual doubling of CO2 levels would lead to an 
acceptable level of climate change, but that higher CO2 levels would become pro­
gressively problematic. From the current scientific information base, what major 
entities have concluded that? Certainly not the  1995 assessment.36 The 
uncomfortable answer is that no major bodies have reached such a conclusion. So 
what is going on? I suspect that this implicit assumption is actually driven by the 
widely, but not unanimously, perceived enormous difficulty in capping the eventual 
CO2 at a doubling, let alone at lower levels. The Kyoto process seems to have quietly 
and wisely concluded that it needed to begin from some point that allows incre­
mental actions to begin, even if they are small steps relative to the real problem. 
Thus, the real greenhouse warming controversy is almost guaranteed to esca­
late further. In order for the Kyoto process to have had any rational hope of suc­
cess, the other half of this effort had to be left off the table. Other half? Well, yes. 
The Kyoto debates were about who pays for the initial costs of reducing CO2 emis­
sions. The part left undiscussed was the debate about who “pays” for the impacts 
caused by the unmitigated CO2 emissions. The tacit agreement to allow significant 
climate change (CO2 doubling or more) was “left home” in the Kyoto process. This 
highlights another fundamental values debate that will surely add daunting levels 
of complexity and emotion to the process. The equity issues are multidimensional: 
climate change winners versus losers; rich versus poor; environment versus econ­
omy; our generations versus future generations…. In short, the values, equity, and 
impacts debates on the cost of realized climate change will inevitably be addressed 
in a substantially more focused way than is currently underway. The stakes and the 
emotional levels of the arguments will be very high. There will likely be clear win­
ners and clear losers. It will take a long time, decades to a century, to sort all this 
out. This is because the costs of sufficiently aggressive mitigative action are likely 
to be very high, clearly so if net global CO2 emissions are to be sharply reduced. 
However, the “costs” of doing too little to prevent significant climate warming are 
also likely to be very high and would be levied for many centuries. 
Simply put, this problem has no soft landing spot. This is the real greenhouse 













Arrhenius S. 1896. On the influence of carbonic acid in the air upon the tempera­
ture of the ground. London Edinburgh Dublin Philos. Mag. J. Sci. 41: 237-76. 
Cane M, Zebiak SE, Dolan SC. 1986. Experimental forecast of El Niño. Nature 321: 
827-32. 
Delworth TL, Mahlman JD, Knutson TR. 1998. Changes in heat index associated 
with CO2-induced global warming. Clim. Change. In press. 
Evans DJ. 1992. Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming. Washington, DC: 
Natl. Acad. 918 pp. 
Farman JC, Gardiner BG, Shanklin JD. 1985. Large losses of total ozone in Antarc­
tica reveal seasonal Cl0x /NOx interaction. Nature 315: 207-10. 
Houghton JT, Jenkins GJ, Ephraums JJ, eds. 1990. Climate Change: The IPCC Sci­
entific Assessment. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge Univ. Press. 364 pp. 
Houghton JT, Meira Filko LG, Bruce J, Lee H, Callander BA, et al, eds. 1994. Cli­
mate Change 1994: Radiative Forcing of Climate Change. Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press. 339 pp. 
Houghton JT, Meira Filko LG, Callender BA, Harris N, Kathenberg A, Mackell K, 
eds. 1995. Climate Change 1995: The Science of Climate Change. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge Univ. Press. 572 pp. 
Knutson TR, Tuleya RE, Kurihara Y. 1998. Simulated increase of hurricane inten­
sities in a CO2-warmed climate. Science 279: 1018-20. 
Lindzen RS. 1990. Some coolness concerning global warming. Bull. Am. Meteo­
rolog. Soc. 71: 288-99. 
Lorenz EM. 1963. Deterministic non-periodic flow. J. Atmos. Sci. 20: 130-41. 
Mahlman JD, Fels SB. 1986. Antarctic ozone decreases: a dynamical cause? Geo-
phys. Res. Lett. 13: 1316-19. 
Mahlman JD. 1997. Uncertainties in projections of human-caused climate warm­
ing. Science 278: 1416-17. 
Manabe S, Stouffer R. 1994. Multiple-century response of a coupled ocean-atmos­
phere model and increase of atmospheric carbon dioxide. J. Clim. 7: 5-23. 
Manabe S, Wetherald RT. 1967. Thermal equilibrium of the atmosphere with a 
given distribution of relative humidity. J. Atmos. Sci. 24: 241-59. 
Oort AH, Liu H. 1993. Upper air temperature trends over the globe. J. Clim. 6: 292­
307. 
Phillips NA. 1956. The general circulation of the atmosphere: a numerical experi­
ment. Q. J. R. Meteorolog. Soc. 82: 123-64. 
Smagorinsky J, Manabe S, Holloway JL Jr. 1965. Numerical results from a nine-level 
general circulation model of the atmosphere. Mon. Weather Rev. 43: 727-68. 
Smagorinsky J. 1963. General circulation experiments with the primitive equa­
tions. I. The basic experiment. Mon. Weather Rev. 41: 99-164. 
Sun D-Z, Held IM. 1996. A comparison of modeled and observed relationships 
between interannual variations of water vapor and temperature. J. Clim. 9: 665­
75. 
World Meteorological Organization. 1985. Atmospheric Ozone 1985, Assessment 
of Our Understanding of the Processes Controlling Its Present Distribution 
and Change.World Meteorolog. Org., Global Ozone Res. Monitoring Proj. Rep. 





46    
 
Acknowledgments 
I wish to acknowledge the following GFDL colleagues who have been of immense 
value to me in my struggle to understand the workings of the dauntingly complex and 
diverse aspects of the climate system: Anthony Broccoli, Kirk Bryan,Thomas Delworth, 
Leo Donner,Kevin Hamilton, Isaac Held,Stephen Klein,Thomas Knutson,Ngar-Cheung 
Lau,Hiram Levy II,Syukuro Manabe,Christopher Milly,V.Ramaswamy,Jorge Sarmiento, 
M. Daniel Schwarzkopf, Brian Soden, Ronald Stouffer, J. Robert Toggweiler, Richard 
Wetherald, R. John Wilson, and Gareth Williams. Regarding the writing of this paper, I 
am grateful to Anthony Broccoli, Mack McFarland, and Robert Socolow for their per­
ceptive comments and recommendations on earlier versions.Two anonymous review­
ers were helpful in their numerous suggestions for improvements. Betty M. Williams 
provided invaluable assistance in manuscript preparation. Finally, I am indebted to the 
legion of scientists who have worked selflessly to make the IPCC process work. With­
out them, the world would not yet be ready for this essay. 
J.D. Mahlman is Director of the NOAA Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory at 
Princeton University in the United States. In 1994 he received the American Meteoro­
logical Society's Carl-Gustaf Rossby Research Medal for pioneering work in the appli­
cation of general circulation models to the understanding of stratospheric dynamics 
and transport. He has been Lecturer with the rank of Professor in Geosciences and 
Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at Princeton since 1980. 
Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory/NOAA, Princeton University, Princeton, New 














The unfccc — history and evolution 
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Abstract 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (unfccc),adopted at 
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro 
in 1992, has a rich, almost unique history, and a powerful and persuasive structure. In 
the years since the Convention was adopted, Parties have seen progress in the imple­
mentation of many of its provisions. Enough confidence was engendered among the 
more than 175 Parties that ratified the Convention to begin a new process of adopt­
ing a legally binding instrument for greenhouse gas emissions limitations from 
industrialized countries. The result of this process was the Kyoto Protocol, which was 
adopted in December 1997.This paper critically reviews the history of the evolving cli­
mate regime and assesses the unfccc and the Kyoto Protocol as the Parties prepare 
for the Sixth Conference of Parties in November 2000. How one might judge this 
regime, what “yardsticks” of success one might employ, and what the future may 
hold both for its successful implementation and the lessons that it might advance 
when humanity is confronted with another global environmental issue—these and 
other issues are addressed in this paper. 
Introduction 
The science of climate change is characterized both by profound uncertainties and 
by rapid advances resulting from ongoing research. It follows that any governance 
system in this area must seek not only to stimulate the growth of knowledge but 
also to provide mechanisms for integrating new insights into the system without 
triggering a time-consuming legislative process. In the case of climate change, to 
do this requires recognition of the challenge and a determination to deal with it. 
Such a dynamic is likely to involve the articulation of a new worldview that rede­
fines human aspirations and gives rise to a restructured ethical system to guide 
human/environment relations. Almost certainly, this worldview will take as its 
point of departure the perspective of ecology, which stresses linkages among the 
elements of complex systems, in contrast to the perspective of technology, which 
emphasizes the separation of complex systems into discrete parts that can be dealt 
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nance system for the Earth’s climate will require a concerted effort to nurture these 
new intellectual underpinnings as well as an effort to design the specific elements 
of the climate regime being established. 
There was a time when the need for a formal instrument such as the Conven­
tion was challenged. According to this view, letting the regime evolve more infor­
mally through the development of what is commonly referred to as “soft law” was 
a better option. Proponents of formalization stress the role that treaties and con­
ventions can play in establishing legal obligations and in minimizing opportuni­
ties for members to ignore the dictates of regimes with impunity. “Soft law” advo­
cates, by contrast, emphasize the virtues of more informal arrangements: avoiding 
the complications of the ratification process and allowing regimes to adapt to 
changing circumstances in a flexible manner. The general conclusion was that 
there is no need to think of these alternatives as mutually exclusive. 
Accordingly, it was agreed that to be effective the climate regime would require 
the loyalty of both public and private actors throughout the world. Partly, this was 
a matter of providing opportunities for all members of the international commu­
nity to participate in a meaningful way in formulating provisions to be imple­
mented through the framework of an international agreement to protect the 
Earth’s atmosphere. More profoundly, however, there was critical need for the 
evolving governance system to have the support of both the international state 
system and non-state participants. In addition, meaningful deliberation requires 
the empowerment of those who are directly affected by an issue through some rec­
ognized method for bringing their voice into the process. 
The climate regime cannot succeed in the absence of a concerted effort to 
address the priority concerns of the world’s developing countries. While the afflu­
ent residents of the industrialized countries are increasingly attentive to matters 
of environmental quality, many developing country leaders are understandably 
concerned that a focus on environmental issues will deflect worldwide attention 
Almost certainly, this worldview will take as its point of departure the perspective 
of ecology, which stresses linkages among the elements of complex systems, in con­
trast to the perspective of technology, which emphasizes the separation of complex 
systems into discrete parts that can be dealt with as self-contained entities. 
from their economic problems, or even lead to the promulgation of restrictive 
rules that hinder their efforts to achieve sustained economic growth and a rea­
sonable standard of living for their citizens. Given the fact that the increases of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) now resident in the Earth’s atmosphere are attributable 
in large measure to the industrialization of ‘First World’ countries, and that no cli­
mate regime can be effective in the absence of acceptance and active participation 
on the part of the principal countries of the developing world, there is no avoid­
ing the need to accommodate the development concerns of developing countries 
as part of a planetary bargain relating to climate change. 
While it is certainly attractive to focus attention on one round after another of 
negotiations, much of the work of bringing the terms of the resultant regime to 
bear on concrete problems must occur in more circumscribed settings. Partly, this 
is a matter of encouraging individuals, industrial enterprises, and the govern­






   
 
















a matter of facilitating the efforts of pairs or small groups of states to transcend 
rigid insistence on simplistic principles, such as the doctrine of polluter pays, and 
to enter into mutually beneficial agreements leading to net reductions in green­
house gas emissions. Underlying all of these approaches is the need to set aside any 
The climate regime cannot succeed in the absence of a concerted effort to address 
the priority concerns of the world’s developing countries. 
expectation that the provisions of the climate regime will be adhered to in prac­
tice just because they are enshrined in a convention, and to begin thinking about 
the development of an array of implementation and strengthening techniques. 
It is futile to ask governments of member states to take actions that are not fea­
sible in economic, technical, or administrative terms. While it is frequently 
assumed that governments desiring to achieve well-defined goals have the capac­
ity to alter the behavior of their citizens in the proscribed manner, this is often not 
the reality. This is particularly true of many developing countries and former 
socialist countries whose governments may be sharply limited in their ability to 
deliver on commitments made in good faith in connection with the creation of 
international regimes. It follows that an effective governance system for climate 
change mitigation must provide substantial assistance to governments that are 
prepared to make a concerted effort to implement the rules of the regime within 
their own jurisdictions. The appropriate tools for such an effort include technol­
ogy transfers, training facilities, and additional development assistance earmarked 
for those endeavoring to implement the terms of the climate change regime. 
History of the climate change negotiations 
While the science and politics of climate change are more than 100 years old, the 
best place to begin to document the history is the Toronto Conference on “The 
Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security” held in June 1988. The 
fast pace of developments from this time on has a history that is quite unique to 
the development of the climate regime. To whit—when the suggestion for adopt­
ing an international convention on climate change by 1992 was made at this Con­
ference, many states, including the United States (which has had a remarkable 
influence, albeit mixed, in the development of the climate regime), believed it to be 
an extremely early and, therefore, implausible target. The United States hosted the 
first negotiating session on the subject in February 1991, in Washington, D.C. The 
United States was also one of the first major countries to ratify the Convention. 
One of the principal reasons for this rapid change is the institutional innovation 
that took place during this time. Deserving special mention in this regard is the 
Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (). The  was established by 
the World Meteorological Organization () and the United Nations Environ­
ment Programme () in November 1988. The secretary-general of , 
speaking at the opening session, emphasized the scientific nature of ’ work in 
assisting 160 member countries in measuring, standardizing, collecting, and dis­
seminating atmospheric data. Despite this scientific emphasis, and given that the 
predicted global warming as one of the most important long-term challenges facing 
humanity, the secretary-general said that  could not stand by while the conse­
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concurred with this assessment and hailed the formation and the launching of the 
 as a milestone in global cooperation to address the challenge of climate change. 
Prior to the adoption of the First Assessment Report by , resolutions had 
been passed by  and  to convene the first open-ended negotiating ses­
sion for a framework convention on climate change. The first set of these meetings 
took place in Geneva in September 1990 and was attended by over 70 countries. At 
this meeting, the  Executive Director emphasized that both he and the Sec­
retary General of the  had been asked by their governing bodies “to prepare 
for negotiations now.” The / notice set out a number of points to be 
taken into consideration during the negotiation process, including: 
•	 gases that ought to be included in atmospheric concentrations; 
•	 stabilization and emission reductions targets; and 
•	 proposed dates, base years, and the criteria for calculating emission levels (per 
capita per unit of  or , according to the area of the country, its climatic 
conditions, the size of its natural carbon sinks, energy consumption per pro­
duction unit—or a mixture of criteria). 
Apart from the detail on what the Convention should accomplish, there was 
agreement to a large measure that “a meaningful legal act for adoption in 1992 
should be a target.” The question, however, was whether this should be accom­
plished at the expense of agreeing to an instrument of a purely declaratory nature. 
As this debate within / continued, the United Nations General 
Assembly established a single Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee () 
under its auspices for the preparation of an effective framework convention on cli­
mate change. It authorized the Secretary General of the United Nations, with the 
assistance of the Executive Director of , and the Secretary General of , 
to convene the first negotiating session in February 1991 in Washington, D.C.Work 
on the Framework Convention, according to the General Assembly, was to be 
The First Session of the INC convened in February 1991, and in May 1992 the 
Fifth Session concluded the negotiations. Thus, barely fifteen months after the 
INC began its work, it completed negotiations on a framework convention. This 
Convention, signed at the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development in June 1992 (Rio Summit), received the required number of ratifi­
cations by December 22, 1993, and entered into force on March 21, 1994. 
completed prior to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Devel­
opment in June 1992 and opened for signature during the Conference that month. 
Thus, the United Nations General Assembly, where the developing countries have 
an overwhelming majority, challenged its members to develop and conclude an 
international agreement of enormous consequence in a fairly limited time. 
Contrary to the history of typical developing country engagement in interna­
tional environmental affairs, their participation in climate negotiations was quite 
spirited and constructive. The Special Committee of the  on Developing 
Countries attempted to channel this interest in ways that would be conducive to 
long-term active involvement of developing countries. The task was, and still 
remains, to translate what has now been accepted as concern on critical issues into 






   
 
 






















rectly pointed out, the three issues that would dwarf the entire negotiating process 
are financial requirements, technology transfer, and economic reforms. 
The climate negotiations have been both complex and extremely significant for 
the future of international relations. In his statement at the first session of the , 
the UN Secretary General characterized the significance of the climate negotia­
tions by saying that a parallel exists between the San Francisco Conference that 
created the United Nations and the process being set in motion at the  meet­
ing. Similarly, in terms of complexity of subject matter, many have drawn a paral­
lel between the climate negotiations and the United Nations Conference on Law 
of the Sea (), which took nine years to negotiate and adopt the Law of the 
Sea Convention. Some have even gone so far as to say that the climate change 
regime is more complex than . Even a casual observer of the negotiations 
would attest to both the significance and inherent complexity of the task at hand 
for the —first for the drafting of the Convention, and now its implementation. 
On the substantive side, progress at the first session was less than satisfactory, 
particularly on the organization of the work. Many countries stressed the impor­
tance of addressing the issue of global climate change in an integrated and com­
prehensive manner and taking full account of the special circumstances and needs 
of developing countries.Yet, there was significant opposition to considering emis­
sions reductions, preservation and expansion of sinks, and financial and technical 
assistance in separate working groups. In particular, developing countries feared 
that if these topics were addressed by separate groups, less attention would be 
given to emission reductions and financial and technical assistance. Another con­
cern was that forests in developing countries would be targeted as a panacea for 
the global warming problem since they are a sink for carbon dioxide, a principal 
greenhouse gas. It was clear, however, that all of these topics could not be 
addressed in the plenary. After intensive discussions, agreement was reached on 
the establishment of two working groups: one to deal with commitments and the 
other with mechanisms. The progress made by the working groups was integrated 
by the plenary, and the final text treated as one package. 
This brief review of the process of building a climate regime indicates that the 
approach that the international community adopted in addressing global warm­
ing was different from any previous attempts. The First Session of the  con­
vened in February 1991, and in May 1992 the Fifth Session concluded the negotia­
tions. Thus, barely fifteen months after the  began its work, it completed 
negotiations on a framework convention. This Convention, signed at the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development in June 1992 (Rio 
Summit), received the required number of ratifications by December 22, 1993, and 
entered into force on March 21, 1994. At the time of this writing, the total number 
of ratifications stands at 176. 
The unique nature of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
The key provision of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change () is its objective, which is outlined in Article 2: 
The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments 
that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance 
with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse 
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent danger­
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In other words, the objective calls for a fine balance, which achieves stabiliza­
tion of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere within a time frame suf­
ficient to: 
•	 allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change; 
•	 ensure that food production is not threatened; and 
•	 enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner 
The other key element, one that took all of the combined energy of the indus­
trialized countries, and nearly derailed the very possibility of adopting  at the 
Rio Summit, dealt with the kinds of commitments that industrialized countries 
ought to make to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Of particular note in this 
regard are Article 4.2(a) and Article 4.2(b). Article 4.2(a) and (b) read as follows: 
The developed country Parties and other Parties included in Annex I 
commit themselves specifically as provided for in the following: 
a.	 Each of these Parties shall adopt national policies and take corresponding 
measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its anthro­
pogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its 
greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs. These policies and measures will 
demonstrate that developed countries are taking the lead in modifying 
longer-term trends in anthropogenic emissions consistent with the objec­
tive of the Convention, recognizing that the return by the end of the pre­
sent decade to earlier levels of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide 
and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol 
would contribute to such modification, and taking into account the dif­
ferences in these Parties’ starting points and approaches, economic struc­
tures and resource bases, the need to maintain strong and sustainable eco­
nomic growth, available technologies and other individual circumstances, 
as well as the need for equitable and appropriate contributions by each of 
these Parties to the global effort regarding that objective. These Parties 
may implement such policies and measures jointly with other Parties and 
may assist other Parties in contributing to the achievement of the objec­
tive of the Convention and, in particular, that of this subparagraph; 
b.	 In order to promote progress to this end, each of these Parties shall com­
municate, within six months of the entry into force of the Convention 
for it and periodically thereafter, and in accordance with Article 12, 
detailed information on its policies and measures referred to in subpara­
graph (a) above, as well as on its resulting projected anthropogenic emis­
sions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases not con­
trolled by the Montreal Protocol for the period referred to in 
subparagraph (a), with the aim of returning individually or jointly to 
their 1990 levels these anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and 
other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol. This 
information will be reviewed by the Conference of the Parties, at its first 
session and periodically thereafter, in accordance with Article 7. 
One truly unique feature of , which has been emulated in other forums 
since then, is in the “prompt start” that the Parties agreed to, enabling the imme­
diate continuation of preparation for the First Conference of the Parties (-). 






















times before -. During these meetings the industrialized countries, led by the 
United States, began voicing the view that  was seriously flawed. Specifically, 
despite the clause that had been adopted in 1992 for “equal but differentiated 
responsibilities” between developing and developed countries, the United States 
maintained that it was vital that the developing countries join in the next phase of 
commitments. 
The Convention entered into force in 1994. The first Meeting of the Conference 
of the Parties (-) was held in Berlin, Germany in March and April of 1995. 
Because of “prompt start,” this meeting turned out to be the most substantive of 
any first  meeting of any international environmental agreements. The high­
lights include: 
•	 Parties agreeing to Bonn, Germany as the home of the  Secretariat; 
•	 Parties agreeing to the “Berlin Mandate;” 
•	 Parties agreeing to a “pilot phase” for Activities Implemented Jointly (); and 
•	 The establishment of the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (). 
The Berlin Mandate 
Among these results, the adoption of the Berlin Mandate was the subject of some 
very intense debate. The developing countries succeeded in ensuring that the 
result adequately reflected their concerns. The Mandate called on Parties to: 
Aim, as the priority in the process of strengthening the commitments in Arti­
cle 4.2(a) and (b) of the Convention, for developed country/other Parties included 
in Annex I, both 
•	 to elaborate policies and measures; as well as 
•	 to set quantified limitation and reduction objectives within specified time-
frames, such as 2005, 2010, and 2020, for their anthropogenic emissions by 
sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Mon­
treal Protocol, taking into account the differences in starting points and 
approaches, economic structures and resource bases, the need to maintain 
strong and sustainable economic growth, available technologies and other 
individual circumstances, as well as the need for equitable and appropriate con­
tributions by each of these Parties to the global effort, and also the process of 
analysis and assessment referred to in section III, paragraph 4, below; Not 
introduce any new commitments for Parties not included in Annex I, but reaf­
firm existing commitments in Article 4.1 and continue to advance the imple­
mentation of these commitments in order to achieve sustainable development, 
taking into account Article 4.3, 4.5 and 4.7. 
While the debate between the industrialized and developing countries on the 
timing of commitments by all was underway, several leading private sector actors 
formed the Global Climate Coalition and began advancing the view that the 
uncertainties in the science of global climate change meant that any action by any 
group of countries, developed or developing, was unwarranted. As a result, the 
Parties felt it important at their Second Meeting of the Conference of the Parties 
(-), held in Geneva, Switzerland in July 1996, to adopt a Ministerial Declara­
tion firmly stating that the science of climate change is compelling, and that legally 
binding commitments are warranted. It made particular note of the Second 
Assessment Report () of the . The Declaration further recognized and 
endorsed “the  of the  as currently the most comprehensive and author­


















   
54    
 
itative assessment of the science of climate change, its impacts and response 
options now available.” Thus, following -, it was clear that all of the prepa­
ration for the next  would focus on the endorsement of legally binding com­
mitments. This led to a flurry of activities around the world. Examples from the 
United States alone include: 
•	 The Economists’ Statement on Climate Change in January 1997; 
•	 The Ecologists’ Statement on Consequences of Rapid Climatic Change in May 
1997; and 
•	 The Scientists’ Statement on Global Climatic Disruption in June 1997. 
A Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, which was held in 
1997 in New York from June 23-27 to review progress since the Rio Summit, pro­
vided further evidence of the global community’s desire to make climate change 
the defining issue in terms of its ability to cope with global environmental chal­
lenge.At this Session, virtually all of the world leaders emphasized the need to have 
a meaningful Protocol adopted in Kyoto at -. Further, the speech by Presi­
dent Bill Clinton at this Special Session was entirely devoted to climate change. 
The U.S. President subsequently launched the White House Initiative on Global 
Climate Change that same year. The U.S. Senate, on the other hand, had serious 
reservations about the activities of the White House. This concern was reflected in 
the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, a non-binding resolution that severely restricted the 
U.S. negotiating position, which was adopted by the U.S. Senate while Parties were 
preparing for - to adopt the Kyoto Protocol. The Senate resolved that: 
1.	 The United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to, or other 
agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in December 1997, or 
thereafter, which would: 
A. mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emis­
sions for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other agreement 
also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties 
within the same compliance period; or 
B. result in serious harm to the economy of the United States; and 
C. any such protocol or other agreement which would require the advice 
and consent of the Senate to ratification should be accompanied by a 
detailed explanation of any legislation or regulatory actions that may 
be required to implement the protocol or other agreement and should 
also be accompanied by an analysis of the detailed financial costs and 
other impacts on the economy of the United States which would be 
incurred by the implementation of the protocol or other agreement. 
Throughout these developments the  held eight sessions in preparation for 
- in Kyoto.It even held a day-long “resumed”eighth session in Kyoto on Novem­
ber 30, 1997. Prospects for agreement appeared very slim at the end of this session. 
Highlights of the Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol was adopted on December 11, 1997 after eleven days of inten­
sive negotiations that, in addition to the Conference delegates, engaged Ministers 























Heads of State and Government. The delegates worked late into the night for three 
nights in a row, and the last article was adopted on December 11th, after an all-
night session that took place after the time allotted for the Conference was over. 
The resulting Protocol contains 28 articles and 2 annexes. Decisions 1, 2, and 3, 
also adopted at -, directly pertain to the Kyoto Protocol. 
•	 Decision 1: Provides for work on implementation. 
•	 Decision 2: Provides for the determination of methodological issues. 
•	 Decision 3: Provides for the implementation of  Article 4.8, which 
addresses the needs of developing countries, specifically those at risk from the 
impacts of climate change, and Article 4.9, which discusses funding for tech­
nology transfer to developing countries. 
The Protocol, for the first time in the evolving climate change regime, requires 
legally binding emission commitments from Annex I Parties. It covers the six main 
GHGs as listed in Annex A to the Protocol: 
•	 carbon dioxide; 
•	 methane; 
•	 nitrous oxide; 
•	 hydrofluorocarbons; 
•	 perflurocarbons; and 
•	 sulfur hexafluoride. 
The target for each Annex I Party is listed in Annex B. The targets range from a 
reduction of 8% to an increase of 10%, calculated as an average over the commit­
ment period 2008-2012. If all Parties meet their targets, the overall reduction in 
emissions from 1990 levels for that group will be around 5.2%. 
The Buenos Aires and Bonn sessions: The road to The Hague 
Since the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol a great deal has happened—particularly 
during the Fourth and the Fifth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties in 
Buenos Aires, Argentina and in Bonn, Germany respectively. At the Buenos Aires 
meeting the Parties adopted a plan called the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (). 
The primary content of the  was a long list of topics that need to be addressed 
by the Parties as they prepare for the Sixth Session of the Conference of the Parties 
scheduled to take place in The Hague, the Netherlands in November 2000. In other 
words, the  did not prioritize the issues in any meaningful manner. However, 
the meetings of the Parties leading up to and following the adoption of the  
did succeed in narrowing the scope without sacrificing any of the issues of signifi­
cance to meeting the objective of the Convention. As Parties prepare for the Sixth 
Session the following topics and questions have gained significance for resolution. 
In preparation for -, a few important points should be kept in mind. 
Clearly most of the attention will focus on the details necessary to operationalize 
the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol. But it is wise not to lose sight of the work that 
still needs to be done to implement many of the provisions of the , which has 
already been ratified by more than 175 countries and is in force. 
What are the “commitments” contained in the fccc? 
Annex I countries agreed to adopt national policies and take corresponding mea­
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greenhouse gases and protecting and exchanging their greenhouse gas sinks and 
reservoirs. Further, Annex I countries agreed to take the lead in modifying longer-
term emissions consistent with the objectives of the Convention, recognizing that 
the return to earlier levels of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases (not 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol) by the end of the decade would contribute 
to such modifications. 
The developed countries (not including countries undergoing the process of 
transition to market economies) agreed to provide new and additional financial 
resources to meet full agreed costs incurred by developing country Parties in com­
plying with their obligations concerning communications and information. The 
developed country Parties also promised to provide resources needed by the 
developing country Parties, including funds for technology transfer, in order to 
meet the agreed upon incremental costs of implementing their commitments. 
It is generally agreed that the extent to which developing country Parties will 
effectively be able to implement their commitments under the Convention will 
depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their 
commitments. This is especially the case with regard to financial resources and the 
willingness of countries to transfer technology, while simultaneously taking fully 
into account that economic and social development and poverty eradication are 
the first and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties. Thus, the 
question remains how to achieve these ends. 
Prior to -, a workshop involving several participants in the climate nego­
tiations identified the following measures for the purposes of enhancing success 
of the Kyoto Protocol: 
• encouraging signature and ratification of the Kyoto Protocol 
• encouraging implementation of the protocol pending its entry into force 
• encouraging more direct and formal private sector participation 
• building confidence and increasing co-operation 
• expanding participation by non-Annex I parties 
• formulating a Buenos Aires action plan 
As we prepare for -, it is instructive to note that outside of formulating a 
Buenos Aires Plan of Action, which focuses heavily on the flexibility of mecha­
nisms, virtually everything else remains central to the development of the ele­
mentary climate change regime. Before going into the details of what or how these 
might be addressed, it may be useful to look at the specific issues identified at 
- in the . 
The Buenos Aires Plan of Action 
The  contains a list of 140 items to be addressed over the two years following 
-. In addition to the so-called “flexibility mechanisms,” there are a number 
of issues that were touched on in the . In a manner that all concerned agree 
is fair and equitable, the  talks at some length about designing the mecha­
nisms to support long-term climate protection. However, there are other issues to 
be considered. These include land use change and forestry and technology trans­
fer issues, all of which are being dealt with in  special reports. Further issues 
include the role of developing countries in the emerging climate regime, creating 
an effective compliance system, including linkages, and interdependence. 
 












   
  
   
   
  
 







    
   
    




What can be done as we wait to develop the details outlined above? 
It is important to encourage every possible effort to reduce greenhouse gas emis­
sions. Whether or not Annex B countries accept their quantitative obligations in 
the near term, it is crucial that they begin reducing their domestic greenhouse gas 
emissions as soon as possible if there is to be any hope of meeting the greenhouse 
gas reduction goals set for the 2008-2012 commitment period. In some instances, 
reductions have been or may be achieved for unrelated reasons, or as a result of 
other policies. Whatever the reasons, these results are still important in moving 
toward the Protocol’s goals. 
There are at least three ways an Annex B country can benefit from reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions domestically while conducting the formal processes of 
Protocol ratification and awaiting its entry into force. First, by documenting and 
publicizing its reduction efforts, a nation will enhance its international reputation. 
Second, if it helps other countries to learn from its efforts, it will make reductions 
by other countries more likely. For example, a country may be encouraged to 
reduce its own emissions when it learns just how substantial the economic benefits 
of fuel-switching have been for its neighbor. Third, if it can show low or negative 
economic costs and significant environmental benefits from its actions, a nation 
will build domestic political support for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
It now appears that the availability of flexibility mechanisms, once their oper­
ations are clarified, can play a large part in encouraging voluntary action while the 
ratification process proceeds. By offering incentives to industry, they, in turn, will 
be eager to encourage governments to act if there are corresponding and sufficient 
financial rewards. Thus, the further development and implementation of the flex­
ibility mechanisms discussed in Kyoto are important for encouraging voluntary 
action. 
It is time to encourage the private sector to become more formally involved in 
implementing the goals of the Climate Change Convention, particularly the 
design of the flexibility mechanisms contained in the Kyoto Protocol. Not only is 
its involvement likely to be critical to the success of the new flexibility mecha­
nisms, but the private sector is in a position to bring significant inducement to 
countries that have not yet signed, or may be hesitant to ratify, the Kyoto Protocol. 
Why might corporations become more active supporters of the  process? 
In various parts of the world, much to the surprise of national governments, cor­
porations are now asking for clarification of the “rules” governing emissions trad­
ing and domestic efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The high degree of 
uncertainty, both globally and domestically, as to which actions for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions will receive credit, is making it difficult for corporations 
to plan their business efforts, and is discouraging them from taking early action. 
Moreover, a number of companies have realized that there are substantial eco­
nomic gains to be had by corporations ready to make the global treaty system work 
for them. If given a choice, some corporations might have preferred that the Cli­
mate Change Convention had never been signed. Nevertheless, recognizing that 
more than 175 countries have already ratified the Framework Convention on Cli­
mate Change, many of the world’s leading corporations are now focused on the 
opportunities this might create. 
It is important that all parties have confidence that each is doing its share to 
implement the Framework Convention on Climate Change. Non-Annex I coun­
tries are unaware of the efforts that Annex I countries are making to fulfil the man­
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date of the Climate Change Convention. With a number of Annex I Parties calling 
for the expanded participation of non-Annex I Parties in the ongoing effort to 
implement the , it is critical that these non-Annex I countries have confi­
dence in the fact that Annex I Parties are taking their commitments seriously, as 
signified by their domestic actions. 
There are several ways in which confidence building and increased co-opera­
tion of non-Annex I Parties might be linked. The first is the implementation of the 
Clean Development Mechanism (), which was created at the Kyoto Confer­
ence.  is going to be important to the efforts that certain non-Annex I coun­
tries make in reducing the growth of emissions over the next few years. Thus, it is 
important to design this tool with an eye toward the kinds of incentives that would 
be most effective and most responsive to the interests of developing countries. In 
addition, a commitment on the part of Annex I countries to help launch the  
will underscore their stated desire to support the voluntary involvement of non-
Annex I countries in the implementation of the Convention. 
The developing countries are quite concerned about the design of the  
governance system. If its creation is going to be seen as a confidence building mea­
sure that will lead to increased co-operation and participation of non-Annex I 
Parties, its structure needs to be responsive to their concerns. That is why they are 
currently putting so much emphasis on the design of the institutional arrange­
ments that will be installed to oversee the allocation of  resources. 
Another strategy for building confidence and expanding the participation of 
non-Annex I countries might be a process of voluntary independent review () 
of what is already happening in developing countries. Such a review would open 
up on-going efforts to outside experts. It might also help to broaden international 
understanding, in an independently documented fashion, of the substantial 
efforts already underway. This would respond, at least in part, to the concerns 
expressed by the U.S. Senate that the developing world is not acting on its com­
mitments to reduce emissions. 
The  reporting process might make greater use of independent experts than 
the country reports required under the . On the other hand, it would likely 
be less comprehensive and/or less demanding than the national, sectoral and pro­
ject review process that is mandated for funding requests by some multilateral and 
bilateral institutions.  would focus exclusively on activities directly related to 
the objectives of the Convention and the Protocol. The goals of  would be: 
•	 to ensure that non-Annex I countries can learn from each other; 
•	 to guarantee that consistent information on efforts to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions in non-Annex I countries is provided to the full range of 
multilateral institutions seeking such documentation; and 
•	 to provide skeptical policy-makers in Annex I countries with credible 
documentation of the substantial efforts already underway in non-
Annex I countries to meet the original objectives of the . 
How are the fccc and the Protocol being assessed? 
International agreements generally, and international environmental agreements 
in particular, are subject to criticism. Unfortunately, and to some extent unfairly, 
the  and the Kyoto Protocol have not escaped this sort of fault-finding. Com­
promises that resulted from late-night negotiating sessions and the simple inabil­













   
 
 












these critiques hardly serve any useful purpose, given that these instruments 
should be considered “works in progress.” 
That said, it is still important to answer the criticism that Kyoto was not even a 
modest accomplishment. There have been suggestions that: (a) the Annex I coun­
tries will not follow through on their obligations; and (b) even if they did, there 
would be no beneficial impact. The implication of this is that Kyoto will make no 
difference—it will not even help put us on the path to reducing  emissions in 
Annex I countries. That even if all Annex I countries were to live up to the com­
mitments they made at Kyoto the total emissions from these countries in 2010 
would, in fact, be nearly the same as they are today. 
The other fault that critics point out is the Parties’ insistence on using on 1990 
as the base year. The suggestion is that there is a fundamental flaw in the whole 
approach, and having 1990 as the base year is a fatal error. Most Annex I countries 
would agree with this assertion, but for wholly different and often contradictory 
reasons. The Non-governmental Organization () community examined this 
issue carefully, and came to the conclusion that while having 1990 as the base year 
is not ideal, any attempt to change it would cause more openings for further sub­
version of the objective of the Convention. 
One example in this context will suffice: An  study looked at “business as 
usual” projections for 2010 from 1990 levels and concluded that there would be an 
emissions increase of between 19% and 33%. The mid-range was an increase of 24% 
from 1990 levels. When one takes the overall reductions agreed to in Kyoto and adds 
that to the mid-range of the projected increase, the reductions in 2010 would be 
approximately 29%. By staying with the 1990 baseline, the Parties could go back to 
their respective legislatures and point out that they have agreed only to modest com­
mitments –between an 8% decrease and an increase limited to 10%. In the United 
States, even these so-called modest reductions were received with howls of protest. 
In one sense, having 1990 as the base year was a victory for the environmental 
community. However, the presence of potential loopholes in the Protocol was crit­
ical for obtaining the acceptance of industrialized countries and the private sector, 
as well as wider political acceptability in general. Kyoto provided a delicate bal­
ance. It may now be very easily tilted one way or another, unfortunately, in a 
manner that will go against meeting even the modest targets contained in the Pro­
tocol. The way to address this is not by identifying what is wrong with the Proto­
col, but by determining the best means of ensuring that the flexibility mechanisms 
are used to accomplish net reductions for Annex I countries. 
These things notwithstanding, the Protocol adopted in Kyoto is perhaps one of 
the most significant international environmental agreements ever crafted. Next to 
the Earth Summit, there probably has not been another conclave of governments 
that has attracted as many people or produced so significant a document as Kyoto. 
Noticeably absent from the Protocol are any commitments from developing coun­
tries. The Protocol contains new obligations only for industrialized countries, but 
its impact will be felt the world over in every walk of human life. On the same 
token, if some of the details of the Protocol are not worked out with great care, it 
is quite likely that the Kyoto Protocol could also mean nothing. How could any 
agreement contain the possibilities for such extremes? 
It is beyond dispute that the Earth Summit of 1992 was a historic event and a 
prominent milestone in global environmental governance. Though a number of 















   













60    
 
amongst them was the adoption of the . The success or failure of the Earth 
Summit has come to be judged by the success or failure of the . 
All of the countries at the Rio Earth Summit agreed that climate change is one 
of the most serious environmental and economic problems confronting human­
ity. They agreed to cooperate with each other and they agreed on “common but 
differentiated responsibilities.” In this case, this was expressed by the industrial­
ized countries accepting voluntary commitments to bring their year 2000 emis­
sions to 1990 levels, while developing countries joined in some general commit­
ments of international cooperation. 
At the First Meeting of the Parties in Berlin, it became clear that the industrial­
ized countries would not be able to meet their voluntary commitments by 2000. 
It was also clear that Parties to the Convention needed to prepare for reduction 
commitments for the period beyond 2000. The shared understanding at Berlin 
was twofold: First, voluntary commitments will not work, legally binding com­
mitments would be needed. Second, it would not be enough for those commit­
ments to include only the industrialized countries. It is apparent that developing 
country emissions will equal or exceed those of the industrialized countries by 
2030 or thereabouts. That notwithstanding, in the name of “common but differ­
entiated responsibilities,” countries agreed in Berlin that the first round of legally 
binding commitments would include only the industrialized countries. 
This decision supplied ammunition to those who were opposed to any sort of 
domestic U.S. action to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. It also sparked a pre­
dictable reaction from U.S. industry as well as a cross section of the political elite. 
Going into the Kyoto Meeting, the big issue was how to ensure that the outcome 
in Kyoto was “fair.” The United States considered anything that did not include 
developing countries “not fair.” The widespread influence of the actors who were 
opposed to U.S. undertakings was signified by the facility with which the Byrd-
Hagel resolution was passed. 
At the same time, the developing countries did their very best to ensure that 
they did not take on any binding legal commitments in Kyoto. In the end, they suc­
ceeded, although the coalition within which they worked, the -77, came close to 
falling apart on a couple of occasions. The tensions within the developing world 
over the topic were obvious. On the one hand, there were the oil producing coun­
tries, concerned about the impact of actions to limit carbon dioxide on their 
economies; and on the other were the island nations, vulnerable to sea level rise 
and storm surges. The sub-Saharan African countries saw their interests as tied 
closely with the island nations because they, too, are vulnerable to damaging 
impacts of global warming. The large developing countries such as China, India, 
and Brazil felt that it would be unfair to expect them to take on any legally bind­
ing commitments to limit their  emissions unless the industrialized countries, 
led by the United States, took the initiative. There are yet other countries, includ­
ing several in Latin America, with aspirations to join either the expanded North 
American Free Trade Agreement () and/or the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (). For these countries, following the lead 
of industrialized countries with regards to emissions limitations might be an 
acceptable option. 
The message from Kyoto is clear. All countries eventually have to accept legally 
binding commitments to ensure that the concentration of GHGs in the atmos­











   
 










addressed within the framework of the evolving climate change regime, will deter­
mine the stage at which developing countries will join the industrialized coun­
tries. Any doubts about the unique role that the United States plays in interna­
tional affairs were set aside at Kyoto. The agreement came into existence because 
the United States was willing to agree to reductions. While pressures from the 
European Union and the  community played a big part, ultimate credit for 
reaching the agreement is largely due to the role that the United States was able to 
play. 
Conclusions 
After all was said and done, and the Kyoto Protocol was adopted, the perspectives 
from industrialized and developing countries were quite different in terms of what 
was achieved. The following table identifies what the “take home” messages were 
in terms of key priorities for the different groups of countries. These impressions 
are bound to have an influence on how the next steps in the evolution of climate 
regime will be undertaken. Even the fact that the Clean Development Mechanism 
appears in both lists does not mean that both groups agree on the real meaning of 
the concept and its operational implications. 
The task ahead is to see how to make the most of the Protocol: to accomplish 
real emission reductions from the industrialized countries; to make it possible for 
the developing countries to join in this exercise; and as a collective, to reach the 
objective of the Convention. 
table 1 key priorities for industrialized and developing countries after kyoto 







Compliance and Verification 
Developing Country Participation 
Clean Development Mechanism 
Special Circumstances 
Common but Differentiated Responsibility 
Clean Development Mechanism 
The success of the Kyoto Protocol will therefore hinge very much upon what 
the industrialized countries will be able to do in the next months and years. 
•	 First, they need to demonstrate to their legislatures and the private sector that 
implementing the Kyoto Protocol will not damage their economies. 
•	 Second, they should be able to work with developing countries in a construc­
tive way both to expand and deepen their constructive engagement. 
The speed with which the developing countries are able to take on such bind­
ing commitments is, of course, dependent on industrialized countries. Industrial­
ized countries should show their good faith by ensuring that the Kyoto Protocol 
enters into force soon. They should meet their commitments by reducing their 
 emissions as agreed in the Protocol. In addition, they should implement 
other provisions, which are contained both in the  and the Kyoto Protocol, 
that deal with their commitments to developing countries by providing financial 
and technical assistance. In the first phase, this means identifying those initiatives 
currently underway that meet developing country socioeconomic objectives for 
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atmosphere. Once identified, assistance should be provided to ensure that feasible 
projects are replicated on a broader scale, and to introduce newer, faster, and more 
efficient technologies. Developing countries will be comfortable with the idea of 
working to reduce  emissions only when it has been demonstrated that emis­
sions reductions do not necessitate foregoing their goal of sustainable develop­
ment. Only when this comfort level is reached will they be open to the suggestion 
of binding legal commitments. 
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Abstract 
Economically and physically, the countries most immediately vulnerable to the 
impacts of global warming are small island developing states (sids). sids are already 
beginning to feel the effects of global warming on their economies, their cultures, 
and their ecological systems, and should serve as a harbinger for the rest of the global 
community. For while geography dictates that sids will be the first to confront the 
tangible effects of climate change, it is soon to be a universal problem. Shared vul­
nerability was a strong factor in establishing the Alliance of Small Island States 
(aosis) in 1990. Since that time, aosis has been a very active participant in the cli­
mate change negotiations – advocating stronger commitment from industrialised 
countries and intensified involvement of developing countries. 
The authors contend that the Kyoto Protocol is a significant improvement over 
the Convention on Climate Change, in that it contains quantifiable goals and com­
mitments. However, the guidelines that it establishes are regarded as not nearly so 
stringent as aosis had deemed scientifically necessary or politically feasible. In 
addition, the Protocol still contains serious loopholes and ambiguities that have the 
potential to interfere with its effectiveness. It is imperative that steps be taken not 
only to strengthen and tighten the language of the Protocol, but to further enable 
the participation of non-Annex I countries. This paper closely examines the 
strengths and weaknesses of the Protocol, examining articles that pertain to com­
pliance, co-operation, and flexibility. Particular attention is paid to Articles 2, 3, 4, 6, 
12, and 17. 
Introduction 
The ten hottest years in recorded history have all occurred since 1980. The World 
Meteorological Organization identified 1996 as the eighteenth consecutive year 
with positive global anomalies. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
() announced in its Second Assessment Report in 1995 that the planet has 
entered a period of climatic instability likely to cause ‘widespread economic, 
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Economically and physically, the countries most immediately vulnerable to the 
impact of global warming are small island developing states (). There are 
many drawbacks associated with small size, magnified by the fact that the small 
island states are not only small, but are spread across a number of small islands. 
Small islands have limited resources, which forces specialisation and high depen­
dence on imports as well as over-use and depletion of natural resources. The limits 
to freshwater supplies are often palpable. Population densities are high, as are 
public administration and infrastructure costs, especially in the transportation 
and communication sectors. Size and isolation also limit institutional capacity and 
domestic markets. Each of these conditions is compounded by the threat of cli­
mate change.  are already beginning to feel the effects of global warming on 
their economies, their cultures, and their ecological systems. Geography dictates 
that  will be the first to confront the consequences of climate change, but it is 
expected that larger and less isolated economies will soon feel the impacts as well. 
What are the most imperative threats of climate change? 
Sea-level rise is perhaps the most critical climate change-related threat to , as  
it touches the very life force of island communities. Even a sea-level rise of twenty 
centimetres could have devastating effects on small islands. In some island groups, 
like Kiribati, Seychelles, and Maldives, up to 80% of the land area is less than a 
metre above present sea level. Higher islands will also experience serious impacts 
on their communities, economic activities, and infrastructural development as a 
result of climate change. For most , the most immediate threats posed by 
global warming include the following: 
Weather: It is predicted that climate change will most likely result in increased 
frequency and intensity of extreme weather events such as tropical storms. Greater 
damage from associated storm surges is also expected. Tropical storms are causing 
unprecedented devastation in  in almost every region of the world as they 
become more frequent, more severe, and much more damaging in terms of their 
financial costs and damages to infrastructure. 
Erosion: In most cases, over half of the population of island communities 
resides within two kilometres of the coast. This portion of the island populations 
is very vulnerable to sea-level rise and loss of property and livelihood to coastal 
erosion. 
Freshwater: Inadequate supplies of freshwater and water conservation are crit­
ical in all developing countries. The issue is especially imperative for , as sup­
plies of potable water can be particularly limited on islands. Small island vulnera­
bility is compounded by threats of drought due to climate change, and by saline 
intrusion into freshwater lenses and wells because of rising sea-levels. 
Biodiversity: Small islands tend to have high degrees of endemism and levels of 
biodiversity. However, populations of various species are typically limited in size, 
and at high risk of extinction. Even minor changes in temperature and sea level can 
result in serious alteration of habitats. Coral reefs, often described as the rain 
forests of the ocean because of their rich biodiversity, are particularly vulnerable 
to temperature increases, and could be seriously depleted. 
Agriculture: Crops can be extremely sensitive to climate factors such as temper­
ature and water levels. Warmer weather, droughts, excessive precipitation, and 
floods, all of which may result from climate change, could result in significant loss 
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Industry: Small economies are extremely susceptible to external economic and 
trade shocks. This creates real constraints for  in the sustainable development 
of trade and industry sectors. The potential impact of climate change on  
economies and environments elevates the perceived investment risk levels for 
industry. 
Culture: Loss of life, loss of livelihood, declines in productivity, and economic 
dislocation may all result from the effects of climate change. In addition to the dra­
matic economic implications of these circumstances, entire cultures may be oblit­
erated. 
Economics: The financial burdens that stem from the effects of global warming 
are likely to have a tremendous impact on the economies of the majority of . 
The costs will include population relocation, loss of crops, loss of natural 
resources, loss of land and other property, increased illness, loss of human 
resources, increased insurance costs, loss of tourism, and scarcity of food and 
potable water. 
Principle 6 of the Rio Declaration promised that the ‘developing countries most 
vulnerable’ would be given special priority. All  should fall within this cate­
gory. The financial pressures of coping with the effects of climate change are likely 
to be overwhelming for the average developing country. Because of their aug­
mented vulnerability, this may prove even more of a struggle for . A  recent  
study examined the likely impacts of an accelerated one-metre sea-level rise on the 
Marshall Islands by 2100. The study determined that between ten and thirty per­
cent of the shoreline would erode and 60 percent of the arable land would be lost. 
There would also be a significant increase in the frequency of severe floods, and the 
underground freshwater that the islanders rely on would become increasingly 
scarce. The cost of protecting the coast is estimated to be four to six times the coun­
try’s current gross domestic product. 
What is the role of aosis in the climate change negotiations? 
For small islands, climate change is an issue of survival. This shared vulnerability 
was a strong factor in establishing the Alliance of Small Island States () in 
1990.  now consists of 43 member states from all over the world, including 
Africa, the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the South 
China Sea. 
Since  are particularly vulnerable to global climate change, climate vari­
ability, and sea-level rise, the concerns being voiced by the members of  pos­
sess the genuine quality of those facing real and immediate jeopardy. However, the 
very tangible consequences of climate change that small islands are starting to 
experience will eventually, inexorably, pose threats to larger island and continen­
tal countries. ’ calls for action are not selfish. They are a reflection of con­
cerns that will become imperative around the planet in coming years. It would 
behoove the international community to take note of the actions and recommen­
dations of the small island nations. 
Throughout the negotiations, the Alliance has maintained a strong and active 
presence in the design of the climate change regime. The government of the small 
island state of Malta was the first to sponsor a United Nations General Assembly 
resolution calling for the establishment of an intergovernmental negotiating com­
mittee for a framework treaty aimed at combating global warming. At the first ses­
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principles to guide the negotiations of what would become the first binding inter­
national treaty addressing climate change. Many of the essential design features of 
the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (), 
including its emphasis on science, precaution, and equity, were supported by or 
derived from  proposals. Although the Alliance was unable to overcome the 
reluctance of industrialised countries to undertake concrete emissions reduction 
commitments at that time, it worked diligently to ensure that the Convention, 
once in force, would provide for the rapid review of the adequacy of Parties’ com­
mitments, in the light of the latest science, and would require the Parties to ‘take 
appropriate action.’ 
 had strength in numbers, which was not an insignificant factor in the 
rapid entry into force of the Convention in 1994. By 1995, at the first meeting of the 
Conference of the Parties (-1), the ’ procedural obligations forced 
the consideration of proposals for a new legal instrument to strengthen industri­
alised countries’ commitments. Just prior to -1,  submitted a draft pro­
tocol to the Convention, which included a proposal for industrialised (Annex 1) 
Parties to the Convention to cut their emissions of CO2 by 20% from 1990 levels 
by 2005. While no legal instrument was adopted at -1, the  protocol pro­
posal provided a rallying point for developing countries and Non-Governmental 
Organisations () as well as a centre of focus for media around the world. The 
momentum that the  protocol helped generate led to the adoption of the 
Berlin Mandate, which set the terms of reference for the negotiation of a legally 
binding instrument containing quantified targets and timetables for Annex 1 Par­
ties. 
In 1997, at -3, it was agreed that industrialised countries would strive for a 
5% reduction from 1990 levels of greenhouse gas emissions by 2012. This target fell 
well short not only of the  proposal, but also of the 60% reductions recom­
mended by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (). Nevertheless, 
 remains committed to the Kyoto Protocol as the best hope for a response 
from the international community to the threat of global warming. Since Kyoto, 
 has focused its energies on striving to clarify and further develop the Pro­
tocol to ensure that the climate system benefits fully from the 5% reduction. 
How does the Protocol fall short? 
The Protocol that was developed at Kyoto contains legally binding commitments 
to limit and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This characteristic alone defines it 
as a quantum improvement over the largely superficial Convention. The innova­
tive ‘flexibility’ mechanisms included in the Protocol, though largely untested, 
have the potential to enable significant cost savings in emissions reductions, and 
to directly engage the private sector in the implementation of an international 
environmental agreement. However, due to politics and limited negotiation time, 
the Protocol was left with many ambiguities and potential loopholes. ’s work 
since the adoption of the Protocol has focused on four aspects of particular con­
cern: 
•	 designing a robust and effective compliance system to back up the Protocol’s 
binding commitments; 
•	 promoting the use of rigorous scientific analysis, in combination with the pre­
cautionary principle, to ensure that remaining methodological imprecision is 
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•	 ensuring that the complexity of the Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms does not 
open opportunities for Parties to avoid genuine emissions reductions; and 
•	 maintaining the long-term momentum of the regime in strengthening the com­
mitments of industrialised countries and seeking ways of engaging developing 
countries as their emissions begin to rise. 
Both the scientific and the regulatory components of the Protocol are great 
improvements over those of the Convention. However, there are still many sub­
stantial ambiguities. It is therefore necessary to closely examine the agenda estab­
lished in Kyoto and address the areas of weakness. The most significant of these 
include: 
•	 adoption of the legally binding and quantifiable targets and timetables; 
•	 multilateral commitment to deploying innovative but untested mechanisms, the 
details of which remain to be negotiated; 
•	 heavy reliance on approaches that entail considerable methodological impreci­
sion and institutional and scientific uncertainty; and 
•	 vulnerability resulting from political uncertainties that may influence the future 
development of the regime. 
 is making a concerted effort to facilitate the resolution of these ambigu­
ities. The Alliance is also working to ensure that the untested mechanisms move 
forward in the most transparent, accountable, and effective manner possible. The 
following section addresses the above ambiguities through a discussion of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the Kyoto Protocol. The subsequent section examines 
specific components of the Protocol more thoroughly. 
What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Kyoto Protocol? 
Targets and timetables 
The question of targets and timetables was central to the Kyoto negotiations. It was 
also the most difficult, and therefore the last to be resolved. In assessing the suffi­
ciency of the targets and timetables established by the Protocol, it is important to 
consider its legal adequacy, scientific adequacy, and equity between parties. 
Legal adequacy 
The terms of Article 3 of the Protocol strengthen the legal character of Annex I tar­
gets. The text refers specifically to emissions limitations and reduction commit­
ments rather than objectives. The targets are clear and quantified. In this way, Par­
ties have moved away from the ‘soft’ targets that existed under the Convention, 
thus resolving an essential weakness of the Convention. 
During the negotiations,  strongly advocated flat reductions, rather than 
differentiated targets. The reason for this was that it seemed more likely that flat 
reductions would foster equal efforts by all Annex I Parties. At this point, the Pro­
tocol contains as near a flat rate as can be expected from the three most important 
Parties – the United States, the European Union, and Japan. Differentiation 
among the other Parties was necessarily accepted as a political compromise. 
Overall, there has been significant progress in achieving ‘legal adequacy,’but the 
agreement is still lacking an effective compliance regime.Article 18 addresses issues 
of non-compliance, but leaves the specific guidelines to be discussed at later nego­
tiations. A good deal of effort has gone into preparing such a mechanism. How­
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Specifically, the issue is complicated by the fact that the enforcement of legal 
requirements will be reliant on the acceptability, accuracy, and reliability of corre­
sponding scientific measures.  has been closely involved in the compliance-
related negotiations, and has stressed the need for the revised system to be: 
•	 preventative and precautionary, in that it should aim to prevent non-compli­
ance, before it occurs, and carry out assessments based upon the precautionary 
approach; 
•	 comprehensive and coherent, in that it should address issues related to all com­
mitments under the Protocol; 
•	 credible, in that it should be able to take up, examine, and effectively resolve 
compliance related issues, without political intervention; 
•	 transparent, in that its rules and procedures should be clearly and simply stated, 
and the reasoning and results should be based on sound information and be 
publicly available; 
•	 graduated and proportionate, in that the procedures and mechanisms should 
take into account the cause, type, degree, and frequency of non-compliance, and 
the common but differentiated characteristics of Parties’ commitments and 
capacities; 
•	 predictable, in that Parties should be informed, in advance, of the range of con­
sequences that might be attached to different categories of non-compliance; and 
•	 based on principles of efficiency and due process, in order to allow Parties an 
opportunity for a full, fair, and timely resolution of compliance-related issues. 
Scientific adequacy 
The legal character of the Protocol is only as sound as the corresponding science. 
The most important components to be examined when considering the scientific 
adequacy of the Kyoto agreement include the size of the targets, their coverage, the 
timing, and the inclusion of sinks. 
Targets. Article 3 of the Protocol requires an overall emissions reduction of six 
gases by at least 5% from 1990 levels by 2012. This falls well short of the 60% global 
reduction called for by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change () 
and of the 20% CO2 reduction proposed by .  considers the implica­
tions of this discrepancy to be egregious. While there is some uncertainty, the vast 
majority of scientists have accepted unequivocally that the global climate system 
is changing. Indeed, the Kyoto Protocol is the political endorsement of this scien­
tific assessment. Furthermore, there is widespread acknowledgement of the inad­
equacy of the current global climate change initiatives. In future commitment 
periods it will become necessary to take better account of the scientific parame­
ters, to ensure that the ability to make reductions is not overshadowed by a polit­
ical reluctance to take the necessary steps. 
Coverage. It is impressive that the Protocol will eventually cover six greenhouse 
gases (). However, the inclusion of all of these gases may engender greater 
uncertainties with regard to the calculation of emissions from less known sources 
and the convertibility of these gases into units of CO2 equivalents, using the esti­
mations provided by their global warming potentials. 
Timing. Another feature of the Protocol is the new and innovative use of budget 
periods or commitment periods. The  proposal suggested a 2005 deadline. 
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and politically feasible.  members were disappointed when the end of the 
first commitment period was designated as 2012 in the Protocol. However, there is 
something of a compromise outlined in the Protocol. According to Article 3.2, by 
2005 each Annex I Party shall have made ‘demonstrable progress’ in achieving its 
commitments under the Protocol. How that progress is to be measured has yet to 
be determined. 
Sinks. The agreement on sinks, which remained an issue until the eleventh hour, 
was the final element that enabled the negotiation of the Protocol targets. Without 
this measure, the Kyoto Protocol would not have been possible. The agreed-upon 
provision will ensure that further  work on sinks is undertaken immediately. 
It will also require the Parties to address uncertainties and methodological prob­
lems. In addition, once the Protocol review process starts, this mechanism will 
ensure that sinks will be dealt with in a verifiable and transparent manner. 
There is, however, still potential for problems. While the inclusion of sinks may 
increase the effectiveness of the Protocol, it may also introduce methodological 
uncertainties and possibly distract the regime from focusing on its main policy 
A recent study examined the likely impacts of an accelerated one-metre sea-level 
rise on the Marshall Islands by 2100. The study determined that between ten and 
thirty percent of the shoreline would erode and 60 percent of the arable land 
would be lost. There would also be a significant increase in the frequency of severe 
floods, and the underground freshwater that the islanders rely on would become 
increasingly scarce. The cost of protecting the coast is estimated to be four to six 
times the country’s current gross domestic product. 
task of shifting the global economy away from dependence on fossil fuels. Offering 
sinks as a means of meeting emissions mitigation commitments may also impart 
the erroneous idea that sinks are an acceptable and less expensive alternative to 
energy efficient or renewable energy technologies. In this way, the cheaper sink-
based option creates a significant economic disincentive for the development and 
expansion of these technologies. This means that developing countries are likely to 
miss opportunities for technology transfer, adding to future emissions problems as 
these economies continue to grow. In addition, while trees will sequester carbon 
from the atmosphere, there is no prediction or guarantee as to the length of time 
they will sustain such a function.  has addressed these issues and a number 
of other sink-related problems in several detailed submissions. 
Equity 
The distribution of emissions reduction commitments between Annex I countries 
varies widely. For example, the European Union has committed to -8% of 1990 
levels, and the United States to -7%, while Australia’s goal is +8% and Iceland’s is 
+10%. These distributions are not based on any identifiable, agreed-upon criteria. 
Rather, they were derived largely from heavily politicised negotiations, and based 
in large part on perceived political and economic ‘ability’ to bear the burden. 
Equity would demand that Parties with the capability to do more should pledge 
to do so. At this stage, there are solid, equity-based reasons for developing coun­
tries, which currently have no obligations under the Protocol, not to take on 
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based approach to differentiation, as demonstrated by the ambiguity of the exist­
ing targets, will complicate the agreement and distribution of obligations when the 
regime expands to include new Parties. 
Innovative, but untested mechanisms 
The Kyoto Protocol outlines several major innovations for ways of meeting emis­
sions reduction commitments. These include: 
•	 Joint commitments or the bubble arrangement under Article 4, which, in effect, 
formalises the European Union umbrella arrangement. This provision is also 
open to any two or more countries that are willing to commit to each other for 
a five-year compliance period. 
•	 Joint implementation among Annex I countries through project-based trading 
of emissions offsets under Article 6. 
•	 Joint implementation between Annex I Parties and developing countries using 
the Clean Development Mechanism detailed in Article 12. 
•	 Emissions trading of unused emissions allowances among Annex 1 countries 
under Article 17. 
Each of these mechanisms is a groundbreaker for international law and is 
intended to allow Annex I countries to use market-based and co-operative mecha­
nisms to take advantage of lowest cost options for emissions reduction. Each also 
challenges the traditional understanding of sovereign obligation and state respon­
sibility, as they allow Parties to fulfil obligations through activities that take place 
outside their territory, and in some cases to subcontract their responsibilities to the 
private sector. Tracing these obligations and holding the contracting states liable for 
any shortfalls of performance will present unique challenges to the climate regime. 
What are the specific components of the Protocol that need to be addressed? 
In the post-Kyoto period,  has determined its primary task to be identifying 
and eliminating loopholes in the Protocol in order to ensure that scientific and reg­
ulatory uncertainties are reduced as much as possible. Fortunately, the text of the 
Kyoto Protocol provides significant opportunities to introduce greater rigor into 
the Protocol’s commitments and, in particular, its flexibility mechanisms. This 
section examines specific components of Articles of the Protocol. The section that 
follows considers the potential for combining measures called for under different 
Articles. 
Article 2: Policies and measures 
There are no binding policies and measures () in the Kyoto Protocol. The 
language used to describe possible actions is relatively soft. For example, the term 
‘such as’ in Article 2.1(a) implies that the outlined PAMs are provided simply as 
examples of actions the Parties may wish to use in meeting their quantified emis­
sions limitation and reduction commitments (). It is possible, however, 
that the  listed in Article 2 may be the preferred means by which Parties 
achieve their . This use of  may provide an important interim bench­
mark for assessing Party compliance, which could, in turn, prove instrumental to 
the Protocol’s long-term goals. Article 2 receives no express mention in the Proto­
col’s provisions on reporting (Article 7) or ‘in depth review’ (Article 8). However, 
it is clearly covered in Article 7(2) by a reference to the obligation for each Annex 
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I Party to provide ‘supplemental information necessary to demonstrate compli­
ance with its commitments under this Protocol.’ 
During the negotiations,  and the European Union supported a mecha­
nism for the international coordination of . The idea was to encourage har­
monisation at as high a standard level as possible, and to avoid any potential neg­
ative impacts on developing countries. Such a mechanism was not included. 
However, Article 2.1(b) captures the spirit of the concerns that had prompted 
. The last sentences of Article 2.3 and Article 2.4 also preserve the right to 
reintroduce proposals for a coordination mechanism. 
Article 2.2 requires Annex I parties to negotiate limitations and reductions on 
aviation and marine bunker fuels. While this is one of the fastest growing emis­
sions sectors, negotiators were unable to agree on how to attribute responsibility 
for ship and aircraft emissions that may be expended in international air space or 
international waters. With respect to climate change,  is in support of regu­
lation of these emissions. However, the majority of , which are so vulnerable 
to the impacts of global warming, are also particularly dependent on air and sea 
transport for trade and tourism. This catch-22 is compounded by the fact that the 
rules agreed to by the Annex I countries will help to predetermine regulations that 
may later be applied to developing countries. 
Article 2.3 reflects an effort, in the context of the implementation of PAMs, to 
balance the interests of those countries concerned about the impacts of climate 
change, such as , and countries that are worried about the impact of responses 
to climate change, like fossil fuel exporters. Petroleum export countries may try to 
use this paragraph to challenge  that affect the petroleum market. However, 
this provision is balanced out by others that enumerate Party vulnerability in a 
manner that is applicable in this situation. 
In the same context, Article 2.3 also refers to ‘further action, as appropriate’ that 
may be taken by the Conference of Parties serving as the Meeting of Parties 
(⁄), but nothing specific is detailed. Article 3.14 contains similar language 
and requires preparation for a -4 decision based on consideration of ‘actions 
related to funding, insurance, and transfer of technology.’ This has provided an 
opportunity for  to raise issues concerning impact-related insurance, and 
for countries belonging to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(), for example, to revive proposals related to compensation for economic 
loss caused by response measures. Whether this latter action is to be deemed 
‘appropriate’ for ‘further action’ remains to be decided. 
Article 3, Annexes A and B: Emissions limitation and reduction commitments 
Perhaps the most significant improvement of the Protocol over the Convention 
lies in the binding legal character of emissions limitation and reduction commit­
ments, which are clearly stated in Article 3 and Annex B. These quantified emis­
sions limitation and reduction commitments () consist of commitment 
periods during which an Annex I Party may not exceed the ‘assigned amount’ of 
greenhouse gas emissions indicated in Annex B. This discussion of Article 3 
reviews specific core design aspects of the . 
Coverage of gases 
Article 3.1 and Annex A of the Protocol list the six greenhouse gases to be monitored 
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raise significant methodological challenges, both with regard to the measurement of 
emissions from sources and removals by sinks of these less well known gases. The 
conversion of these measurements into accurate ‘carbon equivalents’ by comparing 
their global warming potentials () also presents some difficulty. Although 
Article 5 of the Protocol provides that measurement and  methodologies 
accepted by the  and agreed upon at the  will serve as the default approach, 
even these have significant ranges of uncertainty associated with them. At the Kyoto 
conference there were proposals to discount emissions reductions claimed for gases 
with higher levels of uncertainty. No agreement was reached, however. 
Coverage of sinks 
 did not support the blanket inclusion of sinks in the Kyoto Protocol out of 
concern that the benefits of regulatory flexibility would be outweighed by the 
ambiguity caused by methodological uncertainties. In addition, focussing on 
carbon sequestration without taking into account biodiversity and environmen­
tally positive or neutral forestry principles could be damaging to long term sus­
tainable forest management, especially in developing countries. Under tremen­
dous pressure from a coalition of Annex I delegations interested in increased 
flexibility, the treatment of ‘removals of emissions’ by sinks has been divided into 
two categories of activities within the Protocol: 
Article 3.3 authorises Annex I Parties to include emissions from sources and 
removals by sinks of greenhouse gases that are derived from human activities in 
their inventories. This clause is the first such category, and refers only to human-
induced land-use change and forestry activities, limited to afforestation, refor­
estation, and deforestation since 1990; 
Article 3.4 anticipates that the / will decide on modalities, rules, and 
guidelines for a second category of ‘additional human-induced activities’ 
including those affecting agricultural soils and other land-use change and 
forestry categories. 
Under these provisions Parties can begin to calculate and subtract removals 
from their inventories without further authorization from the /. Once the 
/ has approved additional categories, Parties may apply these to the first 
commitment period and must apply them to subsequent commitment periods. 
Article 3.7 is an additional source of concern for , as it allows countries 
that experienced a net increase of emissions from their land-use and forestry sec­
tors in 1990 to include those net emissions in their 1990 baseline. In effect, this pro­
vision creates more leniency for countries that engaged in extensive timber extrac­
tion and land clearing during that year by allowing them a higher 1990 baseline 
from which to measure net reductions. 
Timetables and commitment periods 
Article 3.2 provides for an intermediary review of progress toward the Protocol 
commitments in 2005. The Protocol’s innovative use of commitment periods pro­
vides Annex I Parties with more flexibility with regard to timing and at the same 
time appears to allow for a more precise measurement of emissions reductions. 
However, extension of the first commitment period until 2012 has the potential to 
delay action well beyond the timetable of 2005 that  worked to install. The 
implications of this delay could be compounded by the uncertain status of emis­
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Article 3.13 allows for the ‘banking’ of over-achievements. This means that 
emissions reductions in excess of a Party’s set goal in the first commitment period 
may be carried over into a second commitment period. Clearly, if emissions 
reductions achieved prior to 2008 are part of an overall trend, they will facilitate 
a Party’s efforts to remain below its assigned amount during the first commit­
ment period. It should be noted, however, that it was not possible prior to the 
advent of the first commitment period for a Party to formally ‘bank’ emissions 
reductions to offset its assigned amount in the first commitment period. There 
is one exception to this restriction. Emissions reductions units generated through 
the clean development mechanism (see Article 12, below) may, from the year 
2000, be banked and used to offset some, as yet undefined, ‘part of ’ a Party’s 
assigned amount. 
Di›erentiation in base year 
Article 3.5 allows Parties that are considered economies in transition () to use 
a base year other than the uniform 1990 established in the Protocol for measuring 
the allotted reduction amounts. This mechanism is contingent upon  approval 
of a specified base year or average base year. However, when executed, this measure 
will allow  to use the special base as the starting point for measuring progress 
towards long-term Protocol obligations. In addition, any  that joins the Proto­
col in the future that has not already submitted its national communication under 
the Convention may also submit a baseline other than 1990, with the approval of 
the /. 
Currently, Bulgaria is to use 1989 as a base year, Hungary to use an average from 
1985 to 1987, Poland to use 1988, and Romania 1989. This deviation from 1990 may 
therefore be deleterious to the overall effectiveness of the Protocol as these varia­
tions of base years decrease the obligations of these countries, and may result in an 
increase of the amount of ‘hot air’ that these countries may trade with other Annex 
1 Parties in the future. This Article also sets an interesting precedent for any future 
‘voluntary’ commitments pledged by developing countries at a later stage in the 
development of the Protocol. Further, Article 3.8 allows any Annex I Party to 
choose a 1995 base year for the purpose of measuring reductions of emissions of 
the three long-lived ‘trace’ gases included in Annex A. This is an issue of some con­
cern because unlike Article 3.5, which relegates the authority of approval of base 
year changes to the /, Article 3.8 changes can be made without approval 
from higher authority. 
What are the pros and cons of the flexibility mechanisms? 
The most innovative and untested aspects of the Kyoto Protocol can be grouped 
together as the four ‘flexibility mechanisms.’ These include Article 4, bubble; Arti­
cle 17, trading; Article 6, joint implementation (); and Article 12, the clean devel­
opment mechanism (). Although they all have important, distinguishing fea­
tures, each is based on the principle that the Protocol will operate most efficiently 
if Parties and/or private entities are allowed to invest in emissions reduction 
opportunities where they are least expensive to achieve. In effect this will allow 
Annex I Parties, and in some cases private entities, to purchase or invest in the cre­
ation of ‘emissions reduction units’ which can then be used to offset their obliga­
tions under the Protocol. Table 1 (page 74) sets out the core issues that have arisen 
or are likely to arise and points out where design aspects converge and diverge. 
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table 1 summary of flexibility mechanisms characteristics and issues 
characteristic	 inventory-based transfer project-based transfer 
Article 4 Article 17 Article 6 Article 12 
Bubbling Emissions Trading ji cdm 
Investors/Transferees Annex I	 Annex I Annex I Annex I 
Hosts/Transferors Annex I	 Annex I Annex I non-Annex I 
Limitation 
on use in relation 
to assigned amount none	 ‘supplemental to ‘supplemental to ‘part of’Article 3 
domestic action’ domestic action’ commitments 
Coverage of sinks not explicit	 not explicit yes not explicit 
Environmental actual emissions actual emissions ‘additional to any ‘additional to any 
additionality must be less than must be less than that would that would occur 
‘assigned amount’ ‘assigned amount’ otherwise occur’ in the absence 
of the activity’ 




Government approval yes	 yes yes yes (voluntary) 
Certification provision	 ex ante/ ex ante/ ex post/ ex post/ 
notification to verification rules ‘approval’ by ‘independent 
secretariat under negotiation parties involved auditing’ 
Compliance
conditionality	 notification to verification rules yes, under Articles under negotiation 
secretariat under negotiation 5,7, and 8 










involvement n/a under negotiation ‘legal entities’ ‘private entities’
 
Institutional 
characteristics 	 special provisions under negotiation under negotiation executive board 
for reios of cdm 
* Regional Economic Integration Organization 
After a brief explanation of each of these provisions, selected crosscutting issues 
that are raised by each mechanism will be reviewed. 
Article 4: Bubbling 
Article 4 allows any two or more Parties to enter into an agreement, prior to the 
start of the first compliance period, to share responsibility for achieving their com­
bined . The text was introduced by the European Union to provide a 
clearer legal basis for the bubble under which its 15 member states are to combine 
efforts and commitments through the rules and institutions of the European 
Community, a Regional Economic Integration Organization (). 
 and others were sharply critical of earlier versions of this text, primarily 
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Union. Unlike other flexibility mechanisms, there is no opportunity under Article 
4 for international oversight of the amount of a Party’s obligations that could be 
transferred through a bubble agreement. Nor is there an opportunity for market 
disciplines to set the terms of such transfers. 
The main concern of the Alliance is that a Party with a fairly large reduction 
obligation could team up with a Party that has leeway to increase its emissions. For 
example, Russia might determine that it will overachieve its commitment to sta­
bilize its emissions at 100% of 1990 levels by 4%. Using global warming potentials 
(), this ‘over-achievement’ can be translated into tonnes of carbon equiva­
lent. These carbon units could then be determined to represent a portion, say 2%, 
of United States 1990 emissions. Under an Article 4 bubble, Russia would agree to 
reduce its ‘assigned amount’ from 100% to 96% of its 1990 levels, and allow the 
United States to increase its assigned amount from 93% to 95% of its 1990 levels. 
The United States and Russia would have to notify the secretariat of the new dis­
tribution of  that resulted from their agreement, but there would be no 
opportunity for other Parties to challenge the terms of the agreement. These new, 
modified  will replace the amount assigned to the Parties in Annex B as 
their legally binding commitment. 
Although Article 4 was clearly designed to accommodate the European Union, 
any two or more Parties could declare a ‘bubble’ prior to the commencement of the 
first commitment period. As such, countries like the United States and/or Canada 
could form an agreement, say with Russia, in order to discharge some of their 
obligations. This could result in a significant and potentially unchecked increase 
in the amount of North American emissions, which could not be challenged by any 
other Party. 
There are some who downplay the risk associated with a bubble between the 
United States and Russia. There has even been some speculation that without U.S. 
participation countries that might otherwise want to establish bubble arrange­
ments with Russia would consider it too risky, for economic and other considera­
tions, to tie their successful implementation of the Protocol to a currently unsta­
ble economy. The risk factor is further emphasised by the requirement that the 
bubble be valid for the full five years of the commitment period. Unlike the trad­
ing regime anticipated for Article 17, the exchange of obligations under Article 4 
would remain static during the commitment period, and could not be exchanged 
in response to fluctuations in the market value of emissions reduction units. The 
more restrictive aspect of Article 4 might make it less attractive to the United 
States. However, the liability provisions included in Article 4 place the legal risks 
associated with failure to meet a bubble commitment on the transferor or seller of 
emissions reduction units, in this case Russia. 
Article 17: Emissions trading 
Articles 3.10 and 3.11 authorise Annex I Parties to ‘trade emissions’ by acquiring 
emissions reduction units and transferring any part of an assigned amount, 
according to the provisions in Article 17. The relevant principles, modalities, rules, 
and guidelines, particularly for verification, reporting and accountability are to be 
defined by the . Conceptions of what these modalities should look like, to the 
extent that they have formed any detailed positions at all, are likely to vary widely. 
At the moment, most of the available conceptual work on emissions trading has 
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tion for Economic Co-operation and Development () and United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development () have been particularly engaged. 
Perhaps the clearest distinguishing factor between the approach of  and that 
of  is the extent to which they would involve private parties in trading. 
 literature has thus far examined a system of state to state trades. This would 
essentially be a more dynamic form of the European bubble whereby sovereign 
States might regularly re-negotiate the exchange of their assigned amounts. 
Although potentially complex, such arrangements could rely upon fairly tradi­
tional forms of international instruments and mechanisms. Other approaches, 
including some of the work commissioned by , call for the establishment 
of fiscal instruments that could be bought and sold in an open market by both sov­
ereign States and private actors. This method would likely draw upon methods 
from the international financial markets, including stock markets and commodity 
exchanges. In fact, most of the various trading scenarios being discussed are mod­
eled on stock market rules. However, each national stock market uses different secu­
rity criteria, which may make it difficult to harmonise approaches to issues such as 
compliance with emissions trading rules. Whichever approach gains favour, it is 
possible that one approach may evolve to include the other. 
For those seeking to reduce the regulatory uncertainties associated with a 
system of emissions trading, it is useful that Article 17 stresses the need for rules on 
verification, reporting, and accountability. The negotiating process may be further 
helped by the fact that the United States, the most adamant proponent of emis­
sions trading, has voiced the need for stringent compliance mechanisms. This is to 
ensure Parties trading in emissions permits that the emissions obligations on 
which the permits are based will be backed by legal consequences. However, while 
these principles are advocated strongly, there is an underlying concern that some 
Parties have more experience than others with exploiting loopholes. 
Developing countries will most likely not be engaged in emissions trading 
until and unless they undertake commitments. A main focus for them will be the 
extent to which the popularity of this mechanism could reduce opportunities 
offered to them, especially under Article 12 (). The text of Article 17 states 
clearly that emissions trading must be supplemental to domestic actions and 
there are similar clauses in Articles 6 and 12. As such, the / may choose 
to limit the amount an Annex I Party may use to offset its obligations through 
emissions trading. 
Article 6: Joint Implementation 
Article 6 and Article 12 are the two ‘project-based’ flexibility mechanisms defined 
in the Protocol. Along with Article 3.11, Article 6 allows Annex I countries to offset 
emissions reductions units resulting from projects in other Annex I countries. In 
the short term, most Article 6 investments are expected to be funded by the wealth­
ier Annex II countries or investors, and to take place in Annex I countries with 
, where opportunities for energy-related investments will probably be less 
expensive. Unlike the other flexibility mechanisms, under Article 6 Parties are not 
required to delineate rules beyond those outlined in the Article. The provision 
states only that the / may ‘elaborate’ further guidelines, including those 
for verification. 
Developing countries, including members of , may come to view Article 
6 as both a competitor and a forerunner for the conceptually similar project-based 
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activities of the clean development mechanism (). The clearest distinction 
between Article 6 and Article 12 is in their institutional characteristics. Article 6 
seems to be intended to operate primarily on a bilateral basis.Although Parties and 
institutions of the Protocol may intervene to enforce aspects of this bilateral bar­
gain, including with regard to compliance conditionality, Article 6 does not 
require an overall administrative structure such as the ‘executive board’ established 
to supervise Article 12 activities. 
The less interventionist approach outlined in Article 6 may reflect negotiators’ 
perceptions that the scientific and regulatory risks associated with emissions 
reduction investments in Annex I countries are inherently lower than those in 
developing countries. All Annex I countries, including Article 6 hosts, will be 
required to report their emissions annually, and to demonstrate progress in meet­
ing their commitments under Articles 2 and 3. This suggests that climate change-
related projects initiated under Article 6 will take place within a regulatory frame­
work that might be absent from Article 12 projects. 
In addition to the more laissez-faire approach of Article 6, its projects will not 
be subject to the mandatory administrative and adaptation surcharges imposed by 
Article 12. No reference is made in Article 6, as it is in Article 12, to independent 
auditing or certification processes. This may make Article 6 investments more 
attractive to Annex I countries than Article 12 projects. This is an important issue 
for developing countries, as it is hoped that Article 12 will generate investment in 
developing countries, in particular for adaptation funding. Consequently,  
and many other developing country advocates have an interest in working to 
ensure that the lower transaction costs associated with Article 6 do not draw atten­
tion and investment away from Article 12 activities. The possibility of adding an 
adaptation surcharge to Articles 6 and 17 activities has therefore been strongly 
advocated by . 
Article 12: Clean Development Mechanism 
The concept of a ‘clean development fund’ was introduced late in the Kyoto Pro­
tocol negotiations by the delegation from Brazil. It was originally intended to serve 
the dual propose of providing an incentive for Annex I Party compliance and pro­
viding a source of revenue for developing country implementation of the Proto­
col by assessing financial penalties against Annex I Parties that exceeded their 
assigned emissions amounts. 
The Clean Development Mechanism () was approved in its current form 
because its proponents downplayed its role in enforcing Protocol compliance. 
Instead, the  borrows from pilot arrangements for ‘activities implemented 
jointly’ such as Costa Rica’s national ‘certified tradeable offset’ programme and the 
U.S. initiative on joint implementation. Because it evolved from a developing 
country proposal and incorporates a number of design principles proposed by 
Southern delegations, the  is expected to enjoy greater support than previous 
incarnations of ‘joint implementation’ did. 
As mentioned earlier, the presence of an ‘executive board’ is the main feature 
that distinguishes Article 12 ‘project activities’ from Article 6 ‘projects.’ A number 
of developing countries supported the inclusion of a mechanism for multilateral 
supervision not because developing country investments are inherently more 
risky, but out of a perceived need to develop a transparent and consistent process 
for the negotiation of Article 12 projects. Indeed, several delegations suggested that 
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the regulatory and scientific uncertainties associated with Article 12 projects were 
more likely to be exploited by Annex I countries seeking the highest financial 
return on their investments rather than by developing countries trying to sell pro­
jects with less than satisfactory features. The intervention of an executive board, as 
well as independent auditing and certification processes, were installed to reduce 
potential risks. 
Despite broad-based support for Article 12, the agreement in Kyoto masks sig­
nificant remaining political and ideological differences between countries as to 
how the  would best function. There are many inherently complex questions 
to be answered. There is also tension between those that wish to see the  up 
and running quickly, and with the lowest transaction costs possible, and those 
that remain cautious and are willing to increase costs in exchange for greater 
accountability. Parties at both ends of this spectrum place the  at risk, either 
by undermining its credibility or by crushing it with an over-burdensome 
bureaucracy. 
It was expected that the implications of pre-commitment period banking 
would be analysed at -4. However, neither -4 nor -5 saw any closure 
on the matter. At this point, Article 12.10 authorises Annex I Parties to offset Arti­
cle 3 commitments using certified emissions reductions ‘obtained’ beginning in 
2000. While the final decisions on the  may only be made by the /, 
there will be considerable pressure from both potential hosts and potential 
investors to establish an ‘interim ’ that could pre-authorise projects and pre­
certify emissions reductions. 
 delegations played a significant role in designing and supporting the 
inclusion of the . It is clear that some delegations view the adaptation sur­
charge provision in Article 12.8 as the price  demanded for a more enthusi­
astic encouragement of joint implementation with developing countries. How­
ever, others will expect  to continue to maintain a sceptical approach to joint 
implementation and to demand the highest level of transparency and account­
ability with regard to emissions reductions units generated in developing coun­
tries to offset Annex I country commitments. 
What are the key issues to be considered 
in order to optimise the flexibility mechanisms? 
This section touches briefly on a number of significant design issues that crosscut 
each of the flexibility mechanisms discussed above. Each is discussed within the 
context of how it might complement or compete with the other. This discussion is 
intended to provide a basis for harmonising the transparency and accountability 
aspects of each mechanism at the highest possible level. 
Limitation on use: preserving equitable allocations 
The bargain struck in Kyoto, however imperfect, represents an allocation of oblig­
ations based, to some extent, on an appropriate allocation of burdens among 
Annex I countries and between Annex I and developing countries. Each of the 
Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms provides an opportunity to redistribute these 
burdens through the principle of cost-effectiveness. In order to maintain a sense 
of equity and, more specifically, ensure that Annex I countries take action domes­
tically, Articles 6 and 17 require that joint implementation and emissions trading 
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to compliance only as a part of Article 3 commitments, as determined by the 
/. Each of these qualifiers may provide an opportunity to limit the use 
of flexibility mechanisms to preserve aspects of the allocations identified in 
Annex B. 
Coverage of sinks 
Articles 4 and 17 contain no reference to ‘removals by sinks.’ However, they are 
likely to be subject to the same restrictions as any other Article 3 effort. The absence 
of any mention of sinks in Article 12 provides a solid basis for ensuring that the 
 focuses exclusively on high quality and reliable emissions mitigation projects 
unless and until Parties agree to sufficiently robust criteria and methodologies for 
the inclusion of land-use change or forestry projects. 
Environmental and financial additionality 
Additionality requires project proponents to establish that the investment will 
yield genuine net reductions in emissions that are additional to what would oth­
erwise have occurred. These criteria are relevant primarily to the project-based 
transfers of Articles 6 and 12. Additionality can be broken down into the closely 
related concepts of environmental and financial additionality. 
Environmental additionality requires that project proponents demonstrate 
that the investment will result in genuine net emissions reductions that would not 
have occurred without the investment. In the context of an Article 6 project, envi­
ronmental additionality is easily established, as the Annex I host country is operat­
ing under its own emissions cap. Thus, any investment that leads to over-achieve­
ment of an Annex B allowance should be available for certification and transfer. 
Environmental additionality is far more difficult to establish in projects of non-
Annex I countries operating under Article 12. Because developing countries are not 
subject to emissions reduction obligations there is no reliable pre-determined 
baseline against which progress may be measured. It is therefore impossible to 
know whether the emissions reduction unit produced by the investment would 
not have otherwise been achieved, or that it has not been ‘cancelled out’ by emis­
sions growth elsewhere in the country. 
Financial additionality requires an assessment of whether the investment 
would have taken place in the absence of the regulatory incentive provided by the 
Convention or the Protocol. Financial additionality is important to regulators 
because it can provide important evidence for environmental additionality; that 
is, the additional financial resources that are flowing toward climate-friendly pro­
jects may provide important evidence that the emissions reductions resulting from 
an investment might not otherwise have occurred. 
Proof of financial additionality is important to developing countries in partic­
ular, because it helps reassure them that financial resources such as Global Envi­
ronmental Facility () funding, ‘regular’ flows of Official Development Assis­
tance (), or Foreign Direct Investment are not being redirected to -related 
investments from investments that would otherwise have received a higher 
national priority. Explicit references to financial additionality in draft documents 
during the discussions in the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (), and 
in the activities implemented jointly () guidelines were not incorporated into 
Article 12. In fact, it is not clear that the  will involve the transfer of funds in 
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This lack of clarity raises the possibility of multinational corporations ‘launder­
ing’ their emissions through techniques not dissimilar to the transfer pricing used to 
avoid taxes.A parent corporation based in an Annex I country could pay for its energy 
efficiency investment in a subsidiary in one non-Annex I country by simultaneously 
allowing an emissions increase in a subsidiary based in another non-Annex I coun­
try. The reductions generated in the first non-Annex I country might then be used to 
offset the parent corporation’s emissions in the home country, leading to an overall 
global increase. This type of example indicates clearly that the ambiguities of private 
sector responsibility and liability that are raised by their participation in flexibility 
mechanisms will have to be considered and addressed in the post-Kyoto process. 
Certification provisions 
Each of the Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms requires some form of ‘government 
approval.’ This may happen at the point of transfer or at the point that the portion 
of the assigned amount, or emissions reduction unit, is added to or deducted from 
the obligation of the Annex I Party, as per Article 3. However, only Article 12 pro­
vides for a process of auditing and certification that would require an objective 
assessment of whether the transfer will result in net emissions reductions. The 
additional guidelines and rules that will be developed for Article 6 and 17 should 
incorporate the precedent set by Article 12. 
Compliance conditionality 
A further inconsistency in the Protocol’s approach to flexibility is that the compli­
ance conditionality measures outlined for Article 6 transfers are fairly strict, while 
the others are much more lenient. Under Article 6.1(c), an Annex I Party is pro­
hibited from acquiring emissions reduction units unless it is in compliance with 
its inventory and reporting obligations under Articles 5 and 7. Furthermore, 
should a question arise through the Protocol’s ‘in-depth review’ procedures with 
regard to a Party’s compliance with Article 6.4, it may not apply its emissions 
reduction units until the question is resolved. As such, the role that compliance 
conditionality plays in enforcement of the Protocol could serve as a strong argu­
ment for the inclusion of such a measure within Articles 12 and 17. 
Liability provisions: Who bears the risk? 
As an instrument of public international law, negotiated, signed, and ratified by 
states, the Kyoto Protocol will represent an exchange of sovereign obligations and 
be subject to classical international rules of State responsibility. However, the flex­
ibility mechanisms outlined above were formulated with the anticipation that the 
static obligations reflected in the allocation of commitments in Annex B will be 
made fluid. This will allow a potentially infinite series of transactions through 
which emissions reduction units representing the Annex B commitments are 
bought, sold, and reallocated. 
Article 4.5 contains the only clear liability provision related to the Protocol’s 
flexibility mechanisms. It operates on the principle that the seller or the transferor 
of the emissions credit bears the full risk of the transaction. For example, in the 
theoretical scenario discussed earlier, if Russia failed to meet its newly calculated 
amount, it would be in violation of the Protocol. However, under Article 4.5, the 
United States would still be allowed to emit the full 95% it bargained for in the bub­
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There is considerable logic to the ‘seller beware’ principle which, through lia­
bility rules, holds the ‘host’ Party responsible, as the host is in the best position to 
ensure that the bargained-for emissions reductions actually take place. The same 
logic may well justify extending these principles to emissions trading under Arti­
cle 17. However, transitioning and developing economies wishing to participate in 
Article 6 or  projects should be aware that Article 4.5 could provide a prece­
dent for any liability rules that emerge under that mechanism. Accordingly, host 
countries could be liable should the projects they are hosting fail to generate the 
promised emissions reductions. In these transactions, a far wider range of actors 
may be responsible for the success or failure of the project, including those 
involved in its design, funding, and certification. This complicates the legal rela­
tionships and the chain of liability associated with an ‘emissions reduction unit’ 
considerably. Disputes could arise between and among states, private entities, and 
intergovernmental organisations, each of which may share interest in and respon­
sibility for the success or failure of a project. 
One way of reducing the regulatory risk associated with project-based flexibil­
ity mechanisms is to allow emissions reductions units to be certified and trans­
ferred only after the activity has been completed. For example, should a project 
consist of an investment in the retooling of a power plant with a 20-year life span, 
only the emissions reduced during the specified commitment period could be 
offset against that period’s assigned amount. There is some basis for this ‘ex post’ 
approach in the texts of Articles 6 and 12, which refer to emissions reductions 
‘resulting from’ project activities. This language suggests that they must have 
already occurred to be credited. There will, however, be pressure from investors to 
offset the full projected value of their investment as soon as possible. 
Conclusion 
While much was achieved in Kyoto, there is no room for complacency. Climate 
change is happening. The devastating effects that it could have, from the forests of 
Southeast Asia to the floodplains of Africa and China, to the blistering heat of 
recent American summers, must continue to drive the development of the Con­
vention and its Protocol. 
The existence of the Protocol is a demonstration of international recognition 
of the need for action. However, there is very strong evidence to suggest that the 
commitments being made are not strong enough. The science is overwhelming 
and the consequences of inaction are clear. The  has repeatedly described 
mitigation actions that are not only technologically feasible, but economically 
beneficial. For those of us preparing to watch our crops, our land, our ecology, 
and our cultures disappear, it is impossible to contemplate failure to take action. 
The future of small island States represents the future of the planet. Islands are 
the planet’s coral reefs, offering early warning signals, which only the negligent 
would ignore. 
The level of effort required to resolve the uncertainties set out in this article 
must be placed in the context of the very real possibility that the Protocol may not 
succeed. The Protocol could fail if it does not receive the requisite combinations of 
numbers and emissions levels of Parties required to bring it into force. If the 
United States, the country with the highest level of emissions, cannot build the 
necessary political support in Congress to become a Party to the Protocol, failure 
is also imminent. 
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Scientific evidence points to the use of fossil fuels by industrialised nations as 
the primary cause of global warming. However, given the growth rate in the devel­
oping world, unless effective measures are deployed immediately, developing 
country emissions will exceed those of industrialised countries within 25 years. 
Because of this, it is imperative that steps be taken not only to strengthen and 
tighten the language of the Protocol, but to further enable the participation of 
non-Annex I countries. The principle employed must truly be that of common but 
differentiated responsibilities. 
At this point, especially given the comparatively low targets set for developed 
countries, it seems that Annex I countries must be fairly circumspect in establish­
ing the right environment for the involvement of developing countries in terms of 
Annex I emissions efforts and in the transfer of financial resources and the right 
technologies. The participation of developing countries will be, to a large degree, 
dependent on the development and transfer of appropriate, affordable, and envi­
ronmentally sound technologies. 
Many developing countries, including members of , are already devoting 
considerable time, effort, and funding to this work. Political, financial, and techni­
cal support from the international community will be vital if this work is to progress 
further. It is also important to acknowledge that many major developing countries 
are undertaking significant emissions-saving and emissions-reducing activities. 
Examples include the ‘Gazol’ program in Brazil, biomass research and practical 
application in India, wind energy in China, and solar water heaters in Barbados. 
 put forth a proposal for the assumption of voluntary commitments by 
developing countries but it did not survive Kyoto. There is need for considerable 
political groundwork to convince many developing countries to make Kyoto-ori­
ented commitments. Recognising that many developing countries are already 
taking steps, others should be convinced to do likewise. Early action by Annex I 
countries will help developing countries to access advancements, and to avoid mis­
steps or pitfalls, through a process of technological ‘leap-frogging.’ 
Ahead lies an interim period of legal and institutional limbo. What is done 
during this time to maintain momentum and to ensure integrity of the climate 
regime will be a genuine challenge. It is beyond the reach of current norms and 
institutions of international law. At the core of this very political issue is the per­
sonal issue of obligation. As individuals, and even as governments, many of us feel 
an obligation to secure a better future for our children. This human need must 
undergo the very difficult process of being translated into international policy. 
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Abstract 
Energy is central to the current international discussions about climate change 
because it is the human activity that contributes most to the buildup of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere. It is also a critical element of national plans for economic 
and social development among the poorer countries of the world that currently lack 
su≤cient energy to power modern cities, industries and transportation systems. 
Transformation of the world’s energy systems to promote energy e≤ciency, 
increased use of renewable energy resources and cleaner conventional energy use 
can promote overall economic and social development while at the same time 
e≠ectively addressing the threats of climate change. E≠orts to control greenhouse 
gas emissions can go hand in hand with measures to address the needs of 
developing countries for increased energy services. Focusing on the positive aspects 
of environmentally sustainable development will be more e≠ective in building 
support for climate change mitigation than a strategy that primarily emphasizes 
the need for limiting worldwide emissions. Increased energy e≤ciency, adoption of 
renewable sources of energy, and cleaner use of conventional fuels are the most 
promising options for providing the level of energy services needed in the 
developing world, while at the same time limiting energy-related greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
Introduction: What are the environmental, social, 
and economic threats presented by climate change? 
The potential impacts of climate change include increased frequency of extreme 
weather events like drought, floods, and intense storms; rising sea levels; melting 
of glaciers and the Arctic ice cap; and disruption of a wide range of natural ecosys­
tems. Such environmental changes will likely cause adverse social and economic 
consequences, affecting agriculture and food production, forestry, fisheries, fresh­
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The large percentage of the world’s population living near coastal areas will 
become increasingly vulnerable to storm damage and infrastructure loss. Sea level 
rise due to warming of ocean waters and melting of glaciers could cause extensive 
coastal flooding, forcing large population migrations and elimination of entire 
cultures in low-lying areas. Dry areas will be prone to increased desertification, 
and whole forests could disappear as temperature zones shift much faster than 
forests can naturally migrate. Reduced water supplies in arid regions could pro­
voke international conflicts, while food shortages tend to destabilize shaky gov­
ernments. Direct health effects could include deaths from intense heat waves as 
well as widespread transmission of infectious diseases like malaria and yellow 
fever, which are currently confined to tropical areas. 
Some of the poorest developing countries will be especially vulnerable to the 
adverse impacts of climate change on agricultural production, water supplies, and 
the natural ecosystems on which they rely for basic necessities. Many of these 
Increased energy efficiency, adoption of renewable sources of energy, and cleaner 
use of conventional fuels are the most promising options for providing the level 
of energy services needed in the developing world, while at the same time limit­
ing energy-related greenhouse gas emissions. 
countries are located in regions that are already subject to heat waves, drought, 
desertification, deforestation, flooding, tropical diseases, and natural disasters, as 
well as poverty and lack of infrastructure. Some of the low-lying Pacific islands are 
likely to become almost completely inundated by rising sea levels.Yet, for the most 
part, these countries have not obtained the benefits of the industrialization that 
led to interference with the climate system. Moreover, they generally have the least 
financial and planning resources available to undertake mitigation measures to 
protect against long-range environmental threats. 
Most of the scientific research on climate change has been compiled and ana­
lyzed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, a group of over 2,000 
scientists organized in 1988 by the United Nations Environment Programme and 
the World Meteorological Organization. Their first report confirmed the serious­
ness of the problem and provided the scientific basis for the UN Framework Con­
vention on Climate Change. Their second report, published in 1996, concluded 
that there is discernible human influence on the climate system that is magnifying 
the natural greenhouse effect. Efforts to avert these threats will require a reduction 
in emissions of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and other greenhouse 
gases generated by human activities. 
Surface temperatures on the earth have increased over the last century, partic­
ularly during the last decade. If current trends remain unchanged, greenhouse gas 
emissions will continue to rise substantially during the next century. In order to 
stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations, it will be necessary to reduce emissions 
below present levels. Moreover, since carbon dioxide and some of the other green­
house gases accumulate and remain in the atmosphere for many decades, the chal­
lenge of dealing with climate change will last for many generations. 
Much emphasis has been placed on the perceived economic costs of addressing 
climate change. Yet it is important to recognize that policies designed to establish 
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development and at the same time mitigate the impacts of climate change. The 
benefits of poverty reduction, improved human health, and better local and 
regional environmental conditions provide strong incentives for adopting sus­
tainable energy policies, even without considering climate change factors. 
What are the sources of anthropogenic greenhouse gases? 
The bulk of human emissions of major greenhouse gases come from the energy 
sector, primarily as a result of burning fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas) to pro­
vide electrical power, heat, transportation, and energy for industrial production 
processes. Carbon dioxide is by far the most significant of the greenhouse gases, and 
over 80% of the carbon dioxide added to the atmosphere by human activities can be 
attributed to the use of fossil fuels.1 Methane and nitrous oxides are other important 1 All statistics quoted are
derived from the documents greenhouse gases released, in part, from the use of fossil fuels. Outside the energy 
cited in the Reference Material 
sector, there are several other potentially significant greenhouse gases, including section at the end of this article. 
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexachloride, which are used for 
refrigeration and air conditioning as well as industrial purposes. The impacts of 
these gases are small today, but could become more extensive over the long term. 
Carbon dioxide is emitted from many natural sources, particularly from the 
decay of organic materials. But these sources are generally balanced by natural 
“sinks” that absorb carbon dioxide. Most importantly, new plants take up carbon 
dioxide as they grow. Overall, huge amounts of carbon are exchanged yearly 
among the oceans, the atmosphere, and land vegetation. Human activities, includ­
ing combustion of fossil fuels as well as land-use changes and agriculture, add 
carbon dioxide to the atmosphere in amounts that exceed the absorption capacity 
of existing natural sinks. This extra carbon dioxide accumulates in the atmosphere 
from year to year and reduces the amount of heat radiated from the earth’s surface 
into space, trapping more heat in the lower levels of the earth’s atmosphere. 
Land clearance for agricultural purposes is a major factor affecting the release 
of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere and the decrease in carbon dioxide absorp­
tion by natural sinks. Globally, land use changes account for close to 20% of the 
Much emphasis has been placed on the perceived economic costs of addressing 
climate change. Yet it is important to recognize that policies designed to estab­
lish sustainable energy systems can both promote sustainable economic and 
social development and at the same time mitigate the impacts of climate change. 
The benefits of poverty reduction, improved human health, and better local and 
regional environmental conditions provide strong incentives for adopting sus­
tainable energy policies, even without considering climate change factors. 
carbon dioxide emissions caused by human activities. Expansion of cultivated 
lands has generally come at the expense of forests and woodlands, which have 
greater absorption capacities. Many of these croplands have subsequently been 
degraded due to unsustainable land management practices that cause loss of top­
soil, wind and water erosion, and salinity. In addition, large-scale deforestation is 
accelerated by commercial timber harvesting, industrial and mining operations in 
forest areas, and construction of roads and highways through wooded lands. 
It is the continued reliance on fossil fuels for energy production, however, that 
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Stabilization of carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere will require sub­
stantial changes in the world’s energy systems and technologies in order to reduce 
future emission rates. The primary challenge in addressing the long-term impacts 
of climate change will be to find ways to provide necessary energy services with­
out at the same time increasing greenhouse gas accumulations in the atmosphere. 
Are there reasons besides the threat of climate 
change to consider changes in energy systems? 
In many parts of the world, limitations on the availability of energy services create 
barriers to socioeconomic development. Increased access to energy is needed in 
order to promote income generating activities, educational advancement, avail­
ability of health services, and greater opportunities for women. 
Worldwide, more than 1.5 billion people lack electricity and approximately two 
billion people use traditional solid fuels like firewood or dung for heating and 
cooking purposes. The considerable amount of time and physical energy spent by 
women and children in gathering fuel and carrying it over long distances reduces 
their ability to engage in other social, economic, and educational activities. In addi­
tion, unvented wood and dung fires contribute to indoor air pollution and respira­
tory health problems. Acute respiratory infections are the leading cause of death 
for young children worldwide, accounting for over 2 million deaths annually. 
Because of high capital investment requirements and the need for extensive 
transmission and distribution lines, there are many countries where it has simply 
not been possible to meet the energy needs of rural populations using conventional 
large-scale, fossil fuel-based power plants. Limited economic opportunities in these 
rural areas encourage migrations to already overcrowded urban areas. Meeting the 
energy needs of rural communities through increased availability of small-scale 
non-polluting energy technologies can raise living standards in these areas and also 
mitigate climate change impacts and other local environmental threats. 
Besides contributing to climate change, combustion of fossil fuels produces 
smog, ground-level ozone, particulates, and other forms of local air pollution that 
Although industrialized countries are currently responsible for more than two-
thirds of annual greenhouse gas emissions, by 2025 developing countries are 
likely to account for two-thirds of annual emissions, unless they pursue a differ­
ent energy path. Cumulative emissions by developing countries, however, would 
not catch up to those of industrialized countries for approximately another one 
hundred years. Since it is the buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere that 
causes climate change, a country’s cumulative emissions are a better indicator of 
its level of responsibility than its annual emission rate. 
are directly harmful to human health. Burning fossil fuels also produces emissions 
of sulfur and nitrogen oxides that form acid rain, which can damage sensitive 
forests and lakes, even far away from the source of pollution. Coal mining and oil 
drilling damage fragile land and water ecosystems, while oil spills are a continuing 
threat to surface waters, coastlines, and groundwater aquifers. 
In addition to environmental and health concerns, energy supply issues may 
also play a major role in geo-political tensions and international security matters. 
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to control and exploit these resources have led to political crises and military con­
flicts. Countries without domestic supplies are subject to energy security threats 
due to their dependence on foreign producers. Some poor countries spend large 
amounts of money on imported fuels, reducing the availability of foreign 
exchange for other essential domestic investments, and adding to unsustainable 
debt accumulation. 
Because other sources of energy, like wind, sunlight, rivers, and crop residues 
are more widely distributed, using them as alternatives to fossil fuels can reduce 
energy dependence. Marketing, distribution, and servicing of these new energy 
technologies can provide new economic opportunities for local entrepreneurs as 
well as international corporations. 
Why do developing countries and industrialized countries 
tend to have different perspectives on climate change? 
In general, developing countries are more concerned with immediate and press­
ing domestic issues such as providing for economic development, employment, 
public health, safe food and drinking water, sanitation, and transportation. 
Poverty is their overriding concern. About 1.3 billion people in developing coun­
tries live on less than U.S.$1 per day. 
In many developing countries, the financial costs of providing electricity 
through extensions of the grid to currently unserved regions are prohibitive. 
Moreover, they are facing the prospect of rapidly growing populations. Conse­
quently, these countries are concerned that climate change mitigation plans could 
substantially increase their energy supply costs, or place limits on their ability to 
provide energy for development. 
In international climate change negotiations, developing countries have 
argued that because industrialized countries are responsible for over 75% of 
greenhouse gas accumulations, they should also take the lead on emissions reduc­
tions. (Carbon dioxide emissions can remain in the atmosphere for up to one hun­
dred years.) Historically, it was the industrialized countries that produced the 
majority of greenhouse gas emissions that have now accumulated in the atmos­
phere. They also generated sufficient wealth from their industrialized economies 
to be able to afford to undertake environmental protection measures. Many of the 
industrialized countries have, in fact, accepted the challenge from the developing 
countries and are working within the terms of the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. 
Although industrialized countries are currently responsible for more than two-
thirds of annual greenhouse gas emissions, by 2025 developing countries are likely 
to account for two-thirds of annual emissions, unless they pursue a different 
energy path. Cumulative emissions by developing countries, however, would not 
catch up to those of industrialized countries for approximately another one hun­
dred years. Since it is the buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere that 
causes climate change, a country’s cumulative emissions are a better indicator of 
its level of responsibility than its annual emission rate. 
Energy usage has seemed so critical to national economies that the amount of 
energy consumed per capita has become one of the key indicators of moderniza­
tion and progress. This, however, is a misleading indicator. It is the availability of 
energy services which is the real measure of development, not energy consump­
tion. For developing countries, measures promoting energy efficiency, renewable 
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energy sources, and alternative technologies could allow them to leapfrog over the 
relatively inefficient path of economic growth followed by the industrialized 
countries and achieve a high level of energy services without the same economic, 
social, and environmental costs. 
What efforts are being made internationally 
to move toward a sustainable energy future? 
Most of the recent international discussions on energy have focused on climate 
change concerns, rather than on the other significant economic, social, and envi­
ronmental benefits of altering existing production and consumption patterns. In 
connection with the Convention on Climate Change, there have been extensive 
debates about the need to reduce worldwide dependence on fossil fuels as well as 
the need for new technologies and new approaches to energy supplies. 
At this point, however, climate change concerns alone do not provide sufficient 
motivation to drive the transition towards sustainable energy policies. This might 
change, of course, if the impacts of climate variability actually begin to be felt and 
can be traced conclusively to accumulations of greenhouse gases caused by human 
activities. In the meantime, focusing on the critical role of energy in sustainable 
development may provide a more acceptable and effective route towards world­
wide recognition of the need to change current energy patterns and policies. 
The 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change set specific emission 
reduction goals only for industrialized countries, in light of their greater respon­
sibility for greenhouse gas accumulations and their greater resources for address­
ing climate change problems. The convention also recognized that per capita 
Energy usage has seemed so critical to national economies that the amount of 
energy consumed per capita has become one of the key indicators of moderniza­
tion and progress. This, however, is a misleading indicator. It is the availability 
of energy services which is the real measure of development, not energy con­
sumption. For developing countries, measures promoting energy efficiency, 
renewable energy sources, and alternative technologies could allow them to 
leapfrog over the relatively inefficient path of economic growth followed by the 
industrialized countries and achieve a high level of energy services without the 
same economic, social, and environmental costs. 
emissions in developing countries are still relatively low, and will likely need to 
grow in order for those countries to meet their social and developmental goals. 
Acknowledging the fact that environmental protection cannot be dealt with sep­
arately from economic development, the convention called for financial and tech­
nical assistance for developing countries, as well as transfers of environmentally 
friendly technologies in order to encourage their participation in international cli­
mate change mitigation efforts. 
Worldwide demand for cleaner energy production has already been stimulated 
to some extent by the Convention. Since a large proportion of future investments 
in new energy capacity will be in developing countries, it is important to direct 
international resources towards low-emission energy investments in those coun­
tries. The Kyoto Protocol to the Convention provides new incentives that encour­
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Still, at this point, most countries will not choose unfamiliar or more expensive 
energy options solely because they would help mitigate climate change impacts. 
People are more likely to adopt new low-emission technologies because they pro­
vide affordable, reliable, effective, and convenient energy supplies. Concerns 
about current local air quality and adverse health conditions are likely to be 
more compelling than potential long-term environmental consequences. 
projects and low-emission technologies that minimize additional greenhouse gas 
emissions in developing countries. Moreover, emissions trading markets could 
eventually generate large capital flows channeled into developing countries, which 
could be used for climate change mitigation projects, including investments in 
sustainable energy systems. 
Still, at this point, most countries will not choose unfamiliar or more expensive 
energy options solely because they would help mitigate climate change impacts. 
People are more likely to adopt new low-emission technologies because they pro­
vide affordable, reliable, effective, and convenient energy supplies. Concerns about 
current local air quality and adverse health conditions are likely to be more com­
pelling than potential long-term environmental consequences. 
At the 1997 Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly addressing 
sustainable development, world leaders recognized that energy is essential to an 
improved quality of life. They recommended greater international cooperation in 
promoting energy conservation and efficiency, the use of non-fossil energy 
sources, and the development of innovative energy-related technology. In fur­
therance of this goal, they decided that the ninth session of the UN Commission 
on Sustainable Development in 2001 should focus on energy in its discussions and 
negotiations. 
A World Energy Assessment sponsored by the UN Development Programme, 
the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, and the World Energy Coun­
cil provides background scientific and technical information for evaluating the 
social, economic, environmental, and security issues linked to energy, as well as an 
analysis of technology and policy options for more sustainable production and 
use of energy.2 
What are the best ways to conserve energy and reduce greenhouse gas emissions? 
Improved technological performance can provide opportunities for people to 
enjoy satisfactory levels of energy services while consuming much less fuel and 
generating lower emission levels. Heating and cooling of buildings, transporta­
tion, and industrial production are among the most promising areas for energy 
efficiency gains. 
Building design is an area with tremendous potential for energy savings. Better 
insulation combined with passive solar design techniques can virtually eliminate 
the need for traditional heating and cooling systems. Simple measures like plant­
ing shade trees, orienting buildings for optimal exposures, and placing windows 
for cross ventilation can dramatically reduce energy requirements. New technolo­
gies like windows that let in sunlight but block unwanted heat can improve com­
fort while reducing costs and energy use. Inside houses and offices, the overall 
energy drain can be minimized by using super-insulated refrigerators, compact 
fluorescent light bulbs, and other types of energy-efficient equipment. 
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Redesigned cars can also provide substantial reductions in emissions. Promis­
ing technologies include hybrid vehicles that combine small internal combustion 
engines with electrical generators, as well as cars powered by fuel cells. Several 
major manufacturers are already producing and marketing hybrid vehicles, and 
several manufacturers have plans to introduce fuel cell engines starting in 2003. In 
addition, transportation requirements can be reduced through urban designs that 
eliminate sprawl and long commutes and instead emphasize pedestrian access as 
well as mass transit facilities. Moreover, in some cases transportation needs can be 
virtually eliminated by communications technologies that can make the home 
into an effective workplace. 
In manufacturing operations, there are substantial opportunities for improv­
ing the energy efficiency of energy intensive industries such as iron and steel pro­
duction, chemical processing, petroleum refining, pulp and paper manufacturing, 
and cement production. Improvements in production processes can boost energy 
efficiency significantly and at the same time reduce material requirements. Co-
generation of heat and power is another promising avenue for cutting emissions. 
What sorts of alternative energy sources can be used to produce power? 
Renewable sources of energy already in use include solar, wind, hydro and geot­
hermal technologies, in addition to biomass. Altogether, renewable energy tech­
nologies currently account for about 16% of world energy use. As these technolo­
gies become more advanced and widely distributed, they can provide 
cost-effective alternatives capable of meeting a large percentage of the world’s 
energy requirements. Moreover, they can help address local and national environ­
mental problems like urban air pollution and acid rain as well as climate change. 
The use of biomass fuels to replace fossil fuels is another way to reduce net 
carbon emissions. Biomass fuels are derived from agricultural and other organic 
wastes, or from special crops grown for that purpose. Biomass takes up carbon diox­
ide as the plants grow and releases it again when they are burned, so that the carbon 
dioxide emissions do not add to overall atmospheric emission concentrations. Bio­
mass can be used to produce liquid or gaseous fuels, and to generate electricity. 
Hydroelectric generators are widely used renewable energy systems, providing 
about 20% of the world’s electricity supply. They produce almost no greenhouse 
gases and no local air pollution. Water wheels on fast-flowing rivers provided 
energy for early textile factories. Now large hydropower plants generate electricity 
by damming rivers and allowing the captured water to fall hundreds of feet 
through turbines. These large-scale projects have come under intense criticism 
because they require flooding of vast tracts of land behind the dams, interfere with 
downstream flows, and hinder fish migrations and spawning. Small hydropower 
plants are less destructive to natural ecosystems, however, since they have smaller 
reservoirs, or in some cases simply channel the stream flow through the turbines. 
Some of the other negative environmental impacts of hydroelectric facilities can 
be reduced by the use of fish ladders to help fish migrate over dams, and mainte­
nance of minimum flow rates to prevent downstream damage. 
Wind energy has been used for centuries to pump water, mill grain, and power 
ships. It is now being promoted as a non-polluting, renewable sources of electri­
cal power. High-efficiency wind turbines are already being used to produce elec­
tricity for commercial distribution. Currently, the installed wind power capacity 
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Over the next hundred years the world’s commercial energy system will be 
replaced at least twice, given the projected useful lives of power plants and 
energy grids. That turnover in energy infrastructure, combined with 
replacement of existing industrial, commercial, and residential facilities, will 
present opportunities for a gradual transition to sustainable, low-emission 
energy systems. The question, in terms of climate change mitigation, is whether 
that transition will take place soon enough to avert dangerous interference with 
the climate system. 
per year. In windy areas, the cost of electricity produced in wind power stations is 
competitive with new power plants that use fossil fuels. Small wind turbines 
designed for small-scale residential and commercial use are attractive options for 
remote rural areas. The electricity can be stored on-site in batteries (for very small 
systems) or through compressed air storage for large applications. In areas when 
there is an existing electricity grid, the electricity can be fed directly into the com­
mercial distribution system. 
Solar panels collect the sun’s energy and convert it directly into electricity by 
means of photovoltaic cells. As with wind power, the electricity produced can be 
stored in batteries and used in small-scale stand-alone power systems. Although 
using solar panels to produce electricity is still expensive, it is the least cost choice 
in certain niche applications. The photovoltaic market is currently 200 megawatts 
per year, and is expected to grow by about 30% per year. Solar panels are most often 
used in remote areas not reached by existing electrical transmission systems. They 
can also be connected to the commercial power utility, providing needed energy 
at peak demand times and avoiding the costs—and emissions—of new central 
power stations. Building-integrated applications of photovoltaic technologies 
reduce costs by incorporating the solar panels into the structure and surfaces of 
homes and offices.Another form of solar energy technology concentrates the sun’s 
rays onto receivers using mirrors or special lenses. The collected solar thermal 
energy is then used to heat a liquid that drives a conventional electric power con­
version system. 
Geothermal energy stored in the earth’s crust can be used to heat buildings 
directly and to generate electricity. The heat is partially released by the radioactive 
decay of elements such as uranium and potassium. In areas where molten rock is 
located near the earth’s surface, hydrothermal reservoirs have been discovered 
filled with hot water. These reservoirs can be tapped to power electricity genera­
tors for commercial energy production or to provide space heating. 
These types of cleaner technologies can provide environmentally sustainable 
sources of power. As new investments are made in energy infrastructure, needs for 
environmental protection and economic development can be met simultaneously 
through the adoption of these new and renewable energy technologies. Over the 
next hundred years the world’s commercial energy system will be replaced at least 
twice, given the projected useful lives of power plants and energy grids. That 
turnover in energy infrastructure, combined with replacement of existing indus­
trial, commercial, and residential facilities, will present opportunities for a grad­
ual transition to sustainable, low-emission energy systems. The question, in terms 
of climate change mitigation, is whether that transition will take place soon 
enough to avert dangerous interference with the climate system. 
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Are there alternative ways to use fossil fuels 
that can help reduce greenhouse gas emissions? 
In some cases it is possible to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by switching to 
low-carbon fossil fuels like natural gas. Natural gas produces slightly more than 
half the carbon dioxide emissions per unit of energy produced by burning coal. It 
is currently being adopted as a low-cost, low-emission fuel choice for new electric 
power plants. In a compressed form it can be used as an alternative fuel for motor 
vehicles. 
There are also techniques for using fossil fuels in less polluting ways. One exam­
ple is the production of syngas, a clean gaseous mixture consisting mainly of 
carbon monoxide and hydrogen, which can be made from natural gas, coal, heavy 
oils, petroleum coke, and a number of other substances. Syngas can be used to pro­
duce electricity and heat, as well as alternative gas and liquid fuels, with low levels 
of pollution. With further processing, syngas can become a source of hydrogen for 
use in fuel cells. 
Fuel cells are electrochemical devices that convert fuels like hydrogen and nat­
ural gas into electricity directly, without any combustion, by combining the fuels 
with oxygen from the air; consequently they produce almost no emissions, except 
water. In the future, besides being used to power nonpolluting electric drive vehi­
cles, they might also be used for central and decentralized electricity production. 
Since emissions from motor vehicles represent a large percentage of overall carbon 
dioxide emissions, commercialization of fuel cell vehicles would have a dramatic 
impact on greenhouse gas accumulations, and on urban air quality. 
As fuel cells systems become more widely available, hydrogen could become the 
preferred fuel for transportation and electricity production. Hydrogen can be pro­
duced through steam processing of natural gas or syngas, through gasification of 
coal or other carbon-based feedstocks and through electrolysis of water. Process­
ing fossil fuels to produce hydrogen is currently the least expensive technique, one 
which could provide a way to use familiar fuels in new, low-emission technologies 
without significantly increasing energy costs. 
How can developing countries meet increasing demands for energy services to fuel 
economic and social progress while limiting climate change impacts?
Energy efficiency efforts and investments in renewable energy technologies are 
essential for establishing sustainable energy systems both in developing countries 
and in industrialized nations. But there are considerable economic and social dis­
parities between the richer, high-consuming nations and the poorest ones. Devel­
oping countries require greater availability of energy services that can be used for 
household needs and productive purposes, which will lead to increased use of 
energy. 
Rather than focusing on increasing overall energy supplies, developing coun­
tries would be better served by using integrated resource techniques to identify the 
lowest-cost and most efficient options for achieving their energy goals. This con­
cept involves undertaking comparisons of various energy supply technologies, 
such as conventional coal-powered plants, wind turbines, hydroelectric genera­
tors facilities, and photovoltaic installations, while also considering installation of 
end-use technologies that reduce energy demand levels, like compact fluorescent 
light bulbs and increased insulation. After evaluating all the potential options, the 
lowest-cost mix of technologies can be identified and adopted as investment pri­
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orities. In many cases, the technologies that seem to be the cheapest and easiest in 
the short-term turn out not to be the most cost-effective or efficient from a slightly 
longer term perspective, especially when their social, environmental, and health 
costs are also considered. 
Investments in new production and distribution facilities that emphasize 
energy efficiency can dramatically reduce energy requirements in comparison with 
conventional power plants and manufacturing operations. The additional costs 
attributable to the introduction of these energy-efficient technologies will gener­
ally be offset by reductions in the price of energy. Because traditional sources of 
energy are used so inefficiently, and because countries constructing modern facili­
ties have the opportunity to utilize new energy-efficient technologies and equip­
ment, they can achieve substantial improvements in living standards without sig­
nificantly increasing per capita energy use over current levels. Following this path, 
developing countries could pursue their economic and social development goals 
without substantially increasing their energy consumption or emissions levels. 
Most of the two billion people who lack modern energy services live in rural 
areas in developing countries. Projected capital costs for extending conventional 
electric power grids into these areas are prohibitively expensive, so their prospects 
for obtaining grid-based electrical service in the near future are not encouraging. 
Decentralized renewable energy systems, however, could provide electrical power 
to these remote areas more quickly and less expensively—without producing 
greenhouse gas emissions. Introduction of these systems could promote employ­
ment and educational opportunities in rural areas, as well as improved access to 
health care, clean water, and sanitation facilities. 
Renewable energy systems using wind, solar, biomass, and small-scale hydro­
electric power are particularly easily adapted for rural electrification purposes. 
Rural consumers relying on inefficient use of fossil fuels like kerosene and diesel 
are often already paying high energy prices and would be better served at lower 
cost by modern renewable technologies, if these became available to them. Others, 
particularly women, who must now spend long hours gathering and using tradi­
tional fuels, could gain both time and electrical power that could be applied to 
other productive purposes. 
What barriers are there to the adoption of sustainable energy technologies? 
Primary obstacles to the wider application of energy efficiency measures and 
installation of renewable energy systems include: low commodity market prices 
for fossil fuels; government subsidies that support conventional fossil fuel tech­
nologies; energy prices that do not incorporate environmental and social costs; 
discrimination in capital markets against small-scale energy and energy-efficiency 
projects; and general lack of information about new designs for low-emission and 
renewable energy systems. In addition, there are formidable economic and insti­
tutional forces opposed to a transition in world energy markets away from con­
tinuing reliance on fossil fuel technologies. 
Current national and international debates about the prospective hazards of 
climate change have, to some extent, raised public awareness concerning the need 
to alter energy production and consumption patterns. But there is not yet any gen­
eral consensus about the impacts of climate change and the need for concerted 
mitigation efforts. Much more public education is needed regarding low-emission 
energy alternatives. 
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Existing subsidies for fossil fuel technologies make it very difficult for alterna­
tive energy products to enter markets or achieve competitive positions. World­
wide, these subsidies amount to some 200 billion U.S. dollars per year and actu­
ally encourage wasteful consumption by failing to pass on to users the real market 
costs of providing the energy fuel. Direct government subsidies often take the 
form of payments designed to hold down consumer energy prices. On the pro­
duction side, subsidies frequently provide incentives and support for fossil fuel 
exploration and processing. Although intended to enhance the availability and 
affordability of energy services, these subsidies limit energy choices by favoring 
existing fossil fuel energy systems and suppliers. 
Additional indirect subsidies are granted to conventional energy providers in 
the form of tax credits and exemptions, depreciation allowances, preferential 
loans and guarantees, and procurement preferences. Public financing of conven­
tional utilities by means of tax exempt bonds and low interest loans means that 
potential competitors seeking to introduce competing renewable energy systems 
will have to pay much higher amounts for needed capital. Many countries also 
grant monopolies to national utilities, thereby removing the possibility of any real 
energy market competition. Restructuring of energy markets to introduce com­
petition can reduce costs but, without accompanying regulatory measures, can 
also make it less likely that energy suppliers will support public benefits. 
Even without the artificial minimization of prices provided by government 
subsidies, fossil fuel prices are already unrealistically low because they do not 
include all of the costs associated with their production and use. Environmental 
and public health costs are externalized, that is, paid for by society as a whole 
rather charged to the producers, vendors, or consumers of fossil fuels. These costs 
include public health and cleanup expenditures attributable to air pollution and 
water contamination, the effects of acid rain, damages to land and ecosystems due 
to fossil fuel extraction and distribution and, of course, the impacts and mitiga­
tion costs related to climate change. Unless damages to the environment are 
charged back to responsible parties, market-pricing mechanisms will encourage 
destruction of resources rather than conservation. 
Widespread dissemination of information about the advantages of energy 
efficiency and alternative energy technologies is needed in order to build aware­
ness and confidence among investors, lenders, governments, and consumers. Too 
often, ignorance about energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies keeps 
them from receiving serious consideration in energy planning processes. 
What sorts of policies would create an enabling framework 
to promote environmentally sustainable energy systems?
Governments can set the overall framework for economic activity, but clearly sus­
tainable energy development cannot be accomplished by governments alone. For 
the most part, governments are moving away from acting as direct providers of 
energy services. Instead, many are taking steps to establish more efficient and envi­
ronmentally sustainable energy markets. In general, this will require the breakup 
of monopolies and promotion of competitive markets. Since private capital will 
be required, maintenance of stable investment, banking, and legal institutions will 
become a fundamental priority in order to attract lenders and investors. New 
incentives for investments and entrepreneurial ventures will also be needed to 
promote environmentally friendly products and services. 
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One of the most important things that governments can do is to help create a 
level playing field for competing energy technologies. As a first step, this will 
require elimination, or redirection, of subsidies for conventional fossil fuel tech­
nologies. Energy price subsidies are generally designed to help low-income house­
holds, but often the intended beneficiaries receive only a small portion of the total 
subsidy amount, while other consumers who could afford to pay more obtain the 
largest share of the government benefit. More carefully targeted measures could 
provide the desired support to poorer families without distorting the entire energy 
market. Temporary subsidies for energy efficiency measures and installation of 
alternative energy systems could also help establish competitive opportunities to 
attract new market entrants. 
Another important step in leveling the playing field for energy technologies 
will be to set up mechanisms for taking into account the environmental and social 
costs attached to the use of fossil fuels. These external costs can be charged back to 
One of the most important things that governments can do is to help create a 
level playing field for competing energy technologies. As a first step, this will 
require elimination, or redirection, of subsidies for conventional fossil fuel tech­
nologies. 
those who enjoy the profits and benefits of the energy use through carbon emis­
sion taxes, usage fees, or fines for damages. Resulting revenues could be used to 
support more environmentally sustainable enterprises. Governments can also 
adopt regulations limiting environmentally harmful activities, including green­
house gas emissions, thereby pressuring energy companies to develop and market 
new alternatives. Other alternatives for government interventions include tax 
incentives, collaborative research and development ventures, and green labeling 
schemes. 
Government subsidies, supports, and procurement preferences can help open 
markets for new technologies and build public awareness of their environmental 
and economic benefits. Direct government support may be needed to demon­
strate the advantages of some new energy technologies. In order to move beyond 
demonstration projects, however, there will have to be established marketing, dis­
tribution and service networks for new energy products. Restructuring energy 
industries is one strategy for introducing competition and decentralization in the 
energy market. With proper regulations and policies that support investment and 
competition, governments can promote economic efficiency and diversification 
in the energy sector while also encouraging sustainable development and address­
ing the needs of disadvantaged groups. Market reforms can be accompanied by 
such measures as environmental performance requirements for energy equip­
ment, green certificate markets or renewable portfolio standards mandating that 
a specified percentage of energy be produced using renewable sources, and 
requirements that energy grids be open for inputs from independent power pro­
ducers. 
One option for promoting energy efficiency is through the creation of energy 
service companies. These companies introduce efficiency measures designed to 
reduce energy usage in commercial and residential buildings, and are paid out of 
the cost savings they are able to achieve. Customers continue to pay regular utility 
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bills, and the energy service company finances its operations by being able to engi­
neer energy savings. After the energy service company has completed its work, cus­
tomers will enjoy lower utility bills, and the building will produce lower emissions. 
Appropriate financing mechanisms for alternative energy producers and con­
sumers are critical. In rural areas, micro-credit financing for renewable energy sys­
tems can help provide access to energy services for currently unserved users who 
cannot afford high initial capital costs, but can afford monthly fees similar to a reg­
ular utility bill. In some cases, poor households are paying high costs for small 
amounts of inefficient energy services based on the use of kerosene, candles, fuel 
wood, or diesel generators. Although they might not be able to pay up-front for 
solar panels or a wind generator, many probably could afford to pay for them over 
time if credit facilities were available. By facilitating the organization of invest­
ment pools designed to provide small loans for small-scale electrification projects, 
governments could contribute to the widespread dissemination of low-emission 
energy technologies and also promote employment, education, and public health. 
What framework does the Kyoto Protocol provide for 

international agreement on reducing the threats of climate change?
 
The Kyoto Protocol established plans for industrialized countries to reduce green­
house gas emissions by agreeing to adopt legally binding emission targets which 
are to be met in the period extending from 2008 to 2010. Overall, the industrial­
ized countries committed to a reduction of their combined emissions by approx­
imately 5% from 1990 levels. The specific targets vary, however, from country to 
country. The reduction target for the United States is 7% below 1990 levels, and 
Japan’s target is 6%. The European Union has a general target of 8% below 1990 
levels, but that is averaged among the group members so that some of the poorer 
members will actually be allowed to increase their emissions while others will be 
required to make substantially greater reductions. Russia’s target is stabilization of 
emissions at its 1990 level. The Protocol will enter into force when it is ratified by 
55 countries, including countries responsible for at least 55% of the total 1990 
carbon dioxide emissions from the industrialized country group. 
The Protocol contains legally binding commitments only for the industrialized 
countries. Under the 1992 Climate Change Convention, developing countries 
agreed to facilitate emission reductions. Many are already actively promoting 
energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies, but they did not commit to 
specific reduction targets. 
The Kyoto Protocol contains provisions for a “Clean Development Mecha­
nism,” which is intended to assist non-industrialized countries in achieving sus­
tainable development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the Con­
vention on Climate Change, while assisting industrialized countries in achieving 
compliance with their quantified emissions limitations and reduction commit­
ments under the Convention. The mechanism will permit industrialized countries 
to finance emission-reduction projects in developing countries as a means of 
meeting their obligations under the Protocol. Developing countries could benefit 
by receiving financing for the adoption of low-emission energy technologies, 
while industrialized countries could fulfill their emission reduction commitments 
at a lower cost. 
It is often less costly to achieve emission reductions in areas where new power 
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established, rather than trying to limit emissions from existing facilities. Thus, 
developing countries could potentially obtain substantial investments in energy 
technologies that would promote their own national development programs and 
at the same time assist industrialized countries in pursuing low-cost climate 
change mitigation measures. Although the details of the Clean Development 
Mechanism remain to be worked out, it holds out the promise of mutually sup­
portive international cooperation in addressing both the sustainable development 
and climate change challenges. 
Conclusion 
Energy is fundamental for socioeconomic growth, but current patterns of energy 
production, distribution and use do not support the sustainable development 
goals of environmental protection and social equity. Making a transition to new 
models for energy markets throughout the world is an enormous undertaking, 
requiring complex, long-term strategies that engage consumers and producers as 
well as governments. It is an attainable goal, however, to reconcile economic 
growth with wider access to reliable and affordable energy supplies and with 
reduced environmental harm. 
Through international cooperation, and through adoption of appropriate poli­
cies and economic frameworks, governments can promote energy efficiency, use of 
renewables, and cleaner conventional fuel technologies. Perhaps the most impor­
tant impact of these measures would be to allow countries that are not yet indus­
trialized to follow cleaner routes to development—routes that provide the energy 
services needed for improved health care, education, livelihoods, clean water, trans­
portation, and communications, while limiting greenhouse gas emissions. 
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Climate change and food security 
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Abstract 
Food security in the twenty-first century has three major components: the availabil­
ity of food on the market; adequate purchasing power to acquire food; and human 
ability to digest and absorb nutrients. As we enter the new millennium, the global 
population continues to grow and apprehensions arise about a potential imbalance 
between human numbers and food needs – especially in largely populous countries 
such as India and China. 
Added to the concern over population growth trends is the possible impact of cli­
mate change on agriculture. Global models predict that the overall impact in this par­
ticular sector should be minimal.However,regionally, the repercussions are potentially 
devastating. South and Southeast Asia are particularly vulnerable to the climate 
change-induced conditions. Climate change will have a direct impact on crop yields 
and soil fertility. It will likely also force agricultural migration in many areas.  
While industrialised countries are largely responsible for the human-induced 
damage to the atmosphere, poor nations and the poor in all nations are those who 
will suffer the worst consequences.The global community – industrialised and devel­
oping countries alike – should work in concert to address the issues of climate change 
and its mitigation, and to ensure that all members of the human family have the 
opportunity to live productive lives. 
Introduction 
The concept of food security has been evolving over the last 50 years. Immediately 
following World War II, the principal food security concern was increasing food 
production to meet the needs of an expanding population. Later, economic access 
to food became a matter of concern, since millions were going to bed hungry, not 
necessarily because food was not available, but because they did not have adequate 
purchasing power to achieve balanced diets. In recent years, the human ability to 
absorb and digest food has become an important focus because of poor environ­
mental hygiene and unclean drinking water. Thus, today food security has three 
major components: 
• availability in the market; 
• adequate purchasing power; 
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Based on these considerations, the Science Academies Summit held at the M.S. 
Swaminathan Research Foundation () in Madras, India in 1996 recom­
mended the following definition of food security: 
•	 that every individual has physical, economic, social, and environmental access 
to a balanced diet that includes the necessary macro- and micro-nutrients, safe 
drinking water, sanitation, environmental hygiene, primary health care, and 
education so as to lead a healthy and productive life. 
•	 that food originates from efficient and environmentally benign production 
technologies that conserve and enhance the natural resource base of crops, 
animal husbandry, forestry, and inland and marine fisheries. 
There is evidence that children with low birth weight are handicapped in brain 
development. This may be the cruellest form of inequity, since the new millen­
nium is to be the “knowledge millennium” – wherein information, knowledge, 
and intellectual property will determine the pace and direction of economic 
growth and human wellbeing. 
‘About 50% of the deaths of small children are associated with malnutrition’ 
( 1998). The Food and Agriculture Office’s () 1996 World Summit set a 
target for reducing the number of persons going to bed hungry by half by 2015. 
Several experts have expressed doubts as to whether even this extremely modest 
target can be achieved. In addition to protein-calorie under-nutrition, the  
estimates that nearly two billion people suffer from iron deficiency. It has also 
determined that deficiencies of iodine, vitamin A, and 
other micronutrients are widespread. Such “hidden 
hunger” affects health and productivity. Further, one 
table 1 share of children under five years of age
who are underweight in select countries 
country % underweight country % underweight third of the children in South Asia and the Sahelian 
Bangladesh 66 Philippines 33 region of Africa are born with low birth weights, due to 
India 64 Tanzania 29 nutritional anaemia in pregnant women. There is evi-
Vietnam 56 Thailand 26 
Ethiopia 48 China 21 dence that children with low birth weight are handi-
Indonesia 40 Zimbabwe 11 capped in brain development. This may be the cruellest 
Pakistan 40 Egypt 10 form of inequity, since the new millennium is to be the 
Nigeria 36 Brazil 7 
“knowledge millennium”–wherein information, 
Source: Brown, State of the World 1999 Extracted from WHO Global knowledge, and intellectual property will determine 
Database on Child Growth, Geneva, 1997, based on national surveys
taken between 1987 and 1995. the pace and direction of economic growth and human 
wellbeing. 
What has been the Indian experience with hunger 
and how does this impact future hunger management? 
In 1798 Thomas Malthus published his Essay on the Principle of Population, in which 
he concluded that poverty and famine were natural outcomes of population 
growth, as human populations increase faster than the resources used for subsis­
tence can support. About one hundred and fifty years later, in the twenty year 
period following the Second World War, India began fulfilling Mathus’s predic­
tions. The country had suffered tragic losses in 1943 when an estimated four mil­
lion people starved to death in the Bengal famine, the worst food disaster in 






















assertive, but largely unsuccessful efforts to assuage star­
vation through expansion of farming areas. It was not 
until 1968, with the advent of the Green Revolution – 
which included continued efforts to expand farm areas, 
double-cropping on existing farmlands, and the use of 
genetically modified seeds – that the problem was alle­
viated. (The precepts of the Green Revolution were 
applied at that time in developing countries around the 
world, but India was particularly successful in its imple­
mentation.) As we enter the new millennium, however, 
the global population continues to grow, and apprehen­
sions are arising once again that there may be an imbalance between human num­
bers and food needs. The population growth rate in Asia from 1995 to 2000 aver­
aged 1.4% per annum ( Population Information Network). There are concerns 
that large scale famines in developing countries may require highly populous coun­
tries like China and India to resort to extensive food imports (Brown 1995). Some 
of the major factors underlying such concerns include: 
•	 a steady decline in per capita availability of irrigation water and arable land as 
a result of continuing population growth, as well as the diversion of prime farm 
land for non-farm uses; 
•	 increases in food demand to meet the needs of the growing population, which 
includes close to 800 million undernourished children, women, and men; 
•	 increases in proportional food demand and higher demand for animal prod­
ucts stemming from greater purchasing power and increased urbanisation; 
•	 stagnation or decline in marine fish production; 
•	 slackening of technological change; 
•	 fatigue of the Green Revolution due to environmental, economic, and social 
factors; 
•	 climate change resulting in potential alterations of precipitation, temperature, 
and sea level, and possibly of increased ultraviolet-ß radiation. 
These factors represent real challenges for both scientists and policymakers and 
there is no room for complacency. The Green Revolution, which has saved mil­
lions of lives, was made possible through a collaboration of agricultural scientists 
from around the world who can legitimately claim credit for converting an atmos­
phere of despair to one of hope by transforming the untapped agricultural poten­
tial of developing countries into production. Looking back over the past 30 years, 
it is clear that organised national and international agricultural research, devoted 
to public good and supported largely by public funds and by multilateral and 
bilateral donors, can contribute significantly to achieving a balance between the 
demand and supply of food despite rapid population growth. 
Learning from industrialised country practices 
The major potential impacts of climate change generally are assumed to include 
temperature rise, increased and decreased precipitation, sea level rise, intensifica­
tion of ultraviolet-ß radiation, and increased frequency and force of extreme 
weather events. While it is undeniable that industrialised countries are responsi­
ble for the overwhelming majority of greenhouse gas emissions, developing coun­
tries are among those most vulnerable to these effects. Specifically, developing 
world population
(billions) 1950 to 2050 
Source:World Population
Wallchart, Population Division,
United Nations Department of
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island nations and semiarid regions will bear the burden of the predicted impacts 
– regardless of their proportional emissions culpability. As developing economies 
continue to grow, the associated demands for increased access to electricity and 
transportation that accompany expanding infrastructure will give rise to steep 
increases in CO2 emissions. 
In 1992, the Climate Change Institute spearheaded a study of eight developing 
countries which, together, comprise about 25% of the global population – India, 
Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philip-
As developing economies continue to grow, the associated demands for increased 
access to electricity and transportation that accompany expanding infrastruc­
ture will give rise to steep increases in CO2 emissions. 
pines. Funding was provided by the Asian Development Bank and the governments 
of Australia, Japan, and Norway. A compelling component of the country studies 
was the development of emissions profiles.While over half of the greenhouse gasses 
emitted from the eight participating countries were attributable to fossil fuels, agri­
culture proved to be the largest source for Bangladesh, Sir Lanka, and Vietnam, and 
land-use change was the most problematic in Indonesia (Topping 1997). 
table 2 emissions inventory summary 




Gg CO2–equivalent tons/person/yr 
Bangladesh 51,389–88,048 0.46–0.78 Agriculture accounts for about 76% of emissions. 
India 809,432 0.93 Fossil fuel combustion accounts for about 79% 
of emissions.
 
Indonesia 708,682 3.7 Land use accounts for 72% of emissions.
 
Malaysia 121,367 7.1 Emissions from fossil fuel combustion only.
 




Philippines 75,196–88,638 1.3–1.5 Fossil fuel combustion accounts for about 45%
 
of emissions. 
Sri Lanka 17,677 1.0 Agriculture accounts for about 38% of emissions. 
Vietnam 84,938–112,438 1.3–1.7 Agriculture accounts for about 44% of emissions. 




Source: Country Study Reports, as cited by Topping, 1997 (Prepared by Gibbs). The Malaysia study only ana­
lyzed fossil fuel use. 
What is the significance of climate change for food security? 
As detailed by Qureshi and Richards in their contribution to the 1997  pub­
lication, Impact of Climate Change on Food and Livelihood Security: An Agenda 
for Action, the major potential consequences of climate change for agriculture fall 
into three categories: direct effects on crop yields, effects on soil fertility, and large-
scale effects on agricultural zones. 
Direct effects on crop yields 
•	 increased soil fertilisation from elevated CO2 levels; 
•	 variation in temperature and water availability to levels beyond optimal for 

























•	 loss of crops due to elevated force, frequency, and duration of extreme weather 
events such as droughts and monsoons; 
•	 increased threat from pests as warmer winters and increased moisture provide 
improved breeding conditions. 
Effects on soil fertility 
While elevated CO2 levels may improve soil fertility to an extent, factors such as 
higher temperatures, dramatically altered hydrological cycles, and weather 
extremes are likely to outweigh the potential advantages of this effect. In addition, 
rising sea levels pose the threat of soil salinisation and possibly cropland erosion. 
Large-scale effects on agricultural zones 
As temperatures rise and coasts flood, agriculture will be pushed pole-ward and 
inland. It has not been conclusively determined whether climate change will actu­
ally decrease the amount of cultivatable land because shifts in temperatures and 
hydrological patterns may improve potential productivity for some areas. How­
ever, agricultural migration may represent competition for land currently being 
Given the circumstances, it is also important to promote anticipatory research 
for developing technologies and public policies that can help to mitigate the 
adverse consequences of droughts and floods and at the same time maximise the 
benefits of favourable temperature and rainfall. 
used for cattle, and will most likely have a deleterious effect on natural habitats. 
In addition, such shifts would bring about tremendous social and cultural 
upheavals. 
South and Southeast Asia are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate 
change on agriculture. Specifically, those countries where agriculture is responsi­
ble for a significant proportion of the Gross Domestic Product () are likely to 
feel the consequences. 
In most developing countries, the contribution of agriculture to Gross 
National Product () is going down, but there is no commensurate drop in the 
role of agriculture in providing opportunities for jobs and livelihoods. As such, 
much of the onus of providing more food, jobs, and income falls on the farm 
sector. Job-led economic growth is the need of the hour. While the challenges are 
great, progress in science and technology has opened up uncommon opportuni­
ties for a food secure world. Advances in the fields of biotechnology and informa­
tion, space, renewable energy, and management technologies have been spectacu­
lar in recent years. At the same time, there is a growing realisation that sustainable 
development endeavours must be rooted in the principles of ecology, economics, 
gender equity, and ethics. This involves blending traditional technologies and eco­
logical prudence with frontier science, leading to the development of eco-tech­
nologies. Given the circumstances, it is also important to promote anticipatory 
research for developing technologies and public policies that can help to mitigate 
the adverse consequences of droughts and floods and at the same time maximise 
the benefits of favourable temperature and rainfall. 
table 3 agriculture
as percent of 
gdp in selected
countries 




Source: Qureshi and Hobbie, 
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What is the role of computer models? 
Computer simulation models can provide guidelines for such anticipatory 
research. General Circulation Models () have been developed to demon­
strate the current global weather system, and to simulate the consequences of 
atmospheric alterations – the results of which can then be compared to observed 
events and historical trends. In general,  do not have a high degree of accu­
racy in predicting changes in precipitation and they are limited when it comes to 
extreme weather anomalies. However, there is an overall consensus between  
that rainfall in South Asia will increase in the coming years. In fact, there is agree­
ment that doubling of CO2 levels in the atmosphere will result in higher temper­
atures, which will give rise to higher humidity and consequently increased pre­
cipitation [(Parry 1990), as sited in Qureshi and Richards, 1997]. 
Extreme rainfall and flooding in Florida and California in 1998 resulted in exten­
sive crop-loss as well as in global media attention to the effects of the El Niño South­
ern Oscillation () phenomenon in the United States. At the same time, areas 
like Indonesia,Australia, South and Central America, and South-eastern Africa were 
In the 1980s, El Niño storms caused about $8 billion worth of damage. Subse­
quently, at least $800 million has been invested globally in El Niño predictions, 
about half of which is attributable to the United States ( 1997). 
experiencing uncommonly warm, dry weather.  is a disturbance of the ocean-
atmosphere system in tropical Pacific Ocean that is sparked by a periodic warming 
of the ocean. The consequences of El Niño include droughts, flooding and tempera­
ture fluctuations, and can be felt around the globe. It is expected that with atmos­
pheric deterioration,  will happen more frequently, and with greater force. 
In the 1980s, El Niño storms caused about $8 billion worth of damage. Subse­
quently, at least $800 million has been invested globally in El Niño predictions, 
about half of which is attributable to the United States ( 1997). 
El Niño 1998 was probably the worst of the 20th century. However, it was not 
entirely unexpected. Models and satellites were used to forecast the probable 
extremes of the weather phenomenon. At that time, it proved difficult to translate 
predictions into preventative actions. However, there is now discussion of using 
analyses of previous  in conjunction with computer modelling in order to 
determine the best damage prevention practices in advance. These include rein­
forcing dams and levies in flood-prone areas, ensuring that fire prevention sup­
plies are on-hand in areas likely to experience drought, and planting more plants, 
or crops that are less susceptible to extreme conditions. 
In 1991 Bangladesh was hit by a storm that killed about 138,000 people. Three 
years later, a comparable storm hit the same area, and only claimed a few hundred 
lives because of a warning system that had been established with support from the 
World Meteorological Organisation (Qureshi and Richards 1997). 
Computer simulation models of the potential impact of changes in tempera­
ture, precipitation, and sea level are now available in many industrialised coun­
tries. Data on enhanced ultraviolet-ß radiation on crop and farm animal produc­
tivity are also becoming available. The mandate of national and international 
agricultural research centres includes attention to the stability of crop and animal 




    
 
 
   























which means that they are in comparatively advantageous positions to help initi­
ate anticipatory research for avoiding and mitigating potential adverse changes in 
weather and sea level. Several International Agricultural Research Centres 
() like the International Rice Research Institute () also have a good deal 
of experience studying the relationship between climate and crop yields. 
Climate management and sustainable food security: 
How can we build on the Indian experience? 
In 1979 there was a severe drought in India. The reaction of the government of 
India was to develop a detailed strategy for monsoon management. The three 
major components of this strategy follow: 
First, in each district, the government established a Crop/Weather Watch 
Group that consisted of climatologists, agricultural scientists, representatives of 
farmers’ and women’s organisations, concerned officers of government, represen­
tatives of financial institutions, and members of the media. The tasks to be 
addressed by each group included monitoring monsoon progression, developing 
contingency plans and alternative cropping strategies to suit different weather 
probabilities, building seed reserves of alternate crops, and intensifying efforts in 
the area of water harvesting and minor irrigation. The aim was to maximise the 
beneficial impact of a good monsoon on agricultural productivity while min­
imising the adverse impact of aberrant rainfall through efficient water saving and 
use, crop life-saving practices, and contingency land use plans. 
Second, the most favourable areas () were demarcated in each district, 
with the idea of intensifying agricultural production through appropriate public 
policies and investment, particularly using minor irrigation and water manage­
ment.  were those areas where the moisture retention capacity of the soil was 
high and where irrigation facilities were either available or could be created. Com­
pensatory production programmes were designed to offset, to the extent possible, 
crop losses in the drought or flood affected areas. 
Third, strategies were developed for introducing effective relief and rehabilita­
tion measures in the areas most seriously affected () either by drought or 
floods. In chronically drought prone areas, such measures included earmarking 
community land for establishing cattle camps to save the lives of farm animals, 
In 1991 Bangladesh was hit by a storm that killed about 138,000 people. Three 
years later, a comparable storm hit the same area, and only claimed a few hun­
dred lives because of a warning system that had been established with support 
from the World Meteorological Organisation (Qureshi and Richards 1997). 
and identifying aquifers which could be conserved as “ground water sanctuaries” 
to be tapped for drinking water supply only when absolutely essential. 
The above three-pronged strategy has helped to minimise both human suffering 
and crop losses when monsoon behaviour has been abnormal and resulted in 
drought or floods. Also introduced in 1979 was a Rural Godown Scheme, which was 
designed to promote the decentralised storage of harvested produce in order to pre­
vent distress sales by farmers when the harvest is good and panic purchase by con­
sumers when crop losses are high.This strategy is especially important today, because 
globally, hunger is a result of inadequate purchasing power rather than food scarcity. 
 





















   
 
 










110    
 
What is and should be done in anticipation 
of the impact of climate change on food security? 
The need for micro-level understanding and management of temperature and 
precipitation is evident from the fact that although rainfall may often be normal 
in national terms, total food grain production may go down due to climatic vari­
ations at the local level. Micro-level management promotes the use of precision 
farming techniques, which involves specific, plant-scale agronomy rather than 
area-based methodologies. Plant-scale agronomy is knowledge and information-
intensive, and it affords opportunities for making farming intellectually stimulat­
ing, in addition to being economically rewarding. These methods will be very 
helpful in facing the challenges arising from climate change in that they are 
designed to anticipate and adjust to localised ambient changes as they occur, and 
do not require activity that originates at the national scale. 
Thanks to rapid progress in genome mapping and molecular breeding, we can 
now design crops to suit different growing conditions. The M.S. Swaminathan 
Research Foundation has established a Genetic Resources Centre for Adaptation 
to Sea Level Rise in a mangrove forest near Chidambaram in Tamil Nadu, India. 
The Centre is focussed on assembling a gene pool for the purpose of breeding crop 
varieties that are tolerant to seawater intrusion. This sort of designer crop devel­
opment should receive high priority in meeting the challenge of climate change. 
Genetic research shows great promise for both agricultural productivity and 
nutritional improvement. For example: 
•	 In the United States there have been successful field trials of transgenic cotton 
– altered to carry the bacterium Bascillus thuringiensis (Bt), which is lethal to 
certain insect pests. This method of pest control is proving to be relatively suc­
cessful without the deleterious side effects of insecticide sprays. 
•	 According to , one third of the global population depends on rice for more 
than half of their staple diet. The fact that the milling process for most of the 
rice being consumed removes beta-carotene, a precursor to vitamin A, with the 
hull is therefore something to be seriously considered. In January 2000, a group 
of European scientists announced that they had begun to address this problem 
by genetically modifying rice to carry beta-carotene in its endosperm. 
•	 The Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maiz y Trigo (), which 
is a project of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 
(), has also been conducting regional research around the world in an 
effort to develop wheat and corn seeds that are more resistant to the elements; 
diseases; and extreme fluctuations in weather, such as prolonged droughts. 
It is likely that genetically modified crops will be widely grown in the coming 
decades in both developed and developing countries. It would therefore be useful 
to organise an international network for fostering anticipatory research to meet 
the potential impact of climate change on food security. This network would be 
serviced by a co-ordinating unit, which would advise on priorities for screening 
germplasm for tolerance to climatic changes. Genotypes, which can be used in 
breeding strains for tolerance to heat, coastal salinity, floods, etc, can then be iden­
tified. 
 has already established a facilitating entity for International Agricul­
tural Research Centres (), interested National Agricultural Research Sys­


























existed since 1991 (formerly known as the Inter-Center Training Group), with the 
purpose of strengthening agricultural research and research management train­
ing. Using  as a foundation, an international network, comprised of , 
, and advanced research institutes, could be established within the  
system, and serviced by a co-ordinating unit. This action would be an important 
step in helping  to optimise the benefits of favourable growing conditions 
and to minimise the adverse impact of unfavourable climatic changes. The cost of 
servicing the network could be kept low through electronic information linkages 
with appropriate advanced research institutions and meteorological departments. 
The Co-ordinating Centre could also advise  on the progress being made 
in short and medium term weather forecasting, and on the implications for sci­
entific management of farming systems. Weather forecasting is an area where con­
siderable progress is being made, and  should take the lead in developing 
strategies to enhance the stability of crop production based on the effective use of 
weather forecasts. In this way, a small initiative in this area could provide multiple 
benefits towards achieving the goal of coupling productivity advance with pro­
duction stability. 
In addition to tapping frontier science such as genetic engineering, there is an 
equal need to preserve and use traditional wisdom. For example, the traditional 
water harvesting and saving techniques adopted in the past in India were very 
effective in insulating human and animal populations from acute water scarcity. 
Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain (1996) point out that in the desert region of 
Jaisalmer in India, there is an annual rainfall of 100 mm, but there is enough drink­
ing water for the people even in severe drought years because of their habit of stor­
ing water in traditional rainwater harvesting structures called Kunds. In contrast, 
Cherrapunji, a village in north-eastern India, has an average annual rainfall of 
15,000 mm and suffers from water shortages during summer months because the 
surrounding forests have been denuded and the local population has no tradition 
of water harvesting and conservation. 
Local Action: Governments should sponsor the training of at least one male 
and one female volunteer in every village in the science and art of climate 
management. These trained villagers could be designated “Climate Man­
agers.” Wherever possible, an appropriate technical institution should pro­
vide such village-level Climate Managers with information derived from 
computer simulation models, so as to help them to be prepared to handle 
both adequate and aberrant rainfall. 
Conclusion 
While industrialised countries are largely responsible for the present situation 
where human activities are beginning to influence climate, poor nations and the 
poor in all nations are the ones who will suffer the most. 
Balanced diet and safe drinking water are the first among the hierarchical needs 
of human beings. In the past, food production was described as a “gamble in rain­
fall”in many countries. Today, we are in the fortunate position of being able to har­
ness new scientific tools to minimise the “gamble” component of agriculture. A 

























112    
 
food security is sustained under varying climatic scenarios. The impact of climate 
change on agriculture is likely to be harder on tropical countries than on nations 
in temperate zones, and, as such, will likely increase the nutritional disparity 
between developed and developing countries. 
Successful strategies to address climate change must involve the efforts of both 
developed and developing countries. Both avoidance and mitigation strategies 
should be developed at the local, national, regional, and global levels, in order to 
lay the foundation for a common happy future. 
Developing countries should formulate nationally designed and accepted plans 
for achieving a balance between carbon emissions and absorption. Effective action 
at home and emphasis abroad on a “polluter pays” principle should be the two-
pronged strategy of developing nations in dealing with climate change issues. Pre­
vention of deforestation and promotion of greening will help to increase carbon 
sequestration. 
The global community should work in a concerted manner to avoid large 
human-induced changes in climate and to address the consequences already being 
felt. The international community and national governments must make every 
effort to ensure that all members of the human family have an opportunity for 
productive and healthy lives. 
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Health and climate change 
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Abstract 
Climate restricts the range of infectious diseases, while weather affects the timing 
and intensity of outbreaks. The ranges of several key disease vectors are expanding 
in conjunction with shifting plant communities and retreating alpine glaciers. In 
addition, extreme weather events often create conditions conducive to outbreaks of 
infectious diseases: heavy rains producing insect breeding sites, driving rodents from 
burrows and contaminating clean water systems. Conversely, drought can spread 
fungal spores and spark fires. The 1997-98 El Niño-related extreme weather events 
spawned “clusters” of disease outbreaks in many regions of the globe. Advances in 
climate forecasting and health early warning systems can form the bases for timely, 
public health interventions. If climate change continues to be associated with more 
frequent and intense El Niño events and the accompanying volatile and severe 
weather incidents, we will begin to see the profound consequences climate change 
can have for public health and the international economy. 
Introduction to global warming: Altering the hydrological cycle 
Three aspects of climate change are most important in determining the health 
impacts: 1) the overall warming trend; 2) the disproportionate warming during 
the nighttime and winters; and 3) the increase in extreme and severe weather. This 
paper begins with some of the essential findings related to the water cycle. This is 
fundamental to the discussion of the impact of global warming on human health, 
as changes in water and heat distribution can be used to help assess shifts in the 
ranges of diseases and the growing intensity of disease outbreaks associated with 
a changing climate. 
Many regions of the globe are experiencing an increase in severe weather. Some 
areas have been affected by prolonged droughts,while others suffer from intense rains 
and flooding. Hot and humid days are increasing in Northern and Austral summers. 
Data from the U.S. National Climatic Data Center demonstrate that in the United 
States and most other parts of the world, dry spells and heat waves have become 
longer over this century, as global warming dries out soils. At the same time, sudden 
downpours and flashfloods have also increased over the past century. The question 
is, is this due to natural variability, or have we begun to alter the Earth’s climate? 
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A comparison of the data on warming, humidity levels and extreme weather 
events and the model projections of how the Earth’s heat budget will be affected 
by the build-up of greenhouse gases () in the lower atmosphere (e.g., tro­
posphere, extending to about 10 kilometers above the Earth’s surface) yields some 
interesting corroborations.1 Computer models project that with a doubling of 
atmospheric CO2 the hydrological cycle (average residence time of water vapor in 
the troposphere) will increase by 7 to 15%. Data indicates that the hydrological 
cycle has increased globally. Between 1973 and 1993 it increased 10% over the con­
tinental United States.2 
Three other “fingerprint” studies indicate that atmospheric accumulation of 
 from burning fossil fuels is responsible:3 
•	 Computer models project that ghg build-up will produce the most pronounced 
warming in the mid-atmosphere, three to five kilometers above Earth’s surface. 
Data indicates that greater warming is occurring at that elevation and in moun­
tainous regions —above the layer of sulfur-enriched clouds. 
These clouds can produce localized, ground level cooling by blocking incom­
ing radiation and by producing rain. 
•	 Models driven by ghg-forcing forecast greater warming during the nighttime and 
winters (minimum temperatures or tmins) than during the daytime or summer. 
Data from weather stations around the globe indicate that since 1950 tmins have 
risen twice as fast as daytime maximums—1.86˚ every 100 years vs. 0.88˚ every 
100 years. New nighttime warming records were reached in Dallas, Texas and else­
where, in the summer of 1998. Spring is also coming one to two weeks earlier in the 
Northern Hemisphere. 
Daytime and nighttime temperatures are not changing in tandem, as would 
occur with natural variability. 
•	 Models project greater variability in weather patterns and more extreme weather 
events as heat builds up in the climate system. 
Data demonstrates that there are more prolonged droughts and more heavy rain 
events (over 2 inches per day), leading to more flashfloods. 
This variability—as demonstrated by greater swings in weather—may reflect 
growing instability and overshoots of feedback mechanisms that stabilize the 
climate system. 
How might these findings be explained? 
Are the oceans warming? 
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (), sea sur­
face temperatures have risen during this century. This century, sea surface tem­
peratures have risen, according to the . However, warming has also been 
detected deep in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans, and around both poles. 
The oceans may turn out to be the long-term repository of this century’s global 
warming. 
A warmer atmosphere can hold more water (6% more for each 1˚ of warm­
ing), and 85% of evaporation comes from the oceans—the remainder from plants 
and soils. In general, high clouds warm, while low clouds cool. However, overall, 
the increased water vapor traps more heat (an enhancing feedback mechanism) 






























pheric water vapor and clouds produce more intense and heavy “tropical-like” 
drenching rains when the atmosphere does cool enough to cause condensation. 
Increased cloudiness also blocks the escape of heat (outgoing long-wave radia­
tion) at night, contributing to warmer nighttime temperatures. 
How are El Niño events related to global warming? 
Rule of thumb: Temperature, pressure, wind, weather 
As air warms over heated land surfaces it rises, and atmospheric pressure is low­
ered. Greater temperatures produce greater gradients in pressure. Thus, lowered 
pressures draw in winds, which bring in weather systems, such as tornadoes. 
Meanwhile, warmer ocean surfaces fuel more intense tropical storms such as hur­
ricanes in the Americas, typhoons in the Far East, and cyclones in the Indian 
Ocean. 
In other words, there may be warming below us in the oceans and above us in 
the mid-atmosphere, while on the planet’s surface we are experiencing the 
increased heat as unusual, severe, and unstable weather. Extreme weather events 
may be the most profound—and most costly—manifestation of climate change. 
The frequency and intensity of El Niño 
The Southern Oscillation phenomenon, or El Niño, happens when the Western 
Pacific Warm Pool shifts eastward towards the Americas, disrupting “normal’ 
weather patterns. Records that have been kept since 1877 indicate that El Niño 
events have become more frequent and more severe since the mid-1970s. Once 
occurring every 4.2 years on average, El Niño conditions have been present for half 
of the years since 1976.4 Was there a “regime shift,” as sea level pressures, coral 4 clivar . “A Study of Climate
Variability and Predictability,”records, and marine life range changes along California would suggest? 
World Climate Research Pro-
More and larger El Niño events, and the associated severe weather, could also gram. wmo, Geneva (1992). 
be due to ocean warming. La Niña events, when cooler water surfaces in the east­
ern Pacific, often follow El Niños. El Niño is a natural climatic mode. However, 
The oceans may turn out to be the long-term repository of this century’s global 
warming. 
heat absorption by the world’s oceans from burning fossil fuels and felling forests 
may be altering this natural mode and affecting heat and weather distribution 
across the planet. Given the impact of warm seawaters on the jet stream, that 
upper-atmosphere current of air is also changing its pattern. Thus, some areas of 
the globe experience intense droughts, heat waves, and fires, while others are del­
uged. 
No one yet knows whether the recent harsh El Niños indicate that global warm­
ing may continue to increase and intensify this phenomenon, but temperature 
data indicates that the upward trend in warming is associated with more intense 
spikes over the past twenty years. Records from earlier in the 20th century suggest 
that the warming trends may be associated with increasing variability. Addition­
ally, ice core records near the end of the last Ice Age indicate that periods of 
increased variability and instability may precede “rapid climate change events.” 
Thus, wide swings in weather patterns may become the norm, as sea surfaces and 
deeper waters continue to absorb and circulate the heat accumulating in the tro­
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posphere. At the same time, abrupt changes in climate—hopefully small enough 
to provide a warning and without widespread disruption—may be in store. 
What are the health impacts of global warming? 
Global warming may have grave consequences for the future control of disease. In 
the coming decades, in combination with other environmental and social pres­
sures, the current world-wide warming trend is likely to increase the exposure of 
millions of people to new diseases and health risks. There are indications that this 
disturbing change has already begun. 
Infectious diseases are currently emerging, resurging, and undergoing redistri­
bution on a global scale. In fact, according to a 1996 World Health Organization 
()5 report, at least 30 infectious diseases new to medicine have emerged in the 
past 20 years. Diseases that are transmitted person-to-person, like diphtheria and 
whooping cough, have resurged in many countries where social structures have 
deteriorated. Dengue, or breakbone fever, which had essentially disappeared in the 
Western Hemisphere, has now reappeared in the Americas, infecting over 200,000 
people in 1995.6 Also in 1995, the largest epidemic of yellow fever in the Americas 
since 1950 struck Peru.7 
Biological changes in organisms, under-funded public health systems, and 
social inequities are all contributing to the emergence of infectious diseases. How­
ever, environmental changes, including global warming and greater weather 
volatility, are playing significant roles in this global disease resurgence as well. For 
example, diseases involving pest species as vectors (carriers) respond most readily 
to environmental change. Other illnesses, like the measles and influenza, are trans­
mitted person-to-person and may be most affected by social conditions and 
crowding. However, meningitis epidemics are associated with severe drought con­
ditions, which apparently dry out mucus membranes, making them vulnerable to 
penetration by colonizing organisms. In fact, in Sub-Saharan Africa, the 1995-96 
outbreak was among the largest ever recorded; over 100,000 people contracted the 
disease and 10,000 died.8 
Another exceptional trend is that some infectious diseases are emerging for the 
first time in developed nations. Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome (HPS) and 
Lyme disease first appeared in the United States. Toxic E. coli 0157 has been a par­
ticular problem in the United States, Europe, and Japan. Large outbreaks of food-
borne illness tend to increase in the summer. Many water-borne diseases accom­
pany heavy rains and flooding. 
The implications of the impacts to humans are enormous. As with most risks 
to human health, children and the elderly, and particularly the poor, are most vul­
nerable. From the international policy perspective, the resurgence and spread of 
diseases could affect trade, travel, and tourism, and strain already fragile North-
South relationships. There have been periods of uncontrollable waves of disease 
that radically altered human civilization in the past, such as when Europe’s popu­
lation was devastated by bubonic plague in the Middle Ages. That problem was 
associated with population growth and urbanization. Now a rapidly warming cli­
mate, compounded by widespread ecological changes, may be stimulating wide-
scale change in disease patterns. 
Healthy ecosystems, with preserved predator/prey ratios, provide the natural 
biological controls over infectious diseases and their carriers. Owls, coyotes, and 
















involved in the transmission of Lyme disease, hantaviruses, arenaviruses (hemor­
rhagic fevers), leptospirosis, and human plague. Likewise, freshwater fish, birds, 
reptiles, and bats limit the abundance of mosquitoes—some which may carry 
malaria, yellow fever, dengue fever, and encephalitis. Land-use changes and over­
use of pesticides can alter these ratios. Augmented climate variability can also alter 
the functional balance among predators and prey, which is important for control­
ling the proliferation of pests and pathogens. 
Warmer temperatures and vector-borne disease 
Changing social conditions, such as the growth of “mega-cities,” and widespread 
ecological change, are contributing to the spread of infectious diseases. However, 
climate restricts the range in which vector-borne diseases () can occur, and 
weather affects the timing and intensity of their outbreaks. Rates of insect biting 
and the maturation of microorganisms within them are temperature-dependent, 
and both rates increase when the air warms. Warming can also increase the 
number of insects, provided adequate moisture, although excessive heat can 
decrease survival of either microorganisms or their hosts. Between the limits of 
too hot and too cold is an optimum range of temperature in which warmer air 
enhances metabolism and the chances for disease transmission. 
Most insects are highly sensitive to temperature change: ants even accelerate 
their pace in warmer weather. Findings from paleoclimatic (fossil) studies demon­
strate that changes in temperature, and especially in , were closely corre­
lated with geographic shifts of beetles near the end of the last Ice Age, about 10,000 
years ago. Indeed, fossil records indicate that when changes in climate occur, 
insects shift their range far more rapidly than do grasses, shrubs, and forests. 
Insects also move to more favorable latitudes and elevations hundreds of years 
before larger animals do.“Beetles,” concluded one climatologist,“are better paleo­
thermometers than bears.”9 
Mosquitoes are hot weather insects that have fixed thresholds for survival. 
Anopheline mosquitoes and falciparum malaria transmission are sustained only 
where the winter temperature is always above about 16˚ (61˚), while the variety 
of mosquito that transmits dengue fever, Aedes aegypti, is limited by a 10˚ (50˚) 
figure 1: predicting
disease outbreaks 
The map shows regions of
heavy rainfall and drought
during 1997–98 and the associ­
ated clustering of outbreaks of
emerging infectious diseases.
Extreme weather events have 
resulted in a surge in epi­
demics, particularly in tropical
regions. Using climate data to
predict the arrival of conditions
that are likely to favor disease
outbreaks can facilitate public
health interventions, such as 
vaccination and preparations
and treatment facilities. 
9 S.A. Elias, Quaternary Insects
and Their Environments, Smith­
sonian Institution Press,Wash­
ington, D.C. (1994). [based on
work of R. Coope and others]. 
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winter isotherm. Shifts in the geographic limits of equal temperature (isotherms) 
that accompany global warming may extend the areas that are capable of sustain­
ing the transmission of these and other diseases. The transmission season may also 
be extended in regions that now lie on the margins of the temperature and mois­
ture conditions that allow disease carriers to reproduce. Similar considerations 
also apply to cold-blooded agricultural pests, called stenotherms, which require 
specific temperatures for their survival. 
Malaria 
Approximately 270 million people suffer from malaria worldwide, and over two 
billion of the world’s population is considered at risk of contracting the disease. 
Each year one to two million people die from this mosquito-transmitted disease. 
Malaria generally extends only to places where the minimum winter tempera­
ture reaches no lower than 16˚. However, global warming is predicted to bring 
warmer winters to many places, therefore increasing the potential for malaria 
transmission at higher latitudes and higher elevations. Malaria is already being 
reported at unusually high elevations in the mountains of Central Africa as well as 
Ethiopia and in parts of Asia. Highland urban centers, like Harare, Zimbabwe and 
Nairobi, Kenya are at increasing risk of outbreaks, and are largely unprepared to 
deal with them. 
One study suggests that the proportion of the globe that could sustain malaria 
transmission would increase from 45 to 60% with the doubling of CO2 emis­
sions.10 The anopheles mosquitoes that can carry malaria are already present in 
the United States, and earlier in the 20th century the disease was prevalent. In 
recent decades, the disease has been for the most part under control. In the 1980s, 
local transmission occurred only in California. However, small outbreaks of 
locally transmitted malaria started occurring in the 1990s in Texas, Georgia, 
Florida, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Virginia, California, and in Toronto, 
Canada—primarily during hot, wet spells. This means that conditions conducive 
to transmission may be changing; for example, the increased rain and humidity in 
some areas will engender large populations of mosquitoes; and warmer tempera­
tures will increase the maturation rate of the parasites within mosquitoes. A per­
sistence of similar climatic conditions, combined with inadequate or ineffective 
control methods, could lead to further localized outbreaks. 
Dengue fever 
Dengue or breakbone fever is a severe, prolonged, flu-like illness that can be fatal 
in certain forms. Unlike yellow fever, which is caused by a related virus and spread 
by the same mosquito, there is no vaccine for dengue fever. Dengue fever and 
dengue hemorrhagic fever now occur regularly in Asia and throughout Latin 
America. In many regions, researchers have demonstrated that large upsurges 
often occur during El Niño events. Flooding may create fresh breeding conditions, 
although the heavy rains may initially wash away mosquito larvae. In mountain­
ous areas where streams may dry or where water is stored in receptacles, drought 
may precipitate upsurges. 
The mosquitoes that carry dengue fever (Aedes aegypti) and malaria (Anophe­
line spp.) are limited by temperature. Frost kills adults and larvae. Thus extreme 
weather events may precipitate outbreaks, while warming—especially nighttime 






















Global change in montane regions 
Both insects and insect-borne diseases (including malaria and dengue fever) 
are being reported today at higher elevations in Africa, Asia, and Latin Amer­
ica. Highland malaria is becoming a problem for rural areas in Papua New 
Guinea and for the highlands of Central Africa. In 1995, dengue fever blan­
keted Latin America, and the disease or its mosquito vector, Aedes aegypti, are 
now appearing at higher elevations. In addition, the displacement of plants 
to higher elevations has been documented on thirty peaks in the European 
Alps, and has also been observed in Alaska, the Sierra Nevada range in the 
United States, and in New Zealand. These botanical trends, indicative of 
gradual, systematic warming, accompany other widespread physical changes: 
Montane glaciers are in retreat in Argentina, Peru, Alaska, Iceland, Norway, 
the Swiss Alps, Kenya, the Himalayas, Indonesia, and New Zealand. Some may 
soon disappear. 
According to radiosonde data analyzed by the U.S. National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration’s Environmental Research Laboratory, the 
lowest level at which freezing occurs has climbed about 160 meters higher in 
mountain ranges from 30˚ to 30˚ latitude since 1970. The shift to higher 
levels on mountainsides corresponds to a warming at these elevations (mid­
troposphere) of about 1˚ (almost 2˚), which is nearly twice the average 
warming that has been documented over the earth as a whole. Notably, 
atmospheric models that incorporate observed trends in stratospheric ozone, 
sulfate aerosols, and  predict that, at least in the Southern Hemisphere, 
the warming trend at high mountain elevations should exceed that of the 
Earth’s surface. Thus, mountain regions—where shifts in isotherms are espe­
cially apparent—can serve as sentinel areas for monitoring global climate 
change. 
other complementary sets of biological and physical factors are consistent with the 
observed resurgence of  in highland regions, all suggesting that global warm­
ing is already having biological consequences (see box). 
It is projected that global warming will significantly increase the range con­
ducive to the transmission of both dengue and yellow fever. As if to confirm these 
predictions, dengue fever has been recently reported at higher elevations than 
before, at 1,240 meters in Central America, 1,700 meters in Mexico, and Aedes 
aegypti was found at 2,200 meters in the Colombian Andes.11 
Encephalitis 
Mosquitoes can transmit several viruses that cause inflammatory brain diseases in 
humans. Among these encephalitides are Japanese, eastern equine (in the United 
States), Venezuelan equine, and others. The most common of these infections in 
the United States, for example, is St. Louis encephalitis (). Epidemic outbreaks 
are strongly associated with periods of a few days when temperatures exceed 30 
oC. Particularly wet late winter months, followed by summer drought may exac­
erbate the threat. 
Global warming in the United States could result in a more frequent and more 
northerly occurrence—even up to Canada—of a disease that is currently limited 
mainly to southern parts of the country.  passes through several bird species, 
11 P.R. Epstein, H.F. Diaz, S. Elias,
G. Grabherr, N.E. Graham,W.J.M. 
Martens, E. MosleyThompson,
and J. Susskind,“Biological and
Physical Signs of Climate
Change: Focus on Mosquito-
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including sparrows, pigeons and blackbirds. Its epidemic vector is often mosqui­
toes that commonly breed in sewage or wastewater ponds. For this reason,  
tends to break out in urban or suburban areas. The first major epidemic was in St. 
Louis in 1933, the driest year since 1837. Since 1980, there have been outbreaks in 
Florida, Mississippi, New Orleans, Texas, Arizona, California, and Colorado. 
Climate variability and health 
A global warming trend has been documented since the late 1800s. Many clima­
tologists project more intense heat waves and extreme precipitation to accompany 
that trend. 
Extreme events, such as droughts, floods, storms, and fires, directly cause death 
and injury, and can contribute to conditions that can be devastating to human 
health. Heat waves and winter storms both cause an upsurge in cardiac and respi-
The Second Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (ipcc) Report asserts 
that the frequency of very hot days is likely to increase, resulting in an approxi­
mate doubling of heat-related deaths in affected cities. 
ratory deaths. Floods soak agricultural fields, creating pools and filling ditches, 
thereby increasing fungal growth and providing new breeding sites for disease-
carrying insects. Floods also can spread microorganisms that cause diarrhea by 
contaminating clean water sources with sewage runoff and overflow. Prolonged 
droughts, punctuated by heavy rains, support upsurges in “nuisance organisms,” 
such as insects and rodents, by providing food and breeding sites. 
Heat waves are unhealthy for humans and wildlife. Many climate change sce­
narios project more prolonged and intense heat waves. In the summers of 1995 and 
1998, increased deaths from heat waves occurred across the world, from India to 
the United States. In Chicago in 1995, hundreds died from the intense heat wave 
that gripped the region. High humidity, an increased heat index, and lack of relief 
at night were key meteorological factors. 
The Second Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change () Report12 
asserts that the frequency of very hot days is likely to increase, resulting in an 
approximate doubling of heat-related deaths in affected cities. More frequent, 
warmer weather means more frequent adverse effects. Tetanus bacteria thrive in 
warmer soils, as do many fungi, such as the one that causes San Joaquin Valley fever. 
Australia suffers from a seasonal problem of amoebic meningoencephalitis that 
proliferates in warm inland water in summer. The projected warming of nighttime 
temperatures will be crucial for insect survival and can allow the range of many dis­
ease vectors to expand. Warming of over-land water pipes is also of concern. 
What are the biological impacts of a prolonged El Niño? 
The most prolonged El Niño period in recent history persisted for five years (1990 
to 95), causing myriad environmental impacts. El Niño shifted to the cold La Niña 
phase in 1996 and 1997 and then back to one of the earliest starting, and certainly 
the largest and strongest El Niño of the century form 1997 to 98. Globally, the 
impacts of the extreme weather events were profound. La Niña then returned, 
ushering in severe weather with the opposite pattern—rains where it had been dry 




























Both El Niño and La Niña bring climate extremes to many regions around the 
globe. During the cold phase from 1995 to 1996, many regions of the world experi­
enced intense rains and flooding, following prolonged drought. Such rains have 
been associated with outbreaks of Murray Valley encephalitis and Ross River virus 
in Australia, and malaria in Argentina, southern Africa, and Pakistan. In New 
Orleans, for example, five years without a killing frost (1990 to 1995) engendered an 
explosion of mosquitoes, cockroaches,and termites.With large established popula­
tions, the termites have persisted inside oak trees and houses, despite a frost in 1995. 
The cumulative meteorological and ecological impacts on the marine environ­
ment of the prolonged El Niño of the early 1990s have yet to be fully evaluated. In 
1995, warming in the Caribbean produced coral bleaching for the first time in 
Belize, as sea surface temperatures surpassed the 29˚ (84˚) threshold that may 
damage the animal and plant tissues that make up a coral reef. In 1997, Caribbean 
Sea surface temperatures reached 34˚ (93˚) off southern Belize, and coral 
bleaching was accompanied by high mortality levels in starfish and other sea life. 
Coral diseases are now sweeping through the Caribbean. As these diseases perturb 
marine habitat, such as coral and sea grasses, they can also affect the fish stocks for 
which these areas serve as nurseries.13 
Disease clusters: The 1997-98 El Niño event 
In 1995 there was a heat wave in June during an El Niño in Colombia, followed by 
heaviest August rainfall in 50 years with the commencement of a La Niña. What 
followed was a cluster of diseases involving mosquitoes (dengue and Venezuelan 
equine encephalitis), rodents (leptospirosis), and toxic algae. 
The 1997-98 El Niño event was the strongest of the century. Its impacts were felt 
worldwide. Extreme droughts and fires occurred in Asia, across Mediterranean 
nations, in the Amazon, in Mexico’s tropical rainforest, in Central America, and in 
Florida, in the United States. Respiratory illness, cardiovascular disease, and eye 
irritations rose dramatically in many of these regions. Droughts led to increased 
cholera in many tropical regions. Heat waves killed thousands in India, and hun­
dreds in the United States and Central Europe. The Horn of Africa was deluged 
with flooding and experienced upsurges of cholera, malaria, and Rift Valley Fever, 
which killed both humans and livestock. In Latin America, flooding along the 
Pacific Coast and in southern Brazil resulted in increases in cholera and , and 
many South American nations experienced outbreaks of rodent-borne hantavirus. 
In the southwestern United States, rodent populations began to explode in January 
and February of 1998, which was extremely early, and cases of  occurred during 
that spring. The most devastating floods since 1949 occurred in China as El Niño 
waned, and La Niña began its cooling of the Western Pacific Ocean. 
Note on compounding factors 
Excessive forest burning, deforestation, and other practices also contribute to fires 
and floods. Such local environmental changes can increase vulnerability to 
extreme weather events. Thus environmental and energy policies can compound 
each other and increase social and public health impacts. 
Rodents and disease 
Throughout the United States, Latin America, Southern Africa, India, and Europe, 
rodents are increasing as crop pests and as carriers of disease. Climate variability, 
13 C.D. Harvell, K. Kim, J.M. 
Burkholder, R.R. Colwell, P.R. 
Epstein, J. Grimes, E.E. Hofmann,
E. Lipp, A.D.M.E Osterhaus, R.
Overstreet, J.W. Porter, G.W. 
Smith, and G. Vasta,“Diseases in 
the Ocean: Emerging
Pathogens, Climate Links, and
Anthropogenic Factors,” Science
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changes in land use, and deforestation increase food sources for rodents and 
decrease the number of predators. Combined, these factors are contributing to 
rodent population increases in many areas. A disturbance in one factor can be 
destabilizing; multiple perturbations can affect the resistance and the resilience of 
an entire system. 
This type of synergy is evidenced in the southwestern region of the United 
States. Following heavy spring rains in 1993, rodent populations multiplied ten­
fold, and hantavirus pulmonary syndrome (), a deadly new disease, emerged. 
Over 150 people in the United States have suffered from this viral disease and 
almost half of them have died. Outbreaks of  have also occurred in many Latin 
American nations since 1995. 
In the United States, a prolonged drought prior to the event may have reduced 
populations of rodent predators such as owls, coyotes, and snakes. At the same 
time, the heavy rains provided a crop of grasshoppers and pine nuts, which served 
as nourishment for the deer mice that carry hantaviruses. Thus,  may be 
deemed a “new disease,” the transmission and dissemination of which are most 
attributable to the increased climate variability accompanying climate change. 
In southern Africa rodent populations exploded in 1994, following heavy rainfall 
in 1993 that had been preceded by a prolonged drought.As a result, the maize crop in 
Zimbabwe was crippled, and plague broke out in Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Mozam­
bique. In South Africa a rodent-borne virus was responsible for the deaths of 81 ele­
phants in Kruger Park. Other forms of hantaviruses have resurged in several Euro­
pean nations, particularly in the former Soviet Union and in the war-torn former 
Yugoslavia. In 1994, plague resurfaced in India following a blistering summer, when 
temperatures reached 51 ̊  (124˚), and an unusually heavy monsoon season. 
Are marine-related diseases increasing? 
In marine systems, fish, shellfish, and sea mammals help regulate algae—some 
toxic, others anoxic; still others are transporters of cholera bacteria. Destruction 
of habitat worldwide is reducing predator populations, and global warming may 
be increasing the ability of many disease vectors to survive and reproduce. 
Seashores throughout the world are subject to increasing pressures from resi­
dential, recreational, and commercial development. These stresses may become 
more severe, because human populations in the vicinity of seacoasts are growing 
at twice the inland rate. Some of the pressures that we exert on coastal ecosys­
tems are summarized in the accompanying box. All can increase the growth of 
algae. 
Long-term surface and deep-ocean warming, in combination with coastal pol-
lution, can promote the proliferation of toxic “red tides” and may encourage other 
diseases, such as cholera from bacteria that reside in and take refuge in the plank­
ton. The die-off of manatees off the coast of Florida in 1996 apparently resulted 
from a toxic red tide enhanced by an oversupply of nutrients and warm sea sur­
14 P.R. Epstein, T.E. Ford and R.R. faces.14 
Colwell,“Marine Ecosystems,” Data from the eastern seaboard of the United States and the Caribbean suggest 
Lancet 342 (1993): 1216-1219. 
that diseases of marine life and of habitat (coral reefs and sea grasses) are increas­
ing, as are the number of humans exposed to them. Among the possible conse­
quences of disruption in almost any marine ecosystem is an increase in the oppor­
tunistic pathogens that can abet the spread of human disease, sometimes to 
widespread proportions. One example is cholera.
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Marine ecosystem stresses 
•	 Excessive amounts of dissolved mineral and organic nutrients in coastal 
waters, particularly from nitrogen overload—derived from sewage, agri­
cultural fertilizers, and acid precipitation—resulting in an environment 
that favors plant over animal life. 
•	 Reduced acreage of wetlands, which serve as “nature’s kidneys” to filter 
nitrogen and other wastes that flow from the coastal environment. 
•	 Overfishing, which can reduce the population of beneficial predators of 
algae and animal plankton (zooplankton). 
•	 Chemical pollution and increased penetration of ultraviolet-fl radiation, 
which may increase mutation levels in near-shore sea life of all kinds, and 
disproportionately harm zooplankton and fish larvae. 
•	 Warming of coastal waters and the associated trend toward stable, thermal 
layers that inhibit vertical circulation increase the metabolism and growth 
of algae, and are conducive to more toxic algal species such as cyanobac­
teria and dinoflagellates. Warming may also compromise the immune sys­
tems of sea mammals and coral, and encourage the growth of harmful 
bacteria and viruses in their tissues. 
Cholera 
We tend to think of our modern world as cleansed of the epidemic scourges of 
ages past. Yet cholera—an acute and sometimes fatal disease that is accompanied 
by severe diarrhea—affects more nations today than ever before. The Seventh Pan­
demic began when the El Tor strain left its traditional home in the Bay of Bengal 
in the 1960s, traveled east and west across Asia, and penetrated the continent of 
Africa in the 1970s. In 1991, the cholera pandemic reached the Americas, and 
during the first 18 months more than half a million cases were reported in Latin 
America, with 5,000 deaths.15 Rapid institution of oral rehydration treatment with 
clean water, sugar, and salts limited the fatalities in the Americas to about one in 
a hundred cases. However the epidemics also had serious economic consequences. 
For example, in 1991 Peru lost 770 million in seafood exports and another 
250 million in tourist revenues due to fear of the disease.16 
The microbe that transmits cholera, Vibrio cholerae, is found in a dormant or 
“hibernating” state in algae and microscopic animal plankton, where it can be 
identified using modern microbiological techniques. However, once introduced 
to people though consumption of contaminated water or contaminated fish or 
shellfish, cholera can recycle through a population when sewage is allowed to mix 
with the clean water supply. 
In late 1992, a new strain of Vibrio cholerae, O139 Bengal, emerged in India along 
the coast of the Bay of Bengal. With populations unprotected by prior immuni­
ties, this hardy strain quickly spread through adjoining nations, threatening to 
become the agent of the world’s Eighth Cholera Pandemic. For a time, in 1994, El 
Tor regained dominance, but by 1996, O139 Bengal had reasserted itself. The emer­
gence of this new disease, like all others, involved the interplay of microbial, 
human host, and environmental factors. 
The largest and most intense outbreak of cholera ever recorded occurred in 
Rwanda in 1994, killing over 40,000 people in the space of weeks, in a nation 
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already ravaged by civil war and ethnic strife. The tragedy of cholera in Rwanda is 
a reminder of the impacts of conflict and political, as well as climatic and ecolog­
ical, instability on public health and biological security. Also, epidemics may, 
themselves, contribute directly to political and economic stability.17 
How will plant pests, pathogens, and weeds be affected by climate change? 
Together, plant pests, pathogens, and weeds destroy about 50% of growing and 
stored agricultural produce yearly, worldwide. This amounts to a loss of some 
242 billion annually.18 In the context of human health, climate change presents 
a particular concern for reasons including the following: 
•	 Global warming could increase the range of plant pests and pathogens. 
•	 More extreme weather events could increase the intensity of outbreaks. Floods 
foster fungi, while droughts favor locust, aphids, whiteflies, and rodents. 
•	 There is evidence that weed species and herbivory by insects could increase 
with elevated soil fertilization associated with increased CO2 levels. 
Soils may also be affected by warming making agricultural systems more vul­
nerable. These same dangers hold for forests. The thawing and melting now occur­
ring in Alaska, for example, has weakened pine trees. Now more vulnerable, the 
remaining stands are being devastated by spruce budworm and spruce bark beetles. 
How will air pollution and global warming interact? 
The affects of air pollution from burning fossil fuels and the aggregate impact of 
climate change can compound in several ways to increase such respiratory diseases 
as asthma and bronchitis. Among the combined affects and interactions: 
•	 particulate matter from air pollution directly invades airways; 
•	 nitrogen oxides () contribute to ground-level ozone, which damages the 
lung’s air sacs (alveoli). This reaction is heat-dependant, i.e., warming increases 
the conversion; 
•	 greater humidity with climate change provides more air droplets that also 
increase the  to ozone reaction; 
•	 more flooding events associated with climate change increases the formation 
of moulds in soils and in houses; 
•	 greater humidity provides more surface for the transmission of allergens such 
as pollen and fungi, and of microorganisms; 
•	 warmer winters and earlier springs can produce heavier pollen and mould 
loads; 
•	 more heat waves and unhealthy air masses can concentrate pollutants over sig­
nificant periods of time; and 
•	 droughts and associated fires cause short-term, and uncalculated long-term 
respiratory and cardiovascular illness. 
These synergies and combined affects are yet compounded again by growing 
cities and the “heat-island effect.” Some, like the widespread fires of 1997 to 1998, 
are among the unexpected public health “surprises” that could occur. 
Costs of diseases and climate variability 
The global resurgence of malaria, dengue fever, and cholera, coupled with the 




























attributable to climate change), affect global health and welfare, as well as trade, 
tourism, policy, and economic security. The impacts of disease on humans, agri­
culture and livestock are costly. The 1991 cholera epidemic cost Peru over 1 bil­
lion in lost seafood exports and tourism.19 In India, airline and hotel industries lost 
over 2 billion from the 1994 Indian plague.20 Cruise boats are turning away 
from islands wracked by dengue fever. This could pose threats to the Caribbean’s 
12 billion tourism industry, for example, which employs 500,000 people. 
In the United States, Pfeisteria piscida outbreaks, which have caused fish mor­
talities and human illness (prolonged memory loss and respiratory symptoms), 
have cost seafood and tourism companies and federal agencies millions of dollars. 
These outbreaks occur in the summer when waters warm, and often follow heavy 
rains providing a fresh pulse of nutrients.21 
Worldwide, the rise in severe wind and flood-related events has caused extra­
ordinary losses for property insurers. In the United States, Federal Emergency 
Management Agency payments quadrupled in the 1990s from those in the 1980s.22 
Prior to 1989, single-event insured losses had never exceeded 1 billion per year. 
Since then, annual insured losses have risen four- to five-fold. The causal events 
include: 
• Hurricane Hugo, 1989—5.4 billion 
• Hurricane Andrew, 1992—16.5 billion 
• The winter storms of 1993—1.8 billion 
• The 1993 summer floods—10 billion 
• Hurricane Opal, 1995—2.1 billion23 
With continued extreme climate variability and the spread of diseases, health 
and environmental costs may grow. Insurers already estimate that health-related 
and environmental restoration claims over the next 30 years may reach 50 to 
125 billion. 
Conclusions 
Climate change will have wide-ranging and mostly damaging impacts on human 
health. Longer and hotter heat waves may take more human lives annually in large 
cities. More extreme weather such as storms and hurricanes may kill and injure 
more people, contaminate drinking water, and inflict psychological trauma. The 
combination of climate change and environmental degradation can create ideal 
conditions for the emergence, resurgence and spread of disease. 
Warmer and sometimes wetter weather may already be extending the range of 
infectious diseases such as malaria and dengue fever beyond regions where they 
are endemic and inhabitants have some immunity. Other diseases likely to 
increase and change in connection with the climate include Guinea worm, leish­
maniasis, lymphatic filiasis, onchocerciasis, and Chagas’ disease, which altogether 
affect more than 147 million people already. 
The health, social, and economic costs of unstable and severe weather are 
clearly mounting. In 1997 and 1998, droughts and fires devastated forests (the 
“Earth’s Lungs”) from Indonesia to the Amazon, from Greece and Spain to Mexico 
and Florida. At the same time, ice storms and floods have severely impacted the 
United States and Europe. 
The combined impacts of extraction, mining, refining, transport, and com­
bustion of fossil fuels is healthy neither for ecosystems nor the global environ­
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ment. We cannot afford to continue “business-as-usual” (). Changing course 
will not be easy, but it is necessary. There are costs associated with acting now to 
slow global warming. However, in terms of future health care, productivity, inter­
national trade, tourism, and insurance costs, the savings could be huge. 
The transition to clean energy could be healthy for the environment and for 
economies. Some economic analyses suggest that changing energy policies will be 
costly, but these studies omit the associated damages we may endure by continu­
ing BAU. They also do not include technological innovation. Studies that do 
include the benefits of energy-efficiency and new technologies find that the 
energy transition can spark new growth in the United States and in the global 
economy. 
Development, clean water, and energy sources provide the underpinnings of 
public health. Thus the underlying question is not whether to develop, but how to 
develop cleanly—and how to make the necessary energy transition in such a way 
as to enhance the global economy? 
Greater energy-efficiency and recapturing emitted heat energy for use (co-gen­
eration) are “no-regret” policies. These changes can save money for industries, 
governments, and individuals, while reducing air pollution and the threat of cli­
mate change. The new markets generated by energy-efficient industries and 
nations developing with clean energy sources can be the engine that drives the 
global economy in the coming century. 
An international fund to drive the Clean Development Mechanism of the 
Kyoto Protocol could help catalyze the development of “infant-industries” for 
renewables, spur transfers of technologies, and encourage widespread and equi­
table development. One proposed solution is to tax the 1.5 trillion daily finan­
cial transfers a fraction of a percent. Such a tax, which would also slow down the 
speculative investments that have encouraged unmanageable loans in the 1990s., 
would generate billions of dollars yearly for clean development. This fund could 
go a long way towards insuring economic and social stability in the 21st Century, 
and permit re-stabilization of the climate system, upon which we all depend. 
Major points 
•	 Infectious diseases are emerging, resurging, and undergoing redistribution on 
a global scale. 
•	 Climate change is playing a significant role in the global resurgence of infec­
tious diseases. 
•	 Infectious diseases kill more than 17 million people annually. 
•	 Meningitis epidemics are being associated with the severe drought in Sub-
Saharan Africa. It is the largest epidemic to accompany a drought ever 
recorded. In 1996 over 100,000 people contracted the disease, and 10,000 have 
died.24 
•	 In southern Africa and India in 1994, heavy rainfall, preceded by drought, led 
to explosions of rodent populations and subsequent outbreaks of the plague. 
•	 Following a Mexican epidemic of dengue fever, three cases of the disease were 
reported in Texas in October 1995. 
•	 It is predicted that global warming will increase the area of the globe affected 
by malaria significantly. Approximately 270 million people are infected with 
malaria worldwide. Global warming may cause one million additional deaths 













•	 Following heavy rains in 1993, rodent populations multiplied ten-fold and han­
tavirus pulmonary syndrome, a deadly new disease, emerged in the United 
States. 
•	 Long-term deep-ocean warming has been reported and may be harming 
marine life. 
•	 Ocean warming, particularly in combination with coastal pollution, can pro­
mote the proliferation of toxic “red tides” and may encourage other diseases. 
•	 Recent die-offs of manatees off the coast of Florida may have resulted from a 
toxic red tide, enhanced by an oversupply of nutrients and warm sea surfaces. 
•	 Health-related and environmental restoration insurance claims over the next 
30 years may reach 50 to $125 billion. 
Global warming data 26 
•	 The world has warmed by almost 1.0˚ over the past century and an average 2 
to 3˚ warming is predicted by sometime in the 21st century. 
•	 Past climate changes have occurred rapidly, with changes of 2 to 3˚ occurring 
within decades. 
•	 The scientific consensus is that air pollution from human activities is partly 
responsible for global warming. 
•	 Global sea level has risen between 10 and 25cm in the last 100 years and will rise 
faster still in the coming decades. 
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Abstract 
Forestry is a valuable piece of the climate change mitigation portfolio. Human activ­
ities related to forests and soil are responsible for approximately 20% of the total 
anthropogenic emissions. The ongoing loss and degradation of forests and soils will 
not only contribute to future climate change; it also imposes tremendous environ­
mental,economic,and social costs,particularly on the peoples and resources of many 
developing countries. These costs include loss of species and biodiversity, degrada­
tion of watersheds, silting of hydroelectric facilities, declines in agricultural produc­
tivity, and increasing scarcity of fuelwood. This paper discusses the current status of 
forestry as a mitigation strategy and its potential treatment under the Kyoto Proto­
col and beyond. It is based partially on the 1997 Biotic Offsets Assessment Workshop 
in Baltimore, the purpose of which was for forestry and offset experts to come to 
some agreement regarding the state of the science and policy of forestry-based off­
sets. An appendix of the primary conclusions for policymakers from the Baltimore 
conference is included. 
Introduction 
In early literature about climate change mitigation, forestry was heralded as a 
potential panacea. In recent years, discussion of forestry’s mitigation role has 
become more pragmatic and sophisticated. The credible literature no longer refers 
to forestry as a “solution” to the problem of climate change, but continues to cite 
forestry and other land use measures as a valuable piece of a global mitigation 
portfolio. 
In the aftermath of the Kyoto Protocol, however, signed at the fourth Confer­
ence of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (), 
the future role of forestry for mitigation purposes remains unclear.Although sinks 
are clearly built into the “netting” of Annex B countries’ emissions under Article 
3 of the Protocol, treatment of sinks in project-level mitigation interventions 
undertaken under Articles 3, 6, or 12 has been left for further clarification. To some 
extent, the ambiguities in the Kyoto Protocol are the result of the brevity of the 
Kyoto conference. To a significant degree, however, the Protocol’s ambiguous 
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est groups and countries that are critical of relying on forestry and related miti­
gation interventions as a means of achieving the Protocol’s reduction mandates. 
This issue is discussed later in this paper. 
At the same time that critics are asking questions, numerous studies, including 
those of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (), have concluded 
that forestry-based and other biotic climate change mitigation measures should 
play an important role in mitigating greenhouse gas () emissions and climate 
change.According to the , forestry and other biotic measures can slow carbon 
emissions to the atmosphere by reducing rates of deforestation and forest degra­
dation. In addition, these measures have the potential to increase the incremental 
sequestration of carbon in terrestrial biota through activities such as reforesta­
tion, assisted regeneration, and agroforestry. 
A review of the climate change literature and debate on the subject of forestry 
and sinks inevitably leads to the conclusion that there is a great deal of misun­
derstanding about forestry as a potential climate change mitigation strategy. This 
paper poses a series of questions important to forestry’s current status as a miti­
gation strategy and to its potential treatment under the Kyoto Protocol and 
beyond. The paper is based partially on the work of the Land Use and Biotic Mit­
igation Policy Project (Project), a policy and technical initiative undertaken by 
Trexler and Associates, Inc. in 1997 with the primary objective of significantly 
advancing the technical and policy understanding of whether and how forestry 
and related biotic climate change mitigation measures can credibly and effectively 
contribute toward societal objectives in the climate change arena. The Project is 
working to develop technically and politically credible answers to questions being 
raised in the climate change debate and to improve understanding of the under­
lying issues. 
Many workshops have been organized around the theme of carbon offsets, par­
ticularly around joint implementation () and the “activities implemented 
jointly”() pilot phase. Forestry projects and issues routinely play a role in these 
meetings and workshops, but rarely have forestry and land use issues been given 
exclusive attention. In 1997 the Project convened a workshop that brought 
together nearly 30 international experts to consider key questions regarding the 
use of forestry for climate change mitigation purposes. The goal of the Biotic Off­
sets Assessment Workshop in Baltimore was to bring together well-informed and 
influential forestry and offset experts who would seek to come to some agreement 
among themselves regarding the state of the science and policy of forestry-based 
offsets. The Baltimore workshop focused on project-level forestry-based mitiga­
tion strategies, rather than incorporation of forest-cover changes at the national 
level into a country’s baseline or future emissions budgets (the so-called “netting” 
approach). The workshop participants were a diverse and uniquely qualified set 
of individuals from the academic, government, not-for-profit, and private sectors. 
The workshop’s conclusions are used to help shed light on some of the questions 
posed below. 
Are forestry and land-use change important to the problem 
of climate change and climate change mitigation objectives? 
Since before the Industrial Revolution, land-use changes, first in temperate and 
later tropical zones, have been key contributors to rising levels of greenhouse gases 
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have been responsible for almost one-third of the net increase in atmospheric 
loading of carbon dioxide since the Industrial Revolution. Currently, the relative 
importance of land-use change based emissions is declining as fossil fuel emis­
sions continue to rise. Yet, even today human activities are estimated to emit 
between 1 and 2 gigatonnes () of carbon annually from the world’s forests and 
soils. This is approximately 20 percent of total anthropogenic emissions. In many 
developing countries, land use-related emissions continue to significantly exceed 
fossil fuel emissions. Additionally, land use change contributes to methane and 
nitrous oxide emissions, primarily as a by-product of biomass burning. 
The links between land-use trends and potential climate change go well beyond 
the fact that deforestation and forest degradation are an ongoing and significant 
source of greenhouse gas emissions, thus accelerating the buildup of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere. Several other important linkages that continue to be the 
focus of intensive scientific and political debate are: 
•	 The apparent importance of CO2 fertilization to slowing the buildup of CO2 in the 
atmosphere. The CO2 fertilization effect—in which rising levels of CO2 in the 
atmosphere contribute to enhanced plant growth—is believed to be responsi­
ble for the sequestration of a billion tons of carbon per year in the world’s 
forests, thus slowing future climate change. There is some question, however, 
as to how long this fertilization effect will play this climate change mitigation 
role. 
•	 The potential importance of intentionally undertaken forestry and other land-use 
based climate change mitigation measures. Numerous studies, including those 
of the , have confirmed the potential importance of mitigation measures 
in this sector. One particularly notable example is the potential role biomass 
energy could play in substituting for fossil-fuel emissions in industrialized as 
well as developing nations. 
•	 The potential for increased land use-based ghg emissions in future years due to 
climate change-induced alterations in temperatures, fire regime changes, soil 
carbon oxidation rates, and other variables, and the associated importance of 
understanding how biological systems may adapt to climate change. It may 
require great efforts in some areas just to maintain the forest cover we already 
have. 
This is a brief review of the ways in which forestry and land use change are 
linked to the larger subject of climate change. This review should illustrate the 
need for careful consideration of these issues as facets of the effort to understand 
future climate change, mitigate future climate change, and adapt to climate 
change. 
What is the projected future contribution of deforestation 
and land use change to greenhouse gas emissions? 
There is no reason to believe, under “business-as-usual” circumstances, that the 
absolute contribution of deforestation and forest degradation to global GHG 
emissions will decline significantly any time soon. Vast stretches of tropical forest, 
currently a storehouse for hundreds of billions of tons of carbon, remain threat­
ened by deforestation or degradation. According to the ’ 1995 Second 
Assessment Report, more than 650 million hectares of forest are likely to be lost by 
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In addition, hundreds of millions of additional hectares of forest and agricultural 
land will be degraded, resulting in the release of a portion of the carbon currently 
stored there to the atmosphere. 
The ongoing loss and degradation of forests and soils will not only contribute 
to future climate change; it also imposes tremendous environmental, economic, 
and social costs, particularly on the peoples and resources of many developing 
countries. These costs include loss of species and biodiversity, degradation of 
watersheds, silting of hydroelectric facilities, declines in agricultural productivity, 
and increasing scarcity of fuelwood. 
How can forestry and land use-based measures 
contribute to climate change mitigation goals? 
Numerous studies over the past 10 years have discussed how forestry measures 
could or should contribute to climate change mitigation efforts both in industrial­
ized and developing countries. These studies have included work by the , gov­
ernment agencies, research institutes, and nongovernmental organizations such as 
the World Resources Institute. Much of this research supports forestry as a mitiga­
tion strategy both for its climate change potential and for the additional environ­
mental and socioeconomic benefits that would accompany reduced deforestation 
rates and expanded reforestation programs on suitable lands. Forestry and land 
use-based interventions that have the potential to significantly contribute to cli­
mate change mitigation options fall into one of three major categories: 
•	 Protecting existing carbon reservoirs from losses associated with deforestation, 
forest and land degradation, urbanization, and other land management prac­
tices. 
•	 Enhancing carbon sequestration and expanding carbon stores in forests, other 
biomass, soils, and wood products (including through reforestation, afforesta­
tion, and forest management efforts). 
•	 Using biomass to substitute for fossil-fuel use, whether directly (production of 
biomass energy) or indirectly (substituting wood for steel, cement, or other 
fossil fuel-intensive products). 
International policymakers have repeatedly called for slowing the loss of forests 
and restoring forest or tree cover. In 1989, 68 environmental ministers from 
around the world signed the Noordwijk Declaration in the Netherlands, calling 
for a net increase in global forest cover of 12 million hectares per year to help slow 
climate change. Similar ideas are reflected in international policy initiatives 
including the Tropical Forestry Action Plan, the Global Forestry Program, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Forestry, and the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
The  and the Kyoto Protocol also explicitly mention these objectives. 
The literature surrounding forestry-based mitigation efforts places heavy 
emphasis on reforestation potentials, both in tropical and temperate zones. How­
ever, efforts to slow deforestation and to manage existing forests are probably 
more important for long-term climate change mitigation than efforts to acceler­
ate reforestation. Even critics of plantation forestry acknowledge forest conserva­
tion as a priority. Barnett (1992) concludes, “protection of existing forests [over 
the planting of new ones] should be a priority action in combating climate change. 
This vitally important consideration must be recognized wherever the issues of 
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is by no means easy, large-scale reforestation efforts must grapple with severe eco­
nomic and infrastructural constraints and even environmental concerns. Indeed, 
because protection of threatened forests can serve many environmental, eco­
nomic, and social interests, many analysts argue that forest protection offers one 
of the most socially cost-effective climate change mitigation technologies. 
Nevertheless, reforestation and variants on the reforestation theme—includ­
ing natural regeneration in cases where fire can be controlled in grasslands and 
other areas—does have major mitigation potential. Large amounts of land are 
potentially available for reforestation in both temperate and tropical zones. 
Options being explored include: 
•	 pasture, cropland, degraded or arid land reforestation; 
•	 reforestation of recently harvested stands; 
•	 planting along highway rights-of-way and riparian corridors; and 
•	 planting in windbreaks and other agroforestry applications. 
Using forest-based or other biomass fuels to displace or substitute for existing 
or future fossil fuel use also has tremendous potential as a climate change mitiga­
tion strategy. Opportunities exist, for example, to utilize large quantities of agri­
cultural and forest residues that otherwise would go to waste. There are also 
opportunities to develop specialized biomass crops primarily for energy produc­
tion. If tied to efforts to increase both the efficiency with which biomass is con­
verted to energy and consumed by end-use users, in principle biomass energy 
could supply a large proportion of commercial energy demand in tropical coun­
tries in coming decades. It has to be recognized, however, that such a project faces 
daunting technical and economic challenges. 
What has the ipcc said about forestry’s potential to help mitigate climate change? 
In its Second Assessment Report in 1995, the  identified forestry and other 
land use-based mitigation measures as capable of slowing carbon emissions by 
reducing rates of deforestation and forest degradation while increasing the incre­
mental uptake of carbon by terrestrial biota through means such as reforestation, 
regeneration, and agroforestry (Brown et al. 1996). The  concluded that inter­
vention could realistically reduce cumulative net anthropogenic emissions over 
the next 50 years by more than 70  of carbon. Between 1995 and 2050, by slow­
ing deforestation, promoting natural forest regeneration in the tropics, and imple­
menting a global forestation program, the  concluded that 12 to 15 percent of 
cumulative fossil fuel carbon emissions could be offset. 
What are the technical concerns being raised regarding the use 
of forestry and land-use projects for climate change mitigation? 
The debate over forestry’s potential role in climate change mitigation efforts has 
varied widely over the last decade, from the assertion that forestry could virtually 
solve the climate change problem to the position that there is absolutely no role for 
forestry in a portfolio of mitigation policies and measures. Although many issues 
have been raised in this debate, they can be broadly grouped into several categories: 
•	 Whether forestry and land use change projects can be reliably quantified, mon­
itored, and verified. 
•	 Whether land use-based mitigation measures might be prematurely lost, lead­
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•	 Whether pursuit of forestry and land use change mitigation efforts impede 
basic economic development or result in negative environmental impacts in 
developing countries. 
•	 Whether pursuit of forestry and land use change mitigation efforts impedes 
progress on achieving actual emissions reductions and technology transfer 
objectives in the energy sector. 
This following section addresses the technical issues relating to the use of forestry 
and land use-based mitigation efforts. The discussion reflects conclusions of the 
previously mentioned technical workshop on biotic mitigation options. 
Are there particular difficulties associated with quantifying, monitoring, 
and verifying the performance of forestry and land use-based offsets? 
Substantial progress has been made in defining and refining approaches and 
methods for monitoring forest carbon stocks and flows. Experience with a small 
number of JI projects and monitoring field tests suggests that some of the key chal­
lenges are being met and that forest carbon monitoring can be done at a reason­
able cost with relatively high levels of accuracy and precision. 
Workshop participants agreed that there continues to be a need for standard­
ized methodologies that project developers can relatively easily and consistently 
apply to potential projects. Participants concluded that the absence of standard­
ized methodologies is attributable to the evolution happening in the field, rather 
than to evidence of what is technically feasible. 
How significant are benefit permanence and associated 
biotic risk factors for biotic mitigation projects? 
Additionality 
The supplementarity of individual mitigation projects continues to be a source of 
debate for most project types. Notably, additionality has rarely been raised as a 
concern for forestry projects, since so few existing projects have been economically 
motivated. There is little question that many forestry projects will be able to meet 
or exceed whatever additionality standard is agreed upon in the future. 
Leakage 
The possibility that indirect and feedback efforts occurring outside a project’s 
boundaries will reduce a project’s benefits is commonly identified as a concern for 
mitigation projects. Although leakage is a potential problem for almost all types 
of mitigation projects, forestry projects are often characterized as “leakage-prone.” 
Current thinking suggests, however, that the options available for dealing with 
leakage are similar across mitigation project types, including forestry. 
Reliability 
The different risks faced by some types of forestry mitigation projects make pro­
ject reliability and benefit permanence particularly relevant. Projects intended to 
be permanent (e.g., forest conservation, watershed and natural forest regenera­
tion, soil restoration) face risk factors that could interfere with that permanence. 
Interventions not intended to be permanent (e.g., reforestation or agroforestry for 
timber and other economic products) raise questions the value of delay and the 
length of time needed for an intervention to be considered equivalent to an emis­
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uct substitution for energy-intensive building materials, biomass energy), the 
issues are no different than those facing other kinds of mitigation projects. 
Forestry critics frequently raise the issue of the permanence of land use-based 
mitigation projects. There is very little literature or analysis available, however, on 
the subject. There is little systematic assessment of biotic risk variables that may 
interfere with the permanence of a project’s benefits even when a project is 
designed to generate permanent benefits. Benefit permanence becomes particu­
larly complex when considering projects involving harvesting of timber or other 
biomass. The fate of harvested carbon becomes crucial in determining the long­
term or “permanent” impacts of the project or type of measure involved. Partici­
pants at the workshop quickly concluded that permanence is probably the trick­
iest issue in forestry-based mitigation efforts. Participants also determined that 
although it can be framed technically, the permanence debate is fundamentally 
policy-based. Policymakers ultimately will need to determine what permanence 
means for offsets and how these definitions will apply to forestry and land use-
based projects. 
Quantifying, monitoring, and verifying project benefits 
The ease and accuracy with which the benefits of mitigation options can be quan­
tified, monitored, and verified varies widely. Forestry and land use-based options 
fit this pattern. A range of approaches are available for monitoring changes in 
forest carbon, including remote sensing and ground-truthing, inventory-based 
monitoring, and research-based monitoring. An area of particular confusion that 
should be avoided is equating quantification of national-level sinks through so-
called netting with project-level benefit quantification. The issues involved are 
very different. 
It is important to recognize that not all forestry types and not all forestry pro­
jects are interchangeable in the context of accomplishing climate change mitiga­
tion objectives. Different forestry types and projects will have different mitigation 
characteristics. It is as inappropriate to lump all types of forestry together as it is 
to group together other large categories of mitigation options. In either case, mit­
igation interventions vary dramatically in their quantifiability, cost-effectiveness, 
and long-term outcome. 
Do forestry-based mitigation strategies advance or detract 
from countries’ sustainable development objectives? 
Some critics of forestry initiatives express concern that forestry projects could 
impede socioeconomic development in developing countries, or even cause envi­
ronmental damage. Issues commonly raised include: 
•	 that the land occupied by forestry offsets would somehow deprive countries of 
alternative economic development opportunities and potentially impede 
national sovereignty over their natural resources; and 
•	 that resources going into forestry offsets would somehow displace funding that 
otherwise might become available for activities more directly beneficial to eco­
nomic development. 
These potential problems are most commonly linked to the prospect of large-
scale forest plantations being pursued for climate change mitigation. However, 
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a favored approach to climate change mitigation. Beyond the political and envi­
ronmental issues raised, it is far from the most cost-effective mitigation approach. 
Thus far, no forestry project that has been implemented for climate change miti­
gation involves the types of plantations that have been a primary source of con­
cern for forestry critics. 
Often overlooked in this debate is the tremendous role that forestry-sector pro­
jects, appropriately designed and implemented, can play in societal priority areas 
such as biodiversity conservation, sustainable development, watershed protection, 
and food production. Inclusion of biotic carbon offset projects among the strate­
gies for addressing international concerns about climate change may increase avail­
able resources to support sustainable land-use and forestry practices, both of which 
are unlikely to be adequately funded in the absence of such a mechanism. Indeed, 
biotic carbon offset projects, which include both forestry and land-use manage­
ment options, provide an opportunity to support efforts to reduce deforestation 
and protect vulnerable forest ecosystems, many of which will be lost or degraded 
in the near to mid terms (many within 20 years) without additional support. 
Forestry critics, while raising the concerns cited, acknowledge that forestry 
projects can result in environmental and social benefits, including improved food 
supply security, availability of raw materials to industry, protection of hydrologi­
cal services, conservation of biological diversity, and soil protection (Barnett 
1992). Workshop participants concluded that while one could design forestry pro­
jects to maximize negative benefits, as some cited examples might suggest, it 
should not be particularly difficult to avoid this outcome during project design 
and approval. They also felt that the potential benefits of existing forestry projects 
are significant and observable enough that it is inappropriate to focus excessively 
on hypothetical negative impacts. 
One workshop participant noted that a primary problem with the current 
debate is that participants often have visions of project extremes rather than trying 
to work with the bulk of projects on the middle ground. He commented, “I see 
two sets of types of projects. We are interested in projects that are at the intersec­
tion of these two types. We don’t want simple plantations, and we don’t want pro­
jects that are so social in nature that the carbon benefit is ‘virtual.’ In between are 
kinds of projects that can be done, can be verified, and are socially relevant pro­
jects. The problem is that people have visions of extremes, and it tends to overly 
influence policy discussion.” 
Will forestry offsets impede progress on achieving actual emissions 
reductions and technology transfer objectives in the energy sector? 
Some observers of forestry-based climate change mitigation efforts express con­
cern that pursuit of forestry and land use change mitigation efforts will impede 
progress on achieving actual emissions reductions and interfere with technology 
transfer objectives. Forestry is sometimes portrayed as a negative contributor to 
climate change, even when the technical ability of individual forestry projects to 
offset CO2 emissions is undisputed. This concern involves three assumptions: 
•	 Land use-based emissions reductions are somehow less significant than other 
reductions. There is no dispute, however, that land-use changes release more 
than 1  of carbon to the atmosphere annually. The need to reduce these emis­
sions is just as real as that for other kinds of emissions. 
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jects. There is little empirical evidence to support this argument.While forestry
 
has been a popular mitigation measure, the range of projects pursued through
 
the  pilot phase has been extremely diverse. There is no reason to believe that
 




•	 Forestry projects offer few or no technology transfer opportunities. To the con­
trary, combinations of forest management, reduced impact logging, forest con­
servation, and reforestation measures provide ample opportunities for tech­
nology transfer. 
Many of these technical and policy issues can in all likelihood be addressed 
through development and dissemination of improved information about the role 
of biotic offsets in a global climate change mitigation strategy. There is little doubt 
that appropriate land-use projects can advance rather than impede a country’s 
economic and environmental objectives. 
Why are “co-benefits” so emphasized in forestry 
and other land-use mitigation projects? 
The term“co-benefits” has been coined in the forestry debate to better describe the 
significant non-carbon benefits often accompanying biotic offset projects. Litera­
ture and professional discussions rarely focus on the benefits of biotic options 
beyond cost-effectiveness. Yet the non-carbon benefits associated with biotic 
options are significant. 
Many forestry interventions offer tremendous opportunities to advance bio­
diversity conservation, soil and watershed conservation, rural economic develop­
ment, and the interests of indigenous peoples. Climate change mitigation fund­
ing has the potential to dramatically expand the funding for these goals and 
improved forestry practices, all of which are likely to otherwise remain under­
funded. 
Participants in the Biotics Workshop concluded that co-benefits have not been 
sufficiently factored into the offsets and climate change mitigation debate. This 
omission has been to the detriment of land use-based mitigation opportunities. 
Participants drew several conclusions regarding co-benefits: 
•	 Based on experience with existing offset projects, the co-benefits of available 
forestry mitigation options are plentiful. 
•	 Co-benefits are of interest to both environmentalists and developing countries 
and may generate support for certain forestry-sector mitigation options. 
•	 Co-benefits allow developing countries to meet multiple objectives, including 
biodiversity and rural development objectives. This situation is analogous to 
the commonly accepted technology-transfer co-benefits of energy projects. 
The threat of climate change is only part of the equation in motivating a renewed 
political interest in tropical forestry programs. Just as important is the perception 
that the large-scale use of forestry for climate change mitigation would inject 
much needed resources into the forestry sectors of countries around the world. 
Slowing forest loss and land-use degradation can advance sustainable develop­
ment, energy production, and environmental goals in tropical countries, while 
adding to terrestrial carbon stores. It is conceivable that billions of dollars could 
be spent annually on forest protection, forest management, reforestation, and bio­
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this money would almost certainly flow from industrialized to non-industrialized 
countries, whether through direct nongovernmental investment, government-to­
government payments, debt relief, or other means. 
How much experience has been accumulated through 
existing forestry and land use-based mitigation efforts? 
Since the late 1980s, more than two dozen pilot climate change mitigation projects 
have been implemented in the forestry sector, involving commitments of more 
than $50 million. This figure may be small by the standards of international aid 
and capital flows, but it is significant in the context of climate change mitigation 
spending. There are several reasons that forestry has been a popular climate 
change mitigation option: 
•	 Early offset funders wished to clearly differentiate their offset projects from 
their day-to-day energy-sector business activities. 
•	 Forestry-based offsets were seen as cost-effective and easily implemented at the 
pilot project scale. 
•	 In a strictly voluntary mitigation regime, the many co-benefits of forestry pro­
jects have been particularly appealing to offset funders. 
Forestry and land-use mitigation projects are underway in both industrialized and 
developing countries. They have been based on a range of forestry and other land-
use change interventions, including: 
•	 reforestation and agroforestry; 
•	 protected area establishment or reinforcement; 
•	 expansion of sustainable forestry; 
•	 reduced impact logging; 
•	 conservation easements; 
•	 soil carbon enhancement; and 
•	 research and development on fast-growing trees. 
A brief introduction to the experience with these categories of projects is pro­
vided below: 
Temperate reforestation 
Well over a dozen projects are underway in Annex I countries including the United 
States, Russia, the Czech Republic, and the Netherlands. Although individual pro­
jects are generally modest in size, overall, thousands of hectares are involved. Lands 
targeted by these reforestation projects are ecologically or economically sensitive, 
and include national parks, other public lands, and non-industrial private land­
holdings. Project benefits include soil and water conservation, enhancement of 
wildlife habitat, and rural economic development. Long-term carbon contracts, 
sometimes up to 99 years, ensure that the projects’ carbon benefits are long-lived. 
Tropical reforestation 
Reforestation projects are underway in several tropical countries. This group of 
projects includes the first carbon offset project, an agroforestry and sustainable 
development project in Guatemala that was initiated almost 10 years ago. Lands 
involved in these reforestation projects include national parks, other public and 
communal lands, and private lands. As with temperate reforestation projects, the 
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benefits of tropical reforestation projects include soil and water conservation, 
enhancement of wildlife habitat, and rural economic development. 
Forest and harvest management 
Of these, perhaps the best known is the Malaysia Reduced Impact Logging (RIL) 
Project, which was initiated in 1994. Estimates suggest that through careful plan­
ning and personnel training carbon emissions during harvesting could be reduced 
by as much as 50 percent in some regions of the world. Extensive research has been 
carried out to document these benefits. RIL components can also be found in the 
Rio Bravo Conservation and Forest Management Project in Belize and the Noel 
Kempff Mercado project in Bolivia. 
Tropical forest conservation 
Although this project category constitutes the most widely discussed forestry cli­
mate change intervention, the number of projects underway in this area is quite 
small. Current projects include the Rio Bravo Conservation and Forest Manage­
ment Project in Belize, the  project in Costa Rica, the Mbaracayu pro­
ject in Paraguay, and the Noel Kempff Mercado Project in Bolivia. Each project 
involves a different approach. Examples of these approaches include: 
• the purchase of private inholdings within a national park; 
• buying out timber concessions and doubling the size of a national park; and 
• the purchase and transfer of private lands to long-term public protection. 
Each project includes significant biodiversity benefits, as well other project co-
benefits. Host country support for these projects has been strong. In several cases, 
it is expected that the carbon benefits will be shared between the host country and 
project funders. Most of the projects have demonstrated the ability of forestry-
sector projects to conform to carbon offset evaluative criteria. 
In addition to these individual project-based interventions, several broader 
innovative forestry initiatives and programs are being pursued for climate change 
purposes. One example can be found in Costa Rica, which has established its Cer­
tified Tradeable Offsets () program. The  program is based on a national 
system of forest protection and reforestation incentives. Another example is the 
Forest Resource Trust in the state of Oregon in the United States, in which large 
numbers of individual reforestation interventions will be aggregated into a 
statewide and risk-insured carbon pool. 
Biomass utilization 
A small number of projects are underway in both industrialized and developing 
countries to experiment with and demonstrate opportunities for commercial uti­
lization of biomass in the energy sector as a means of displacing fossil fuels. 
Soil Carbon Enhancement 
A few projects are pursuing enhancement of soil carbon reserves. One project, 
in Saskatchewan, Canada, pays landowners to pursue no-till agricultural prac­
tices. The proposed Halophyte Cultivation Project in Sonora, Mexico, would also 
result in significant soil carbon replenishment. 
These brief examples provide some insight into the range of measures being 
pursued around the world for offset purposes. Through these projects a great deal 
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rience has also helped clarify the questions still needing to be resolved with respect 
to forestry’s use for climate change mitigation. 
How do forestry and land use-based mitigation projects 
systematically differ from energy-based mitigation projects, if at all? 
Most observers evaluate climate change mitigation projects through their ability 
to address several key questions: 
• Are they additional to what would have happened but for the project? 
• Are the project’s benefits reliable and long-term? 
• Can the project’s benefits be accurately quantified, monitored, and verified? 
• Do the projects provide significant co-benefits? 
Forestry and land use-based mitigation measures are often discussed as if they 
are fundamentally different from mitigation projects undertaken in the energy 
arena. Participants in the Baltimore Workshop generally agreed that many biotic 
offsets would be of comparable mitigation quality. They also concluded that 
implementation of land-use initiatives would involve the same degree of difficulty 
as most energy projects. 
Workshop participants did, however, express some concern over the contro­
versy surrounding the general characteristics of different types of mitigation 
interventions and associated assertions that some categories are inherently better 
than others. In the case of forestry interventions, this debate was contributed to 
by a naive community of forestry experts who have openly shared the strengths 
and weaknesses of measurement capabilities with a policy community that is not 
sufficiently prepared for interpreting this discussion. As one participant said: “We 
[forestry experts] have done some damage in getting too involved in technical dis­
cussions. As a result, we have confused policymakers. The technical issues for 
forestry are no more perplexing than they are for energy offsets.” Voicing support 
for this view, another participant stated that “the central issue we need to address 
is not what our confidence level in our forestry measurements is, but to make it 
clear that forestry offsets can accomplish the same levels of accuracy as energy at 
equivalent levels of effort. The issue is comparability.” 
As a result of these discussions, a primary conclusion of workshop participants 
was that forestry-sector offset projects are not dissimilar to energy-sector projects. 
There are relatively few systemic differences between the project categories, and 
they can run in different directions (e.g., additionality vs. permanence). Partici­
pants concluded that it is not feasible to make blanket statements at the sectoral 
level about the comparable quality of energy-sector and forestry-sector projects. 
Participants concluded that forestry projects should not be held to higher perfor­
mance standards than energy-sector projects, nor should they be generically dis­
counted against energy-sector projects.Workshop participants concluded that the 
specific characteristics of individual projects need to be taken into account when 
judging compliance with any crediting system that is established for climate 
change mitigation. Whether a project is within the forestry sector or the energy 
sector, it should be required to prove individual compliance with offset standards. 
How are forestry and land-use projects treated 
under the fccc and the Kyoto Protocol? 
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use sinks are important components of the  and the Kyoto Protocol. Relevant 
provisions of the two instruments include: 
•	  Article 4(2)(a): Parties shall adopt national policies and take corre­
sponding measures on the mitigation of climate change by . . . protecting and 
enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs. 
•	 Kyoto Protocol, Article 2.1(a)(ii): Annex I Parties shall implement policies 
relating to protection and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs, and promotion 
of sustainable forest management practices, afforestation, and reforestation. 
•	 Kyoto Protocol, Article 3.3: Industrialized Parties shall net out forestry sources 
and sinks in calculating their emissions. 
•	 Kyoto Protocol, Article 6.1: Any Annex I Party may transfer or acquire emission 
reduction units from projects aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions by 
sources or enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks. 
•	 Kyoto Protocol, Article 12.3(b): Annex I Parties may use the certified emission 
reductions accruing from project activities to contribute to compliance with 
part of their quantified emissions reduction commitments. 
With regard to forestry-based mitigation strategies, the outcomes of the third 
Conference of Parties (-3, at which the Parties adopted the Kyoto Protocol) 
are widely regarded as ambiguous. The discussions of sinks at -3 were not gen­
erally in the context of project-based mitigation efforts. Rather, they focused pri­
marily on sinks within the context of whether and how forestry would be netted 
against fossil-fuel emissions for the purpose of determining compliance with 
emissions reduction targets. 
The forestry outcomes of the Kyoto Protocol can be summarized as follows: 
•	 Reforestation, afforestation, and deforestation since 1990 will be netted against 
other  emissions by Annex B (former Annex I) countries. 
•	 Reforestation and afforestation “sinks” projects that can meet an unspecified 
“but for” or “additionality” test will be eligible for crediting under Article 6 of 
the Protocol (joint implementation), albeit not until the first budget period. 
•	 The Clean Development Mechanism () provides for crediting of “certified 
emissions reductions,” but does not define the types of emissions reductions 
that will be included. While some environmental organizations and develop­
ing countries have argued that this means that forestry-sector projects should 
be excluded, this opinion is widely disputed. It is interesting to note that a 
number of potential forestry interventions do constitute “emissions reduction” 
projects rather than sink enhancement projects. 
The first response to the ambiguity surrounding land-use projects left by the 
Kyoto Protocol occurred at the follow-up Subsidiary Body meetings in June 1998 
in Bonn, Germany. One of the few areas in which progress was made was in the 
land-use change and forestry area. Even so, advances were procedural rather than 
substantive. As a result of the Bonn meetings, the  was charged with prepar­
ing a special report on several key land use and forestry issues. This special report, 
in conjunction with the   treatment of forestry options in its ongoing Third 
Assessment Report, should significantly contribute to the discussion of the role 
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What is the difference between “netting” sinks in estimating 
national ghg emissions (Article 3.3 of the Kyoto Protocol) 
and pursuing individual sinks projects (Articles 6 and 12)? 
When considering the role of land use-based emissions reduction and sequestra­
tion projects, it is important to differentiate between national netting of emissions 
under Article 3.3 of the Protocol and pursuit of forestry and other mitigation mea­
sures at the project level. Article 3.3 delineates how forests fit into industrialized 
calculations of compliance with emissions reduction targets: 
The net changes in greenhouse gas emissions from sources and removals by 
sinks resulting from direct human-induced land-use change and forestry 
activities, limited to afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation since 
1990, measured as verifiable changes in stocks in each commitment period 
shall be used to meet the commitments in this Article of each Party included 
in Annex I. 
There is still considerable uncertainty as to how this paragraph will be applied. 
What is clear, however, is that language of Article 3.3 applies to the “netting” of cer­
tain categories of land use change and forestry interventions in Annex B countries 
against those countries’ fossil fuel emissions for purposes of evaluating compli­
ance with Parties’ obligations under Article 3.3. There is a clear difference between 
quantifying benefits at the national level for this type of netting, vs. the quantifi­
cation of benefits at the project level. The methodologies are different, the uncer­
tainties are different, and the accuracy and precision of the quantification process 
is likely to be quite different. Of particular importance, the fear of large loopholes 
in the Protocol is likely to be significantly greater in the case of national-level net­
ting than it is in project-by-project benefit quantification. As a result, the policy 
and technical concerns and debates that have characterized discussions of netting 
before and during the Protocol development process cannot simply be transferred 
over to the discussion of project-based mitigation interventions. 
How much of a role will forestry play in future climate change mitigation efforts? 
Historical land-use change has been a key contributor to anthropogenic emissions 
of CO2, totaling almost one-third of all emissions since the Industrial Revolution. 
Forest loss and degradation will continue to release more than a billion tons of 
carbon to the atmosphere each year into the indefinite future. This clearly creates 
a place for forestry in the societal menu of climate change mitigation options. Both 
the  and the Kyoto Protocol acknowledge forestry’s importance. 
As with most mitigation options, the total potential of forestry measures 
depends on many variables and is difficult to reliably predict. A range of studies 
suggests that 1 to 2  of carbon benefit per year is achievable through temperate 
and tropical forest conservation, regeneration, and reforestation. Expanded com­
mercial biomass utilization for energy and products could add to this figure. Even 
when not permanent, the benefits of biotic projects can help slow the rise in 
atmospheric concentrations of CO2 for several decades or more. 
Many forestry interventions offer tremendous opportunities to advance biodi­
versity conservation,soil and watershed conservation, rural economic development, 
and the interests of indigenous peoples. Climate change mitigation funding has the 
potential to dramatically expand the resources to meet these goals and improve 
forestry practices, which would otherwise be likely to remain underfunded. 
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As the priority level of climate change mitigation efforts continues to increase, 
more attention will be focused on the need to pursue the full range of available 
mitigation options. More interest groups are recognizing the importance and 
value of forestry and land-use mitigation measures. Dozens of environmental, 
conservation, and sustainable development organizations, as well as private-
sector entities, have demonstrated increasing awareness of the value of forestry 
options by signing the Call for Inclusion of Forest-Based Joint Implementation in 
the Kyoto Protocol, which urged delegates not to overlook the many benefits of 
forestry sector interventions. 
As with most mitigation measures, in-depth work is required for forestry-
sector interventions to develop the protocols and modalities by which project-
level mitigation efforts can be reliably and consistently implemented. How can 
forest areas truly under threat of loss be identified? How can they be effectively 
protected for the long-term? How can reforestation and other projects effectively 
contribute to long-term climate change mitigation goals? These questions deserve 
concentrated political and analytical attention. The Land Use and Biotic Mitiga­
tion Policy Project is starting to provide such attention and has reached several 
preliminary conclusions: 
•	 For land use-based emissions reduction and sequestration, it is important to 
differentiate between national netting of emissions under Article 3.3 of the Pro­
tocol and pursuit of forestry and other mitigation measures at the project level. 
•	 The issues facing forestry interventions are often the same ones facing other 
mitigation options. In most cases, the challenges facing forestry and other pro­
ject-level mitigation efforts require policy rather than technical solutions (e.g., 
defining additionality, leakage solutions, permanence). 
•	 Some issues, such as quantification of project-level benefits, pose less of an ana­
lytical problem than is widely believed because accurate measurement tech­
niques are increasingly available and remaining uncertainty can be effectively 
addressed. 
From the standpoint of a host country, forestry deals will be implemented if 
project benefits, to either the government or private landowners, are larger than 
those from alternative land uses (e.g. logging, pasture). In other words, the bene­
fits of the carbon offset must be greater than the costs of opportunity. Benefits 
might include biodiversity conservation, watershed protection, enhanced eco­
tourism potential, and expanded marketing of non-timber forest products. These 
co-benefits will be weighed against the opportunity costs of diminished timber 
sales and secondary processing opportunities, such as value-added revenues, 
employment and other multipliers. 
What are the priorities for moving forestry issues forward? 
Most of the priorities for advancing project-based mitigation objectives in the 
forestry sector are the same as those in other project-based mitigation sectors. 
Based on the conclusions of the Baltimore workshop referenced in this report, 
however, the following prioritization of issues can be put forward: 
•	 CO2 Benefit Permanence: Permanence was identified by workshop participants 
as perhaps the most technically challenging of the issues considered. It is also 
the issue most commonly flagged by forestry critics. Permanence is also fun­
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technical issues such as the value of delaying emissions, “how long is long 
enough,” and how to incorporate risk factors (e.g. fire) into project benefit 
quantification and evaluation. 
•	 Standardization of Guidelines and Criteria Across Project-Based Mitigation: 
Workshop participants concluded that most issues facing forestry-based off­
sets are the same issues facing other types of offsets. Lack of standardization in 
the field contributes to the concern and confusion surrounding forestry-based 
offsets. Once standardization begins, it will become easier to systematically 
evaluate the performance of forestry-based offsets against other project types 
and determine the degree to which forestry efforts can be integrated into a 
larger post-Kyoto climate change mitigation regime. 
•	 Leakage: Leakage concerns may pose a significant threat to incorporation of 
forestry-sector mitigation efforts into a credit-based regime. Although leakage 
also affects energy-sector projects, there is disagreement as to whether some 
types of leakage are unique to forestry projects and whether the magnitude of 
the leakage issue is greater for forestry than for energy-sector projects. Just as 
important, the issue of whether project-specific leakage assessment is even 
appropriate remains unresolved in both the energy and forestry sectors. 
•	 Protocols for Dealing with the Fate of Forest Products: The treatment of forest 
products for forestry-sector mitigation is linked to all three priorities already 
identified. It is also an important issue in its own right, and one for which no 
process for standardization has been attempted. 
•	 Forestry Project Benefit Quantification, Monitoring, and Verification: A great deal 
of benefit quantification, monitoring, and verification work has recently been 
carried out for forestry-sector mitigation options. Nevertheless, few, if any, stan­
dardized protocols have been developed in a way that is accessible to either pro­
ject developers or climate change policymakers. Extensive practical work in this 
area is still needed. At the same time, project quantification issues are seemingly 
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Appendix: Conclusions for policymakers from the Biotics 
Assessment Workshop, Baltimore, Maryland, September 1997 
Excerpted from: 1998. Trexler and Associates, Inc. The Role of Forestry as a Climate 
Change Mitigation Strategy: Report of a Workshop Held in Baltimore, Maryland, Sep­
tember 5-7, 1997. Prepared for U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 
Workshop participants felt strongly that certain conclusions from this unusual 
gathering of forestry-related expertise should be reported to the policy community. 
During the course of the workshop, participants also concluded that a number of 
technical issues and questions that have been raised in connection with the feasi­
bility and appropriateness of forestry and land use-based offsets can be straightfor­
wardly addressed based on existing technical knowledge.The following conclusions 
reflect these two categories of findings. 
Forestry and land use-based carbon offset projects can be an effective tool that can 
provide an important component of any domestic or international climate change 
mitigation strategy. 
There was strong general agreement that biotic offset projects could provide impor­
tant and cost-effective contributions to national or global climate change mitiga­
tion strategies. Participants felt that one particular benefit of forestry is that it can 
be done on a small scale. It was cautioned repeatedly, however, that biotic offsets are 
not a panacea or “the” answer to climate change and that forestry and other land 
use-based projects are likely to be a small component of an overall global mitigation 
portfolio. At the same time, biotic mitigation strategies have an inherent flexibility 
that can build on experience and be adapted to the special circumstances of a par­
ticular location, culture, or political situation. 
There are three types of forestry and land use-based offset projects: those aimed at 
protecting existing carbon reservoirs and sinks (e.g., avoiding carbon emissions from 
deforestation and other land-use changes); those aimed at adding to existing carbon 
reservoirs; and those aimed at substituting biomass for fossil-fuel-based products 
(e.g., energy, cement, and steel products). 
Participants recognized that it is important to avoid treating forestry mitigation 
options as a monolithic block and that is inappropriate to group all biotic mitigation 
technologies under the same tent for purposes either of embracing or dismissing 
their climate change mitigation potential. Many different potential forestry-based 
mitigation strategies currently exist. Slowing deforestation, for example, can be as 
real a CO2 emissions reduction project as a fossil-fuel substitution or demand-side 
management project in the energy sector. 
There is no question that forestry-based carbon offset projects can help slow the rise 
in atmospheric concentrations of CO2 for several decades or more. This will provide 
time to implement CO2 mitigation policies and measures that require long lead 
times, including conversion to more efficient electrical generation technologies. 
Workshop participants agreed that biotic carbon offset projects can help provide 
time to make long-term investments and changes. Even the short-term removal of 
carbon from the atmosphere provided by some forestry-based offset projects can 
have an impact on the rise in atmospheric concentrations of CO2. It was agreed that 
while permanence of the carbon benefit is important and should not be ignored,one 
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service that biotic offsets can provide – buying time while delaying ghg emissions 
– is a significant scientific and policy benefit. It was also agreed that one can look at 
certain forestry projects as being permanent in the sense of ensuring carbon stor­
age or sequestration over a very long period of time. 
Inclusion of biotic carbon offset projects among the strategies for addressing inter­
national concerns about global climate change may increase resources available to 
support sustainable land-use and forestry practices, both of which are unlikely to be 
adequately funded in the absence of such a mechanism. 
Workshop participants coined the term “co-benefits” to better describe the signifi­
cant non-carbon benefits often accompanying biotic offset projects. The group dis­
cussed how debate on this issue tends to take the position of why forestry “isn’t all 
that bad.” Rarely does one hear in the literature or professional discussions why 
biotic options are good for reasons other than cost-effectiveness (e.g., advancement 
of biodiversity goals). Yet non-carbon benefits associated with biotic options are sig­
nificant. It was agreed that biotic options provide significant ancillary benefits and 
that there are many reasons why these options should be pursued. As some in the 
group noted, the carbon offset could in actuality be considered the ancillary benefit: 
the reasons for pursuing these projects often are – or often should be – other reasons 
that promote environmental and socioeconomic goals. 
Biotic carbon offset projects, which include both forestry and land-use management 
options, provide an opportunity to support efforts to reduce deforestation and pro­
tect vulnerable forest ecosystems, many of which will be lost or degraded in the near 
to mid terms (within ~20 years) without additional support. 
Workshop participants felt strongly that biotic offset projects can provide a mecha­
nism in support of sustainable development practices in developing countries. 
Inclusion of biotic options among the strategies for addressing international con­
cern about global climate change will increase resources available to support sus­
tainable land-use and forestry practices. It was also agreed that time is of the 
essence, since many forests face severe threats in the near future. Workshop partic­
ipants felt that JI is a unique funding mechanism that could help save threatened 
areas while they still exist. Time is crucial in this respect. Several participants agreed 
with the observation that “It will be a lost opportunity if we don’t catch it while it’s 
there. The question is not whether we can capture the benefit later, it’s whether we 
can capture it at all.” 
Forestry and energy carbon offset projects both provide carbon benefits over differ­
ent timeframes. Some give relatively immediate but long-term benefits (e.g., forest 
protection), whereas others provide most of their offset benefits over several 
decades (e.g., long-rotation forest plantations). However, as with energy-sector pro­
jects, the carbon benefits of projects should not be credited to the project until it has 
actually accrued and is verifiable. 
Biotic offset projects can provide both short- and long-term benefits. The issue of 
perpetuity in connection with biotic offset projects – the timeframe over which a 
project offers its benefits – has been contentious and is often raised by critics. It was 
noted that even energy projects cannot claim to yield perpetual emissions reduc­
tions; a 200-year timeframe before gas reserves are depleted (and gas that is con­
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The precision with which we can measure carbon accumulation in onsite vegetation 
associated with forestry carbon offset projects is very high – up to ( 10%, with a con­
fidence of 95% in most situations. 
A project’s carbon benefits can be measured with a high degree of precision. A 
number of the workshop participants, with extensive fieldwork experience in this 
area, felt confident that a ±10% figure is achievable. The effort to reach this high 
level of precision will vary among projects. Workshop participants noted that this 
level of precision is comparable to that found in many energy-sector carbon offset 
projects. 
Whatever the concern associated with the level of measurement precision achiev­
able for a given project, it is always possible to report the net carbon benefit based 
on the lower bound of the achieved confidence interval. Doing so makes the carbon 
benefits claimed highly credible in relation to energy projects, for which estimates 
may be more precise. 
Participants felt strongly that even though some forestry projects will be unable to 
match the quantification precision of many energy projects, this is no basis for argu­
ing that forestry projects should not play a role in mitigation efforts or in a CO2 trad­
ing regime. If considered appropriate by policymakers, means are readily available to 
adjust the quantified benefits of different project types for uncertainties of this sort. 
Where appropriate, such adjustments should be applied to energy sector as well as 
forestry-sector projects. 
It is relatively easy, and the cost is often modest, to measure on-site carbon stored or 
sequestered as a result of a forestry carbon offset project. Measurement is similar to 
the cost and ease of measuring carbon savings associated with many energy carbon 
offset projects. 
Participants concluded that as a technical and practical matter, the cost of measur­
ing carbon in biotic offset projects is not significant; in any event, it is comparable to 
the technical and practical cost issues associated with many energy offset projects. 
It was generally agreed that this was a non-issue despite being commonly raised by 
critics. 
Some categories of biotic projects are capable of meeting a crediting regime, what­
ever that regime might be. 
Workshop participants felt that while the characteristics of forestry-based offset 
projects vary widely with respect to quantifiability, leakage, persistence, and other 
variables, there are forestry-based measures that can successfully conform to any 
crediting regime that might be developed in the future. 
Accounting for the leakage of carbon benefits, if any, associated with biotic carbon 
offset projects is similar to that associated with many energy projects. 
Participants concluded that leakage is an issue to consider in both energy and 
forestry-based projects and that the potential sources of leakage facing both cate­
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Third-party verification of accrued carbon presents similar technical issues in both 
forestry and energy projects. For both types of projects, verification improves the 
accuracy of carbon claims; it can enhance and verify the environmental and social 
benefits of biotic offset projects. 
Participants generally agreed that third-party verification is desirable for offset pro­
jects generally. Some questioned whether such a mandate might not simply add 
another bureaucratic layer to offset projects. Participants observed that third-party 
verification is an issue of credibility of measurement and analysis, rather than one of 
standard-setting. 
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Abstract 
In 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (unfccc) 
demonstrated international agreement that global co-operation is required to for­
mulate and implement adaptation strategies. However, the development of further 
understanding of adaptation, and movement towards international agreement on 
what steps should be taken in order to facilitate it,has lagged well behind mitigation. 
This paper describes a variety of current perspectives on adaptation.It then moves 
on to report on the state of knowledge and thinking as reflected in recent research 
in Uganda, Antigua and Barbuda, and Pakistan. On this basis, the paper concludes 
with the identification of several possible approaches to the development of inter­
national co-operation on adaptation in the context of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. 
Introduction 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change recognises both 
adaptation and mitigation as essential responses to the risks of climate change. 
Mitigation is the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and the sequestration of 
carbon dioxide in vegetation and soils to help stabilise the concentration of green­
house gasses in the atmosphere. Adaptation is all adjustments in socio-economic 
systems designed to reduce vulnerability to climate change. Since the Convention 
was signed in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, there has been much focus has been on mit­
igation, and little attention paid to adaptation. However, the recognition that 
adaptation to climate change is imperative, and even urgent, is growing. This 
paper is a discussion of the range of possible adaptation responses and how they 
can be integrated into national economic development planning and investment. 
Adaptation in developed and developing countries 
Adaptation can reduce the impacts of climate change in both developed (Annex 
I) and developing countries. It has been authoritatively concluded that in devel­
oped countries the capacity to adapt is high (National Academy of Sciences 1992). 
This confidence must be qualified in three ways: 
1 This paper is based on
research that was supported in
part by the U.S. Agency for
International Development
working through the World
Resources Institute,Washing­
ton D.C. and by the United
Nations Environment Pro-
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•	 First, adaptation is most applicable to heavily managed socio-economic sec­
tors. In the National Academy Report these sectors are listed as farming, man­
aged forests and grasslands, water resources, tourism and recreation, settle­
ments and coastal structures, human migration, and domestic tranquillity. 
Natural landscape and marine ecosystems are delineated in the Report as areas 
that are sensitive to climate change and where adaptation is questionable. 
•	 Second, the costs of adaptation remain largely uncharted (Rothman et al. 1998; 
Bein et al. 1999). It is commonly assumed that the costs will be relatively low in 
relation to national wealth, but this may not be the case. It will depend on the 
magnitude and rate of climate change, which remain uncertain. 
•	 Third, confidence in the ability to adapt assumes that climate change will be 
slow and incremental, and will not involve dramatic events such as sudden 
shifts in ocean circulation. The probability of these events is presumably low, 
but they could be catastrophic. 
These caveats notwithstanding, the view that developed countries can cope 
with the necessary adaptation without broad international agreement or con­
certed actions is widely accepted. Recognition is growing, however, that adapta­
tion measures adopted in one country might have consequences for other coun­
tries. This applies most clearly in transboundary situations. For example, when 
adaptations to changing hydrological regimes are made in a country that shares a 
river basin with neighbouring countries, the repercussions are likely to be 
regional.Adaptation policies and measures may also affect the terms of trade, both 
regionally, in cases such as the European Union and under the North American 
Free Trade Agreement, and globally, through the World Trade Organization. As 
such, it seems likely that some international agreements or understandings will 
eventually be required. 
In developing countries, especially the poorer, least developed, and most vul­
nerable to the effects of varying climate, the capacity to adapt is generally much 
lower than developed countries. This is due to a relative lack of financial resources; 
less access to technology; weaker scientific research and development capacity; 
fewer effective institutions, social and governmental organisation; and less devel­
opment of skilled human resources. In addition, not only is the actual amount of 
national wealth a factor, but its distribution is also important. Countries with 
larger proportions of the population living in poverty have less adaptive capacity. 
The uncertainty about the response of natural ecosystems and potential loss of 
biodiversity is another impediment to the development of sound adaptation poli­
cies, especially in tropical countries. 
The large divergence of adaptive capacity between fully developed and least 
developed countries is the major reason why the impacts of climate change are 
likely to be much greater in those regions where climate change, measured in 
terms of mean temperature change, is projected to be least ( 1996a). These 
regions can be described as low latitude or tropical. Significantly larger changes in 
mean annual temperature are projected for middle and high latitudes. However, 
the fact that the more highly developed countries, with greater adaptive capacity, 
are largely located in these regions is expected to reduce impacts. 
Since the  was agreed to in 1992, major emphasis has been placed on 
attempting to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. At the time of this writing (June 
2000), negotiators were seeking ratification and implementation of the Kyoto Pro­
tocol. The goal is to complete these negotiations by the time of the sixth meeting 
 


























of the Conference of the Parties (-) to be held in The Hague in the Nether­
lands in November of 2000. So far, there has been little discussion of international 
co-operation for adaptation, with the exception of National Communications 
under the Convention. 
This paper is intended to place adaptation more firmly in the context of sus­
tainable development. By drawing attention to the importance of both mitigation 
and adaptation as components in a balanced portfolio of responses, it is the 
author’s intention to help stimulate more debate and more rapid progress. Sub­
stantial mitigation will take considerable time to achieve. Adaptation measures to 
address existing and future vulnerability can be taken now. 
The Climate Convention context 
From the outset of the negotiations for the  in the late 1980s, adaptation to 
climate change was treated as secondary to mitigation. The ultimate objective of 
the Convention is stated as the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in 
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interfer­
ence with the climate system.” What followed this initial formulation was over­
whelming concentration on mitigation: how much mitigation is needed, when, at 
what rate, and what is the appropriate distribution of responsibility for achieving 
agreed upon targets on schedule? The requirement that the agreement be inter­
national stems from the global nature of climate change. Since all countries con­
tribute greenhouse gases to the atmosphere, albeit in unequal amounts, it is 
imperative that all countries agree on their respective responsibilities in order to 
avoid the “free rider” problem—where non-Parties enjoy the benefits of the steps 
taken without actually participating. 
Nevertheless, the Convention does recognise the eventual need for adaptation. 
This is specified in Article 4.1 of the Convention as well as in Article 4.4, which pro­
vides that “Annex II Parties shall also assist the developing country Parties that are 
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting the costs 
of adaptation to those adverse effects.”According to one commentator,“This pro­
vision is the clearest expression of the acceptance that the Convention is as much 
about adaptation as it is about mitigation” (Yamin 1998). 
Over the first five years of the life of the Convention, up through the agreement 
on the Kyoto Protocol, a disproportionate amount of attention has continued to 
be devoted to mitigation. Six considerations help to explain the reluctance to 
address adaptation: 
•	 Adaptation has been thought of as a long-term strategy that can be delayed 
until the effects of climate change are more evident and less uncertain. 
•	 Adaptation has been so broadly defined that the potential range of adaptation 
measures is extremely large. At the same time, there is still neither adequate 
information on the costs of adaptation nor an agreed upon basis for the deter­
mination of priorities. 
•	 The developed country Parties have been concerned about exposing them­
selves to substantial and ill-defined demands for assistance under Article 4.4. 
Guidance provided by the developed countries to the Convention’s financial 
mechanism, the Global Environmental Facility (), has so far worked to 
restrain the provision of assistance for adaptation. 
•	 The GEF was initially established in response to developing country demands 



























     
 
 
156    
 
for global environmental protection. A criterion for  funding, therefore, 
has been that global environmental benefits be demonstrated in order for an 
initiative to be eligible. In the case of adaptation, it is generally believed that the 
benefits are overwhelmingly domestic, and therefore additional funds beyond 
normal development assistance are not justified except where genuinely global 
benefits can be demonstrated. 
•	 Many development activities already account for present day climate as well as 
its associated probable future variability and extremes (in theory, at least). 
Since it is not yet, and may never be, possible for atmospheric science to dis­
tinguish with certainty between normal climate variability and climate change 
on either a local or regional scale, it follows that there is no scientific basis for 
distinguishing between adaptation measures to natural climate factors (and 
their costs) and to climate change. 
•	 Throughout the international negotiations, developing country representa­
tives have regarded adaptation as a potential source of outflows or costs. Mit­
igation measures, however, have been seen as potential sources of inflows or 
financial assistance (through Joint Implementation and the Clean Develop­
ment Mechanism). 
Of these six biases against addressing adaptation more aggressively, two have 
lost much of their credibility: lack of urgency and lack of global benefits. 
Lack of urgency 
The recent dramatic increase in the financial costs of weather-related natural dis­
asters has helped to create a sense of urgency. While it cannot be scientifically 
proven that the magnitude of the climate variability and extremes currently being 
experienced is linked directly to climate change, there is certainly a possibility that 
this is the case. Atmospheric scientists generally agree that such a pattern is con­
sistent with the changes that could be expected as a result of atmospheric desta­
bilisation and intensification of the hydrological cycle caused by climate change. 
The cost of weather-related disasters in 1998 exceeded the cumulative cost of all 
such disasters in the 1980s (Annan 1999). The extreme losses of 1998 can be attrib­
uted to the unprecedented strength of the 1997-98 El Niño event. Here, again, a link 
to climate change is possible but not proven. Despite these necessary qualifica­
tions, the link between climate change and current extreme events is sufficient 
cause for alarm, and has fuelled the sense of urgency. 
Lack of global benefits 
The argument that adaptation measures do not yield substantial global benefits is 
offset by the recognition that the costs of adapting to climate change have, in effect, 
been imposed on all countries by the historical emissions of greenhouse gases pri­
marily from the developed country Parties. Indeed, the acceptance of responsibil­
ity in meeting the costs of adaptation, as stated in Article 4.4, is tacit recognition 
of this culpability (Fankhauser 1996). Furthermore, the prevention of large-scale 
losses from climate-related natural disasters can have substantial global benefits. 
In the case of Hurricane Mitch, for example, the economic losses in Guatemala 
and Nicaragua equalled approximately ten years of economic growth. Such set­
backs are occurring more and more frequently, and are a real cost to global eco­
nomic development. This is in addition to the growing costs of emergency relief 
and rehabilitation for disasters, the growing threat that is posed to political and 
  
   










   
  













In the case of Hurricane Mitch, the economic losses in Guatemala and Nicaragua 
equalled approximately ten years of economic growth. Such setbacks are occur­
ring more and more frequently, and are a real cost to global economic develop­
ment. This is in addition to the growing costs of emergency relief and rehabilita­
tion for disasters, the growing threat that is posed to political and social stability, 
and the potential increases of transboundary and transoceanic refugees. In the 
case of Hurricane Mitch, for example, the economic losses in Guatemala and 
Nicaragua equalled approximately ten years of economic growth. 
social stability, and the potential increases of transboundary and transoceanic 
refugees. 
The remaining four reservations about adaptation are addressed in this paper. 
While completely satisfactory answers are not yet available, it is becoming increas­
ingly clear that the costs of adaptation to climate change need not be a huge black 
hole with an unlimited capacity to absorb financial resources. Ways are being 
sought to distinguish the costs of adaptation to climate from adaptation to climate 
change. While this distinction cannot be based on a rigorous scientific distinction 
between climate, climate variability, and climate change, there is an emerging 
sense of what might be considered reasonable incremental costs. At the same time, 
developing countries are recognising that there is a strong case to be made for 
additional assistance in their efforts to meet the costs of adaptation. The outcome 
is likely to depend more on negotiation than on science, but the gap in positions 
no longer looks unbridgeable. 
What is meant by ‘adaptation to climate change?’ 
The  does not define adaptation, and there is generally a lack of a formally 
agreed-upon definition. The closest thing to an authoritative definition may be 
found in text from an  Technical Analysis where it is stated that “adaptation 
refers to the adjustments in ecological, social or economic systems in response to 
actual or expected climate stimuli, their effects or impacts. It refers to changes in 
processes, practices and structures to moderate potential damages or to benefit 
from opportunities associated with climate change” ( 1996b). 
It is sometimes claimed in the new research and policy literature on adaptation 
to climate change that adaptation is a new field about which there is little knowl­
edge or experience. This is true if it is applied strictly to anthropogenic climate 
change. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that an entirely new field of sci­
ence is being created. While the scope of adaptation is clearly very wide, the range 
is dramatically reduced if a distinction is made between adaptation to climate and 
adaptation to climate change (Burton 1997). 
Adaptation to climate has always been an essential part of the evolution and 
survival of both natural and human systems. In all regions, the pattern and design 
of human settlements and infrastructure, agricultural practices and crop selec­
tion, and a range of various other activities have been successfully adapted to the 
prevailing climate over the centuries. In each of the socio-economic sectors at risk 
from climate change there exists both theoretical and practical knowledge con­
cerning responses to climate as well as climate variability and extremes (Washing­
ton Advisory Group 1999). The character of this knowledge differs from sector to 
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local experience in every farming community. This is the basis of day-to-day deci­
sions individual farmers make about factors such as cultivators, timing, and meth­
ods of cultivation. This fundamental knowledge is augmented by a considerable 
body of knowledge encompassed in crop models, which correlate to the responses 
of various types of crops with a wide range of climatic and weather variables. 
Weather and climate variables are also taken into account in design standards 
for components of infrastructure. For example, in water management, trans­
portation, forestry, tourism and recreation, health protection, and coastal zone 
management, factors of climate variability and extremes are always an element in 
design and decisions, either formally or informally. In addition, residential, com­
mercial and industrial properties, bridges, highways, drainage channels, and docks 
and harbours are frequently subject to weather and climate-related standards that 
are officially approved, the implementation of which is commonly the responsi­
bility of construction companies and other members of the private sector. Thus, 
adaptation to climate change is not something that must start from scratch. It is 
an incremental process that can build upon a long history of previous adaptation. 
What is new is the need to adapt much more rapidly because of the impact of 
human activities on climate. This is likely to be more difficult and more expensive, 
and is a legitimate charge against the global economic resources that are available 
through such financial mechanisms as the Global Environment Facility. 
In order to develop the science of climate change adaptation, it will be neces­
sary to build on this existing knowledge in increments that allow for new and, 
probably wider, ranges of variability and extremes than have previously been con­
sidered. However, there is one important new element that implies that the science 
of adaptation to climate change will require more than incremental changes to the 
sum of previously employed methods for adapting to climate change. Risk man­
agement for climate and weather variability and extremes has previously been 
quite compartmentalised. Different weather variables with different underlying 
causes affect different sectors. Accordingly, those concerned with weather and cli­
mate variability have developed their sciences quite separately from one another. 
In this way, agricultural priorities, and therefore techniques, are likely to be dis­
tinct from those applied in forestry, water resources management, and building 
and infrastructure design. For example, farmers are more concerned about the 
likelihood of frost or drought, and less concerned with the heating and ventilating 
of large buildings for human occupation. The sciences of agronomy, hydrology, 
forestry, architecture, construction design and engineering, and human health 
have all developed unique approaches and terminologies for risk assessment. Now 
they are confronted with a risk to which they are all vulnerable, albeit in different 
ways and to different degrees. This common threat is forcing a convergence of 
methodologies and terminologies towards what might be called integrated risk 
assessment for climate change. This process is only beginning, and its momentum 
is apparent in the growing field of integrated assessment modelling. 
The identification of adaptation needs and their assessment 
Within this broad conception of adaptation to climate change it becomes neces­
sary to specify, within each country and each locality, what the adaptation needs 
are and to prioritise them. In developed countries it has thus far been assumed that 
the various socio-economic groups will have the capacity to adapt, and that little 
or no overall planning or policy is required. To the extent that preparatory action 
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Thus, adaptation to climate change is not something that must start from scratch. 
It is an incremental process that can build upon a long history of previous adap­
tation. What is new is the need to adapt much more rapidly because of the impact 
of human activities on climate. 
is thought necessary, it has tended to focus on research for future adaptation that 
has concentrated on climate impact studies. 
In developing countries the search for adaptation needs and the development 
of priorities has received a little more attention. The reasons for this are that the 
need for adaptation is likely to be greater and the capacity is known to be less. 
Developing country governments have also been hoping, and in some cases 
requesting, that Annex II Parties will assist them in meeting the costs of adapta­
tion. It is therefore in their best interests to be able to demonstrate that adaptation 
needs exist and can be assessed. The decisions of the Conference of Parties () 
reflect recognition of this. 
The Global Environment Facility has been designated the financial mechanism 
for the Convention, and it functions under the guidance of and with accountabil­
ity to the . At the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties (-), held 
in Berlin in 1995, it was agreed in Decision 11/.1 that adaptation would take place 
in developing countries in three sequential stages, using short, medium and long­
term strategies. The stages are specified as follows: 
•	 Stage I was defined as the planning level, to involve studies for identifying the 
impacts of climate change, those countries or regions that are particularly vul­
nerable, and policy options for adaptation and capacity building. 
•	 During Stage II, as envisaged in Article 4.1(e) of the Convention, measures are 
to be implemented in those countries/regions that have been identified in Stage 
I as particularly vulnerable. These activities are to include capacity-building to 
prepare for adaptation. 
•	 Stage III will concentrate on measures to facilitate adaptation, including insur­
ance, as envisaged in Article 4.1 (b) and Article 4.4 of the Convention. 
At the fourth meeting of the  in Buenos Aires in 1998, based on communi­
cations between the Parties to the Convention Secretariat, it was agreed that it was 
time to move from Stage I to Stage II. 
During the first few years of the Climate Change Convention, support to devel­
oping countries under Stage I was limited (with few exceptions) to assistance in 
preparing National Communications. This is expected to continue under Stages 
II and III. One commentator cites “reluctance on the part of the  to finance 
adaptation measures” (Yamin 1998), which is said to be “fuelled by donor concern 
about responsibility for adaptation costs” (Yamin 1998). The reluctance stems in 
part from the ’ constitutional mandate to fund actions that result in “global 
environmental benefits.”Adaptation benefits are assumed to be domestically con­
centrated and to generate no easily quantifiable global environmental benefits 
(Werksman 1993). 
There has been some additional support for adaptation studies. Prominent 
among these are the U.S. Country Studies Program (Smith et al. 1996), and the 
Country Studies supported by the  through the United Nations Environment 
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The sciences of agronomy, hydrology, forestry, architecture, construction design 
and engineering, and human health have all developed unique approaches and 
terminologies for risk assessment. Now they are confronted with a risk to which 
they are all vulnerable, albeit in different ways and to different degrees. This 
common threat is forcing a convergence of methodologies and terminologies 
towards what might be called integrated risk assessment for climate change. 
Antigua and Barbuda in 1998. In addition, the Netherlands has supported a 
number of Country Studies, and one project has been carried out in Uganda in 
association with the World Resources Institute with the support of the U.S.Agency 
for International Development (Apuuli et al. 2000). The  also supported an 
important regional initiative in the Caribbean ( 1995), and the World Bank 
and others have supported development of an adaptation strategy for Bangladesh 
(World Bank, forthcoming). However, these are exceptions that prove the rule 
about the relative lack of major or widespread support for adaptation to date. 
A review of these studies reveals no case in which a specific adaptation measure 
is identified that clearly applies to climate change alone, and does not also yield 
additional or co-benefits from the reduction of damages from known climate 
variability. Most of the studies have focused primarily on the potential impacts of 
climate change and have devoted little attention to adaptation beyond the creation 
of long lists of needed adaptation measures. However, discussions of the contents 
of three of the studies, which may be considered exceptional, are included here. 
Uganda 
In the course of the Uganda study, a useful distinction emerged between crosscut­
ting measures with regard to a variety of government policies and programmes 
that are multisectoral, and single sector measures. These sectoral measures may be 
further subdivided into groups that can be considered general and specific. When 
this three-fold grouping of adaptation measures is applied to other adaptation 
studies, almost invariably examples of all three types are identified. In the case of 
Uganda, the following crosscutting measures were proposed at a workshop that 
was attended by government experts, policymakers, university-based scientists, 
and environmental non-governmental organisations (Republic of Uganda 1997). 
Proposed multisectoral and crosscutting measures 
•	 strengthening Uganda’s meteorological services so that they could provide reli­
able medium to long-term drought and flood advisories; 
•	 strengthening the Early Warning Information capacity, especially for food 
security and short-term climate prediction; 
•	 incorporating climate change and variability information and projections into 
Uganda’s long-term development plans, such as the National Environment 
Action Plan (), the Water Action Plan (), the Forest Action Plan 
(), the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (), and the Decentralisation 
Process; 
•	 conducting an inventory of existing practices and policies used to adapt to diff­
erent climates in all agencies and sectors in order to begin more detailed iden­
tification of adaptation measures for evaluation and adoption; 
























long-term climate change and climate variability hazard reduction in its work-
plan; 
•	 promoting awareness of climate variability and change and potential response 
alternatives throughout Ugandan society. 
Proposed general sectoral measures 
•	 reviewing agricultural policies to find ways of reducing existing vulnerability 
and avoiding creation of new vulnerabilities; 
•	 renegotiating the Nile Waters Agreement to include climate change response 
plans; 
•	 reviewing the Uganda Forest Action plan to ensure that climate variability and 
change have been adequately considered. 
Proposed specific sectoral measures 
•	 reducing reliance on monoculture planting of matoke bananas; 
•	 expanding irrigation and increasing irrigation efficiency; 
•	 adopting contingency plans aimed at managing current climate variability, for 
both droughts and floods, at both the national and local levels, but especially 
in the most vulnerable districts; 
•	 ensuring that development on potential dam sites along the Nile River and 
other basins is controlled to ensure future development without encum­
brances; 
•	 encouraging water conservation at all community levels, using appropriate 
methods, including market based systems; 
•	 enhancing and strengthening the Uganda Tree Seed Project to ensure that orig­
inal biodiversity is protected against climate change and climate variability; 
•	 reducing geographic fragmentation of forests to ensure that forest types can 
freely migrate in the face of climate change; 
•	 encouraging off-site biodiversity protection in order to avoid species extinction. 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Probably the most comprehensive study to date of climate change impacts and 
adaptation needs at the national level was completed in Antigua and Barbuda in 
1998. This is largely because the country is relatively small, with about 170 square 
miles (440 km2) and a population of about 64,000, which meant that no part of 
the national territory was excluded from the study. Thus, the six sectors examined 
account for virtually all the economic activity and environmental resources of the 
country. The study encompassed coastal zones, fisheries, agriculture (including 
forestry and livestock), water resources, human health, and human settlements 
and tourism. 
For each of these sectors, detailed studies of potential impacts were made, and 
a list of more than 60 adaptation needs was assembled. No attempt was made to 
establish priorities for adaptation between sectors, although some preliminary 
screening of adaptation measures was carried out within sectors. 
The report concludes that the major sources of impacts are likely to be hurri­
canes, sea level rise, and drought. It is not possible to say with confidence to what 
extent hurricanes may increase in frequency and severity, or how rapidly sea level 
rise may occur, nor how much more frequent and intense the area’s recurrent 
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these phenomena now cause substantial damage to the economy, and that present 
adaptation measures are insufficient. Antigua and Barbuda presents a clear “win­
win”or “no regrets”adaptation case.Augmentation of present measures is needed, 
and will yield higher benefits the more rapidly climate change related impacts 
intensify. The water resources and human settlements and tourism sectors illus­
trate the situation. 
Water resources 
Potable water supplies in Antigua and Barbuda are already limited, especially in 
the dry season and during the recurrent drought years. There is competition 
among users for available water. When supplies are not sufficient to cater to all, 
municipal uses and the commercial hotel sector receive water services at the 
expense of agriculture. High variability between seasons and between years com­
pounds the difficulty of water management. According to the report, “There is no 
national water resources management policy or strategy to cope with the stressed 
water situation and the possible impacts of climate change.” The report proposes 
a general, sector-wide adaptation approach, which would require the launching of 
a Water Resources Management Action Programme that would include, but not 
be limited to, the following components: 
•	 more efficient management of existing supplies and infrastructure; 
•	 the initiation of institutional arrangements to limit future demands and to 
establish integrated water resources management; 
•	 the strengthening of water resources monitoring and information systems; 
•	 promoting conservation. 
In Antigua and Barbuda, as elsewhere, improved water management is an 
urgent requirement. Such actions would yield benefits in the near term, regardless 
of climate change. With climate change these actions are likely to be even more 
beneficial. Conversely, unless water management is improved, the impacts of cli­
mate change will be that much greater. 
A number of specific measures have been proposed in addition to the general 
measures outlined for the Water Resources Management Action Programme, 
including: 
•	 displacement devices that reduce the amount of water toilet tanks hold; 
•	 low-flow faucets; 
•	 watershed rehabilitation; 
•	 setting up new reservoir capacity to capture and store excess flows produced by 
altered precipitation, run-off patterns, and storms; 
•	 digging deep wells. 
These are in addition to the existing plans of the Antigua Public Utilities 
Authority (), which call for increased desalination capacity, exploration of 
deep aquifers, automatic water transmission control, and decreased “leakage” 
through waste control measures and diminished illegal connections. 
Human settlements and tourism 
Hurricanes and tropical storms are the major risk to human settlements and infra­
structure in Antigua and Barbuda. Even a small increase in the frequency or intensity 




























Hurricane Hugo caused an estimated $154.1 million (East Caribbean Dollars) in 
direct damage, including $130 million to buildings. This amounted to 17.6% of the 
Gross Domestic Product (), which was comparable to five or more years of eco­
nomic growth at current average rates. In September 1995, Hurricane Luis had worse 
consequences, and the cost of direct damages was estimated at $364.5 million, 
which was 30.5% of , equal to about ten years of economic development. 
The following adaptation measures have been proposed to reduce the vulner­
ability of human settlements and infrastructure to climate change: 
•	 hazard mapping, which involves identifying the areas that are most vulnerable 
to the effects of climate change on maps; 
•	 flood control, which includes cleaning watercourses and drains, and preven­
tion of filling-in of the natural drainage system; 
•	 land use controls and enforcement, which includes: 
•	 implementing zoning regulations to demarcate specific areas for different 
types of land use, such as building densities and height limits within each 
zone; 
•	 creating building codes and planning and infrastructure standards; and 
•	 establishing setback requirement for coastal zones; 
•	 retrofitting existing structures, which involves refurbishing old structures to 
bring them up to building code standards and, more importantly, strengthen­
ing their resilience against hurricanes and droughts; 
•	 capacity building, which involves strengthening institutions such as the Devel­
opment Control Authority and other agencies responsible for environmental 
management. It also encompasses improvements in inter-agency co-ordination; 
•	 improving forecasting and early warning systems in order to increase pre­
paredness; 
•	 a public education and information systems programme, to heighten the 
public awareness of global warming and its effects. 
Pakistan 
The Pakistan Country Study, also conducted in 1998, concentrated on the water, 
agriculture, and forest sectors. Within these three sectors, the Pakistan study is one 
of the most sophisticated yet undertaken, especially in its use of socio-economic 
scenarios of future growth and development and its treatment of adaptation to cli­
mate change in the context of economic development. Pakistan has a hot, arid cli­
mate that would support a much lower population were it not for exogenous river 
flow, which permits extensive irrigation. Pakistan’s Indus Plains have the world’s 
largest contiguous irrigation system, and there is year round cropping in much of 
the area. Water potential, waterlogging and salinity, and water use efficiency are 
the current key issues, and will continue to be in the future. Population growth has 
been rapid, from 32.5 million in 1947 at the time of independence to an estimated 
138 million in 1999, and is projected to reach approximately 229 million by 2020. 
A number of climate change scenarios were employed in the Pakistani study. In 
general, 
… the results show that while the total water storage in the system remains 
insufficient, the water resources operation under various climate scenarios 
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will become more serious if the increase in temperature is coupled with the 
decrease in precipitation. The net overall capacity of the system to supply 
water in time will decrease in Pakistan unless some urgent actions are taken 
(Government of Pakistan 1998). 
The adaptation strategy for the water sector may be summed up as “the con­
servation and efficient use of water in an informed and efficient manner” (Gov­
ernment of Pakistan 1998). The report concludes that water managers will be 
forced to re-evaluate the operations of the whole system and revise the allocation 
of water for agriculture in various irrigated areas. Adaptation options reviewed in 
the report include: 
• mitigating the hazards of floods; 
• altering streamflow regime by the construction of reservoirs; 
• alleviating economic damages of waterlogging and salinity; 
• augmenting supplies; 
• re-allocating the available resources (Government of Pakistan 1998). 
With regard to agriculture, the Pakistani study reports that the production of 
major crops like wheat, rice, cotton, and sugarcane will have to double by the year 
2020 in order to meet the needs of the country’s growing population. “...climate 
change would further demand to increase the annual growth rate in agriculture of 
around 0.1% and 0.2% for the periods 1997-2020 and 2021-2050 respectively”(sic.) 
(Government of Pakistan 1998). The study concludes that this expansion of pro­
duction, and the water inputs it will require, are feasible. However, it will necessi­
tate the adaptation of very high efficiency irrigation systems as well as improved 
agronomic practices. The study uses a coupling of sprinkler and drip irrigation 
systems with chemigation facilities as an example of this. 
Conclusions to be drawn from the county studies 
Despite the many political and geographical factors that set Pakistan, Uganda, and 
Antigua and Barbuda apart from each other, there is one general conclusion that 
may be drawn from all three: many of the activities recommended for adaptation 
to climate change would be needed in any case. There is a risk level that each coun­
try maintains with regard to elemental factors such as the availability of potable 
water and crop security. If this risk level is to be maintained, the threat of climate 
change is a reason for the recommended actions to be accelerated. At this point, 
risk levels in many countries are no longer consistent with sustainable develop­
ment, which means that climate change ought to add even more force to the argu­
ment for accelerating adaptation. However, adaptation to climate change is not 
limited to the simple hastening of development activities that would have hap­
pened in any case. It will only be successful if complemented by parallel changes 
in policy, management practices, and innovations in monitoring, forecasting, and 
research. In addition to the concurrence of results among the three studies dis­
cussed here, these conclusions are consistent with those emerging from other 
studies, such as the U.S. Country Studies Program, as well as the more limited 
adaptation studies that have been completed in developed countries. 
The assessment of adaptation measures 
Attempts to measure the costs of adaptation to climate change are few and far 
between. In the impact and adaptation studies cited, the common pattern has been 
 
    































that major emphasis is placed upon impacts, and then lists of possible adaptation 
options are generated. In some cases a preliminary screening of measures has been 
carried out, but there has not been a thorough assessment of adaptation to date. 
This is not for lack of methodology or guidelines on how to proceed, nor for a lack 
of theory on cost. It is simply a matter of time before well-grounded estimates of 
adaptation costs become commonplace. 
In 1999, Stratus Consulting prepared the Compendium of Decision Tools to 
Evaluate Strategies for Adaptation to Climate Change for the Secretariat of the 
. Despite the use of the word “strategies” in the title, most of the tools in 
this volume actually refer to the evaluation of specific projects. The Compendium 
describes nine tools that are applicable to multiple sectors, including benefit-cost 
analysis, risk analysis, expert judgement, and a range of screening techniques. 
Twenty-three additional tools are described for selected sectors: water (5), coastal 
zones (5), agriculture (11), and human health (2). These largely consist of physical 
and economic models, as well as some more general methodologies. 
A more detailed description of the application of benefit-cost analysis has also 
been prepared for the  (Smith et al. 1997). In addition, guidelines for impact 
and adaptation assessment have been prepared and widely disseminated in coun­
try study programmes (Feenstra et al. 1998; Carter et al. 1994; Benioff et al. 1996). 
More theoretical groundwork on the potential costs of adaptation has been 
developed in a number of papers (Fankhauser and Tol 1996; Yohe 1996). Method­
ological questions regarding the costing of adaptation are also addressed in the 
work of the  and elsewhere. 
In a practical demonstration of the application of benefit-cost methods, Smith 
and others (Smith et al. 1998) discuss three case studies: flood prevention measures 
on the Meuse river in the Netherlands; augmentation of storage capacity by 25% 
in a proposed water supply reservoir in the western United States; and adaptation 
to a one-metre sea level rise in the height of a bridge between New Brunswick and 
Prince Edward Island, Canada. In theory, in all three situations there is a case to 
be made for precautionary or anticipatory adaptation measures involving changes 
in project design. However, in each case the benefits of these measures would only 
justify the cost under the most severe assumptions about the occurrence of 
extreme events and the discount rates most favourable to the project. Discount 
rates greater than 5% result in virtually zero present value for avoided climate 
change impacts in the middle and latter part of the next century. In order for the 
bridge raising and the dam enlargement to be justified, it would be necessary to 
assume a 100% probability of a one-metre rise in sea level or a 10% decrease in pre­
cipitation respectively. 
The Smith analysis does not negate the argument that precautionary or antic­
ipatory adaptation merits consideration, especially when considering long-term 
infrastructure investments. The same group of experts have proposed three 
“simple rules” to guide adaptation decisions: 
•	 Adaptation measures should be considered now, rather than delayed until 
more concrete evidence of climate impacts is available; 
•	 Measures to increase flexibility and robustness in project design are justifiable; 
and 
•	 Public (governmental) action to facilitate adaptation is needed, because with­
out it autonomous adaptation will either not take place or will be less than opti­
mal (Fankhauser et al. 1999). 
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The literature also strongly suggests, however, that there is likely to be little jus­
tification for massive investment in adaptation measures in the short-term. It 
seems that adaptation measures can be justified, but at the project level the costs 
will be limited to marginal increases in the aggregate costs of projects justified in 
their own right, regardless of the impacts of climate change, or its speed. 
This conclusion seems likely to be viable at the project level, i.e. when it relates 
to specific adaptation measures, and to some extent within sectors. However, as is 
demonstrated by the case studies of adaptation completed to date, there is an argu­
ment to be made for a more strategic approach to adaptation. So far none of the 
adaptation literature addresses the costs of the multisectoral and crosscutting 
measures that are being advocated to strengthen the capacity to adapt. When it 
comes to specific adaptation measures, it seems reasonable to make assessments 
based on the marginal increments that can be justified in project design to reduce 
potential losses from climate change related impacts. Where broadly based 
national programmes of water management (Pakistan), coastal zone management 
(Antigua and Barbuda), and management of floods and droughts (Uganda) are 
involved, it is not entirely clear how the benefits of incremental strengthening or 
acceleration are to be measured. Yet, at this stage in the evolution of the climate 
change regime, it is the strengthening of national capacity to adapt, and the mod­
ification of existing development plans to take climate change into account, that 
are most urgently required. 
Adaptation and mitigation in the context of sustainable development 
The conventional view has been that climate change is primarily a pollution prob­
lem. The problem begins with the emission of greenhouse gases from human 
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mate change and adverse impacts on human socio-economic activities and on 
natural systems. It is this “pollution” view which has led to the emphasis on miti­
gation or the reduction of emissions. It is a rather linear cause and effect perspec­
tive. In fact, the relationship between people and climate is interactive and there is 
a long history of adaptation to climate (and slowly changing climate) that has been 
taking place over thousands of years, long before the emergence of anthropogenic 
climate change as a public policy issue. 
Figure 1 is a simplified view of climate and society as an interactive process. The 
climate cycle is represented by ovals ( to ), and human intervention in the 
cycle is represented by rectangles (- to -). One can enter the cycle at any 
point, and all the components operate continually. Following convention, the 
figure “begins” with the state of human activities at what can be assumed to be the 
present (). The environmental impact of human activities () can be described 
by the formula =, where environmental impact is a function of the level of 
population (), the affluence or level of consumption prevailing in the population 
(), and the technology in use to extract natural resources, produce goods and ser­
vices, and dispose of (or recycle) wastes (). In the case of climate change, the rel­
evant consequence is the emission of greenhouse gases. The storage of carbon in 
biomass is also a result, although it is not depicted in Figure 1. Human Interven­
tion 1 (-) consists of the measurement of emissions (and carbon sequestra­
tion) and efforts to control or reduce them through activities such as increasing 
energy efficiency, fuel switching, and tree planting. 
As a result of population, affluence, and technology, as well as efforts at reduc­
tion, a level of greenhouse emissions prevails at any one time, which gives rise to 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere (). The second human inter­
vention (-) consists of atmospheric, oceanographic, biogeochemical, and 
other research aimed at better understanding the relationship between emission 
levels (cumulated over time) and actual recorded concentrations of greenhouse 
gases. The carbon cycle, for example, has yet to be measured in a full and consistent 
way. Some estimates show that, given the amount of carbon dioxide that has been 
emitted from anthropogenic sources, atmospheric concentrations should in fact 
be higher than they are. This is referred to as the problem of the missing carbon. 
Greenhouse gas concentrations (), rather than the emissions, are used in 
global atmospheric models. The development of such Global Atmospheric 
Models () (-) is a necessary step in linking concentrations with projec­
tions of climate change (). While the models have become increasingly sophis­
ticated over the past decade, they still fall well short of the level of detail and reli­
ability required to predict the amount and rate of climate change.  are 
especially criticised for lack of specificity at the regional and local scale, the level 
at which impacts are studied, and for providing much more information on 
means than on changes in variability and extremes. The models are also often 
designed to provide projections of climate conditions that are expected to prevail 
under an “equilibrium” condition of double the pre-industrial level of greenhouse 
gases. However, this assumption may be extremely inaccurate.2 
It is the task of the “impacts community” to assess the impacts on human and 
natural systems on the basis of the information made available through climate 
models and studies of climate variability and extremes (-). Like the , the  
early generation of impact studies also relied heavily upon double-CO2 scenarios. 
However, more recently, the impacts community has begun to pay more attention 
2 For further information on 
climate change modelling, see
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to the repercussions of climate variability and extremes, including present day cli­
mate as well as longer-term change. 
The results of some impacts studies, especially on natural ecosystems, provide 
new understandings of feedback mechanisms () which can affect  concen­
trations. For example, climate variability may lead to the melting of the permafrost 
in high latitudes, which, in turn, is expected to release substantial quantities of 
methane, which is a greenhouse gas, thus adding to the greenhouse effect. 
Knowledge of impacts can be obtained from studies based on climate scenar­
ios as well as current climate variability and extremes, and also from direct expe­
rience. Farmers, for instance, adjust their agricultural practices according to the 
weather, including their recent weather-related losses. There are also similar, often 
less obvious, adjustments being made in other economic sectors. This constitutes 
the first step in the adaptation process (-). 
Adaptation is not opposed to mitigation or an alternative to it. Progressively more 
aggressive adaptation is also a path towards effective and long-term mitigation. 
Adaptation to climate change can be broken down into three levels of activity 
(Smit et al. 2000). A number of different terms have been used to describe these 
levels. For the purposes of this discussion, the terms Tactical, Strategic, and Meta­
bolic are used. Tactical, or Level 1 adaptations (-), are those that can be taken 
by individuals, small communities, or entrepreneurs in the private sector. They do 
not necessarily require government intervention, although the choice of adapta­
tions adopted can be greatly affected by government policy. Tactical adaptations 
can reduce vulnerability to climate change, and thereby reduce impacts (). 
Climate change is likely to result in impacts that exceed the capacity of actors 
at the individual and private level, however. In addition, public infrastructure and 
public goods are also vulnerable to climate change. This makes a case for govern­
ment actions to reduce vulnerability by strategic interventions. Thus, a second 
level of adaptation is the Strategic Level. The government involvement can be at 
the sector level, including initiatives such as improved natural resources manage­
ment, conservation of water resources, or protection of biodiversity. It can also 
happen more broadly, by means of an overall adaptation strategy. No country has 
yet adopted a broad adaptation strategy across sectors, but preliminary studies 
have been conducted in Uganda and Bangladesh. This work, perhaps with the sup­
port of the , may eventually lead to the preparation of crosscutting multisec­
toral adaptation strategies (-). 
As with Level 1, some impacts will remain after the implementation of Level 2 
adaptation, which represent vulnerabilities that cannot be easily removed in the 
short-term by policy interventions (). This brings into play the idea of Level 3, 
which is adaptation at the fundamental level, the Metabolic Level. The term Meta­
bolic is meant to suggest the functioning of society as a whole, from the local to 
the global scale. It includes the adaptation measures adopted at Levels 1 and 2, but 
also extends to a broader category of changes including lifestyle, values, and tech­
nology. Precise prescriptions vary and are often hotly debated, but they include 
such measures as adopting “voluntary simplicity” in high income societies; envi­
ronmentally friendly behaviour such as action to reduce one’s individual ecologi­
cal footprint; the widespread development and deployment of environmentally 
   























friendly technology; and the “dematerialization” of the economy. These and other 
measures have been seen as the core elements in a move toward sustainable devel­
opment. To the extent that such adaptation succeeds, people are likely to be less 
vulnerable to climate change and variability. These same measures will also pro­
foundly change the = formula, with the consequence that greenhouse gas 
emissions will be reduced. 
From this perspective the distinction between adaptation to climate change 
and mitigation becomes moot. Adaptation is not opposed to mitigation or an 
alternative to it. Progressively more aggressive adaptation is also a path towards 
effective and long-term mitigation. 
Muddling through 
Gradually, the reasons for the past lack of attention to adaptation are being removed. 
It is increasingly being recognised that some marginal, incremental investments in 
adaptation measures at the project level are now justifiable. Studies show that the 
costs of such measures are not likely to be large, at least in the short-term. Even the 
difficult question of how to distinguish between the impacts of normal climate vari­
ability and anthropogenic climate change can be sufficiently clarified by research to 
encourage belief that negotiations can prove tractable and that reasonable decisions 
can be made on the basis of projections and models of climate change and its poten­
tial impacts, with reasonable and transparent assumptions. The remaining ques­
tions have more to do with the mechanisms for adaptation,and to what extent adap­
tation can be effectively addressed by itself, or can be addressed simultaneously with 
mitigation. The day may come when adaptation becomes so central to the climate 
regime, and the need for international co-operation so urgent and necessary, that a 
special Protocol for Adaptation may be negotiated. 
In the Kyoto Protocol adaptation funding is specifically linked to mitigation for 
the first time.Article 12, which defines the Clean Development Mechanism (), 
provides a levy for mitigation agreements to assist the most vulnerable develop­
ing countries in meeting the costs of adaptation. Negotiations are currently 
underway on the subject of the precise rules for implementation of the , in  
anticipation of the day that the Kyoto Protocol will be ratified and go into force. 
While these negotiations are naturally focused on the mitigation aspects of the 
, a number of important questions arise with respect to adaptation.3 In the 
context of sustainable development and the ongoing negotiations, several other 
questions are now demanding attention. 
Will the adaptation levy that exists within the text
of the  be extended to other Protocol tools? 
The Kyoto Protocol contains guidelines for three mechanisms of international co­
operation in the reduction of  emissions. These are: 
•	 Joint Implementation (), as discussed under Article 6, which involves trans­
fers of emission reduction units () created by emission reduction or 
sequestration actions in one Annex B country to sources in another Annex B 
country in return for financial and other assistance. 
•	 International emissions trading (), as detailed under Article 17, which 
enables transfer of assigned amount units () between Annex B countries. 
•	 The Clean Development Mechanism (), covered in Article 12, which 
involves the generation of certified emission reductions () in developing 
3 Many of these questions are
addressed in Farhana Yamin, 
“Adaptation and the Clean
Development Mechanism,” in
The Clean Development Mech­
anism. Draft Working Papers,
World Resources Institute, 
Washington D.C.: 1998: 43. 
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One of the stumbling blocks in the implementation of the UNFCCC has been the 
unwillingness of the developing country Parties to make any commitments to the 
reduction of their own emissions. At the same time, the developed country Parties 
have been slow to respond to the need for adaptation assistance. One way forward 
might be to develop a comprehensive approach to mitigation and adaptation in 
which developing countries would commit to some reduction in GHG emissions 
(and incidentally qualify to participate in JI and IET), while the developed coun­
tries would agree to a more flexible approach on adaptation assistance. 
countries to be transferred from the developing country Party to an Annex B 
Party in exchange for financial and other assistance. 
Of these tools, only the  carries the adaptation levy. Other things being 
equal, this would seem to bias the choice in the direction of  and , and hence 
reduce the extent to which the  is used, and accordingly reduce (or fail to 
increase) the potential funds to be generated for adaptation. Accordingly, there is 
some question as to whether, in the interests of equity and in the generation of 
adaptation funds, the adaptation levy should not also be extended to all three of 
the mechanisms. This is, of course, a matter for governments to decide, but the 
answer will depend, in part, on the need for adaptation assistance. 
How much money will be generated for adaptation? 
Even if the adaptation levy were to be extended to all three mechanisms, it is not 
clear how much money is likely to be generated for adaptation, or whether this is 
likely to be adequate. Preliminary estimates suggest that even with the most 
favourable assumptions the  is not likely to generate substantial funds in the 
near term (Haites 1999). At the time of this writing, there were no estimates of the 
costs of aggregate adaptation needs in developing countries. However, research 
suggests that the open-ended need for funds that has been conjectured by some is 
unlikely to materialise, provided reasonable and transparent assumptions are 
made about impacts and the pace of climate change. 
Will su≤cient adaptation funds be made 
available for the most vulnerable countries? 
It was agreed at - in Buenos Aires that it is time to advance to Step II for adap­
tation. The implication of this is that the developing countries that have been 
identified as particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change should begin 
receiving capacity-building assistance. Given the difficulties currently being expe­
rienced with the Kyoto Protocol and the , the amount of resources made 
available to these countries through the  may actually be increased to enable 
progress in the implementation of Stage II, irrespective of the level of the mitiga­
tion efforts. 
How should funds be allocated among the vulnerable countries? 
If the Kyoto Protocol comes into force as proposed, and if the adaptation funds are 
generated by the  (or all three mechanisms), how should the international 
community proceed with the allocation of the funds among the more vulnerable 
countries? 
 




   
 
   







   










Thus far the assumption has been that funds would be allocated on a project-
by-project basis, in conjunction with feasibility studies. The financial distribution 
might also be influenced to some extent by a vulnerability index.4 An additional 
approach would be to develop a formula or guidelines linked to mitigation efforts. 
One of the stumbling blocks in the implementation of the  has been 
the unwillingness of the developing country Parties to make any commitments to 
the reduction of their own emissions. At the same time, the developed country 
Parties have been slow to respond to the need for adaptation assistance. One way 
forward might be to develop a comprehensive approach to mitigation and adap­
tation in which developing countries would commit to some reduction in  
emissions (and incidentally qualify to participate in  and ), while the devel­
oped countries would agree to a more flexible approach on adaptation assistance. 
What is the proper relationship between mitigation and adaptation? 
As it stands, the more effective the  is, and the more it is used, the more funds 
can be expected for adaptation assistance. Logic suggests that the reverse relation­
ship should also hold true. Presumably, the more mitigation is implemented, the 
less need there will be for adaptation. A more appropriate relationship would 
therefore be one in which adaptation funds are increased in an inverse relation­
ship to the achievement of mitigation targets and schedules. This logic stems from 
an economic optimisation perspective, in which mitigation and adaptation are 
seen as competing alternatives in a “zero sum” game. In other words, necessarily, 
the more of one, the less of the other. In terms of practice, rather than theory, it 
seems closer to the truth to suggest that the global community, as well as individ­
ual countries, will find it difficult to achieve enough of either. There is a strong 
prospect that climate change will not be slowed at a fast enough rate to prevent sig­
nificant impacts. The precautionary principle might therefore be extended to the 
development of a mixed strategy of mitigation and adaptation, neither of which 
would be dependent upon the other for its financial support or its agreed pace of 
implementation. 
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Abstract 
In recent centuries, increased economic productivity has come about predominantly 
as a result of technological change, enabling greater outputs from given levels of 
labor and capital. However, human progress has often come at the expense of nat­
ural resources and the environment, as is evidenced by the excessive concentration 
of greenhouse gases (ghgs) in the Earth’s atmosphere, resulting in the growing 
threat of climate change. 
While technology is at the root of climate change, technology can also be an inte­
gral part of its mitigation. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (fccc) emphasizes technology transfer as an important element in the mit­
igation of climate change. Yet, in order for technology to be an effective tool, it will 
be essential to formulate a worldwide strategy that ensures proper development, 
transfer, and adaptation of technologies. 
This paper is an exploration of the potential role of technology transfer in the cli­
mate change regime.The discussion begins by examining the fundamental elements 
of technology transfer, specifically as a component of a larger economic cycle. The 
steps that will facilitate technology transfer are then considered, followed by a dis­
cussion of how the concept of technology transfer is evolving within the climate 
change regime. The author then details several topics deserving of close attention in 
future negotiations, including capacity building, developing information resources, 
setting up knowledge networks, and establishing new mechanisms for innovative 
financing. The chapter concludes with a discussion of specific elements of the Clean 
Development Mechanism and the fccc as they pertain to the abilities of developing 
countries to take part in climate change mitigation activities, and a summary of the 
potential for developing country participation. 
Introduction: What is the role of technology transfer in climate change mitigation? 
The role of technology in economic decisionmaking is generally not fully under­
stood. This is perhaps because most technological developments throughout 
human history have come about as a result of individual initiatives rather than as 
the direct result of specific actions by governments. There have been some cases 
where government policies or investments have directly resulted in development 
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general, the time lag between the initial actions that spur the development of a 
technology and its actual dissemination is so extended that the public loses sight 
of the interrelationship. Governments also frequently embark on these programs 
with a notable lack of transparency, which distances the public from what actually 
happens. Yet, technological change is an important and ongoing part of human 
progress, in both its positive and negative manifestations. 
Technology has provided the human population a means of avoiding the 
Malthusian prediction of total disaster. Thomas Malthus stated that 
“...as population doubles and redoubles, it is exactly as if the globe were halv­
ing and halving again in size until finally it has shrunk so much that food and sub­
sistence fall below the level necessary for life. Because of the law of diminishing 
returns applied to nature’s fixed supply of land, food production tends not to keep 
up with the population’s geometric-progression rate of growth.” 1 
However, Malthus believed capital and labor were locked into a rigid, linear 
relationship. He clearly did not realize the role that technology could play in alter­
ing the productivity scenario over time. In recent centuries, increased economic 
productivity has resulted predominantly from technological change enabling 
greater outputs from given levels of labor and capital. 
While Malthusian predictions effectively have been evaded, unfortunately, the 
role of natural resources and the environment in the production process has gen­
erally been ignored. Consequently, human progress has been accompanied by 
growing misuse and abuse of natural resources, one repercussion of which is the 
excessive concentration of greenhouse gases () in the Earth’s atmosphere, 
resulting in the growing threat of climate change. 
While technology is at the root of climate change, it should also be an integral 
part of its mitigation. However, the effectiveness of such an application will be 
reliant not only on new directions for technological development, but also on an 
improved dissemination process—enabling swift and efficient global distribution. 
The importance of technology transfer, therefore, arises from the fact that the cur­
rent system has inherent weaknesses that frequently hinder expeditious distribu­
tion, particularly from developed to developing countries. If the global problem 
of climate change is to be addressed, then a worldwide strategy that ensures proper 
transfer, adaptation, and development of technologies will be necessary. 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (), 
which was accepted during the Rio Summit on Climate Change in 1992, empha­
sizes transfer of technology as an important element in the mitigation of climate 
change. Yet, since then, progress in this area has been slow. In fact, a precise defin­
ition of what needs to be done has not yet been established. At the First Confer­
ence of the Parties ( ) in Berlin, it was determined that the Convention Sec­
retariat would have to 
“… prepare an itemized progress report (according to the types of activities 
specified in paragraphs 34.15 to 34.28, inclusive of Chapter 34 of Agenda 21) taken 
by the Parties listed in Annex II to the Convention with respect to their commit­
ments related to the transfer of environmentally sound technologies and the know­
how necessary to mitigate and facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change.”2 
In subsequent sessions of the  and its various subcommittees, emphasis has 
been placed on the software and policy aspects of technology transfer. As far back 
as the meeting of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation () in February and 
































processes for enhancing removals by sinks as well as facilitating adaptation to cli­
mate change. These may include soft technologies such as capacity building, infor­
mation networks, training, and research; and hard technologies such as equip­
ment for controlling, reducing, or preventing anthropogenic emissions of  
in the energy, transportation, forestry, agriculture, and industry sectors. 
What is involved in technology transfer? 
To fully understand the process of technology transfer, it is important to examine 
technology within the larger economic context. In the ultimate analysis, govern­
ment support for the development or dissemination of technology will only take 
it so far. The final phase of adaptation and use of any technological process or 
innovation will happen only if there is economic rationale for its use. Typically, 
therefore, whether or not government programs focus on the development of a 
particular technology, the crucial final steps required for commercialization may 
not be taken, simply because an economic agent may not find the technology to 
be economically beneficial. 
The same considerations must also apply to the transfer of technology from 
developed to developing countries, mainly because the actual movement of hard­
ware or equipment from one country to another is only one component in the 
economic process. The technology being transferred must effectively fit into the 
overall cycle. A transferred technology may fail if the skills and capacity to main­
tain it at a level that is economically advantageous are expensive or not available. 
If a technology is economically viable in and of itself, then it is essential to provide 
the necessary resources for maintenance of the equipment and processes inherent 
to the technology, at a cost that makes its adaptation economically beneficial. 
Along these lines, a technology that is inherently labor-saving cannot be justi­
fied in a labor surplus economy, and equipment that is energy efficient will not be 
accepted or disseminated unless the existing price of energy reflects scarcity to an 
extent that would economically justify energy saving measures. It is therefore 
important to understand that the proper development and transfer of technolo­
gies for mitigation of climate change must be preceded by the establishment of 
conditions that make the technology economically attractive. There are two major 
prerequisites in this context: 
•	 The development of local capacity, skills, and know-how must match requisite 
levels of technological change, innovation, and up-grades. 
•	 Prices of both the inputs and outputs for the production process of a given 
technology must be rationalized to remove any distortion that would skew the 
choice of technology. 
Development of local capacity should not be limited to technical and scientific 
training. Rather, it should aim at development of infrastructure that will enable 
the rational introduction and use of appropriate technology. Developed countries 
have, for the most part, increased their incomes using technology with high pol­
lution levels. Only when income has reached a certain peak has environmental 
improvement been given attention and allocated appropriate resources. However, 
experience has shown that properly defining property rights, creating awareness 
of the costs and benefits of environmental quality, and strengthening institutional 
frameworks for regulation and monitoring of environmental laws can signifi­
cantly lower the peak of the Environmental Kuznets Curve.3 
3 The Environmental Kuznets 
Curve is basically a representa­
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Historically, in developed countries, environmental quality deteriorated until 
incomes reached fairly high levels before environmental protection became a 
focus. Developing countries should be able to bring about improvements in envi­
ronmental quality at much lower income levels. Developing countries are now in 
a unique position to benefit from the developed country experiences with institu­
tional innovations for preserving and improving the environment. At the same 
time, developed countries have an opportunity to help create this capacity for 
environmental improvement in developing countries, which is an essential pre­
requisite for the adoption of appropriate technologies. 
What are the steps that will facilitate technology transfer? 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change () has stressed the impor­
tance of technology transfer as an element of global warming mitigation strategy. 
Responding to the needs of the governments that are party to the , the Panel 
completed an in-depth special report that covers all aspects of technology trans­
fer in the context of climate change. 
Theoretically, in a perfect world, markets would operate without constraints or 
restrictions, including political barriers. Under such circumstances, technology 
transfer would take place in a manner that led to efficiency in all areas of produc­
tion. In an ideal world, it would be expected that technology, capital, and other fac­
tors of production would flow to those places where the costs of production, 
goods, and services would be minimized. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Even 
in the most progressive market-based economic systems, technology transfer is 
restricted—both explicitly and implicitly—in the form of existing legislation or 
specific government policies. 
The existing global market is rife with imperfections that render it non-con­
ducive to the unrestrained flow of technologies between states. Additionally, 
another detractive element has existed since before the industrial era—the exces­
sive use and mistreatment of natural resources and the environment. In essence, 
these resources have not been valued as assets to be maintained and preserved. As 
mentioned earlier, it is always important to examine technological advancement 
If technology transfer is to be successful, then development of local capacity 
before the actual flow of any hardware is essential. This applies not only to the 
adoption of the incoming technologies, but also possibly to the adaptation of 
technologies for local conditions. 
within the context of the larger development and economic picture. The excessive 
concentration of  in the Earth’s atmosphere, for example, is the direct result 
of externalities: the cost of remedying the damage done is not being included in 
the price of the use or production process of fossil fuels. Due to the nature of the 
emissions, the cost of addressing their effects has now been imposed on the global 
population. 
The future of technology transfer will depend greatly on suitable capacity being 
created in developing countries, and on institutional arrangements being made 
for successful implementation of environmental policies. However, another ini­
tiative that could result in significant benefits would involve research and devel­
opment partnerships between industrialized and developing countries. This 
 
 








   
 






   






arrangement would not only have the cost advantages of the generally less expen­
sive technical and scientific staffs in developing countries, but it would also create 
conditions for technology absorption in the developing countries. Now that intel­
lectual property rights are more precisely defined at the global level, there is much 
greater incentive for contractual agreements between entities in developed and 
developing countries. 
In order to facilitate technology transfer between developed and developing 
countries, bilateral and multilateral organizations should focus on creating capacity 
that also requires partnership with institutions in recipient countries. These efforts 
should essentially involve the development of knowledge networks that combine 
the knowledge and understanding of select organizations with the responsibility for 
implementation of sustainable technology choices in other organizations. 
How is the concept of technology transfer evolving in the climate change regime? 
If climate change is to be mitigated, then methods must be developed with which 
appropriate technologies can be harnessed as rapidly and efficiently as possible. 
This is particularly important for those countries that do not have the means to 
develop or purchase environmentally efficient technologies. The text of the  
emphasizes that future mitigation of  emissions, particularly in the develop­
ing world, will take place only if technology transfer to developing countries is 
facilitated. This will be true even for countries that are experiencing major indus­
trial expansion or systemic economic modernization. 
As mentioned earlier, technology transfer is not merely a movement of hard­
ware or equipment. Hardware, or physical capital, is only one component of the 
overall economic process. If technology transfer is to be successful, then develop­
ment of local capacity before the actual flow of any hardware is essential. This 
applies not only to the adoption of the incoming technologies, but also possibly to 
the adaptation of technologies for local conditions. 
Local capacity can be built essentially through two sets of activities. The first 
group of activities is directed at human resource development; the second is 
related to the software aspects of technology, which are frequently ignored in both 
developed and developing countries. In this context, software can be defined as the 
overall chain of policy measures, and the institutional frameworks whereby the 
adoption and use of the right technology is facilitated and ensured. In a world 
where economic rationale must underlie the use of specific technologies or pro­
duction processes, ignoring these software aspects would effectively result in the 
dumping of capital equipment or hardware. Without the underlying economic 
rationale to maintain and use such hardware efficiently, this would only lead to its 
disuse or rejection over time. 
A crucial stage has been reached in the negotiations for implementation of the 
, wherein developing countries, the non-Annex I parties, must clearly artic­
ulate exactly what is required to push the concept of technology transfer in a 
manner that was intended in the . Unfortunately, while considerable atten­
tion has been paid to the political necessity of facilitating technology transfer since 
the  was drafted and adopted, concrete measures and recommendations have 
generally been absent. It is expected that   deliberations will provide some 
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What are the technology transfer issues that 
should be focused on in future negotiations? 
To some extent, the ambiguity of the  has given the Annex I countries a very 
convenient means by which to plead that technology transfer cannot be insured 
by Annex I governments. Their argument is that the technologies are commer­
cially available and can be purchased by the developing countries that intend to 
use them. However, while this simple posture has been voiced in many forums, 
reality is far more complex. The transfer of technology can, in fact, be accelerated 
through government actions. Government policy would not supercede or surpass 
the commercial processes by which technology transfer actually occurs. Rather, it 
would assist the commercialization process—retaining the incentives and benefits 
that the developer of a technology normally looks for when investments are made 
in research and development and in the evolution of technological solutions. It 
would be useful for non-Annex I Parties to formulate a set of concrete proposals 
for future consideration. These solutions could cover the following sets of activi­
ties: 
Building local capacity in developing countries 
As mentioned earlier, development of local capacity requires training programs 
and human resource development. These can be initiated within government 
departments that are responsible for formulating incentive mechanisms and poli­
cies that facilitate technology transfer. At the grassroots level, capacity can be built 
into the corporate sector by training people on specific technological innovations 
that may not be easily available in some developing countries. In the past, training 
programs have been favored by a number of bilateral assistance organizations. 
However, there has been a general reduction in these activities. This may be hap­
pening in conjunction with the progression of industrialization in a number of 
developing countries. 
While traditional forms of technical training are not required to the extent that 
they once were, there is now a growing need at the grassroots level for trained 
managers and specialists with expertise in environmental benefits and cost-bene­
fit assessments related to specific technological options. Ideally, training for posi­
tions such as these would not be carried out by parachuting specialists from devel­
oped countries into developing countries, but through collaborative ventures 
whereby the training process takes advantage of skills and talents that are already 
available in the developing countries. This would be the most durable and sus­
tainable approach to training and human resource development. 
With regard to local software capacity building, merely training government 
policymakers may not be adequate. In some cases, there may be a need to create 
institutions outside of the government, or to strengthen existing organizations 
appropriately. One example of this is the regulatory commissions charged with the 
responsibility of pricing services provided by natural monopolies such as electric 
utilities. The training of regulators and officials in such organizations becomes 
increasingly important if internalization of environmental costs is incorporated 
into the pricing of services such as electricity or other forms of energy that are 
being used in increasing quantities in the developing world. Rational pricing, 
including the internalization of resource use and pollution abatement costs, is an 





   
  
 
   

















Developing information resources 
Although commercial information on technology is generally available and effi­
ciently transferred throughout the world, certain aspects of such information are 
not easily available. For instance, the specific environmental benefits of technolo­
gies are not easily known and require careful evaluation, specifically under local 
conditions. The practical feasibility of using a certain technology varies from one 
place to another because the conditions under which the technology may be used 
may vary substantially. For example, refrigerators operating in a country where 
Peddling of technologies that may only have global benefits, i.e. reduction of ghg 
emissions, is not likely to be successful in developing countries. Developed coun­
try policymakers must also understand, however, that technology that addresses 
local environmental problems will generally be globally positive as well. Projects 
that focus on local pollution levels and energy efficiency will also reduce global 
ghg emissions levels. 
the electricity supply has large fluctuations of frequency and voltage will need a 
different compressor than those that will be used in a country where stability of 
voltage and quality of power supply can be taken for granted. Different compres­
sors will use different amounts of energy, which means that the environmental 
implications of the technology will vary from one location to another. 
It should also be emphasized that in a number of developing countries, while 
information on specific technologies may be available, there may be a huge cost, 
in terms of time and money, associated with actually attaining the information. 
The establishment of networks to provide such information at zero or low cost 
would make a substantial difference in the understanding, assessment, and 
launching of technological initiatives for environmental protection. The Inter­
national Energy Agency () has several programs for providing information 
to its members, but most of these require fees. It would be useful if multilateral 
and bilateral assistance organizations would help developing countries gain 
access to  information that might be relevant to the country’s needs and ini­
tiatives. 
Setting up knowledge networks 
The importance of knowledge flows and the networks that support such flows 
cannot be overemphasized. Given the vintage of the plants and equipment in 
developing countries, there is much room for energy efficiency improvement. If 
existing technologies are upgraded,  emissions will be reduced substantially. 
However, capital is scarce in most developing countries, and there is no institu­
tional framework for financing innovation and replacement of energy inefficient 
equipment. As such, these innovations are not likely to happen without informa­
tion networks and integrated initiatives, as well as capacity building measures. 
Given the potentially huge economic benefits from such innovation, motivat­
ing an industrial owner to become involved with such innovative programs should 
not be difficult. However, this motivation will only exist if the benefits are essen­
tially local in nature. Peddling of technologies that may only have global benefits, 
i.e. reduction of  emissions, is not likely to be successful in developing coun­
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nology that addresses local environmental problems will generally be globally 
positive as well. Projects that focus on local pollution levels and energy efficiency 
will also reduce global  emissions levels. 
Successful cases of local technology development and transfer of knowledge to 
address environmental problems, particularly in the industry sector, have benefited 
demonstrably from networks that facilitate the creation and flow of knowledge. 
The Tata Energy Research Institute () is part of a coordinated effort 
between small-scale industries in India, the premise of which is a knowledge 
network among small-scale, local industries that require similar technical 
innovations. The participating industrial partners are characterized by a large 
number of small-scale units, particularly foundries, glass factories, and brick 
manufacturers. 
Working with the bilateral assistance organization Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation (), and an expert on cupolas from the 
United Kingdom,  was able to facilitate a major improvement in the 
design of a small foundry unit near Calcutta. This development for the 
foundry industry, in partnership with the industrial manager and owner, has 
had dramatic results in terms of energy efficiency improvements and emis­
sions reductions. Since the pilot industrial unit is located within a cluster of 
similar units, the chances of quick dissemination are good. It is expected that 
the improved technology established in this single unit will now be emulated 
by other units in the same cluster. 
This innovation would not have been possible without the cooperative 
efforts of the research institution and the progressive bilateral assistance 
organization, and the expertise of the U.K. consultant. The final, essential, 
ingredient was the foundry owner’s entrepreneurial spirit and willingness to 
be involved in an innovative exercise. 
Innovative financing of new technologies 
The transfer of new technologies from the developed to the developing world can 
be facilitated through innovative financing methods that will not necessarily sub­
vert flows from the market. For example, the U.S. Department of Energy () 
in its various programs develops superior technologies that can be emulated at the 
international level. If there is a new technology that is significantly advanced over 
what is currently available, the  solicits bids for a large-scale purchase for 
the production and supply of the technology. Once a bid is accepted, the  
places an order for the units, and then makes them saleable under existing market 
conditions. 
The market price might be much lower than the purchase price paid by the 
. Were this the case, the government would subsidize the new units so that 
they would not distort the market, and would therefore support similar innova­
tions in subsequent purchases and sales. Bilateral and multilateral organizations 
should specifically target programs of this nature whereby technologies can 




   



























What is the importance of the Clean Development 
Mechanism when considering technology transfer? 
The Clean Development Mechanism () is often touted as a financial oppor­
tunity whereby developing countries can promote the use of environmentally 
sound technologies. This, however, is not the central objective of the . As  
clearly articulated in paragraph 2 of Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, the purpose 
of the  is basically to promote sustainable development in non-Annex I coun­
tries. Hence, technology transfer that is done merely for the reduction of  
emissions is really secondary to the objectives of sustainable development, as they 
are defined by the society to which such technology transfer takes place. 
It is important to remember that if the  is to be used as a vehicle for tech­
nology transfer, it must meets the objectives of both sustainable development and 
 emissions reductions in the host country. In order to ensure this, proper train­
ing is required for the decisionmakers that will be involved with each project. This 
is important in the developed countries as well as the developing countries. How­
ever, in the developing countries the focus would have to be not on simply training 
decisionmakers and project developers to evaluate  emissions reductions for 
every project, but also enabling them to weigh its value in meeting the overall goal 
of sustainable development, as complex as this task would undoubtedly be. 
Why is technology transfer so integral to the fccc? 
Two other aspects must be discussed in the context of technology under the . 
First, there would be lasting and tangible benefits from the establishment of 
research partnerships between developed and developing countries. The World 
Trade Organization () and the current patenting regime now cover most 
countries, which means that intellectual property rights are fairly secure interna­
tionally. It should therefore be possible to ensure that contractual arrangements 
between developed and developing country organizations minimize the possibil­
ity of disputes or misuse of intellectual property rights. This will create a number 
of opportunities for joint technology development, which might even be achieved 
at substantially lower cost than if the technology were developed solely in a indus­
trialized country. The computer software industry is already realizing the advan­
tages of such a scenario. A number of software companies that are based in devel­
oped countries are establishing facilities in countries like India, where the city of 
Bangalore is already acquiring the characteristics of a new silicon valley. 
Second, while all of the micro-level initiatives and programs can be taken in 
hand as discussed above, it is vitally important for developing countries to start 
shaping and developing a technology vision for the future, including initiatives to 
ensure environmental protection and natural resource conservation at the local 
level. This is an area where efforts must be made to involve think tanks and 
research organizations in both developing and developed countries. The Batelle 
Memorial Institute and the Electric Power Research Institute recently undertook 
an important initiative that effectively shut out institutions and organizations 
from developing economies. Given that the impact of technological innovations 
in the next century will be the greatest in developing countries, this is fairly egre­
gious. The developing world is likely to experience major energy-related expan­
sion, specifically in the industry and transportation sectors, as well as with the 
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Conclusion 
Developing country governments and organizations must take the initiative by 
articulating long-term technology policies and developing technology visions for 
the future. Multilateral and bilateral organizations can play an important role by 
supporting these efforts. It may even be necessary to think in terms of this being 
the first step for key developing countries where governments, domestic corporate 
entities, and local research organizations can collaborate with multilateral and 
bilateral organizations to examine the prospects for future economic growth. In 
order for this to be successful, technology policies will have to be in place to ensure 
that projects with local benefits will also result in positive global environmental 
outcomes. 
It is time that the developing countries come to understand the benefit of such 
an exercise and articulate the need for cooperative action involving all of the key 
players. It is also time that, in the context of technology transfer, the Group of 77 
and China develop a detailed proposal for  , and for subsequent exercises 
that will be undertaken for implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and the . 
This is an area in which institutions like  have substantial experience. It would 
be ideal if  could join with other organizations to develop a road map for a 
future that would serve the interests of both developing countries and the global 
community at large. 
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Maximizing private investment
in developing countries under the Kyoto Protocol 
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Abstract 
For a growing number of decision-makers, understanding and building on the links 
between international private capital flows and climate change is an increasingly 
critical e≠ort. For developing countries this is true both because (i) private capital is 
the primary engine of economic growth and, therefore, of sustainable development, 
and (ii) the Kyoto Protocol has the potential to substantially increase private invest­
ment in developing countries. 
This paper describes the links between private capital flows and environmental 
performance. It starts by reviewing the recent history of private capital flows to 
emerging markets.The impacts of environmental issues on investor decision-making 
are then described. Finally, some initial suggestions are made on ways to integrate 
environmental and investment frameworks, including under the Kyoto Protocol – 
with particular attention to the Clean Development Mechanism. 
Overview 
Private capital flows and climate change—what are the links? To some in the envi­
ronmental community, the question has little meaning because they focus on the 
use of public monies—particularly Official Development Assistance ()— 
when thinking of climate change and developing countries. To others, the answer 
is easy because the links are all negative. In their view, increased private investment 
means only expanded industrial activity and natural resource exploitation and, 
thus, increased emissions of greenhouse gasses and destruction of carbon sinks, 
such as rainforests. 
For a growing number of decision-makers, however, the question is neither 
meaningless nor easy. In fact, it is increasingly regarded as one of the most impor­
tant questions being asked. From a developing country perspective, understand­
ing the links between private capital flows and climate change is crucial for two 
major reasons: 
•	 Private capital is the primary engine of economic growth and therefore must 
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•	 The Kyoto Protocol has the potential for substantially increasing private 
investment in developing countries. 
This paper takes an instrumental approach. It does not attempt to address the sci­
entific, ethical, or political issues surrounding the Kyoto Protocol and its flexible 
implementation mechanisms. Rather, it assumes a goal of maximizing private 
investment in developing countries under the Protocol and proceeds from there. 
The paper starts by reviewing the recent history of private capital flows to emerging 
markets. The impacts of environmental issues on investor decision-making are then 
described. Finally, some initial suggestions are made on approaches to integrating 
environmental and investment frameworks, including ways they might be applied to 
the Kyoto Protocol. Specific attention is paid to the Clean Development Mechanism. 
Why the shift in attention from oda to international private capital flows? 
The numbers are stark and speak for themselves. As shown in Figure 1, transfers of 
ODA to developing countries averaged around $50 billion per year from 1990 
through 1999. At the same time, private investment in developing countries 
exploded from under $50 billion in 1990 to a high of over $300 billion in 1997. 
Even with recent financial crises, net private capital flows to developing coun­
tries were still four to five times larger than official flows in both 1998 and 1999. As 
economic recovery picks up pace in many parts of the world, the differential will 
only increase. 
In general, the shift from  to international private investment as the major 
vehicle for resource transfers from industrialized to developing countries is a good 
thing. Developing country governments cannot achieve sustainable development 
acting alone. They cannot create or provide 
all or even a majority of a nation’s capital. 
Rather, as discussed below, their role should 
be to set and oversee the frameworks for pri­
vate economic activity, including both 
investment and environmental factors. 
The shift does not, however, decrease the 
importance of effectively applied . 
Many developing countries have been left 
out of the global flows of private capital. 
Between 1990 and 1996, nearly 80% of the 
private investment in the developing world 
went to three regions: Asia, Latin America, 
and Central Europe, and within those, to 
twelve countries: Argentina, Brazil, China, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Russia, Thailand, and Turkey.While 
these countries represent a large percentage 
of the world’s total population, they are few in number. Other developing nations 
are struggling to increase their share of private flows. Those that have not been 
successful to date—particularly in sub-Saharan Africa or parts of South Asia—are 
in serious danger of being left further and further behind economically. To the 
extent that  can be applied to help more developing countries build their 
capacity for attracting a larger share of global private investment—and weather-
figure 1 
Private Capital Flows to Develop­
ing Countries vs. oda 1990 
through 1999. Source: World
Bank (2000). Global Develop­
ment Finance 2000. Washington,




















ing the storms inherent therein—it is an appropriate and important use of public 
money. This is especially true in the climate change arena, given the historical 
roots of the problem in the industrialized countries. 
In what ways are the di≠erent forms of international 
investment linked to the environment? 
International private investment is not all the same—nor are the environmental 
effects of the different forms. It is important to distinguish among three major 
components of private capital flows: (1) foreign direct investment (); (2) port­
folio equity investment; and (3) debt. Each has different links to environmental 
performance. Each exhibits different responses to financial crises. Interestingly, 
the policy recommendations on how to manage private capital flows coming from 
both the environmental and investment communities seem to be converging, with 
a focus on predictable and effective legal frameworks, greater access to informa­
tion, and strategically applied public investment. 
Foreign direct investment 
As shown in Figure 2,  is the largest and most durable component of private 
capital flows to developing countries. Typical  is investment by a multinational 
company—either from an industrialized or a developing country—in a local com­
pany, either wholly owned or through a joint venture.  occurs in many sectors, 
including resource extraction, manufac­
turing, infrastructure, and banking. Pre­
liminary data from 1999 suggests that  
made up 80% of all foreign investment in 
developing countries. The total amount of 
 going to developing countries is 
expected to continue to grow in the future. 
 also has the most direct links to 
environmental performance, as it often 
goes into production operations. Environ­
mental damage can result from increased 
land use, increased pollutant loads, and the 
secondary effects of expanded production 
(i.e. along transportation corridors or in 
new settlements). Environmental perfor­
mance can also be improved, however, 
through increased efficiency of raw mater­
ial use, greater attention to the environmental characteristics of products, and 
more effective protection of sensitive areas. 
Portfolio equity investment 
Portfolio equity investment is at the other end of the spectrum, having been the 
smallest and one of the more volatile components of private capital flows to devel­
oping countries, with the least direct—but still critical—links to the environment. 
It consists of publicly traded ownership shares in private companies, often 
referred to as stock. While portfolio equity investment in developing countries 
increased rapidly in the early and mid 1990s, its percentage share dropped 
markedly before starting a recent recovery. 
figure 2 
Flows of fdi , Portfolio Equity, and
Debt to Developing Countries
1990 to 1999. Source: World Bank 
(2000). Global Development
Finance 2000. Washington, D.C.
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Many developing countries have been left out of the global flows of private cap­
ital. Between 1990 and 1996, nearly 80% of the private investment in the devel­
oping world went to three regions: Asia, Latin America, and Central Europe, and 
within those, to twelve countries: Argentina, Brazil, China, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Russia, Thailand, and Turkey. 
The links between portfolio equity investments and environmental perfor­
mance are less clear and more complex than those for . Initial public offerings 
of shares in companies () provide new capital to the firms involved, and thus 
may act like . Later trades in the secondary markets, such as on stock 
exchanges, can help spur economic growth, with good and bad effects on the envi­
ronment (e.g. greater political pressure for environmental protection versus 
increased consumption of environmental resources). Secondary market activity 
can also help slow economic growth—for example, through the rapid withdrawals 
from developing countries witnessed over the past few years—with good and bad 
effects on the environment (reduced consumption versus unsustainable resource 
use spurred by economic need). 
Yet, the opportunities portfolio flows present as a point of leverage for envi­
ronmental policy are vast. Worldwide, portfolio flows of both equity and debt 
comprise the largest segment of cross-border transactions—55 percent in 1996. 
Portfolio equity and debt investors hold the purse strings to more money world­
wide than is available from any other type of investment source, dwarfing the 
resources potentially available from . For example, according to the IFC, in 
1996 the world’s total market capitalization topped U.S.$18 trillion, far in excess of 
total global  flows of $320 billion. 
Debt 
Debt, including both commercial bank lending and portfolio debt instruments (such 
as bonds), is the third major component of private capital flows to developing coun­
tries. In 1999, it appears to have fallen dramatically from its 1997 high of $103 bil­
lion, to a low of $19 billion. Interestingly, during the recent financial crises, com­
mercial bank lending was one of the most volatile of all types of private capital flows. 
Many different types of debt instruments exist, from commercial bank loans to 
power stations to medium-term bonds issued by large companies. The environ­
mental effects of debt run the gamut from  to portfolio equity. Government 
bonds present the greatest mystery in terms of leverage points for affecting their 
environmental performance. Some are used to fund improvements in environ­
mental infrastructure. Most, however, go into general government revenues, with 
potential investors having essentially no reason to consider the environmental 
performance of the underlying government operations. 
How does the environment a≠ect investor decision-making – 
from risks to opportunities, identifying points of policy leverage? 
Since one can find legitimate examples of private investment being both good and 
bad for the environment, the critical question is how the opportunities for 
improving environmental performance can best be captured. 
One set of answers can be developed by understanding and building on the 

























improved environmental performance only happens when it increases the 
investors’ commercial advantage. In developing countries, this usually occurs for 
one of five major reasons: 
•	 improving access to export markets, such as through the adoption of environ­
mental management systems or the award of product “eco-labels”; 
•	 increasing productivity, through more efficient use of raw materials; 
•	 maintaining a “social license” to operate, in the face of local and international 
pressure from neighbors, , shareholders, and customers; 
•	 accessing finance, since international financiers increasingly require environ­
mental risks to be addressed and, in cases such as World Bank loans, separate 
environmental guidelines to be met; 
•	 making “environmental” investments, such as in water systems or cleaner 
energy production. 
These commercial advantages for foreign direct investors provide leverage 
points for environmental policy-makers. This is true in both the developing coun­
tries receiving the investment and in the countries that are the sources of the 
investment, which are usually, but not always, among the industrialized countries. 
When considering how best to use the Kyoto Protocol to increase private 
investment in developing countries, all of these factors should be considered. 
Thoughts on how best to build on these links between private capital flows and 
environmental performance are offered in the following sections. 
How are opportunities for private investment created 
and how does this change the role of government? 
The shift to private investment is also changing the role of many governments, as 
they move from being the provider of services to being the enabler and overseer 
of their provision by private parties. Governments enable private investment by 
setting the frameworks within which private economic activity occurs. Govern­
ments oversee private investment by monitoring both the frameworks and the pri­
vate activity, and taking action when either fails to perform. 
The basic frameworks for private investment and other market activities 
include definitions of various property rights, the manner in which such rights 
may be held or transferred, and how any particular rights may be protected. Only 
with such basic legal rights in place can private investment flourish. It does so by 
taking these basic building blocks and arranging them in a myriad of ways that 
increase the value to potential customers. Many of these arrangements change 
over time, in ways that are impossible to predict when the underlying property 
rights are created. 
This combination of flexibility within an overall market framework allows the 
creativity of private actors to flourish in ways consistent with societal values. This 
is where the policy recommendations of the environmental and investment com­
munities come together. Both want clear, predictable, transparent regulatory 
frameworks, consistently applied. Both want to see ODA used to build the capac­
ity of host countries to adopt and maintain such frameworks. Increasingly, it is in 
each of their interests to have environmental considerations integrated into 
national investment frameworks. 
The concept of market frameworks allowing flexible implementation is also 
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the core roles for governments is to help build demand for private investments, 
particularly those with positive environmental content. This means developing 
both market frameworks and mechanisms for internalizing environmental costs. 
In the context of climate change, setting market frameworks includes defining the 
range of property interests that may be traded. Internalizing environmental costs 
means creating demand for those property interests by limiting or reducing allow­
able emissions of greenhouse gases from operations in industrialized countries. 
Many developing countries object to the Clean Development Mechanism and 
the other “flexible” implementation mechanisms provided in the Kyoto Protocol. 
Some do so because of the unfairness of letting industrialized countries “buy their 
way out” of a problem they caused. Some are concerned about losing their future 
ability to develop by selling their right to use the air today. Still others worry that 
any such trading systems will be so complicated that they will be impossible to 
administer. These are all serious concerns. 
At the same time, many of these countries are actively seeking to attract more 
private investment into other parts of their economies, frequently in operations 
that exploit other natural resources such as minerals, oil, and timber. Many of the 
investors in these operations are from industrialized countries. Many of the prod­
ucts from these operations are consumed in the industrialized world. Govern­
ments decide the terms on which to make the resources available to investors, 
either directly through concessions or indirectly through regulatory and tax 
frameworks. Presumably they do so only when the proposed operations are seen 
as beneficial to the local economy or when they help meet other governmental 
objectives. Within this context, host country governments may monitor private 
activities and take action, should they conclude it is warranted. 
A similar conceptual approach is appropriate for any sales of interests in reduced 
emissions of greenhouse gases. It is up to the host countries to determine whether 
they want to make such property interests available. They should only do so on 
terms with which they are comfortable. For example, they might choose to allow 
only relatively short-term interests to be developed and sold. Concerns over differ­
ences in bargaining power between governments and international investors might 
be reduced through efforts to harmonize the types of interests being offered for sale. 
Even if a developing country decides to make such investment opportunities 
available, however, the details of the  still remain to be understood and nego­
tiated. Some of the issues are scientific—how can the levels of emissions reduc­
tions be determined and monitored? Others are legal—how should industrialized 
countries that violate their emission reduction commitments be punished? 
The focus of this paper, however, is on how to design the  to maximize 
opportunities for private investment in developing countries. Some principles for 
helping to achieve this goal are suggested in the following section. 
How can private investment be maximized through market frameworks 
and oversight, rather than through centralized approval processes? 
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol defines the basic features of the  to include 
the following: 
•	 benefits to developing countries from project activities generating emission 
reductions; 
•	 use of certified emission reductions () by Annex I countries to meet part 
of their emission limitation and reduction commitments; 










   
  
 











•	 development by the Conference of the Parties () and supervision by an 
Executive Board; 
•	 certification of eligible emissions reductions by operational entities, including 
private and public parties, to be designated by the ; 
•	 certification according to specified requirements, including voluntary partici­
pation, as well as real, measurable, and long-term benefits that are additional 
to those that would otherwise occur; 
•	 auditing and verification of project activities under rules determined by the 
; 
•	 use of a share of the proceeds from  activities to cover administrative 
expenses, as well as to contribute to an adaptation fund for particularly vul­
nerable countries. 
Although these basic elements must be included in the , whatever  form  it  
takes, a huge number of critical details have yet to be defined.How they are reflected 
in the final structure will make all the difference for the ’ success or failure. 
For example, much of the process to date appears to have focused on identify­
ing the government body that will approve the trading rights, and how it will do so. 
The quickest way to strangle the ’ potential for increasing private invest­
ment in developing countries is to force all transactions through centralized 
global, or even national, approval processes. As illustrated in Figure 3, the best way 
to maximize the ’ full investment potential is through centralized frame­
works for the decentralized generation, transfer, and oversight of emission reduc­
tion credits. This approach is also consistent with the core government roles of 
defining market frameworks and then overseeing the performance of a myriad of 
market actors. 
Finding a balance between the need to ensure that the terms of the Protocol are 
met and to still leave room for markets to function in a flexible and timely manner 
is the key challenge for negotiators. Any effort to develop frameworks for decen­
tralized implementation of the  needs to consider three major components: 
•	 the overarching framework for the ; 
•	 methods for maximizing the generation of certified emission reductions; and 
•	 methods for maximizing the resources transferred with their sale and use. 
figure 3 
Centralized approvals versus cen­
tralized frameworks for decen­
tralized implementation – impli­
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figure 4 
Credits, resources and maximized 
private investment. 
Each of these components faces a huge number of issues. Some ideas for nego­
tiators are offered in the following sections. 
Building the market framework 
The overall structure of the  is the framework within which private invest­
ment will occur and be overseen. As illustrated in Figure 4, it starts with the 
/ Executive board 
defining the rules for granting 
credits against emission reduc­
tion commitments to Annex I 
country governments. 
It also requires Annex I gov­
ernments to put domestic emis­
sion reduction requirements in 
place and to offer credits against 
those requirements for qualify­
ing investments in developing 
countries. Until such require­
ments and credits are in place, 
private investors will have only 
limited incentives to invest in 
. 
According to Article 12, the 
Annex I country governments 
must also provide resources to 
the , both for administra­
tive expenses and for the Adaptation Fund. If they do not make the required pay­
ments, they will receive no credits. These finances would come, in part, from fees 
paid by the users of Certified Emission Reductions (). It could also include 
amounts taken from general tax revenues, such as . If participating countries 
and/or the  Executive Board wanted to take a larger share of  proceeds 
directly, they could also seek to impose a tax on all sales of . How to balance 
the additional administrative burden of collecting such a tax with the desire to 
allow the markets as many different opportunities as possible for transferring 
 is a critical issue for any such taxing mechanism. 
The / Executive Board will also set the framework for the creation and 
trading of the  among developers, sellers, buyers, and users. Some of the pos­
sible features of these activities are shown in Figures 5 and 6 below. 
Before moving to these more detailed aspects, however, it is important to 
return to the goal described in this paper—maximizing private investment under 
the  while meeting the terms of the Protocol. At its core, this means creating 
predictable and verifiable frameworks that both allow and promote decentralized 
action by a wide range of parties, public and private. Only by allowing such pri­
vate sector creativity to flourish will the ’ full potential be realized. 
Maximizing the generation of cers 
For developers and sellers of , this requires workable mechanisms for defin­
ing and overseeing the property rights to be traded, leaving as much room as pos­















Maximizing the generation of
Certified Emission Reductions. 
this can be done through decentralized certification and verification programs 
similar to those used under a wide range of international product standards. 
The basic features of such a system include both certification and verification 
functions. Both start with and provide a vehicle for implementing rules and guid­
ance from the  and the  Executive Board across a wide range of individ­
ual transactions. For certification of emissions reductions, those rules are initially 
overseen by national accreditation and tracking bodies (possibly using the 
national standards organizations already in existence in most countries around 
the world). Those national organizations will both accredit certifiers and track 
the certifications made through notices and fees submitted by certifiers. Should 
a certifier fail to follow the rules, their right to certify would be revoked. Accred­
ited certifiers will be paid by developers (public or private) to review the emis­
sion reductions proposed for certification. If they meet the rules set by the 
/ Executive board, a certification will be issued and the  may be freely 
traded. 
Ideally, such trades should be left free to take a wide variety of forms, including: 
•	 sales by developers directly to the ultimate users in Annex I countries (similar 
to the  scenario described above); 
•	 sales by developers to brokers and other intermediaries who then locate buyers; 
or 
•	 sales to “pools” of credits, shares in which are offered for sale by public or pri­
vate parties (similar to the portfolio investment scenario described above). 
For auditing and verification, a similar basic structure is used, with one major 
difference: its primary function is to check samples from the certification process, 
not to approve every . Only if problems are found will more extensive inves­
tigations be undertaken. International or national bodies can accredit the audi­
tors. They will then conduct periodic audits to verify that the national accredita­
tion bodies and the individual certifiers are performing their functions as 
prescribed by the / Executive board. Government inspectors and, possi­
bly, authorized  might also provide a supplemental check on the  
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The result is a system for maximizing the generation of  that both meet 
the requirements of the Protocol and are available for trading in a wide variety of 
ways. 
Maximizing the opportunities for private investment in cers 
Such a result clearly fits the needs of potential buyers and users of the , max­
imizing the opportunities for private investment and resource transfers to parties 
in developing countries. As shown in Figure 6, the money flows two ways under 
this structure: first, to the sellers of the  (and then up through the national 
certification chain); and second, to the adaptation fund through the Annex I gov­
ernments. As noted above, other alternatives also exist, such as a tax on each sale 
of a . 
Buyers of  would pay the market price directly to the sellers, whether they 
are developers, intermediaries or pools, public or private. The buyers themselves 
may be public or private, pools, intermediaries, or even the final users. Ultimately, 
the  will be purchased by those wanting to use them—including Annex I gov­
ernments and firms needing help meeting their domestic emission reduction 
figure 6 
Maximizing resource transfers. 
requirements, or  and others wanting to force further reductions by taking 
the emission rights off the market. 
Users of  would then provide notice and pay a fee to an Annex I govern­
ment in exchange for a credit against domestic requirements. In turn, the Annex I 
government would make a contribution to the expenses of the / Execu­
tive Board and the Adaptation Fund in exchange for credit against its Protocol 
commitments. As with the certification system, the system of using  to meet 
domestic emission reduction targets would be overseen by internationally accred­
ited auditors. 
What are the potential benefits of centralized frameworks 
with decentralized implementation and oversight? 
Decentralized implementation and oversight within a centralized framework is 
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the opportunities to generate . It maximizes the flexibility among sellers and 
buyers. It is founded on the requirements of the Protocol. Adherence to those 
requirements is regularly verified. 
Will this approach work? It is too early to say. The technical and policy issues 
facing the creation and monitoring of emissions reductions still need to be 
addressed. Political issues in determining the substance of the certification 
requirements, such as the details of the “additionality” rules, still need to be 
resolved. Even assuming that an approach along these lines is adopted, the capac­
ity of many governmental and private parties to administer such a system effec­
tively will need to be improved substantially. 
What this approach does do is provide a basis for concrete discussions between 
developing countries and the private investment community on how the  
might best engage private investment. Until recently, even if a private financial 
institution had heard of the  (and many have not), it was viewed as too ill-
defined or far off to be paid much attention. As more concrete approaches are 
developed, particularly those based on current investors’ conduct, these attitudes 
are changing and opportunities for dialogue are emerging. 
Where is progress being made? 
Little progress has yet been made on the  through the formal negotiating 
process. At the November 1998 - in Buenos Aires, a two-year period for fur­
ther study was agreed upon. At the October 1999 - in Bonn, a greater degree 
of comfort with the basic concepts was apparent, but no specific agreements were 
adopted. The Sixth Conference of Parties, in The Hague in November and Decem­
ber of 2000, will be a critical session for the future of the . 
Instead, real progress on the design and implementation of trading mecha­
nisms is being made through a series of experiments by private firms, national 
governments, and multilateral organizations. Included are the: 
•	 establishment of internal emission trading programs within multinational 
production companies such as BP/Amoco and Shell; 
•	 development of protocols for third-party certification of CO2 emission reduc­
tions by firms such as Ecosecurities and ; 
•	 production and sale of carbon offset credits by organizations around the world, 
from Costa Rica to the State Forests of New South Wales, Australia; 
•	 purchases of carbon offset credits directly by electric power utilities (such as 
 Corporation) and indirectly through commodity markets (such as the 
Chicago Board of Trade and the Sydney Futures Exchange); 
•	 formation of investment funds specifically designed to invest in carbon rights 
such as the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund; and 
•	 design of national CO2 trading programs in countries such as the United King­
dom and Norway. 
These “experiments in social learning” are helping to uncover both the obsta­
cles to and the opportunities for converting the theory of emissions trading into 
reality on a global scale. They are also starting to provide a concrete foundation 
for progress on the overall design of the . These “real world” activities help 
flesh out the possible interior of a “decentralized”  mechanism, i.e. the pro­
cedures for developing , trading , and maximizing private investment 
in  projects (Figures 5 and 6). 
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Where should negotiators go from here? 
In order to spur more private investment in developing countries, however, gov­
ernments need to agree on the “centralized” framework for the  within which 
specific trades will occur (Figure 4). Industrialized countries need to impose 
domestic requirements that enhance the value of  investments in developing 
countries. Developing countries need to adopt both general and -specific 
frameworks that encourage private investment. 
Both industrialized and developing countries need to recognize that it is in 
their mutual self-interest to break through the “chicken and egg” question of who 
acts first by agreeing to proceed together down the  or similar path. Many spe­
cific questions about the  remain to be answered. Efforts to develop those 
answers should be undertaken in light of the goal of increasing overall investment, 
both public and private, in developing countries. 
Negotiators from developing countries should explore and understand the 
links between private capital flows and environmental performance, particularly 
in considering their position on the . Doing so will provide a solid founda­
tion for deciding whether, and if so on what terms, they want to work on design­
ing the  to help maximize private investment in their countries. 
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Investors’ views on climate change 
Camilla Seth, Surdna Foundation 
Andrew Kasius, EA Capital 1 
Abstract 
The Kyoto Protocol contains provisions that have the potential to mobilize significant 
financial resources to mitigate global climate change. However, the emissions reduc­
tions called for by the Protocol will require broad based public and private collabora­
tion as well as clear national and international policies to help establish new trading 
mechanisms and institutions. Because this is the first time the private sector is being 
called upon to participate in such a large-scale, global environmental effort, there is 
some uncertainty how the investment community will respond and when it will 
begin to engage in the carbon market in a meaningful way. This paper makes gen­
eral observations about how the investment community has responded to climate 
change, and the extent to which the larger policy discussions are having an impact 
on investment activity. The paper also discusses investments that are compatible 
with climate change mitigation objectives, but which are taking place completely or 
somewhat independently of the global policy framework. The investors’ views 
described here are based on interviews across a variety of investment sub-sectors, as 
well as an accumulated impression developed over several years of working at the 
intersection of finance and the environment. 
Introduction 
The Kyoto Protocol contains provisions that have the potential to mobilize signif­
icant financial resources to mitigate global climate change. Flexibility mechanisms 
outlined in the Protocol, including joint implementation (), the Clean Develop­
ment Mechanism (), and emissions credit trading, allow for international 
collaboration in reducing greenhouse gases (), thereby establishing the path 
by which a large proportion of the financial resources could be directed to advance 
clean development in developing countries. The emissions reductions called for 
by the Protocol will require broad based public and private collaboration. Clear 
national and international policies must be established, the rules must be kept as 
simple as possible, and appropriate incentive structures must be created and com­
municated. It should be noted that this is the first time the private sector is being 
called upon to participate in such a large-scale, global environmental effort that 
requires the establishment of new trading mechanisms and institutions, new 
emissions valuations, and targeted investment. The questions remain, however, 
has the private sector heard the call, and has it been in the right language? 
1 The authors wrote the major­
ity of this article while both
were working for EA Capital, a
New York City based financial
services firm. Camilla Seth is 
now Associate Program Officer
for the Environment at the 
Surdna Foundation. Andrew 
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2 Even though more than
U.S.$1 trillion, or 10% of all pro­
fessionally managed money, is
now screened in some way, the
fraction of such funds screened 
on environmental grounds is
very small. 
3 There are approximately 800
venture funds based in the 
United States that each have 
over U.S.$25 million under man­
agement. In Europe there are
many fewer. 
Monitoring and representing “the perspective”of a sector as large and diverse as 
the financial sector is an extremely difficult task; to do so on an environmental 
issue such as climate change is even more challenging. With the exception of a 
select few institutions and individuals, the mainstream investment community 
does not appear to be convinced that environmental issues have any bearing on 
their business. In the United States in particular there is still very limited discussion 
of climate change in the financial services sector. It is therefore difficult to make 
conclusive statements about the industry’s perception of the issue. Thus, this paper 
focuses on some general observations about how the issue is being discussed, 
where, and the extent to which it is having any impact on investment activity. 
The investors’ views described here are based on interviews across a variety of 
investment sub-sectors, as well as an accumulated impression developed over sev­
eral years of working at the intersection of finance and environment. In research­
ing the financial community’s views on global climate change as a business issue, 
soliciting opinions from specific individuals was often easier than identifying the 
policy of the firms they represent. Frequently, these individuals requested that 
their comments remain anonymous until they were better able to gauge their 
firm’s policy on this issue. 
Which segments of the investment community 
are engaged on the climate change issue? 
Overall, the climate change issue has not provoked the active interest of the invest­
ment community. One might expect that those investors with exposure to the sec­
tors with the greatest carbon liabilities, such as electric power, building, and trans­
portation, would be the most concerned. After all, if binding global regulations 
emerge, these are the sectors that will be the focus for emissions reductions, 
through technology and process upgrades, or through credit trading. However, 
only a small subset of these investors are actively incorporating climate change 
into their investment criteria. These include: 
•	 Corporate (strategic) investors: Leading strategic investors in the energy sector 
in particular have initiated notable emissions baselining efforts and 
exploratory offset trades to establish themselves in what they see as an emerg­
ing market. Several have also made headlines around the world with their 
financial commitments to alternative energy technology development. 
•	 Some institutional investors: Of this very large investment base, only a select 
group of insurance companies, primarily in Europe, have begun to look for 
investments in alternative energy sources and other “low-carbon”technologies. 
Because the insurance industry operates by managing long-term savings and 
investments, it cannot ignore the possible effects of climate change on long­
term pension and life-insurance investment portfolios. Even though the 
socially responsible investment funds () are much more aware of the issue 
and are more likely to incorporate it as an investment criterion, as a whole, they 
represent a very small percentage of institutional capital.2 
•	 Venture capital and private equity funds: There are only four venture capital 
funds in the United States3 that are focused on emerging energy technologies. 
The climate advantages of these technologies are one aspect of these technolo­
gies’ perceived strength and market advantage, but by no means the sole or even 
leading criteria. 
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Why are certain segments of the investment community 
not engaged on the climate change issue? 
Investment banks, commercial banks, and most institutional investors (pension 
funds, mutual funds, universities, and foundations with large endowments, etc.) 
have not yet recognized the relevance of climate change to their core business 
interests. Explanations for the lack of interest by these investors include: 
•	 Policy vacuum: The United States continues to lack a clear policy framework 
around climate change at the federal level. This policy vacuum is contributing 
to inaction on the part of the private financial sector. In Europe, where a greater 
number of clear policies on climate change have been articulated by govern­
ment, private industry and the financial sector have begun to respond more 
seriously. Some notable emerging industrial champions in the United States are 
acknowledging that human contribution to global climate change will be a sig­
nificant business issue in the future. These firms are in the minority, however. 
The same firms were also particularly adamant about the failure of the federal 
government to provide sufficient leadership in this area. Over time, the finan­
cial markets may come to support or reject these industry leaders. 
•	 Conflict of interest with clients: Firms in the investment or commercial banking 
sector representing companies with potential carbon liability will be hesitant 
to publicly announce that they perceive climate change as a legitimate issue 
worthy of regulatory interest. Investment banks and financial advisory services 
are likely to follow the lead of their clients and conventional thinking within 
each industry on this issue. 
That said, leading investment banks are developing greater interest in the 
alternative energy market. Providing underwriting services for initial and sec­
ondary public offerings is a highly lucrative business. Leading analysts at major 
investment houses such as , Goldman Sachs, and Robertson Stephens 
have undertaken coverage of this industry and are now incorporating climate 
change criteria into their analyses. 
•	 Incentive structure/political neutrality of capital markets: The incentive struc­
ture within the financial services industry places value on revenues generated 
in the near term, with bonuses tallied on an annual basis.As an investment issue 
global climate change is, at the very earliest, a mid-to-long term issue. Analysts, 
traders, and money managers are unlikely to face either any risk or upside 
within their investment time horizon. Institutional investors or lenders are 
likely to be concerned with risks of this time horizon but, to date, have shown 
little interest in the issue. 
For those investors who are concerned or actively engaged 

with the issue, what are the main factors that have influenced them? 

Several factors have stimulated the interest of those few investors interested in cli­
mate change. They include: 
•	 Public relations benefits: Many early-stage investments in Activities Imple­
mented Jointly () and Joint Implementation () projects and similar 
carbon-related initiatives have, arguably, primarily been stimulated by compa­
nies’ interest in being seen as good corporate citizens by consumers, stake­
holders and governments. Indications are that other factors described below 
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4 Returns on disaster bonds 
are linked to the level of finan­
cial loss due to natural disasters 
during a given time period and
whether or not the insurance 
claims resulting from these dis­
asters exceed a prescribed
dollar amount. In return, 
investors are given a good
return and only lose on their
dividend or principal in the
event of massive weather 
related damages. Weather
related hedges are proving to
be a popular way for gas and
electric companies to hedge
against mild weather. Warm
weather in winter reduces nat­
ural gas consumption while
cool weather in summer 
reduces electricity consump­
tion. Structured hedges payout
in the event of such occur­
rences. Other companies are
similarly affected by weather,
including, for example, snow­
blower manufacturers, air con­
ditioner makers, etc. 
•	 Strategic benefits from being an early actor: Several early investors got involved 
in AIJ and JI projects in order to learn first-hand about the range of opportu­
nities available and how such projects might work. This, they believed, would 
put them ahead of the game once formal frameworks were developed, and 
would enable them to identify the cheapest and most effective offsets. 
•	 Potential investment opportunities in low-carbon technologies: A few investors 
were primarily stimulated by what they saw as good investment opportunities 
in new technologies, including distributed and renewable energy technologies. 
Larger energy companies also see this as a diversification in their energy tech­
nology holdings or as a hedge against regulatory action against their core busi­
ness areas. 
•	 Meeting their own internal environmental policy objectives: Some leading com­
panies have developed their own environmental policies, including those to 
reduce emissions of CO2 from their own operations. Shell, BP Amoco, Elf, and 
Totalfina are among the leaders in stated reductions of emissions and in terms 
of developing alternative, low-carbon fuels and technologies. 
•	 Risk mitigation opportunities: Some investors have been reviewing ways to mit­
igate their risk exposure to high-carbon sectors and companies. Insurance 
companies, primarily in Europe, have recognized that the time horizon for pro­
jected climate change effects is not so dissimilar from the time horizons incor­
porated into the actuarial calculations of the industry. 
How does the level of awareness of climate change in the 

financial services sector differ between the United States and Europe?
 
Awareness of climate change is generally higher in Europe, particularly among the 
insurance and reinsurance industries. This can be attributed to a history of poli­
cies in Europe which now complement climate objectives, and to a general sup­
port by the European populace for more activist fiscal policy. For example, in a 
number of European countries, a carbon (or energy) tax has already been imple­
mented. In the United States it is generally accepted in the policy and advocacy 
communities that similar taxes are unlikely, due to the resistance of many large 
corporate interests, as well as an unwillingness on the part of the population to 
change consumption habits. Tax incentives are typically the preferred fiscal tool to 
redirect investment and consumption in the U.S. 
Within the insurance industry, U.S. and European companies see this issue 
through different lenses. For example, the U.S. insurance industry is focused more 
on the mitigation of climate related damages and claims, and has invested in 
efforts to study building codes and revise actuarial data on policies. Innovative 
financial solutions such as disaster bonds or weather hedges have emerged.4 In 
Europe there is more interest and openness in considering the causes of climate 
change—and firms have begun to invest in technologies and companies that might 
address these causes. There are also a select few companies where strategic invest­
ment decisions are being made, in part, with climate change liabilities as an invest­
ment criterion. 
How do investors perceive the climate change policy environment? 
In general, investors see the policy environment as very weak and as a primary 
factor limiting their involvement in the debate. When questioned about climate 
change, many investors in the United States point out that the strength of the 
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financial sector is in its political neutrality and in its ability to respond to the 
opportunities created by a given policy framework. Given the current debate in 
Washington, D.C., most investors do not see regulation of carbon as a near-term 
possibility and are therefore not devoting resources to addressing potential busi­
ness implications as yet. Strategic and institutional investors have expressed hope 
that the U.S. government will take more of a leadership position on this issue. 
What kinds of investment opportunities are being created 
by climate change and how are investors responding to them? 
“No-regrets” investments in low-carbon technologies 
Where capital investments have been made, they are “no-regrets” investments, i.e., 
those that make strategic and economic sense, that are insulated from regulatory 
risk from climate change treaties, and that might have some ‘credit’ potential. For 
example, it makes sense for utilities to improve the efficiency of their boilers and 
generating equipment in order to compete in the emerging competitive market for 
electricity. Optimizing the heat rate of a power plant from 33% to 40% makes sense 
from a business perspective, and it also reduces risk from regulatory requirements 
based on climate change. 
From a technology investment perspective, climate change is only one of sev­
eral factors influencing the development of new areas of opportunity. Global 
restructuring and privatization, deregulation in the United States, rising environ­
mental standards in general, and the growing power needs of the developing 
countries are all drivers creating opportunities for technologies that may also have 
climate benefits. These low-carbon technologies include energy efficiency, renew­
able energy, and certain types of distributed generation. 
Over the past few years, corporate investment in the alternative energy field has 
proliferated. BP Amoco, for example, has shaped much of its investment strategy 
around next generation fuels and technologies. This has included not only 
expanding their traditional business of oil and gas exploration, development, and 
downstream distribution, but also moving into new areas such as photovoltaics 
and cleaner transportation fuels in key markets. 
Competitors such as Shell, Texaco, and Suncor Energy have similar initiatives 
underway to stake claims in the future energy market. Shell has made public com­
mitments to invest $500 million in developing its fifth core business, Shell 
In general, investors see the policy environment as very weak and as a primary 
factor limiting their involvement in the debate. 
International Renewables, over the next five years. Also, Shell Hydrogen has been 
developed to create infrastructure solutions to meet the expected growth of fuel 
cells, a non-polluting, efficient source of electricity that many believe will grow 
rapidly over the next several decades. Texaco Energy Systems has been created to 
leverage Texaco’s gasification and catalyst expertise and apply it towards fuel cell 
applications. Suncor in January 2000 announced that they would launch a $100 
million fund to invest into renewable and alternative energy projects. 
Electric utilities have also expanded their venturing activities.  Corpora­
tion recently announced the formation of a $500 million fund to target second 
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5 The evolution of the SO2 
market in the United States 
provides a useful example of
the potential efficiency of the
market in meeting environ­
mental objectives. It was
expected that a secondary
market in trading would
emerge as the most cost-effec­
tive way to reach private sector
obligations. There were indus­
try estimates that projected the
cost of investment necessary to
meet obligations would be near
U.S.$100 billion. In the early
1990s the U.S. Government and 
consultants to the U.S. Environ­
mental Protection Agency were
forecasting that the average
price for SO2 credits would
range between U.S.$600 and
U.S.$1500/ton. All the predic­
tions were wrong. As of today, a
median price for SO2 trades is
U.S.$100/ton. The total volume
of investment in SO2 credits 
during the last three years has
been roughly U.S.$4 billion. 
6 Canada, Finland, Japan, the
Netherlands, Norway, and
Sweden have all agreed to par­
ticipate in the PCF. Corporate
participants include BP Amoco
and six Japanese electric power
companies. A complete list of
participants can be found on
the Fund’s website: www.proto­
typecarbonfund.org 
munications technologies. Sempra Energy, Duquesne Enterprises,  Energy, 
and others have made significant investments into similar ventures. 
Of late, the public equity markets have become enamored with alternative 
energy stocks. In the United States, stocks for fuel cell makers Plug Power, Ballard, 
and Fuel Cell Energy skyrocketed in value in 2000. Capstone Turbines, a leading 
microturbine manufacturer, saw its stock price rise 200% on the day of its initial 
public offering. (Although, like Internet stocks, these often drop back down to less 
stratospheric levels after investors initial euphoria.) Other stocks related to alter­
native energy such as Astropower, a leading photovoltaics manufacturer, and 
Unique Mobility, a components manufacturer for next generation automotive 
technologies, have also gained ground. European companies such as Johnson 
Mathey, makers of fuel reformers for fuel cells, and Vestas, the leading manufac­
turer of large wind turbines, have experienced similar growth in value. 
Numerous automobile manufacturers such as Ford, DaimlerChrysler, General 
Motors, Honda, and Toyota have also made notable investments into new tech­
nologies such as fuel cells, flexible fuel vehicles, electric vehicles, and hybrid-elec­
tric vehicles. Ford and Daimler Benz have invested hundreds of millions into Bal­
lard for the development of the fuel cell power-train. Hybrid electric vehicles such 
as the Honda Insight and the Toyota Prius are already on the market in limited 
production, while GM’s Precept and Ford’s Prodigy models are expected on the 
market by 2003. Fuel cell vehicles continue to develop and are likely to first be seen 
in transit applications such as buses. 
Carbon offset investments/trading 
Some more active and entrepreneurial players are looking at carbon trading 
opportunities that are arising from the Protocol. U.S. investors appear to be more 
interested in this than investors in Europe, perhaps due to a greater familiarity with 
emissions trading regimes such as the SO2 market created by the Clean Air Act.
5 
U.S. carbon brokers indicate that trading activity for carbon offsets is acceler­
ating. Buyers of credits and options for credits have been participating in trades 
with an emphasis on credits for the years 2006 through 2010. This reflects some 
consideration of the timetable of the Kyoto Protocol. 
In January of 2000, the World Bank launched its Prototype Carbon Fund () 
as one trading mechanism available within the global carbon offset market. The 
Fund is capped at $150 million and is scheduled to terminate in 2012. The  
will provide a mechanism whereby buyers and sellers of carbon offsets can invest 
The Global Climate Coalition, the most powerful corporate lobby in the United 
States that is opposed to the Kyoto Protocol and related regulations, has been sig­
nificantly weakened in the last year. 
in a pool of carbon investments, generated by the carbon emissions reductions 
created by projects in countries where the project costs are lower. The  is not 
without controversy and there are many who question its structure and potential 
impact. Still, the  is drawing significant interest from governments and the pri­
vate sector. To date, the  has received commitments from six nations and fif­
teen companies.6 Twenty countries have expressed interest in hosting  pro­
jects, and additional private sector co-investment is sought. This fund is an 
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example of a collaborative public-private partnership, created to address the 
financing needs of the carbon market. 
Other pooled funds are likely to develop as the rules of the carbon market are 
established—especially those that will afford credit for early action. Meanwhile, 
Credit Lyonnais and Arthur Anderson plan to launch a U.S.$400 million fund to 
invest in energy infrastructure projects intended to generate carbon credits. At the 
time of this writing the fund is still in the planning stage and is due to be launched 
later in 2000. Prime investment targets are likely to be projects in developing coun­
tries that will qualify as  projects under the Kyoto Protocol. Several smaller 
funds exist, such as the $150 million DexiaFondElec Energy Efficiency and 
Emissions Reduction Fund and the upcoming $65 million fund by Union Bank 
of Switzerland. 
Given the much greater uncertainty surrounding the potential for forest 
based carbon-offset investment, few forest products companies or investors in 
the forestry sector, have, as yet, shown great interest in the opportunities gener­
ated by the Kyoto Protocol and the . 7 Hancock Timber Resources, a division 
of Hancock Natural Resources Group (), is a notable exception.  is 
the world’s leading forest and agricultural investment management organisation 
for institutional clients, with $3.2 billion and 3.2 million acres under man­
agement. The company recently announced the establishment of a forestry-
based carbon offset investment fund targeted towards Australian forestry invest­
ments. The Fund will be based in Sydney in order to build on the work of State 
Forests, a New South Wales government trading enterprise that has significant 
forest acreage under management and has pioneered trading in carbon credits. 
The location will also allow access to the new carbon sequestration credit market 
being developed by the Sydney Futures Exchange, the largest futures exchange 
in the region. 
Do investors see climate change as creating new 
liabilities, and how are they responding to them? 
Most investors are still unsure of exactly what their liabilities will be. In Europe, 
greater clarity surrounding public policy on climate change has prompted greater 
levels of dialogue—seeming to indicate that potential liabilities may be taken more 
seriously. 
The activities of some strategic investors indicate that they are proactively 
trying to mitigate potential liabilities—although it can also be said that they are 
pursuing new opportunities. They are taking early action to familiarize themselves 
with possible offset alternatives, to develop baseline estimates of current and past 
emission rates, to understand and gain experience with trading mechanisms, and 
to provide input to the policy debate. Examples include: 
•	 BP Amoco’s internal trading system for carbon emissions, their participation 
in a forestry offset project, and voluntary pledges to reduce the company’s 1990 
emissions levels by 10% by the year 2010. 
•	 American Electric Power’s () efforts to improve internal efficiency mea­
sures including power plant operations and customer efficiency projects, their 
participation in the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, and early forestry 
offset projects.  felt that they were unprepared for dealing with the sulfur 
emissions requirements of the Clean Air Act and are trying to be better pre­
pared for the outcome of the climate change debates. 
7 Forest-based offsets and 
other details of the Kyoto
mechanisms are to be refined 
at the Sixth Conference of Par­
ties to the UN Framework Con­
vention on Climate Change,
scheduled for November of 
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Arguments from certain industry groups that carbon regulations would place 
a large portion of their corporate value at risk seem to indicate that these compa­
nies should be disclosing such potential risk to their investors. This is an area that 
merits further attention from financial advisors. It should be noted that the Global 
Climate Coalition, the most powerful corporate lobby in the United States that is 
opposed to the Kyoto Protocol and related regulations, has been significantly 
weakened in the last year. Automakers Ford and DaimlerChrysler left the coali­
tion in December of 1999, followed by Texaco in February of 2000. These compa­
nies still claim that the Protocol’s regulatory approach is too costly. As indicated 
above, all are now voluntarily increasing their investments in alternative tech­
nologies. 
What can be done to stimulate greater interest 
and response among the investment community? 
Policy framework that supports investment in 
low-carbon technologies and other mitigation solutions 
A variety of policy measures can help, including production tax incentives for 
alternative fuels, a better link between government research and development 
funding, private commercialization finance for low-carbon technologies, emis­
sions disclosure regulations, support for the establishment of national registries 
and information on carbon trends, and carbon taxes. Some measures, such as a 
fuel tax, will be more or less feasible, depending on the country. Creating policy 
mechanisms that would allow venture capital, strategic, and private equity 
investors in low-carbon technologies to receive carbon credits for their invest­
ments would enhance returns on this type of investment and mobilize more cap­
ital towards it. 
One particularly interesting result of interviews with U.S. investors was broad 
agreement that the U.S. government should avoid subsidies targeted at specific 
technologies. The investors held that past programs had been extremely inconsis­
tent and success had been limited– perhaps doing more harm than good in the 
long-term. In the words of one experienced debt and equity investor, “Instability 
of tax incentives makes longer-term capital market interest impossible.” 
Alternative to subsidies have been suggested. One is to provide a tax credit 
when long-term capital gains have been captured. Credits that are made to 
investors who have realized such gains would support—and not distort—invest­
ment in sound and profitable projects and companies. Production credits are also 
thought to be more effective in stimulating long-term development and success of 
the market than simple investment tax credits. Finally, as most of these projects 
have high capital costs, any financial mechanism that can help reduce capital costs 
and allow the projects to be financed over the life of the assets (maximizing long­
term debt financing) will be very helpful. 
Education and information dissemination 
Accurate information is critical to making wise investment decisions. Exploiting 
new investment opportunities will require increased availability of information 
on technologies, markets, and regulations to help companies and investors make 
investment decisions and identify opportunities related to climate change. As a 
result, resources should be devoted to overcoming informational barriers to devel­
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•	 High-level ceo seminars: Educating the CEOs of energy generation and auto­
motive companies in private, exclusive non-political briefings about the con­
sensus on the role of fossil fuel burning in climate change would be highly valu­
able. This would help corporate leaders understand the magnitude of the 
problem they face, and might encourage them to discuss them with their 
financiers. 
•	 Investor forums: Dissemination of information could take place through the 
facilitation of investor forums for emerging technologies, and through support 
for objective studies that can quantify risks and opportunities to investors. Lead 
sponsors from the investment community should be sought out and the gov­
ernment may play a role in providing information to the group or helping to 
support convening the forum (investors interviewed said they would be skep­
tical of government- convened forums). 
•	 Publicize investment successes: Broader investment interest might be garnered 
by publicizing investment successes in low-carbon technologies within the 
investment community. Projects that have successfully met return-on-equity 
() and debt expectations should be profiled and brought to the attention 
of the larger investor community. 
Exploiting new investment opportunities will require increased availability of 
information on technologies, markets, and regulations to help companies and 
investors make investment decisions and identify opportunities related to cli­
mate change. 
Documentation and disclosure 
•	 Document and quantify potential risks to different classes of investors: Different 
classes of investors will be affected by climate change and associated regulation 
in varying ways. To help identify these various risks, studies could be prepared 
to help inform investors and analysts about the potential financial risks to their 
investments and how they might price that risk. Lenders with long-term matu­
rities for loans could see how future regulations affect their portfolios if they 
are heavily weighted towards fossil fuel-based energy sources. Institutional 
investors with long-term equity holdings might see the valuation of their secu­
rities diminished as a result of regulation. The insurance and reinsurance 
industries might be affected both in the types of policies they offer for prop­
erty and casualty as well as the potential for increased claims. In addition, 
insurers might also see their portfolio of investments affected by regulations 
that limit  emissions. A well-designed study to analyze how the different 
sectors within the financial industry could help each to identify their liabilities 
and suggest strategies for mitigating that risk. 
•	 Disclosure of carbon liabilities: Were government or the Securities Exchange 
Commission (or its equivalents) to take a stronger stance with respect to the 
disclosure of environmental liabilities, including potential carbon liabilities, 
greater response from industry and investors might be expected. One sugges­
tion would be to convene national or regional forums of financial advisors and 
equity analysts to examine the issue of long-term value at risk in the portfolios 
of large energy companies and energy investors—particularly those who have 
been so vocal in opposing the Kyoto Protocol and any regulation of carbon 
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emissions. At a minimum, a systematic way to display carbon trends should be 
developed and tracked by energy analysts. 
Conclusion 
Discussion of climate change in the financial services sector was previously very 
limited. However, over the past two years the climate change debate has evolved 
beyond simply questioning the existence of the global warming phenomenon. 
Investors’ awareness of the issues and opportunities is increasing. Although cli­
mate change goals or sensitivities may still not be a central motivating factor 
behind investor’s decision-making, a number are increasingly willing to reference 
the climate change benefits of their low-carbon investments. 
Insufficient national climate policies, potential conflicts with client interests, 
and time horizons that don’t match with climate change eventualities all continue 
to limit investor interest in climate change-oriented activities. However, these fac­
tors are gradually being overcome by the awareness of the public liability of inac­
tion or opposition to the Kyoto Protocol, the strategic advantages from early 
action, and increasingly diversified investment opportunities. Changing market 
conditions, such as utility restructuring in the United States, have created signifi­
cant opportunities for investment in low-carbon technologies, and activity is con­
tinuing to intensify in this area. These “no-regrets” investments are already eco­
nomically and strategically sound and, further, serve to safeguard against potential 
future climate change regulations. Several large corporations have begun to 
demonstrate interest in testing the market and gaining experience with develop­
ing low-carbon technologies by committing to environmental policy objectives, 
and investing in the development of alternative energy technologies. Several major 
auto-manufacturers have also started taking precautions in anticipation of future 
regulations by investing in new vehicle technologies. In addition, investor interest 
in carbon offset investments and trading is developing, and international carbon 
trading mechanisms are being established for the first time. 
In order to foster even greater interest from the financial services sector in low-
carbon investment, national and international policies must be unambiguous and 
accompanied by appropriate incentive systems. Dissemination of information on 
emerging technologies, markets and regulations will be crucial to further private 
sector involvement, as will publicity of successful investments in markets where 
such technologies are already playing a key role. Finally, in order to capitalize on the 
growing awareness of climate change issues and opportunity areas in the private 
sector, it will be important to encourage greater alignment between companies’ per­
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How developing countries can benefit
from policies to control climate change 
David Pearce 
Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment 
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Abstract 
The Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) and the Kyoto Protocol (1997) 
set the foundations for the global control of greenhouse gas emissions, and hence 
the control of global warming. While developing countries do not yet have emission 
reduction targets under the Protocol, they stand to gain by its provisions. First, global 
warming damage is unequally distributed and is likely to affect developing countries 
more than developed countries. Second, the Protocol’s provision for ‘joint implemen­
tation’ – a limited form of emissions trading – could greatly facilitate the transfer of 
clean and more efficient technology to the developing world.There are real prospects 
for mutual gain. 
Introduction: Developing countries and climate change 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change () of 1992 
established that accelerated climate change, or ‘global warming,’ arising from the 
emission of ‘greenhouse gases’ () posed threats to human wellbeing and 
ecosystem integrity; that, while the nature of the threats remains very uncertain,  
action should be taken in advance of scientific certainty (the ‘precautionary prin­
ciple’); that developed economies should take the lead in reducing emissions of 
, 1 and that the ‘incremental cost’ of any actions taken by developing coun­
tries under the Convention should be met by the international community 
through a financing mechanism subsequently agreed to be the Global Environ­
ment Facility (GEF). The  emissions reduction targets set under the  
were not legally binding, but centred on the return of industrialised countries’ 
emissions of CO2 in 2000 to 1990 levels. One matter of serious concern is that these 
voluntary targets for 2000 have not been met by many of the signatories. 
The Kyoto Protocol to the  was agreed to in December 1997 and is now 
open for ratification. In contrast to the 2000 targets, the Protocol set mandatory 
targets, binding international law, using the period from 2008 to 2012 as the first 
‘commitment period.’ These targets are shown in Table 1. Countries with manda­
tory targets are the ‘Annex B’ countries—primarily, industrialised countries and 
the economies in transition (EITs). Under the Protocol, developing countries do 
1 The relevant GHGs are: 
carbon dioxide (CO2), methane 
(CH4), nitrous oxides (N2O), 
chlorofluorocarbons (cfcs),
hydrofluorocarbons (hfcs), per-
fluorocarbons (pfcs) and sul­
phur hexafluoride (SF6). CFCs 
are regulated under the Mon­
treal Protocol on Protection of 
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not have targets, although a few countries have subsequently adopted their own 
targets (e.g. Argentina). This reflects the agreement under the  that the pri­
mary responsibility for climate change rests with the developed economies, 
although it is increasingly recognised that the rate of growth of  emissions 
from developing countries means that they will soon be substantial ‘drivers’ of 
future rates of global warming. 
table 1 emissions reduction targets under the kyoto protocol
and the eu burden sharing agreement 
% reduction from 
1990 emissions levels 
of 6 ghgs between
2008 and 2012 
country target 
Australia + 8 
Canada – 6 





Monaco – 8 





United States – 7 






















































Lithuania – 8 
Poland – 6 
Romania – 8 
Russian Federation 0 
Slovakia – 8 
Slovenia – 8 
Since developing countries currently do not assume responsibility for climate 
change, and since their policy priorities lie in securing sustained economic and 
social development, policies towards climate change control would seem to hold 
out little benefit for them. However, this is not the case, and it is important to 
understand that developing countries can gain significant development advan­
tages by participating in various mechanisms established under the  and the 
Kyoto Protocol. 
How can developing countries benefit from climate change control? 
There are essentially four ways in which developing countries can benefit from cli­
mate change control: 
1.	 Some developing countries are especially threatened by climate change: 
notably, those that are vulnerable to sea level rise and those that are at risk from 
major weather events, such as hurricanes, which are expected to increase in fre­
quency and severity. Thus, if rates of warming are reduced, these countries can 
expect to benefit, even if they take no direct action. 
2. The  enabled ‘joint implementation’ () a process whereby a country 
with an emissions reduction target can reduce emissions in another country 
and count the emissions reduction against its own target. Under the Kyoto Pro­
tocol, several forms of joint implementation are permitted. There are guide­

















Since developing countries currently do not assume responsibility for climate 
change, and since their policy priorities lie in securing sustained economic and 
social development, policies towards climate change control would seem to hold 
out little benefit for them. However, this is not the case, and it is important to 
understand that developing countries can gain significant development advan­
tages by participating in various mechanisms established under the fccc and 
the Kyoto Protocol. 
Annex B countries and non-Annex B countries. This latter form of  is called
 
the Clean Development Mechanism (). Developing countries could there­
fore gain by partnering with industrialised countries under the . An essen­
tial feature of the  is that any trades must contribute to the sustainable
 
development of the host nation.
 
3.	 The Kyoto Protocol also enables emissions trading, a process whereby coun­
tries are allocated ‘permits’ to emit  and can buy and sell those permits in 
the open market. Currently, developing countries would probably not be 
included in any permit allocation, but it is widely argued that they should be 
able to enter such a permit trading system in the future. 
4. The  also has a provision for a fund to be generated by what is essentially 
a tax on  projects. This fund is to be used for mitigation measures in those 
countries that are especially vulnerable to climate change impacts. 
The following section focuses briefly on the first of these benefits—direct gains 
for developing countries through reduced global warming. Emissions trading is 
not discussed here because it is likely to be some time before a trading system is 
established.2 In contrast, joint implementation schemes already exist and can be 2 For a full discussion of emis­
sions trading, see Stewart andcommenced more formally upon ratification of the Protocol. 
Sands, this volume. 
What is the impact of climate change on the developing world? 
While the initial responsibility for tackling climate change rests with the devel­
oped world, proportionally, it is the developing world that is likely to suVer more 
from the impact of climate change. Thus, develop­
ing countries stand to benefit from climate change 
control policies in a direct manner. 
table 2 some estimates of global warming
damage by world region 
Table 2 shows two estimates of the scale of dam- region fankhauser tol 
ages expressed as a percentage of gross national % gnp for 2x co2 % gnp for 2x co2 
product () for various regions of the world. The 
OECD countries	 1.3 1.6Fankhauser estimates show non- (Organisa- Non-OECD countries 1.6 2.7 
tion for Economic Co-operation and Develop-	 Africa – 8.7 
ment) countries suffering marginally more than	 Latin America – 4.3 
Middle East – 4.1 OECD countries, while the Tol estimates depict the EITs 0.07 -0.3 
damage as 70% higher proportionally. The Tol esti- China 4.7 5.2 
mates project significant damage in individual	 S/SE Asia – 8.6 
World	 1.4 1.9developing country regions: Africa, nearly 9%; 
South and Southeast Asia, over 8%; China, over 5%; 
Source: Fankhauser (1995), Tol (1995) 
and Latin America, around 4%. These are the dam­
ages associated with a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations (‘2 
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While the initial responsibility for tackling climate change rests with the devel­
oped world, proportionally, it is the developing world that is likely to suffer more 
from the impact of climate change. Thus, developing countries stand to benefit 
from climate change control policies in a direct manner. 
important to understand that the effects of global warming will not cease at con­
centration doubling—this is just a convenient benchmark for measuring impacts. 
The proportionate damage will be even worse if warming is not controlled. 
The monetary damage estimates underlying the figures in Table 2 are not 
deserving of too much faith since measuring these impacts is complex and uncer­
tain. However, they do illustrate the appropriate orders of magnitude, and support 
the view that developing countries may be the main beneficiaries of climate change 
control. This conclusion is reinforced when we consider the extent to which coun­
tries can take defensive measures against the effects of climate change. It is arguable 
that the damages shown for OECD countries, for example, are exaggerations 
because those countries can afford to undertake actions such as better sea defences, 
investments in weather-resistant crops, more robust infrastructure, etc… Develop­
ing countries have much less capacity to mitigate damage in this way. 
Further insight into the vulnerability of developing countries can be obtained 
from estimates of populations at risk from sea level rise. Table 3 provides some cost 
estimates for protecting vulnerable states against sea level rise, and the probable 
benefits in terms of the population at risk. It is shown that the Pacific and Indian 
Ocean islands have high-risk exposure, which can only be reduced by spending 
table 3 risks from sea level rise 
substantial proportions of their GNP on pro­
tection. In other cases, such as the Atlantic 
% of population at risk
from sea level rise 
Ocean islands, substantial 
reduced at fairly modest cost. 
risks can be 
cost of 
region 
Indian Ocean Islands 










(% of gnp) 
0.74 
0.09 
Other direct benefits 
from climate change control 
While developing countries may not wish to 
Caribbean Islands 















prioritise climate change in their domestic 
policies, it is worth noting that policies 
designed to reduce  emissions often pro­
duce locally beneficial effects. For example, an 
energy conservation scheme reduces local pol-
lutants, such as particulate matter and sulphur and nitrogen oxides, but also reduces 
carbon dioxide emissions. The fact that global warming control is not a priority for 
3 Article 12.8:The Conference domestic policy is not reason to ignore the jointly beneficial effects of many domes-
of the Parties serving as the tic policies. This has come to be known as the issue of ‘ancillary benefits’. How large 
meeting of the Parties to this
these benefits are is hotly debated and, of course, it may be more efficient to adopt Protocol shall ensure that a 
share of the proceeds from cer- policies which directly secure these benefits rather than trying to secure them 
tified project activities is used through climate change policies. None the less, ancillary benefits provide some 
to cover administrative 
rationale for countries with emissions obligations to act sooner rather than later. expenses as well as to assist
developing country Parties that
are particularly vulnerable to The Clean Development Mechanism Fund 
the adverse effects of climate 
Article 12.83 of the Kyoto Protocol is a feature of potential interest to developing change to meet the costs of






























allocated to what is effectively a ‘ tax’ fund that will ‘...assist developing coun­
tries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to 
meet the costs of adaptation.’4 
This clause was added because of pressure from the Alliance of Small Island 
States. It bears a slight resemblance to an earlier Brazilian proposal for a Clean 
Development Fund, which effectively included a tax on non-compliance with tax 
proceeds going to a fund for the benefit of mitigation and adaptation measures in 
developing countries. Some commentators have noted that if such a tax were sig­
nificant in size, it would raise the cost of  projects, which would work against 
the main purpose of the . 
How can developing countries benefit from Joint Implementation? 
Joint Implementation () involves one country paying for emissions reductions 
in another country.5 The ‘investing’ country undertakes a project in a ‘host’ coun­
try and the  emissions reductions associated with that project are then cred­
ited (or partially credited, see below) to the investing country. 
The rationale for Joint Implementation 
The rationale for  is twofold. First, one tonne of  does the same global 
damage regardless of the geographical location of the emission. Thus, the location 
of emissions does not matter: if one country pays for the reduction of one tonne 
of emissions in another country, the global warming reduction effect will be the 
same as if the country reduced the tonne of emissions domestically. Second, the 
costs of reducing emissions vary significantly between countries.  and devel­
oping countries have markedly lower costs than developed countries (, 
1997).6 Thus, the overall costs of complying with emission targets will be lower if 
emission reduction can be implemented jointly. 
The combination of these features means that it is globally more cost effective 
to meet the  obligations by engaging in . The principle of global efficiency 
is recognised in   Article 3.3: ‘...measures to deal with climate change 
should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.’ 
In economic and political terms, global efficiency is important for at least two 
reasons: 
•	 If more resources are allocated to global warming control than are needed for 
any given target, there is a cost to the world as a whole in terms of the foregone 
activities that could have been undertaken with the wasted resources. Thus, if 
it costs $1 billion to control global warming efficiently, but $2 billion is 
spent because of an inefficient set of policies, then $1 billion worth of bene­
fits are lost in the form of, for example, foreign aid or environmental protec­
tion, healthcare, etc... 
•	 If more resources are used than are needed, global warming control will be 
unnecessarily expensive and this will deter countries from agreeing to control 
emissions. Countries might also defect if they discover that emissions control 
is more expensive than they thought when they entered the agreement. 
These are very powerful reasons for encouraging . But the distribution of 
benefits and costs from  also matter. An agreement can be globally beneficial but 
still not be attractive to any one negotiating Party to the agreement. The essence 
of , then, is that it should benefit all Parties. 
4 For more complete discus­
sions of the CDM, see Gentry,
also Werksman and Cameron, 
this volume. 
5 The term ‘Joint Implementa­
tion’ is used generally here to
refer to the types of activities
mentioned in this section. 
6 econ (1997) uses the oecd 
‘green ’ model to indicate dif­
ferences in abatement costs 
between countries. In turn, the 
green model ‘simulates’ (mar­
ginal) abatement costs on a
‘top down’ basis, through the
hypothetical imposition of a
carbon tax. For a 12% reduction 
in carbon emissions, the model 
shows marginal abatement
costs in 2020 to be around 
us$60 tC (per tonne of carbon) 
in oecd countries, us$50 tC in 
non-China developing
economies, and only us$4 tC in 
developing countries. For bigger
emissions reductions these dif­
ferentials widen considerably.
Mulongoy et al. (1998) suggest
that forest projects in Annex B
countries could sequester
carbon at us$9-65 tC com­
pared to tropical forest projects 
at us$2-25 tC, a ratio of around 
3: 1. The comprehensive review
by IPCC (Hourcade 1996)
demonstrates an array of esti­
mates that cover such a wide 
range that no specific conclu­
sion on relative costs appears
possible. It is nonetheless pro­
jected that abatement costs in
eits will be below those of 
oecd countries and that many
‘low cost’ options exist in devel­
oping countries. Weyand (1997)
concludes that trading could
reduce costs by 60%, and the
U.S. Administration (1998) esti­
mates that U.S. compliance
costs would be reduced by at
least 57% (trading within Annex
I only) and possibly up to 87%
for a ‘bubble’ between the 
United States and Eastern 
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The need for additionality 
A critical condition for a  project to be admissible is that it must be ‘additional.’ 
Additionality has two meanings, each of which is important. 
The first is that any project must be financially additional. In other words, it 
must not involve a diversion of existing development aid funds, but the use of new 
and additional funds. Otherwise, the potential benefits to developing countries 
from a  project might be lost through reduced aid flows. 
Testing for financial additionality is complex and difficult. There are some sus­
picions, for example, that Global Environment Facility funds are not ‘new’ money,  
but have been diverted from official aid funds. This conjecture is difficult to prove 
because official development aid has declined in recent years. 
The second requirement is that the  project be environmentally additional, 
i.e. it must result in  emissions reductions that would not otherwise have 
occurred. Again, if this is not the case, then the global environment has not 
gained from the  project. Environmental additionality raises the complex issue 
of the baseline, i.e. determining what would have happened if the project had 
not existed. For example, a country might have burned coal to generate electric­
ity until a  project encouraged it to switch to natural gas or renewable energy. 
The  emissions reductions are then additional, provided there is some guar­
antee that the host country would have burned coal rather than the alternative 
fuel. 
Additionality is perhaps the most complex issue that needs to be addressed in 
 projects. It is not discussed further here, but it is important to note that devel­
oping countries cannot gain from  unless financial additionality is assured. They 
can still gain if environmental additionality is not fulfilled, i.e. they can still secure 
net benefits from the project, but then the global goal of  is not achieved. 
The types of ji projects that may be eligible under the Kyoto Protocol 
Unfortunately, the Kyoto Protocol is obscure when it comes to delineating the 
kinds of projects that may be eligible for  between Annex B and non-Annex B 
countries. Elsewhere in the Protocol,  between Annex B countries appears to 
include  emissions reductions plus avoided emissions from deforestation, 
carbon sequestration from afforestation, and reforestation. Even here, the terms 
are not truly defined. Article 12 of the Protocol, which deals with the , does 
not delineate what is included and excluded by way of projects. The Conference of 
Parties will eventually decide on these issues. 
There is justification for taking a broad view and assuming that a wide range of 
projects should be covered. The rationale for this is that any form of emission 
avoidance and any form of carbon sequestration should, prima facie, qualify 
because they all result in global environmental benefits. Some may be short term, 
some may be permanent, but anything that contributes to emissions reduction 
seems valid. Any list may be modified later because of other considerations, but 
excluding certain projects at the outset does not seem rational. 
From this broad perspective, the  could then embrace any of the projects 
listed in Table 4. 
The Clean Development Mechanism and sustainable development 
Article 12 requires that  projects contribute to sustainable development in 
host countries. In other words, contributing to sustainable development in the 




















table 4 potential project types for cdm joint implementation eligibility 
baseline cdm option 
Energy emissions reduction 
Business-as-usual 
energy consumption 
Demand Side Management (DSM): domestic sector 
DSM: industrial sector 
DSM: transport 
Reduced transmission losses 
Improved generation efficiencies 
Prevailing fuel mix Fuel switching in generation
Fuel switching in transport 
Non-recovered energy	 Recovery of landfill methane
Recovery of coal-bed methane
Recovery of incineration heat/power 
Non-energy emissions reduction 
Continued deforestation	 Avoided deforestation via agroforestry, conservation, and
other sustainable forest uses 
Degraded land	 Biomass fuel plantations substituting for carbon-intensive 
fossil fuels 
Non-sustainable forestry	 Sustainable forestry 
Existing forest management	 Improved management practice
Reduced impact logging in natural forests 
Low productivity	 Raised productivity to reduce incentives to expand
agriculture into forested areas, thus avoiding deforestation
emissions 
Fire, pests	 Reduced risk of fire by switching from slash-and-burn to 
agroforestry, etc. 
Sequestration/storage 
Degraded land	 Afforestation by plantation
Reforestation by plantation
Natural regeneration of secondary forest 
Slash and burn	 Conversion to agroforestry 
host country is a condition of allowing such trades to be eligible for credit against 
national emission targets. The difficulty is how to test this. 
Obviously the  is only one of the available instruments for achieving sus­
tainable development, and it may well not be the most important one. Much 
depends on the likely size of the  ‘market’ for  projects. However, it is essen­
tial to ensure that  is compatible with sustainable development. If it is not, 
then the developing world has little or nothing to gain from it. Article 12 makes it 
clear that  ‘projects’ demonstrate consistency with sustainable development. 
Articles 2.3 and 3.14 require that any negative social, environmental, or economic 
impacts be minimised. Unfortunately, since there is no universally agreed upon set 
of indicators for sustainable development, demonstrating that  projects are 
consistent could either be very difficult (because indicators are disputed) or 
extremely easy (because projects may be consistent with at least one of many indi­
cators). Mulongoy et al. (1998) suggest that  projects could be tested against 
the list of indicators published in 1996 by the UN Commission for Sustainable 
Development (). The problem with this is that it might be hard to envisage 
projects that would not improve at least one of the  indicators, rendering the 
sustainable development ‘test’ redundant. It is also unclear what would happen if 
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It seems preferable to pursue a different approach. There are two possibilities: 
one in which the problem of defining sustainable development is avoided alto­
gether, and the other which utilises a general framework for testing the contribu­
tion of  projects to sustainable development. 
The first approach is based on participation in ’s being a voluntary 
process. Thus, if a host country chooses to participate, it is presumably doing so 
on the basis that it will secure net benefits, which could be construed as sufficient 
affirmation of sustainable development goals. No separate guidance or tests would 
be required. While this is attractive in many ways, it assumes that the host coun­
try would be able to conduct what might be a fairly detailed analysis of likely 
impacts, and without guidance. It also raises the possibility of the inconsistent 
implementation of  projects. 
The second approach requires that some guidelines be offered on the sustain­
ability of  projects. The essential framework for testing whether the  is con­
sistent with sustainable development in developing countries could be as follows: 
First, any developing country participating in a  project must secure bene­
fits from the project in excess of the opportunity costs of the project. This is the most 
basic and the most important principle. It specifies that a country participating in 
a project must secure flows of benefits, either monetary or non-monetary, that 
exceed what it has to surrender because of the project. The stress on opportunity 
cost will help to avoid situations where projects appear beneficial but fail to provide 
alternative livelihoods to those affected adversely by projects (e.g. displacement of 
slash and burn agriculture). 
Second, benefits and costs may appear as monetary revenues from the ‘sale’ of 
 credits, and/or as non-monetary effects. A non-monetary effect can be neg­
ative or positive. In this case, a negative effect is damage against a party for which 
no compensation is paid; a positive effect is when a party receives benefits without 
having to pay for them. The emphasis on these ancillary effects will help to avoid 
projects which, while yielding significant gains in sequestration or emissions 
reduction, do so by damaging some other social or environmental asset. Mono-
cultural tree plantations, for example, would be downgraded (though not neces­
sarily excluded) because of the potential damage to biodiversity. 
Third, benefits and costs accrue to different people. Because of the need to 
ensure that the  is consistent with poverty alleviation, the incidence of bene­
fits and costs matters. There are several possibilities: 
•	 A  project may secure net overall benefits to the developing country, and 
it may help alleviate poverty because the net benefits are biased towards the 
poor. In this case, there is no conflict between the project and sustainable devel­
opment. On average, wellbeing is raised and the quality of life for the poor is 
improved. 
•	 A project might achieve no overall net benefit and be especially damaging to 
the poor. In this case the project is clearly incompatible with sustainable devel­
opment. 
•	 A project might secure overall net benefits but be harmful to the interests of the 
poor. There is a potential trade-off, but the high priority given to poverty alle­
viation means that this project is unlikely to be regarded as consistent with sus­
tainable development. 
•	 A project might not secure a national net benefit for the developing country, 
but result in high benefits for the poor. If poverty alleviation is afforded high 
   
 
   
 
  

















priority, such a project might pass a ‘sustainability test,’ although this is open to 
dispute. 
Fourth, and as a means of enabling the above to be attained,  projects 
should identify incentives for project sustainability. There must be incentives in 
place to ensure that losers are compensated and that the underlying forces giving 
rise to  emissions are addressed. Otherwise, projects will face serious risk of 
failure. The focus on incentives should also assist with poverty alleviation since it 
is often the disenfranchised or un-empowered poor whose interests are neglected, 
but who have the capacity to destroy projects precisely because their concerns are 
not taken into account. Incentive mechanisms would fundamentally include 
many factors such as land and resource tenure and prices. They would also incor­
porate participation, law-making and capacity building. 
table 5 summary of the tests’ for the sustainability of cdm projects 
Test 1: The Cost Benefit Test 
Do monetary and non-monetary benefits to the host country outweigh the opportunity costs?
Yes: proceed. No: reject.
Ensure that opportunity costs are properly measured to incorporate, as far as possible, any macro­
economic impacts of projects, and any environmental gains and losses. 
Test 2: The Social Incidence/Poverty Test
Are the most disadvantaged groups affected adversely or beneficially?
Affected beneficially: proceed. Affected adversely: reject or redesign project to account for their
concerns; e.g. compensation, modify nature of project, mitigating investments. 
Test 3: The Incentives Test 




Resource rights? Local participation?
 
Other legal structures? Capacity?
 
‘Static’ benefits to developing countries 
The basic static requirement for a non-Annex I country to benefit from the  
is: 
[Host  Credits + Avoided Ancillary Costs] > Opportunity Cost 
The first item— credits—refers to the potential for developing countries to 
hold some share of the credits () created by the project. A developing coun­
try that reduces its emissions or sequesters carbon compared to its baseline, or 
what would otherwise have happened, creates a credit that is defined by Article 12 
of the Kyoto Protocol as ‘a certified emission reduction’ (). That  is effec­
tively sold to an Annex I ‘investor’, and the reductions are added to the investing 
country’s Kyoto emission reduction target. The investing country pays the (incre­
mental) costs of a project in the host country—this is the ‘revenue’ that goes to the 
developing country.  trades have been allowed since the Conference of Parties in 
1995. These projects predate and include the ‘Activities Implemented Jointly’ 
(). In the existing  trades, credits have often been shared between investor 
and host. Even though developing countries have no targets under the Kyoto Pro­
tocol, they may choose to retain some credits, which have a potential market value 
since they may be sold at a later date. Article 3.12 appears to allow for such credits 
to be resold since ‘any certified emission reductions which a Party acquires from 
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7 Article 12.3a: Parties not 
included in Annex I will benefit 
from project activities resulting
in certified emission reduc­
tions. 
another Party in accordance with the provisions of Article 12 shall be added to the 
assigned amount for the acquiring Party.’ 
Article 3.12 also appears to allow credits () secured under  to be resold 
to another Party. Since developing countries do not have targets under this phase 
of the Kyoto Protocol, it may be assumed that this ‘resale’ option relates to  
credits acquired by investor countries. However, it appears that there is nothing to 
stop host nations from sharing in the  generated by a  project and 
reselling them. In this way, the credits become a potential source of revenue to 
developing countries. On this interpretation, then, the ‘benefits’ referred to in 
Article 12.3a7 include the revenues from credit sales. To be clear, this is but one 
interpretation, but it has the virtue of reflecting existing AIJ practice—whereby 
host countries often share the credits with the investor. 
If credit sharing occurs, from an investor’s point of view it is equivalent to a ‘tax’ 
on the  project, where the tax equals the value of the host country’s share of 
the credits. Credit sharing raises the investors’ costs and accordingly reduces the 
overall market for  projects. It has been suggested that the Conference of Par­
ties might determine a universal credit-sharing ratio to apply to all  projects. 
If so, the effect remains one of reducing the overall size of the market. However, 
credit sharing is only likely to arise because the host country contributes to the cost 
of the project. The arguments are then quite subtle. If the host country contributes 
to the cost it could be argued that the cost to the investor is less by that amount, 
i.e. although the host retains credits, the overall cost to the investor could actually 
be less. On the other hand, if the host country contributes, then it is important to 
ensure that it is contributing only to an ‘additional’ part of the project: it must not 
be the case that the host country input would have happened regardless of the 
 project. If the developing country pays for non-additional components of 
the project, then by the additionality guidelines of the Protocol, it should not 
receive credits. The general rule here is to determine whether the potential resale 
of the credits is the motive for reducing emissions. If it is, the project is prima facie 
additional. 
Host countries are most likely to have an interest in credit sharing if credits are 
saleable. However, they might also be interested if they plan to adopt an emission 
reduction target ‘voluntarily,’ or expect to have to adopt such a target under later 
commitment phases of the Protocol. If developing countries generally expect to 
adopt targets in later commitment periods, then the ‘banking’ of such credits (i.e. 
accumulating them over time for resale or credit against a future target), may well 
be a sensible strategy. It is important to understand that the credits have an economic 
value and their price can change over time. These changes will be in favour of devel­
oping countries as Annex B countries move up increasingly costly abatement curves. 
A developing country could also finance its own projects and then sell the cred­
its. Costa Rica has done this by implementing a fuel tax, the revenues from which 
are used to finance emissions reduction and sequestration projects. The projects 
are then certified and the ‘certified tradeable offsets’ () can be sold on the 
market. Again, investors will only be interested in buying such  if they are 
recognised as additional emissions reductions. In this case, additionality appears 
legitimate because if Costa Rica did not plan to sell the  then it would not 
have undertaken the projects or implemented the fuel tax—the fuel tax and emis­
sions reduction projects are not part of the baseline. As a result, the commercial 
value of the credits should be included in the ‘credit’ item. Note that these direct 
 




















benefits depend on the negotiated shares of the credits between Annex 1 and host 
countries. 
Dynamic net gains to developing countries 
To these static gains and losses must be added any dynamic gains from a ji trade. 
Of these, the most relevant is technology transfer, i.e. the import ‘into the host 
country of advanced technology.’ Technology may be physical—e.g. capital equip­
ment embodying new technology; or managerial—e.g. improved forest manage­
ment techniques. While the static gains and losses are hard to quantify, estimating 
the dynamic benefits of ji will be extremely difficult. 
Once the overall condition for achieving a net benefit to the developing coun­
try is analysed, attention should focus on each component of the net benefit equa­
tion to see who experiences the gains and losses. For example, a  project might 
displace slash and burn agriculture. Prima facie, the opportunity cost will fall on 
the relatively poor, and steps would need to be taken to ensure that the net bene­
fits of the project were carefully reinvested to ensure that the wellbeing of this dis­
advantaged group is improved. If a  project displaces coal burning, this may 
have effects on any indigenous mining industry. Again, the groups involved are 
likely to be low-income groups. 
More on Clean Development Mechanism additionality 
For a  project to be additional according to the terms defined here, it must be 
a project that the host country would not have implemented without the . 
Otherwise the project yields no global benefit in terms of ghg reduction. However, 
if the host country only has an incentive to participate in the  project if ben­
efits exceed costs, would it not therefore have carried out the project anyway? The 
additionality of a  project can be tested by determining if the project’s bene­
fits would exceed the costs were the host country to meet all of the costs by itself. 
If benefits exceed costs in this scenario, the project is not additional. If the  
project has host benefits in excess of host costs once investor financing is included, 
then the project meets the sustainable development requirement—it is additional 
(globally beneficial) and it yields development benefits for the host country. 
There is also a need to ensure that the benefits actually accrue and are sustained. 
This raises the issue of the social incidence of the costs and benefits, and the design 
of incentive systems. Social incidence and incentives can be seen as conditions for 
the realisation of the net benefits of  projects. 
Conclusion 
Climate change control has rightly been targeted at the developed world because 
theirs has been the primary responsibility for ghg emissions. The current view of 
most developing countries is that they should not have targets for ghg emissions 
reduction. Such targets might involve diverting resources away from their primary 
goal of socio-economic development based on domestic investments in capital 
assets, health and education, and social concerns. Moreover, developing country 
environmental concerns are likely to focus within the domestic sphere of local pol­
lution control and resource conservation. 
Developing countries can nonetheless benefit from climate change control. 
The way is open for partnerships between developing and developed economies 
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First, a number of developing countries are especially vulnerable to the impacts 
of climate change—especially sea level rise and the increased incidence of severe 
weather events. Developing countries therefore have a direct interest in ensuring 
that the provisions of the  and the Kyoto Protocol are met. The evidence also 
suggests that the Protocol will not have a significant impact on rates of global tem­
perature increase until developing countries also have emissions control targets. 
Working with developed economics in anticipation of such future controls is 
therefore expedient. 
Second, the Kyoto Protocol opens the way for Joint Implementation. Under 
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, developing countries can participate in joint 
implementation through the . Developing countries stand to gain in three 
ways: 
•	 Through the ‘ tax,’which may generate funds to be used for climate change 
impact mitigation in vulnerable countries; 
•	 Through sharing credits that will be commercial assets when they can be sold 
through a world market; and 
•	 Through the ancillary benefits that will accrue from  projects—these 
include both ‘static’ benefits, such as reduced air pollution, and ‘dynamic’ ben­
efits arising from the transfer of technology and capacity building. 
Throughout, the benefits accruing to developing countries will depend on the 
extent to which the  operates without constraints. For example, the  will 
compete with other forms of , which may not involve developing countries. In 
addition,  will be in competition with any tradeable permit scheme that is 
ultimately established. A  that has too many limitations will not therefore 
prosper, and developing countries could lose out on opportunities for net gain. 
Nonetheless, there are problems with  projects, notably the complex issue of 
establishing financial and environmental additionality. Many of these problems 
are being worked out through the existing  schemes, which have been established 
because of the appeal of a ‘green image’ among investors, because of the desire to 
see how such schemes might work, and, occasionally, because investors anticipate 
receiving retrospective credit under the Kyoto Protocol. Most important, however,  
they have produced a wealth of experience and expertise, which can be brought to 
bear on the design of the . While it is unlikely ever to be a major stimulus to 
economic development, the  has all the hallmarks of a potential mutually 
beneficial bargain between developed and developing countries. 
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Institutional and legal issues of emissions trading 
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Abstract 
Emissions trading systems as a means of air pollution control have been developed 
in recent years to address some important limitations of traditional command and 
control environmental regulation. Trading systems address many of the inefficien­
cies of command systems and may promote cost-effectiveness by introducing flexi­
bility and providing incentives for sources with lower control costs to undertake more 
of the control burden. In the United States, for example, experience demonstrates 
that emissions trading systems for diffuse air pollutants can work effectively to pro­
tect the environment, provide desirable flexibility in the means of control, stimulate 
environment-friendly innovation and achieve very significant cost savings if such 
systems are properly designed and enforced. Successful U.S. programs have included 
trading systems to eliminate lead in gasoline, reduce sulfur dioxide emissions by 
50%, reduce smog in Los Angeles, phase out chemicals that deplete stratospheric 
ozone, and provide flexibility in air pollution regulation generally. 
Emissions trading systems are especially well suited to addressing climate change 
because they achieve limitations of net greenhouse gas emissions at far less cost and 
stimulate innovation along environmentally friendly paths to sustainable develop­
ment. Because greenhouse gas emissions mix globally, net reductions of greenhouse 
gas emissions provide the same environmental benefit regardless of where on the 
globe they occur. The flexibility afforded by trading systems thus allows emissions 
reduction and sequestration activities to occur wherever greenhouse gas limitations 
can be accomplished at least cost. In recognition of these advantages, the Kyoto Pro­
tocol authorizes emissions trading among Annex I countries, as well as between 
Annex I countries and developing countries through the Clean Development Mecha­
nism ( cdm). Reducing the costs of achieving limitations may promote the likelihood 
of successful international agreement on and implementation of more ambitious 
limitations measures. Equally important, the cdm can provide important economic 
and environmental benefits for developing countries by channeling additional public 
and private sector investment capital from the developed countries into sustainable 
development in developing countries. 
This paper starts with an explanation of the basic features of emissions trading 
systems. It then reviews the successful domestic use of trading systems in the United 
States. Finally, it discusses the international use of emissions trading to mitigate cli­
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1 Article 17 provides that such
trading shall be “supplemental”
to domestic actions for meet­
ing such obligations. Other pro­
visions of the Protocol autho­
rize additional forms of trading
among Annex I countries.
Under Article 4 such countries 
may implement their limitation
obligations jointly, creating the
potential for trading arrange­
ments among the participating
countries. Under Article 6 they
may trade project-based emis­
sion reduction units. 
2 For an overview of emission 
trading systems and other eco­
nomic incentive systems and
their advantages over com­
mand regulation, see Richard B.
Stewart,“Controlling Environ­
mental Risks Through Economic
Incentives,” in 13 Columbia Jour­
nal of Environmental Law 153 
(1998); Thomas H. Tietenberg,
“Economic Instruments for 
Environmental Regulation,” in 6
Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy 17 (1990). 
Introduction 
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention of Climate 
Change () authorizes a variety of greenhouse gas () emissions trading 
systems in order to combat global warming in an efficient, cost-e›ective manner. 
Article 17 of the Protocol authorizes emissions trading among Annex I countries 
in order to fulfill their Protocol emissions limitation obligations.1 Article 12 autho­
rizes a di›erent type of trading system, involving developing as well as developed 
countries, by defining a Clean Development Mechanism () administered by 
an Executive Board established by and accountable to the parties to the  and 
Protocol. Under the , Annex I countries that invest in emissions limitations 
and sink enhancement projects in developing countries obtain certified emission 
reduction credits () that count against their emissions limitation obligations. 
 would be traded internationally. The Protocol provides for the participation 
of private entities in the . The objective of the  is to direct capital and 
technology to developing countries in order to promote energy efficient and other 
forms of environmentally friendly development and to enable the Annex I coun­
tries to meet a portion of their  limitations obligations in a cost-e›ective 
manner. The implementation of these and other Kyoto flexibility mechanisms is 
currently under active discussion and consideration by the Parties to the Conven­
tion and Protocol. 
What are the basic features of emissions trading systems? 
Emissions trading systems have been developed in recent years to address some 
important limitations of traditional command and control environmental regula­
tion.2 Command regulations impose fixed quantitative limits on emissions by each 
pollution source. In order to make this task manageable, regulators typically estab­
lish uniform limitations for categories of sources, such as power plants and steel 
mills, based on widely available control technologies. In practice, however, the 
sources in a given category often vary substantially in both their function and in 
the cost of their emissions control. The use in these circumstances of uniform 
“one-size fits all” requirements can lead to serious inefficiencies. Sources are often 
precluded from implementing alternative methods, such as source-specific process 
changes and pollution prevention measures, which may limit emissions far more 
inexpensively than generic control technologies. In addition, the current uniform 
requirements do not account for the varying cost among sources. As a result, 
sources with very high costs are more heavily burdened than sources with lower 
costs and societal resources are wasted. The total cost of achieving a given overall 
emissions limitation target may be two or three times higher under command reg­
ulation than under a more flexible system as a result of these inefficiencies. 
Emissions trading systems can address many of the inefficiencies of command 
systems and may promote cost-e›ectiveness by introducing flexibility and pro­
viding incentives for sources with lower control costs to undertake more of the 
control burden. Under a tradable emissions quota system, a government author­
ity issues a fixed number of pollution quotas. Each quota entitles the holder to 
emit a given amount, such as a ton, of a pollutant. A source may not emit pollu­
tion in excess of the number of quotas that it holds. Thus, the fixed stock of quotas 
e›ectively puts a cap on total pollution by all sources. Quotas are allocated to indi­
vidual sources by auction or by administrative allocation. Quotas may be traded, 
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be worth money. Should a source’s emissions exceed its initial quota holding, it 
will have to purchase additional quotas. Should it simply use all of its allotted 
quota, the source foregoes the potential sale of the quota that would have become 
surplus if it had lowered its emissions. Thus a tradable quota system, like a pollu­
tion tax system, imposes a price on each unit of pollution emitted. Where quotas 
are traded in markets, this price is set by market supply. 
Tradable quota systems are designed to allow individual sources flexibility in 
deciding what level of emissions limitation to strive for and how to achieve it. 
Sources are no longer locked into uniform “one size fits all” requirements. Quota 
systems also provide strong incentives for sources to reduce their emissions. Sources 
with lower control costs will control their pollution more, and sell or transfer their 
excess quotas to sources with higher control costs. As a result, the tradable quota 
Emissions trading systems are emphatically not a deregulatory form of laissez­
faire. They are part of a regulatory framework establishing overall quantitative 
restrictions on emissions. 
system will facilitate cost-e›ective emissions limitations. The cost savings that 
result, compared to the command system, could be in the range of billions of dol­
lars to control a given pollutant in a domestic setting such as the U.S., and trillions 
of dollars in the case of international  emissions limitations. Moreover, tradable 
quota systems provide long-term incentives for firms to develop more resource-
efficient, less polluting methods of production that reduce emissions less expen­
sively. Firms that succeed in this e›ort will save money, enjoy a competitive advan­
tage, and profit financially from pollution control. Society will benefit because 
pollution will remain limited while economic development moves forward. By con­
trast, traditional command regulation allows sources to discharge pollutants within 
regulatory limits for free, and sources have no incentive to reduce such emissions. 
Another emissions trading system relies on emission reduction credits. Under 
this system, a source that reduces pollution below the levels fixed by regulatory 
requirements or other emissions baselines obtains an emission credit. The source 
may then transfer or sell that credit to another source, which can use it to help 
meet its emissions limitation requirement. Like tradable quota systems, credit sys­
tems provide sources with flexibility and incentives to reduce emissions and real­
locate control e›orts from high-cost sources (who will purchase credits) to low-
cost sources (who will generate credits and sell them) thereby producing a 
cost-e›ective allocation of control e›orts. A credit system does not establish an 
initial set of quotas for all sources. Instead, credits are established on an individ­
ual basis for those sources that reduce their emissions below the levels required by 
regulations.As a result, tradable credit systems tend to have higher transaction and 
administrative costs than tradable quota systems. 
Emissions trading systems are emphatically not a deregulatory form of laissez­
faire. They are part of a regulatory framework establishing overall quantitative 
restrictions on emissions. Governments play a vital role by fixing the total amount 
of emissions allowed, establishing and enforcing the quota system, and prohibit­
ing sources from emitting pollution in excess of the quotas or credits that they 
hold. Violations of these requirements, like violations of command requirements, 
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3 Experience with trading sys­
tems in other countries as well 
as the U.S. is reviewed in 
Richard B. Stewart,“Economic 
Incentives for Environmental 
Protection: Opportunities and
Obstacles,” in Environmental 
Law, The Economy, and Sustain­
able Development: Europe, the
United States, and the Global 
Regime (R. Revesz, P. Sands & R.
Stewart, eds.) (2000). 
tems need not perpetuate existing pollution levels. As illustrated by the U.S. trad­
ing programs for lead in gasoline, sulfur dioxide emissions, and ozone-depleting 
substances, the number of quotas can be gradually reduced over time in order to 
reduce or even eliminate total emissions. 
Emissions trading systems may not be well suited to deal with localized pollu­
tants that will cause serious harm if too many sources are concentrated in a given 
location, or if their emissions are too high. In such cases, the flexibility provided 
by emissions trading systems may be a disadvantage, and limitations on trading or 
supplemental command regulation may be needed to ensure that localized pollu­
tant concentrations are not excessive. Emissions trading systems are most suitable 
for widespread pollutants that are emitted by large numbers of sources. 
What lessons can be learned from the 
U.S. experience with emissions trading systems? 
Globally, the United States has the most extensive domestic experience with emis­
sions trading systems.3 Most of this experience has been in the context of air pol­
lution control. Two programs have been regarded as especially successful: 
•	 the phase-out of lead additives in gasoline during the 1980s; and 
•	 the program adopted in 1990 to reduce sulfur emissions by 50% over a ten-year 
period. 
These programs achieved substantial cost savings in meeting environmental 
objectives. These cost savings in turn promoted agreement on more ambitious 
environmental protection objectives than would have been possible under a tra­
ditional command system. 
Lead reductions trading 
When the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency () decided in 1982 to elimi­
nate lead additives in gasoline, it opted to institute an emissions credit-trading 
program to accomplish the phase-out. Given the severity of the reduction (90% 
of the lead additive was to be removed by 1987), there was concern that some 
refiners, particularly smaller ones, would have difficulty complying. The credit-
trading program added flexibility, which helped ease industry concerns about the 
feasibility of compliance. In addition, the  allowed “banking,” under which 
credits earned in one time period could be used in another, providing refiners 
with desirable flexibility in the timing of reductions. These flexibility features 
enabled the  to pursue further reductions than it would otherwise have been 
able to impose, which provided environmental as well as economic benefits. The 
 adopted regulatory requirements that progressively reduced the amount of 
lead allowed in gasoline on a fixed timetable. Refiners that reduced their gasoline 
lead content further and faster than required by the regulations earned credits 
that they could sell to other refiners that were facing higher costs and having 
greater difficulties meeting the schedule. Credits earned in one period could be 
“banked” for use in later periods.Vigorous trading occurred throughout the pro­
gram’s history. An essential element of the program’s success was its low transac­
tion costs. Credits were entirely fungible. They could be traded without review or 
approval by the . The  monitored compliance and brought strong enforce­
ment actions against cheaters. It is estimated that the trading program saved sev­
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SO2 trading 
Title IV of the U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 instituted emissions and 
trading programs for sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions by fossil-fuel electric gener­
ating plants, which are the major source of acid rain. The program will reduce SO2 
emissions by 50% over a ten-year period. The way the program works is that the 
government issues allowances, each entitling the holder to emit one ton of SO2, to  
existing plants based on their energy input. Allowances are issued annually and 
may be used in the year of issuance or banked for use in subsequent years. The 
number of allowances is being reduced over time on a fixed statutory schedule in 
order to achieve the targeted 50% reduction. Plants must install continuous emis­
sions monitors. Plants whose emissions exceed the allowances that they hold pay 
a $2000 penalty per ton and forfeit the corresponding number of tons the fol­
lowing year. Allowances are fully transferable. The  has successfully instituted 
an allowance tracking system to register trades and accounts on current allowance 
holdings. 
A substantial market has developed in the allowances, including a Chicago 
Board of Trade futures market in the allowances that plants will receive in future 
years.4 Because many electric generating companies in the United States own a 
substantial number of plants, much trading has also been carried out internally 
among such plants rather than through open market sales. As of June 1997 nearly 
2,700 transfers of allowances had occurred, involving 42.4 million allowances. 
In addition to promoting a more cost-e›ective allocation of control burdens 
among plants, the flexibility a›orded by trading has enabled plants to take advan­
tage of a variety of emissions reduction methods including the use of low-sulfur 
coal and the dispatch of generation demands to low-emitting facilities. Customer 
energy conservation programs have also been implemented. These measures are 
often far less expensive than the uniform use of a single “end of pipe” flue gas 
desulphurization technology that would have been mandated under a command 
regulatory approach. 
The SO2 trading program is deservedly considered an enormous success. The 
program is ahead of schedule and running at far below the costs of a command 
system. As of 1996, emissions were more than 30% below the reduction schedule 
target. Control costs are less than 50% of the command regulatory alternative, 
resulting in more than $5 billion in savings thus far; savings are projected to 
increase even more in the future. A strong monitoring and enforcement program 
has ensured 100% compliance by sources with quota limitations. Like the lead 
trading program, the SO2 trading program has produced both environmental and 
economic benefits. The use of emissions trading to address acid rain broke a 13­
year political stalemate over dealing with the problem and enabled agreement to 
be reached on the ambitious 50% reduction target. 
Other U.S. emissions trading programs that have introduced beneficial flexi­
bility in pollution control including the following: 
reclaim 
The  program uses a quota trading system to reduce emissions of nitro­
gen oxides and sulfur dioxide in the heavily polluted Los Angeles Basin. The 
 program was adopted with the support of regulators, environmental 
groups, and industry, all of which concluded that traditional command regulation 
had reached its limits in dealing with the pollution problems of Los Angeles. 
4 The futures market, along
with the banking feature, cre­
ates significant inter-temporal
flexibility. A plant that reduces
its emissions faster than the 
schedule can bank its extra 
allowances for its own future 
use or sell the extra allowances 
to others for present or future
use. A plant that plans to make
its reduction investments later 
and accordingly has excess
emissions in the near term can 
buy surplus allowances from
others for the current year or
can buy allowances for use in
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5 The reclaim Program
restricts trading among differ­
ent zones in the Los Angeles air
quality region in order to pre­
vent increased concentrations 
of pollution in a given locality. 
Under , allowances are issued to existing sources based on the amount 
that they are permitted to emit under current regulatory requirements. The 
allowances’ emissions value is reduced over time. There have been a substantial 
number of trades. The program is expected to save hundreds of millions of dol­
lars compared to the command alternative. 
Ozone depleting chemicals 
The United States has successfully initiated an emission trading system to provide 
firms with flexibility in the phase-out of chlorofluorocarbons () and other 
ozone-depleting substances as required by the Montreal Protocol and subsequent 
international agreements. Because the number of producers is small, the number 
of trades has been limited, but it appears that the program has yielded apprecia­
ble cost savings and provided firms with beneficial flexibility in complying with 
the phase out schedule. 
epa emissions credit trading programs 
The  has introduced several emissions credit trading systems to provide a 
degree of flexibility within the command regulatory system for air pollution con­
trol. The Clean Air Act prohibits new sources of air pollution from locating in pol­
luted regions unless compensating reductions are achieved from existing sources; 
under the ’ o›set program, new sources can contract with existing sources to 
reduce their emissions and provide o›set credits to the new sources. Under the 
“netting program,”an existing source may add a new unit that generates emissions 
and achieve compensatory reductions in emissions from existing units without 
triggering new regulatory controls. Under the “bubble” program, an existing 
source within a given facility can reduce its emissions below the level required by 
current regulations and transfer the emissions credit to another source within the 
same facility or a di›erent facility, enabling it to increase its emissions. 
The netting program, which involves a form in internal trading, has been 
widely used and has resulted in many hundreds of millions of dollars of cost sav­
ings without impairing air quality. The other programs have been less successful. 
There have been very few o›set trades, and bubble trades have been limited. A 
major reason for this modest performance is that the  requires advance regu­
latory approval of each trade, creating delay, uncertainty, and high transaction 
costs. In addition, there are restrictions on trades to ensure that there is no wors­
ening of air quality in any location even though air quality standards would not 
be violated. By contrast, the lead, SO2, and ozone depleting substances trading sys­
tems do not require advance regulatory approval and impose no restrictions on 
trades.5 They establish a uniform, homogenous commodity in the form of credits 
or allowances, promoting the development of trading markets and attendant cost 
savings. 
The lessons learned 
The formulation process for international market-based mechanisms for limiting 
net  emissions can and should benefit from the U.S. domestic experience. 
U.S. experiences demonstrate that emissions trading systems for di›use pollu­
tants can work e›ectively to protect the environment, provide needed flexibility in 
the means of control, and achieve significant cost savings if such systems are prop­
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mental in securing agreements on more ambitious environmental protection and 
control objectives than would be possible under a command system. Further, this 
experience shows that a quota or credit trading system should be designed so as to 
minimize transaction costs and facilitate trading by making the commodity 
traded homogeneous, and eliminating or minimizing the need for advance gov­
ernment approval of trades. U.S. programs have illustrated that it is feasible - at 
least at the national level - to design and implement such systems without signif­
icant additional administrative expenditure over a command system. These expe­
riences also demonstrate the necessity of establishing a strong system of monitor­
ing and enforcement to ensure the integrity of the market and the achievement of 
environmental protection objectives. 
How can emissions trading systems be used to limit net greenhouse gas emissions? 
Emissions trading systems are well suited to deal with the challenge of limiting net 
 emissions.6  are globally mixed throughout the atmosphere, eliminat­
ing any problem of local pollution “hot spots.”Accordingly, it is irrelevant from an 
ecological perspective whereon the globe limitations on net emissions are 
achieved. Also, the cost savings from using emissions trading to combat climate 6 See United Nations Confer­
ence on Trade and Develop-change are enormous. There are many di›erent types of facilities and activities 
ment, International Rules for 
that generate . Di›erences in the current state of capital plant and technol- Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
ogy, economic structure, geographical and ecological factors, the stage of devel- Trading (1999). 
opment, and available substitutes create very large di›erences in the costs of con­
trolling net  emissions among di›erent economic sectors and di›erent 
nations. Opportunities for activities to sequester  cost-e›ectively also vary 
widely. The potential costs of limiting net  emissions are huge, running to tens 
The formulation process for international market-based mechanisms for limit­
ing net  emissions can and should benefit from the U.S. domestic experience. 
U.S. experiences demonstrate that emissions trading systems for di›use pollu­
tants can work e›ectively to protect the environment, provide needed flexibility 
in the means of control, and achieve significant cost savings if such systems are 
properly designed and enforced. 
of trillions of dollars over coming decades. It is therefore extraordinarily impor­
tant that limitations be achieved in the most cost-e›ective fashion, provided that 
such limitations are also equitable and enforceable. Reducing the costs of achiev­
ing limitations can promote the likelihood of successful international agreement 
on and implementation of limitations measures. 
Emissions trading systems can further these objectives by capitalizing on 
di›erences in the costs of limiting emissions or enhancing sinks in di›erent sec­
tors and nations, and steering investments to the lowest cost -reducing 
opportunities. For example, insisting that each Annex I country undertake steps 
to limit emissions in order to meet its Protocol obligations entirely through inter­
nal limitations is a form of command regulation that treats each nation as a dis­
crete source and imposes a fixed quantitative limitation on its emissions. The flex­
ibility a›orded by international trading could greatly reduce costs by allowing 
some emissions limitations activities to be shifted from countries with high con­
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7 See William D. Nordhaus and 
Joseph B. Goyer, Requiem for
Kyoto: An Economic Analysis of
the Kyoto Protocol (1998) (esti­
mating that while the abate­
ment costs of the Kyoto ghg
reductions would be approxi­
mately us$276 billion annually
under a scenario that allowed 
global tradable emissions,
abatement costs in the absence 
of trading would be us$1,971 
billion). 
8 Article 12(a) provides that
participation in the cdm , 
including acquisition of cers , 
“may involve private and/or
public entities.” Annex I coun­
tries, in adopting domestic reg­
ulatory systems to achieve their
emissions limitations targets
under the Protocol, would give
credits to domestic non-gov­
ernmental entities that partici­
pate in trading credit against
their domestic regulatory oblig­
ations for emissions reductions 
achieved by reductions in other
countries that they finance,
thereby providing the necessary
incentive for private investment
in emissions reductions in such 
countries. 
finance, through the trading system, the additional controls in the low cost coun­
tries. Use of trading could reduce the costs of achieving the Kyoto Protocol emis­
sion limitations by 80% or more compared to systems without trading, generat­
ing trillions of dollars of savings.7 Overall targets would be met. In order to achieve 
these cost savings, governments should not be solely responsible for identifying 
and realizing the best and lowest cost emissions limitation opportunities. Private 
sector capital, technology and business experience is necessary for the efficiency 
and e›ectiveness of such a trading system. This can be achieved by allowing busi­
ness firms and other legal entities to participate in trading, subject to internation­
ally agreed standards and procedures, as specifically envisaged by the  provi­
sions of the Protocol.8 
The development of an emissions trading system among Annex I countries, as 
provided by Article 17 of the Protocol, would generate large cost savings. These 
savings would help to ensure that the Annex I countries meet their emissions lim­
itation obligations under the Protocol and facilitate further agreements on reduc­
tions following the first commitment period. Furthermore, as recognized in Arti­
cle 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, there are powerful reasons to include developing 
countries, which are not subject to emissions limitations obligations, in a  
trading program with Annex I countries that would allow industrialized countries 
to meet a portion of their emissions limitation obligations by investing in devel­
oping country projects to limit emissions or enhance sinks. It should be empha­
sized that any participation in  trading is entirely voluntary on the part of a 
developing country. There are four important benefits that the  trading 
system would provide for developing countries: 
•	 First,  trading could channel potentially large amounts of capital and tech­
nology to developing countries to enable them to modernize plant and equip­
ment and develop economically. In this regard, the participation of private 
entities in a trading and investment program, as specifically provided for in 
Article 12 of the Protocol, would be essential. The private sector is currently 
responsible for over 85% of external direct investment in developing countries. 
The amount of bilateral and multilateral assistance from developed to devel­
oping countries is limited and cannot be expected to increase significantly in 
the near future. Tapping large amounts of new and additional private sector 
investment through a  trading system would be a major contribution to 
economic modernization and growth in developing countries. 
•	 Second, trading projects in developing countries that limit  emissions 
could provide social as well as environmental benefits. For example, projects to 
enhance energy efficiency or switch to cleaner fuels will reduce emissions of 
sulfur dioxide, particulates, and nitrogen oxides, providing significant health 
benefits to local populations. 
•	 Third, providing for voluntary participation by developing countries in a 
trading system with the Annex I countries would generate large additional 
cost savings over and above those that could be achieved by an arrangement 
that allowed trading only among Annex I counties. Many developing coun­
tries lack modern technology and use energy inefficiently. As a result, large 
emissions limitations can often be achieved at a lower cost by investment in 
modernization and new technology in developing countries rather than by 
imposing additional controls on sources in industrialized countries. There are 
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oping countries than among the Annex I countries themselves.  trading 
will further reduce the costs of meeting emissions limitation obligations for 
the Annex I countries and thereby make it more likely that these countries will 
be able to meet their existing obligations. In addition it will increase the prob­
ability that Annex I countries will agree to additional and more demanding 
emissions limitations obligations in the future. Thus,  trading could help 
achieve greater limitations on  emissions, to the particular benefit of 
developing countries, which are especially vulnerable to the adverse e›ects of 
climate change.9 
•	 Fourth,  emission reduction credits against the Annex I countries’ emis­
sions limitations obligations during the first commitment period can be 
earned by Annex I countries beginning in the year 2000. This feature will pro­
vide incentives for early investments by Annex I countries in  emissions 
reductions through the , e›ectively producing additional economic and 
environmental benefits for developing countries, and possibly enabling further 
reductions. 
How would an emissions trading system among Annex I countries work? 
Some basic legal and institutional arrangements are necessary for establishing a 
system for trading emissions allowances among Annex I Parties. Such a system 
could be established to become operational during the first commitment period, 
from 2008 to 2012, as authorized by Article 17 of the Protocol.10 Alternatively, it 
could be instituted in the period prior to 2008 by a voluntary “early action” agree­
ment among those Annex I countries that chose to participate, on terms consis­
tent with the Convention and Protocol. Annex I countries participating in such 
systems would be subject to national caps on their emissions. In a trading system 
established under Article 17 of the Convention, the caps would be those set by the 
emissions limitation obligations imposed by the Protocol. In the case of a volun­
tary pre-2008 early action trading system, they would be established by the vol­
untary agreement of the participating countries. 
Under an allowance trading system, each participating country would be allo­
cated allowances (net emissions quotas) equal to its agreed-upon net  emis­
sions cap. Allowances would be expressed in tons of CO2 or the equivalent.
11 
Allowances could then be freely bought and sold. Allowances could be issued on 
an annual basis, as under the U.S. sulfur trading program, for use in the year of 
issuance or a subsequent year. Inter-temporal flexibility could be achieved by 
authorizing banking of unused allowances for future use and providing for a 
futures market to allow borrowing against allowances to be issued or made avail­
able on the market in the future. Alternatively, allowances could be issued on a 
multi-year basis and used in any year during the period. The latter is e›ectively the 
approach taken by the Protocol for the first commitment period. 
Parties to such a trading system would commit to ensuring that their net emis­
sions for any given accounting period did not exceed their agreed-on cap for that 
period, plus any allowances obtained from others, minus any allowances trans­
ferred to others. Parties would enjoy the flexibility of determining how they would 
choose to implement this commitment. Many Parties might choose to establish 
domestic systems of trading in allowances or emission reduction credits. These 
domestic trading systems would feed into the international trading system 
through trades between private entities in di›erent countries, and facilitate devel­
9 Concern has been voiced 
that participating in trading
will be to the long-term disad­
vantage of developing countries
because the Annex I countries 
will invest in the lowest cost 
emissions limitations projects ­
the “low hanging fruit” -leaving
only higher costs projects avail­
able if and when developing
countries assume emissions 
limitations obligations. The fac­
tual basis for this concern is 
quite doubtful. Most develop­
ing countries are making major
investments in energy genera­
tion and distribution and other 
industrial and service infra­
structure. These investments 
are being made now and the
capital invested will be in place
for many years. These invest­
ments present opportunities
for emissions limitations that 
ought not to be postponed for
the future. If, however, a partic­
ular developing country
nonetheless concludes that 
participation in CDM trading is
not in its interest, it can simply
decline to do so. 
10 This section is based on a 
monograph prepared for
unctad , R. Stewart, Jonathan B. 
Wiener and Philippe Sands,
Legal Issues Presented by a Pilot
International Greenhouse Gas 
Trading System, unctad 1996. 
11 The relevant agreement
would establish a system for
indexing emissions of different
gases and sequestration pro­
jects in terms of CO2 equiva­
lents. Initially some sectors,
gases, or sinks might not be
included in the system at all
because of severe monitoring
and verification uncertainties 
or difficulties, although these
should be overcome in time. 
See Richard B. Stewart and 
Jonathan Wiener,“The Compre­
hensive Approach to Global Cli­
mate Policy: Issues of Design
and Practicality,” 9 Arizona Jour­
nal of International and Comp.
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opment of a “thick” international trading market with many participants. Alter­
natively, Parties might choose to employ command regulations, emission taxes, or 
other measures to limit net domestic emissions in at least some sectors. These 
strategies could involve the issuance of tradable emission reduction credits to 
domestic entities that reduced emissions below the levels required by command 
regulation. 
Parties participating in an international trading system would be required to: 
•	 Monitor and report their net emissions to international authorities in accor­
dance with agreed-upon procedures and protocols and submit to specified 
inspection and monitoring activities by such authorities; 
•	 Participate in and honor a system of accounting by international authorities of 
holdings and trades of emissions allowances; 
•	 Respect free trade in allowances and refrain from expropriating them, while 
adopting appropriate domestic legislation in order to implement the interna­
tional trading system; and 
•	 Participate in and abide by the outcome of dispute settlement procedures 
established by the agreement. 
International entities, established pursuant to the  and Protocol or a pre­
2008 agreement, would have to carry out three essential functions to ensure the 
successful working of a trading system. 
•	 First, an international authority would have to establish basic procedures and 
rules for registering and trading allowances or credits, and keep accounts of 
trades and current holdings. It is thought that trades would not actually be car­
ried out through such an entity, but by one or more exchanges and through 
non-exchange transactions in accordance with trading regulations that it 
establishes. 
•	 Second, the same or a di›erent international authority would establish and 
oversee monitoring and verification of the Parties’ net emissions. It would estab­
lish procedures and protocols for reports by parties of their net emissions for 
each accounting period. The authority or other public or private authorized 
entities would receive and review these reports; engage in independent moni­
toring and inspection activities as authorized by the agreement; and certify each 
Party’s net emissions for each accounting period at the close of that period. 
•	 Third, an international authority would have to establish a system for resolv­
ing disputes regarding the trading system, including issues regarding parties’ 
compliance, and institute sanctions or other remedies for non-compliance. 
Parties would be responsible for ensuring compliance by their domestic 
sources with measures so as to limit each Party’s net emissions within its agreed-
upon cap. Parties that failed to meet this obligation, and that failed to buy 
allowances in the trading market to cover their emissions deficit, would be certi­
fied as non-compliant by the relevant international authority at the close of the 
accounting period and would be subject to liabilities and sanctions. A sanction 
that could be automatically imposed for deficits would be to reduce the Party’s 
allowed emissions in the next budget period by an amount at least equal to its 
deficit in the prior budget period, similar to the U.S. sulfur trading system. Addi­
tional sanctions, including fines and exclusions from the trading system, could be 
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If these measures assured high levels of compliance by Parties selling 
allowances, it would be appropriate to provide that sold allowances would remain 
valid in cases of occasional or temporary non-compliance by sellers. In this case, 
buyers of allowances would be fully protected. This approach would reduce 
investor risk and thereby promote trading. This is the approach of the most suc­
cessful U.S. emissions trading programs. It has been argued, however, that inter­
national institutions may be too weak to enforce seller liability in the international 
context. If so, liability might be imposed on allowance buyers. This could be 
accomplished by, for example, discounting the value of their allowances pro rata 
by the percentage of non-compliance by the seller. There have also been propos­
als for shared buyer-seller liability. 
In order to ensure a well-functioning market, one must address the potential 
problem of market power. Monopolization or other attempts to restrain trade in 
allowances can best be prevented by ensuring the widest possible market with 
many buyers and sellers, including large numbers of private entities. Any remain­
ing problems of market power might be adequately addressed by domestic or .. 
competition law, although thought might be given to developing a form of inter­
national competition policy for trading pursuant to the international agreement 
establishing the trading system. 
How would emissions trading work under the cdm? 
Article 12 of the Protocol provides for a trading system between developed and 
developing countries. It provides that certified emission reduction credits 
obtained from  projects in developing countries during the period from 2000 
to the first commitment period 2008-2012 can be used to meet Annex I countries’ 
obligations during that period. Thus, Article 12 designates the  as an “early 
action mechanism” that will provide inducements for investments in developing 
countries and environmental benefits beginning in 2000. Operationalizing the 
 is, however, a complex task both politically and administratively. It involves 
a number of circumstances and considerations that are di›erent from those in a 
trading system among Annex I countries. It will, of course, be necessary to estab­
lish a structure for governance of the  that will safeguard the interests of the 
participating Parties, especially developing country Parties. Under Article 12.4, the 
 is to be “subject to the authority and guidance” of the Conference of the Par­
ties () to the  and the Meeting of Parties () to the Protocol, and is to 
be “supervised” by an Executive Board. It must again also be emphasized that par­
ticipation in the  is entirely voluntary. 
Developing country parties, unlike Annex I countries, are not subject to emis­
sions limitation obligations. This means that the  trading system cannot be 
based on tradable emissions allowances or quotas. Instead, credits must be 
awarded for emissions reductions achieved by specific projects. This is the system 
established by Article 12.5 of the Protocol, which requires the / to desig­
nate “operational entities” to authenticate Certified Emission Reductions () 
for projects in developing countries financed by Annex I Parties and their private 
entities. In order to be certified, projects must provide emissions reductions that 
are additional to any that would occur in the absence of the project and that pro­
vide “[r]eal, measurable and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of cli­
mate change.”In addition, under Article 12.7, the / must provide for inde­
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procedures with the objective of ensuring transparency, efficiency, and account­
ability,” to ensure that  are valid. There must also be bookkeeping arrange­
ments to track  holdings and trades. The system for certifying and recogniz­
ing  should be designed to maximize their fungibility in order to provide for 
the widest possible trading market. 
Active discussions are currently in progress, through the Convention’s Sub­
sidiary Body for Implementation and meetings of the /, on the detailed 
design of the  and the criteria and procedures for determining project eligi­
bility and certification of credits. It must be emphasized that the  is not a 
single organization. Rather, it is a legal and institutional system that includes a 
variety of entities, including Parties, the Executive Board, and a variety of inter­
national institutions and non-governmental entities. The role and relations 
among these various entities will have to be further defined. It also includes rules, 
standards, and procedures linking these components together in fulfillment of the 
’ objectives, as set forth in Article 12.2 of the Protocol: to assist developing 
countries in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the ulti­
mate objective of the Convention and to assist Annex I parties meeting their emis­
sions limitation obligations. With regard to the latter, Protocol Article 12.3(b) pro­
vides that Annex I Parties may use  to “contribute to compliance with part of 
their” Protocol emissions limitations requirements. Thus, an issue that must be 
addressed by the / is whether to impose any limitations on such use of 
 and, if so, how any such limitations should be defined. 
A central purpose of the  is to mobilize private capital to help fund projects 
in developing countries that will promote sustainable development and help miti­
gate climate change. Article 12.9 of the Protocol explicitly mentions the participa­
tion of private entities in the . Thus, the ’ operational modalities and cri­
teria must harmonize environmental and economic considerations. The 
environmental integrity of  projects and of the  that they earn must be 
assured.At the same time, investors require clarity and consistency of rules through 
a  framework with maximum transparency and minimum subjectivity. 
Additionally, it will be necessary to provide assistance to developing countries 
for building analytical, legal, and institutional capacity to participate e›ectively in 
 trading. Such assistance might be appropriately provided by entities such as 
the World Bank, the regional development banks, and the  Commission on 
Trade and Development (). There is a danger that without such capacity 
building, the  could simply replicate forms of development capitalism that 
are considered exploitive by observers in many developing countries. Capacity 
building, in its broadest sense, should involve a concerted campaign of informa­
tion dissemination about current project finance tools for local developers and 
financiers and government officials involved in the  process. It will be essen­
tial to build host country capacity to understand the  and negotiate project 
terms, including the allocation of . This could be done through multilateral 
and/or bilateral funding, by developing standard project contracts for guidance, 
and by initiating regional pilot projects and support capacities. 
An important set of issues relates to the criteria that a project must satisfy in 
order to be eligible to earn . It is intended that there will be a process for regis­
tration of projects upon a determination of  authorities that they meet criteria 
of eligibility. Under Protocol Article 12.5, undertakings must secure “[r]eal, measur­
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“additional to any that would occur in the absence of the certified project activity.” 
Active discussions are underway on operationalizing these criteria. It is widely 
agreed that financial investments in  projects must, in order to earn , be  
additional to official development assistance, global environmental funds, and 
existing Annex I Party commitments to developing countries. Also, as noted above, 
a basic purpose of the  is to assist developing countries in achieving sustainable 
development. This raises the issue of what criteria of sustainability projects must 
satisfy, and whether project sustainability determinations should be made solely by 
the host countries in which projects are located, or whether international  
authorities should also have some role. In any event, the host country must, in all 
cases, approve a project in order for it to qualify under the . 
Protocol Article 12.8 provides that a share of the proceeds from certified pro­
ject activities is to be used to cover the ’ administrative expenses as well as 
to assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse 
e›ects of climate change to meet the costs of adoption. Measures must be taken to 
operationalize these provisions. 
Certification of Emission Reduction Credits 
In order to determine a project’s , one must first determine the extent of the 
emissions or sequestration services that a project will generate. A certifying 
authority must also establish a baseline that defines the level of net emissions that 
would have occurred had the project not been implemented. The di›erence 
between the baseline and the net emissions generated by the project determines 
the amount of the credit. The determination of both a project’s net emissions and 
its baseline present difficulties. This, in turn, raises the question of when, how and 
by whom  should be determined. 
One approach is to certify a project’s credits in advance (ex ante certification) 
based on its expected net emissions. In many instances, however, projects will be 
designed to operate over many years, requiring a degree of predictive uncertainty 
and a risk of future project failure. The ex ante certification system is based on the 
certification of a stream of future credits over a period of years, the amount of 
which is derived from best possible predictions. If a project fails to generate the 
anticipated credits, then liability would be imposed on the project sponsor, the 
buyers of credits, or both. Another approach is to certify credits only after the pro­
ject is operational, based on its actual emissions performance (ex post certifica­
tion). Under this approach,  would be issued periodically during the life of 
the project at the end of each of a series of accounting periods, such as every one 
to two years. The advantage of ex ante certification is that it reduces investor risk 
and facilitates securitization of the credits expected to be earned by a project over 
its lifespan, whereby financial intermediaries could capitalize the value of the life­
time stream of project credits and provide the capital to the project sponsor to 
cover the initial investment costs. The disadvantage of ex ante certification is that 
it creates environmental risk and complications in sorting out liabilities when pro­
ject performance falls below predictions. There is a growing consensus in favor of 
ex post certification. It is believed that if a baseline can be established at the outset 
of the project, investor risk will be sufficiently reduced to allow securitization of 
the  that a project is expected to earn over its operating life. 
Establishing the baseline for a project, however, is a complex, and often-con­
troversial undertaking.12 Consider, as examples: 
12 Case-by-case determination
of baselines is one of the prob­
lems that have been encoun­
tered by Joint Implementation
(ji) projects and Activities
Implemented Jointly (aij) pro­
jects involving investments by
one country or its private enti­
ties in another country to
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•	 A project to switch an electricity generating plant from coal to natural gas ­
would the switch have occurred anyway, because mandated by domestic envi­
ronmental regulations? 
•	 An investment in a more efficient electricity distribution system - would the 
system have been upgraded anyway purely for economic reasons? 
•	 A project to preserve a forest slated for cutting - will the cutting simply be 
shifted to another forest that would not otherwise be cut? 
The last example exemplifies the problem of “leakage,” in which a project con­
sidered in isolation reduces net  emissions but indirectly causes increases in 
other locations and sectors. It would be highly desirable to develop, insofar as 
practicable and appropriate, generic rules of thumb to resolve these baseline 
issues. This could be accomplished by developing international benchmarks 
rather than attempting to determine baselines on a project-by-project basis, 
which would elevate administrative costs and uncertainty. For example, an inter­
national benchmark could specify a given level of energy efficiency that would 
normally be achieved in a given type of new project, such as an electricity distri­
bution system in developing countries at a given level of development. This 
benchmark would then establish the baseline to determine the extent to which a 
 project that creates a more efficient electricity distribution system would 
reduce  emissions. 
The design of the cdm’s investment functions 
A key issue in the implementation of the  is the design of its investment func­
tion. Protocol Article 12.6 provides that the  shall “assist in arranging funding 
of certified project activity as necessary,” but does not specify how this function is 
to be discharged. A variety of potential approaches have been discussed. 
The centralized fund model 
Under a centralized fund model, the  would constitute the sole or primary 
source of investments in  projects in developing countries. It would review, 
evaluate, and select projects proposed by developing countries for funding. Pro­
jects could be developed directly by a developing country, or by private entities 
with the approval of the host developing country. Investment funds for projects 
would be contributed to the fund by Annex I governments or by private entities 
seeking credits against their international or domestic obligations. Instead of 
approaching host countries directly, investors would buy  from the  
itself, thus channeling moneys to host countries that have submitted individual 
projects or “bundles” of projects to the  for approval and certification of cred­
its. The Parties participating in the , particularly Annex I Parties, would pre­
sumably have to provide an initial capital contribution, but thereafter financial 
contributions to the  would consist primarily of the receipts from  sold 
to Annex I private entities. Most of these receipts would channel back to the devel­
oping countries and local project sponsors providing the . This model would 
require that the  have a substantial institutional infrastructure to carry out a 
wide variety of functions, including: 
•	 project identification and selection; 
•	 marketing of project investments; and 
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A central investment entity could, in theory, enjoy advantages through special­
ization and the ability to realize scale economies. It could develop the capacity and 
experience to assess and select worthwhile projects. It could diversify risk for 
investors by spreading investments across a portfolio of projects. The fund approach 
would also “shield” host countries from direct “buying” and “selling” of . It  
could help to meet developing country concerns over their ability to control invest­
ment flows and their impacts on their countries. It would also meet equity concerns 
by channeling funds to those developing countries who might be comparatively 
unsuccessful in attracting investment through a market-based system. This 
approach could also create the potential for a secondary market in certified credits. 
The centralized fund model also has a number of significant disadvantages: 
•	 Its reliance on a single centralized bureaucracy operating in a somewhat polit­
ical setting is likely to produce significant inefficiencies. Such an organization 
would face difficulties in generating accurate and timely information about the 
costs and risks of various investment alternatives. 
•	 It would also have problems providing appropriate incentives for the fund’s 
administrators to adopt measures that will achieve  reductions at least cost. 
•	 A single funding and investment entity would be a  monopoly, to the 
potential disadvantage both of investors and project sponsors. 
•	 The  would have a financial stake in both the success of its projects and the 
continuing value of . This would create a troubling conflict of interest. 
These factors could significantly inhibit the influx of additional private invest­
ment into developing countries through the . 
The decentralized transactions model 
Under this model, the  would define basic ground rules for the creation of 
credits and credit trading. In contrast to the fund model, however, the selection 
and financing of  projects and the resolution of issues concerning the allo­
cation of project benefits and risks would be accomplished through negotiation 
and agreement among the Parties and the non-government entities involved in 
particular projects. Under this approach, the  would be designed to ensure 
that investor and host countries (and their respective private sectors) are given the 
maximum amount of choice to select and finance  projects. Financial trans­
actions and  sharing would be determined flexibly, project by project, with 
minimal interference from a centralized international bureaucracy. 
Under this model, the  authorities would be responsible for establishing 
the basic criteria and procedures for approving projects as qualified for  and 
certifying the credits that they generate. The  authorities would also strive to 
anticipate the needs of buyers and sellers (including host countries) and provide 
services to facilitate trade between them and reduce transaction costs. They could 
do this in a variety of ways, including: 
•	 organizing a web project “bazaar” or electronic bulletin board for  project 
opportunities and investor interests; 
•	 publishing details of projects for dissemination, etc.; and/or 
•	 trying to match donors with suitable projects and vice versa. 
Using these means, the  authorities would seek to meet the provisions of 
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fied project activities as necessary.” The  would also require an independent 
certification, monitoring, and verification process to generate environmental 
integrity and business confidence in the system. If successful, this approach could 
generate vigorous primary and secondary trading markets in  and promote 
efficiency and cost-e›ectiveness. 
There are, however, a number of potential disadvantages to the decentralized 
transactions approach: 
•	 The / and  Executive Board would remain in charge of the over­
all design and implementation of a decentralized system. Despite this, this 
system might fail to provide sufficient governmental control over investment 
decisions to meet the concerns of some developing country Parties, including 
those who fear that a decentralized approach would not ensure that they would 
receive sufficient  investments. 
•	 This model would also have to overcome the problems that have plagued Joint 
Implementation () and Activities Implemented Jointly () projects. These 
projects have been quite limited because no credit could be obtained for pro­
ject emissions reductions against international emission limitation obliga­
tions. The Protocol resolves this problem by providing credit for  against 
Annex I Parties’ obligations. However, the  would still have to address the 
high transactions costs involved in a decentralized process of identifying pro­
jects, identifying and bringing together investors, project sponsors, and host 
countries, and negotiating project agreements. In the / experience, these 
transaction costs have often equaled or exceeded the cost of the project itself. It 
remains to be seen the extent to which these costs can be reduced under the 
 by establishing central or regional clearinghouses and electronic bulletin 
boards to reduce investor-host search costs, and by taking steps to promote a 
primary market in . 
The unilateral host country model 
Under a unilateral model, the host country would both develop and invest in a 
project and hold the sole or predominant equity interest. This arrangement would 
allow a developing country to identify and invest in a project in its own country 
and then sell or bank the  that the project generates. This model could pro­
mote host country autonomy and financial reward. It would also maximize host 
country control over projects and assurance that projects would meet the host 
country’s sustainable development goals. On the other hand, the Unilateral Model 
requires considerable host country project development and financial capacities, 
as well as ready availability of extensive private sector debt financing. At present, 
many developing countries may be unable to meet these requirements. 
The mutual funds model 
Another model would rely on a system of mutual funds. The  authorities would 
provide for and encourage participation of a substantial number of financial inter­
mediaries, established by multilateral development banks, host countries, non­
governmental organizations (), and private firms. An example of such a 
mutual fund is the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund, which is designed to pool 
private and public capital for investments in  projects. Under this approach, a 
variety of international, governmental, and non-governmental entities would pro­
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vate sector entities could invest. As such, it would provide economies of scale, 
reduced transactions costs, and diversification of risk for investors, like the fund 
model. However, unlike the single Fund model, the Mutual Funds Model would 
allow many di›erent governments, organizations, and entities to o›er such funds. 
The  would not o›er mutual funds itself, but would be limited to promoting 
their development by others and ensuring the integrity of the credits o›ered. 
This approach would eliminate the conflict of interest problem and signifi­
cantly reduce the market power dangers inherent in the model of a single fund 
o›ered by the  itself. However, there are questions as to whether, at least ini­
tially, the demand and supply for  would be sufficient to support a system of 
multiple mutual funds. In addition, there would be a need to address developing 
country Party concerns by ensuring that there would be sufficient governmental 
control over the local impacts of investment and financial decisions. This concern 
might be met by assuring the regional development banks a substantial role in the 
mutual funds approach, while allowing host countries and private entities that 
wished to o›er funds independently to do so. 
Mixed approaches 
A variety of other mixed or intermediate approaches that combine elements of the 
various models outlined above. The  could seek to promote a variety of 
investment approaches simultaneously. For example, it could o›er its own mutual 
fund while encouraging the development of similar mutual funds by others. It 
could also provide support for decentralized project-by-project transactions 
between investors and hosts while promoting the development of mutual funds 
for some of these transactions. Host countries could o›er  from projects that 
they undertake to the international investor community through mutual funds as 
well as on an individual project basis. The  should, in any event, provide a 
substantial role for market-based approaches in order to mobilize private capital 
into  project investments on a large scale. Also, the investment functions of 
the  should be designed so as to attract investments in  projects from the 
widest possible array of commercial and concessionary funding sources.  
project capital can potentially be provided by a wide variety of sources, not exclu­
sively  emitters. Rules and guidelines for the  should accommodate this 
flexibility, especially if it is to attract domestic investments in host countries and 
encourage the use of concessionary multilateral funds as well as international pri­
vate capital to meet the sustainable development objectives of the . 
Equity issues 
An important question related to equity is the extent to which an unfettered cap­
ital market will prioritize financial flows to  countries, sectors, or markets that 
are regarded as high risk or otherwise less attractive from a purely market invest­
ment perspective. To maximize participation of developing countries, interna­
tional and domestic policy guidance must explicitly recognize that developing 
country motivation for the  is to increase capital and technology flows into 
sectors that implement their development priorities. One solution is capacity 
building. But other measures may well be needed. Current discussions in the Sub­
sidiary Body for Implementation have emphasized the need for modalities and 
procedures for project eligibility that will ensure that  investments take place 
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There has been discussion of a  Equitable Distribution Fund, funded by the 
industrialized countries, to provide needed finances for  projects, taking into 
account the geographic distribution of existing and planned  projects and the 
comparative need of regions and countries to receive assistance in achieving sus­
tainable development. It has also been suggested that in some cases there will be a 
need for public sector finance from sources such as the Global Environmental 
Facility (), the World Bank, or the International Finance Corporation (IFC), 
to catalyze projects, particularly those in countries with poor institutional capac­
ity or high-risk ratings. Using concessionary finance also provides an additional 
mechanism by which a host country could direct investment flows, by selecting 
multilateral funding for projects deemed within economic or sustainable devel­
opment objectives. Another equity issue is whether the  should have a role in 
determining how the  generated by a project should be shared among 
investors, project sponsors, and host governments. 
Other functions of the cdm 
The design of the ’ investment function will have important implications 
for the Executive Board regarding size, organizational structure, and Board 
member qualifications. In any event, the Board should be small enough so that it 
can carry out its managerial and other functions efficiently. It should also be sub­
ject to the authority and guidance of the /. In addition, the  will have 
to arrange for a number of key functions to be executed, however its investment 
function is structured. 
•	 First, it will have to provide for “operational entities” for certification of net 
emissions reductions achieved by projects. If, as it is hoped, there is a large 
number of projects, it would be impractical for the  itself or some subor­
dinate entity to certify all projects centrally. Certification would be more 
appropriately implemented by host countries or private entities under proce­
dures and criteria established by the , using a process that is subject to 
appropriate review and supervision. 
•	 Second, the  will have to provide for monitoring of a project’s emission or 
sequestration services and reporting of the monitoring results. In the first 
instance, monitoring will be appropriately carried out by the project sponsor. 
The results could be reported to the same entities responsible for certification 
of , such as host country governments or designated private entities. The 
procedures and requirements for monitoring would be established by or under 
the direction of the Executive Board. 
•	 Third, in order to ensure that monitoring is accurate and that projects actually 
generate the credits that have been certified, a verification system would have 
to be established for . Under Article 12.7, verification must be carried out 
by an entity independent of those engaged in certifying a project’s credits. Such 
entities could include international organizations, private entities, and . 
They would follow procedures and criteria established by the , and would 
also report to the . 
•	 Fourth, the  would have to arrange for a system for recording the issuance 
of  and keeping account of  holdings and transfers. 
•	 Fifth, independent entities, such as private accounting firms, would have to 
audit  accounts. 
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ensure that they are used to their fullest potential and that they facilitate  
investments. There should also be arrangements for providing insurance 
against project failure for project sponsors, credit buyers, or holders who desire 
it. These tasks would likely best be carried out by the private sector. 
In order to stimulate  investment, the  must ensure accurate certifi­
cation, verification, and auditing in order to maintain the integrity of . These 
functions, carried out in a uniform, consistent fashion, would ensure the homo­
geneity and fungibility of  from di›erent projects and host countries. Inso­
far as feasible, the  system should also be designed to be compatible with the 
Annex I trading system. The same criteria should be used for certifying net emis­
sions (in the Annex I allowance trading system) or  (in the  system). The 
same methods of bookkeeping should be used for trades and holdings of 
allowances and funding for . By promoting the fungibility of allowances and 
, these steps could help ensure the widest array of opportunities for investors 
and the most cost-e›ective emissions limitation projects. 
A further set of fundamental issues relates to institutional procedures to resolve 
disputes among both State and non-State entities participating in the . The  
 represents a highly innovative private/public partnership model of interna­
tional law and organization. To function efficiently, there will need to be one or 
more dispute settlement mechanisms built into . These instruments will have 
to deliver clear and determinative decisions in a speedy and cost-e›ective manner. 
This is especially important if the private sector is to be attracted to participating 
in projects on a large scale. 
Conclusion 
Experience demonstrates that emissions trading systems, when properly designed 
and implemented, can provide significant environmental and economic benefits 
over traditional regulatory approaches. Emissions trading systems are especially 
well suited for addressing climate change because they achieve limitations of net 
greenhouse gas emissions at far less cost and stimulate innovation in environ­
mentally friendly paths to sustainable development. In recognition of these 
advantages, the Kyoto Protocol authorizes emissions trading among Annex I 
countries, and, through the , between Annex I countries and developing 
countries. The  will provide a number of important economic and environ­
mental benefits to developing countries by stimulating substantial additional 
inflows of private investment. If properly implemented, the  will ensure that 
the developing countries’ participation in these arrangements is truly voluntary, 
on equitable terms that will provide sufficient control by host countries of invest­
ment projects to assure that they promote developing countries’ interests and sus­
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Abstract 
This article explores the conceptual roots of different aspects of the Clean Develop­
ment Mechanism (cdm), including the Pilot Phase for “activities implemented 
jointly” (aij); the functioning of the Convention’s financial mechanism; efforts to 
secure funding for adaptation; and the negotiations on the regime’s compliance 
provisions. The negotiating history of Article 12 is reviewed, with reference to the 
specific textual proposals by both industrialised and developing countries that pro­
vided the elements of what would become the cdm.This is then followed by a close 
textual analysis of Article 12, which reveals significant ambiguities, and an overview 
of the wide-ranging perceptions on how the cdm should evolve. Special attention 
is paid to the private sector. Finally, a suggestion is offered on how to make the cdm 
attractive and simple to use, while maintaining its status as a servant to its ultimate 
objective. 
Introduction 
When it was unanimously adopted in December 1997, the Kyoto Protocol to the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change () became the most signif­
icant economic agreement since the Uruguay Round concluded with the estab­
lishment of the World Trade Organisation. Economic development and increased 
energy production and consumption have historically been bound together. 
When in force, the Kyoto agreement will seek to reorient the global energy market 
in order to meet the objective of stabilising concentrations of greenhouse gasses 
in the atmosphere. Within the agreement there is a mechanism, distilled from a 
range of differing policy ingredients, which has the potential to be a major force 
for development while contributing to the long term reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions. This key tool is the Clean Development Mechanism (). 
The  exists only in text so far, but it could be implemented and applied to 
projects as early as 2000. It has already become part of the implementation strate­
gies of the largest emitters of greenhouse gasses and has attracted the interest of 
1 This chapter draws substan­
tially from J. Werksman,‘The
Clean Development Mecha­
nism: Unwrapping the Kyoto
Surprise,’ reciel vol. 17, issue 2 
(1998). 
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2 Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, adopted 11
December 1997. Uncorrected 
text at 37 ilm 22 (1998); the 
corrected text, and most other 
official documents cited in 
this article can be found at 
the web site of the Secretariat 
to the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change
<http://www.unfccc.de>. 
3 Remarks by Ambassador Raul
Estrada y Oyuela, From Kyoto to
Buenos Aires:Technology Trans­
fer and Emissions Trading, a
conference held at Columbia 
University, New York, 24 April
1998. 
4 United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change,
31 ilm 849 (1992), entered into
force 21 March 1994. 
5 The two major references to
the concept in the Convention
appear in Article 4.2(a), which
anticipates that Annex I (devel­
oped) Parties ‘may implement ...
policies and measures jointly
with other Parties’, and Article 
4.2(d), which requires the 
Conference of the Parties, 
at its first session, to take 
decisions regarding ‘criteria 
for joint implementation.’ 
The text of the Convention 
and all official documents cited 
in this article can be found 
on the secretariat’s website, 
http://www.unfccc.de. 
the private sector. It is perceived as a bridge between the Annex I ‘industrialised’ 
countries, which are responsible for the bulk of present and historical greenhouse 
gas emissions, and the large populous developing countries, whose emissions will 
begin to dominate over the next 50 to 100 years. It could assist the ratification 
process in the United States because it offers opportunities for U.S. business inter­
ests, while engaging countries such as India, China, and Brazil in technology-
based emission reduction strategies. 
The proposals that led to the adoption of the ‘Clean Development Mechanism’ 
(, Article 12) of the Kyoto Protocol2 emerged late in the negotiating process. 
The consensus on the final text of the  was reached with unprecedented speed. 
The speed of this process, and the centrality of the  in brokering the final out­
come of Kyoto, led the Chairman of the negotiations to refer to Article 12 as the 
‘Kyoto Surprise.’3 Aspects of the  are undeniably innovative and have the 
potential to take the climate change regime, and quite possibly international law, 
into uncharted territory. However, many of the ’ core concepts can be traced 
directly to principles and mechanisms that have been discussed within the climate 
change regime since the outset of the negotiations of the Framework Convention.4 
In essence, the  will facilitate a form of project-based ‘joint implementa­
tion’ (), which will be governed by a multilaterally agreed upon set of rules, and 
operate under the supervision of an intergovernmental body. Annex I (industri­
alised) Parties that invest in projects in non-Annex I (developing) countries may 
use the greenhouse gas emissions reductions accrued from these projects to offset 
a part of their emissions reduction commitments under Article 3 of the Protocol. 
Proponents of  see such investments as ‘win-win’ opportunities, whereby indus­
trialised countries are allowed to achieve their commitments through the most 
cost-effective and flexible means, and developing countries gain access to finan­
cial resources and clean energy technologies. However, as Article 12 took shape and 
gained momentum, various delegations sought to accommodate the means for 
achieving a range of other objectives within the . 
This article explores the conceptual roots of different aspects of the , 
including the Pilot Phase for ‘activities implemented jointly’ (); the function­
ing of the Convention’s financial mechanism; efforts to secure funding for adap­
tation; and the negotiations on the regime’s compliance provisions. The negotiat­
ing history of Article 12 is reviewed, with reference to the specific textual proposals 
by both industrialised and developing countries that provided the elements of 
what would become the . This is then followed by a close textual analysis of 
Article 12, which reveals significant ambiguities, and an overview of the wide-
ranging perceptions on how the  should evolve. Special attention is paid to 
the private sector. Finally, a suggestion is offered on how to make the  attrac­
tive and simple to use, while maintaining its status as a servant to the climate 
change regime’s ultimate objective. 
What are the fundamental ideas behind project-based joint implementation? 
Joint Implementation 
The ’ theoretical heritage derives from the concept of ‘joint implementa­
tion,’ first proposed during the  negotiations. While the term ‘joint imple­
mentation’ () is not defined in the , 5 it has been used to refer to two dis­
tinct, but related concepts: 
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or credits towards their emissions reduction targets in exchange for investment 
in mitigation projects abroad in either Annex I or non-Annex I Parties where 
the costs of such investments are lower; and 
•	 a system of tradeable emissions allowances which, once allocated between Par­
ties, or groups of Parties, can be traded subject to a set of prescribed rules. 
Both forms of  were conceived to enable Annex I Parties to achieve their com­
mitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in a more cost-effective manner. 
Each was also intended to encourage transfers of financial resources and/or tech­
nology between Parties. Both forms, however, have provoked concern from Par­
ties and observers, who argue that some forms of  shift the responsibility, if not 
the cost, of undertaking emissions cuts from developed to developing countries. 
There are concerns that this shift in responsibility could make it more difficult to 
ensure compliance with emissions reduction obligations. 
Proponents of  have argued that such arrangements are legally possible with 
no additional justification to the text of the Convention. An early launch of the  
initiative was, however, constrained by the absence of agreed upon ‘criteria for 
joint implementation.’ According to the Convention, these guidelines were to be 
agreed to by the Conference of Parties () at its first session (-). Nonethe­
less, soon after the Convention entered into force, potential investor countries, 
most notably the United States and Norway, began experimenting with projects 
designed to demonstrate the feasibility of generating carbon offsets in developing 
and transition economies. However, in the context of uncertainty about whether 
and under what criteria such offsets would be ‘credited’ by the , and in the 
absence of clearly quantified legally binding commitments, there was little incen­
tive to do more than experiment. 
Activities Implemented Jointly: Pilot Phase 
As a result of legal and political uncertainties, little was done to develop either the 
methodologies or the confidence of the  sceptics in time for -. Instead, after 
intense negotiations, - established a Pilot Phase for Activities Implemented 
Jointly.6 The purpose of the Pilot Phase was to provide a more transparent and 
coherent basis for testing the feasibility of . 
Constructive ambiguities built into the Pilot Phase decision, including the 
newly coined acronym ‘,’ allowed  proponents to claim that the concept of 
project-based carbon offset investments had been approved in principle. At the 
same time, sceptics could maintain that  was still on trial. The core of the  
decision clearly tipped the balance towards the sceptics by denying  investors 
the possibility of obtaining credit, even retroactively, for any emissions reductions 
achieved through investments made during the  Pilot Phase. 
The negotiations of the  decision and the operation of the Pilot Phase, did, 
nonetheless, help to flush out and to elaborate a number of issues of principle and 
of practicality that influenced the development of Article 12 of the Protocol. These 
issues will be critical to the ongoing discussions on the . Perhaps most cru­
cially, the - negotiations resolved that, despite the references to  in the Con­
vention, decisions on whether and on what basis credit for investments could be 
offset against commitments could not be taken unilaterally, or through bilateral 
agreement between an investor and a host Party. Only rules agreed to multilater­
ally, by the , could resolve the issue of crediting. 
Despite the unavailability of ‘credit’ during the  Pilot Phase,  proponents 
6 Report of the Conference of
the Parties on its First Session, 
fccc/cp/1995/7/Add.1, April
1995, Decision 5/cp .1. 
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7 The secretariat’s most recent 
analysis of AIJ reports indicates
that only nine non-Annex I Par­
ties are currently participating
in formally reported aij pro-
jects. With regard to geogra
phical distribution, 18 of the 77
projects are based in Latin
America (nine of which are
hosted by Costa Rica), one is in




9 An initial draft of the aij
Uniform Reporting Framework
was presented to the Parties in
fccc/sbsta/1997/3. A modifi­
cation of this format, contained 
in fccc/sbsta/1997/4, was 
adopted by cop-3, in Decision 
10/cp/3. 
10 For a discussion of the 
methodological challenges
associated with AIJ and the Pro­
tocol’s flexibility mechanisms
see Activities Implemented
Jointly: Partnerships for Climate
and Development
(iea/oecd:1997); J. Heister,
Baselines and Indirect Effects in 
Carbon Offsets Projects: A
Guide for Decision-making
(World Bank: Draft 20 January
1998). 
made significant investments in demonstration projects. By the time of the Kyoto 
conference, there were 77  projects. These were implemented amongst a very lim­
ited number and range of Parties,7 primarily through bilateral initiatives, such as 
the ..  programme, and the Norwegian/World Bank  programme. In the 
early stages, only the United States, Norway and the Netherlands developed  
projects with partners outside Annex I.8 
The  and its Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice 
() developed a uniform reporting format for . The review of these reports 
by the  secretariat and the  allowed a number of significant political and 
methodological issues to emerge, which facilitated discussions on  develop­
ment. Many supporters of , in both the Northern and Southern Hemispheres, 
have recognised rigorous reporting as essential to the successful use of  as a means 
of achieving real net reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions. 
Thus far, resistance to rigorous reporting standards for  projects has come 
from a number of developing countries. These countries are concerned that mech­
anisms for monitoring compliance of individual  projects are an initial step 
toward extending significant emissions reduction and reporting requirements to 
developing countries as a group. The ‘Group of 77’developing countries (-77) pro­
vides the primary negotiating forum for non-Annex I countries in the climate 
change discussions. The -77 has historically resisted detailed reporting on green­
house gas emissions with the argument that they are too intrusive and an imposi­
tion on national sovereignty. While none have openly stated so, some developed 
countries may also resist rigorous reporting on  as it will necessarily increase the 
transaction costs involved in each project. There is also concern that it may reveal 
fundamental impracticalities in project approach that render it less attractive. 
Under the evolving drafts of the  uniform reporting format,9  partners 
must demonstrate, for each project: 
•	 Environmental additionality, i.e., that the  project brings about real, mea­
surable, long-term environmental benefits related to the mitigation of climate 
change that would not have occurred in the absence of the project; and 
•	 Financial additionality, i.e., that the resources from the Annex I investor are 
additional to the financial obligations of the Annex I Party under the Conven­
tion, as well as to current official development assistance flows. 
Demonstrating that  investments have yielded net additional environmen­
tal benefits thus requires  partners to construct a ‘counterfactual’ baseline or 
reference case that describes what the host country would have done in the 
absence of the  project. Furthermore, project proponents wished to discourage 
the problem of ‘leakage,’ whereby emissions increase within the host country but 
outside the scope of the project. Leakage has the potential to counteract the pro­
ject’s environmental benefits. Preventing or accounting for leakage might require 
a baseline that would assess potential emissions on a countrywide basis. Such 
counterfactual determinations are inherently difficult and, particularly when left 
to bilateral negotiation, take place in a context where the investor and the host 
share strong incentives to overstate the baseline emissions scenario in order to 
inflate the offset credited to the project.10 
With regard to financial additionality, the Pilot Phase  and the uniform 
reporting framework were designed to ensure that developed countries did not 
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they are already required to make under the Convention’s financial mechanism. 
During the Pilot Phase, the funding for  projects is in addition to the financial 
obligations of Annex I countries under the framework of the financial mecha­
nism. It is also exclusive of current official development assistance () flows. 
 flows are, however, notoriously difficult to monitor and compare. It is not 
clear how Annex I Parties will be able to establish, in the context of declining over­
all flows of , that investments in  are ‘additional’ to resources that would 
have or should have been committed to the Global Environmental Facility () 
11or to other sources of . 
Just before the Kyoto conference, the  secretariat undertook an analysis of 
the  reports. The secretariat confirmed that Parties were struggling with these 
methodological challenges and producing inconsistent results.12 
End of the pilot phase, start of the Protocol 
New  projects were announced immediately following the Kyoto conference. 
Japan is currently pursuing a programme of enhancing the capacity of sinks to 
absorb CO2. A joint implementation strategy, which largely involves reforesta­
tion,13 is underway with Russia. 
The  negotiations revealed the depth of scepticism with which many devel­
oping countries view . This resistance, in the face of political pressure and the 
offer of financial incentives, might best be summarised as a combination of con­
cerns, most of which focus on the idea that fully operational  programmes could 
be used to constrain development choices: 
•	 Unequal bargaining positions in bilateral  negotiations could allow Annex I 
investors to impose new conditionalities for access to financial resources and 
technology transfer. 
•	 Annex I countries might work to promote projects that were not necessarily in 
the best interest of the host country. 
•	  funding could divert resources from more broadly applicable  and  
14resources.
The  Pilot Phase continues and, at least until the entry into force of the Pro­
tocol, its fate will remain linked to the obligations and the institutions of the Con­
vention rather than the Protocol. Efforts will no doubt be made to fold  pro­
jects involving developing countries into the . However these issues are 
resolved, in the interim period before the Protocol and the  begin to operate, 
the practical experience gained through the  will continue to influence the 
development of methodologies and procedures for the . 
What is the role of the Global Environment Facility? 
The Global Environment Facility () has served, since the adoption of the 
Convention, as the operating entity responsible for matching eligible projects in 
developing country Parties with funds provided by Annex II Parties under the 
Convention’s financial obligations. The  will be of interest to those working 
on the  as both a forerunner, and as a potential competitor for  pro­
jects. The methodologies that the  has developed over the past five years to 
calculate the global environmental benefits generated by its investments may 
provide a basis for measuring the value of carbon-offsets accruing from  
investment. 
11 When seeking to determine
whether contributions to the 
gef were, as the Convention 
requires, ‘new and additional,’
an independent panel of
experts concluded that until
international rules were devel­
oped such a determination was
not possible. Study of gef ’s 
Overall Performance, G. Porter, R 
Clémençon,W. Ofosu-Amaah, 
M. Philips (gef 1998). 
12 fccc/sbsta/1997/inf .3. 
13 Bureau of National Affairs, 
International Environmental 
Reporter, Feb 4 1998. 
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15 In fact, gef concepts trace
directly to financial arrange­
ments under the 1987 Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer, 26 ilm 
1550, and its Multilateral Fund. 
See J Werksman, Consolidating
Governance of the Global Com­
mons: Insights from the Global
Environment Facility, 6 Year­
book of International Environ­
mental Law 27 (Oxford 1995). 
16 unfccc , Article 4.3, 4.7. 
17 Study of gef ’s Overall Per­
formance, G. Porter, R Clé­
mençon,W. Ofosu-Amaah, M. 
Philips (gef 1998). 
The  serves as the financial mechanism for the other major Rio treaty, the 
Convention on Biological Diversity. It represents what can be termed the ‘ 
approach’ to financing treaty implementation in developing countries.15 Follow­
ing the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility,’ Annex II Parties 
(the wealthier Annex I countries) are required to provide new and additional 
funds to cover the agreed upon full incremental costs of measures undertaken by 
developing country Parties to implement the Convention. The extent to which 
developing countries are expected to fulfil their commitments is explicitly reliant 
on the compliance of developed countries with their financial obligations.16 
In order to limit the scope of their financial commitment, and to help ensure 
the most effective use of the ’s resources, Annex II Parties encouraged the 
development of methodologies for calculating the ‘incremental cost’ of green­
house gas mitigation projects. In theory, under an incremental cost discipline, the 
 funds only that element of a project that results directly in the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions, thereby yielding a ‘global environmental benefit.’Under 
this methodology, a project proponent must describe a baseline scenario of the 
activity that would have taken place in the host developing country in the absence 
of the  investment. The  then provides the funding that makes the alter­
native or additional ‘climate friendly’ activity possible. 
Thus, both  projects and project-based carbon offset activities developed 
under the  will require that the design and identification of projects or project 
activities that can be demonstrated as identifiable emissions reductions. Although 
they may use different terminology, both mechanisms require projects to provide 
environmental additionality, meaning that they must generate emissions reduc­
tions that are additional to any that would have occurred without the investment. 
For the , the additionality stipulation is used to justify the investment of an 
‘incremental cost’ for an identifiable global environmental benefit. For the , 
the additionality clause may ensure that the resulting emissions reduction unit, if 
used to offset against a commitment, results in a net emissions reduction. 
A recent assessment of the ’s overall performance, commissioned by an 
independent review team, highlighted the challenges that the  continues to 
face in applying the incremental cost methodology. Although the ’s approach 
has improved and become more flexible over time, the review team noted that the 
‘present process of determining incremental costs has excluded the participation 
of recipient country officials in most cases, because of the lack of understanding 
of the concept and methodologies.’17 If project-based  is to attract the support 
of host countries, the  will have to overcome similar challenges to produce a 
methodology that is transparent and practicable. The experience with the  
Project Cycle thus far indicates that the process of identifying and designing pro­
jects that truly demonstrate emissions reductions that would not otherwise have 
occurred can be fraught with political and methodological difficulties. 
Developing countries are the primary recipients of  funds. Since Rio, these 
countries have consistently expressed their disappointment with the . This is 
reflected most clearly in their refusal to confirm the  as the ‘permanent’ oper­
ating entity of Convention’s financial mechanism. This disappointment stems 
from the perceived inadequacy of  funding levels, the slowness of the  pro­
ject cycle, and the continued dominant influence of donors and the World Bank 
in shaping  policy. Although the Protocol and the  Council have effectively 
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Convention, its rocky beginnings have created an opportunity for an alternative 
funding mechanism and helped make the  possible.18 
How will the Protocol help developing countries to meet the 
financial challenge of adapting to the effects of climate change? 
Article 4.4 of the Convention requires Annex II Parties to assist those develop­
ing country Parties most vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in 
meeting the costs of adapting to those adverse effects. The provision was negoti­
ated into the Convention by the Alliance of Small Island States (), but other 
vulnerable developing countries such as Bangladesh and Egypt would also bene­
fit from this Article if they suffered climate change consequences such as sea-level 
rise. Annex II Parties have, however, been concerned about the potentially unlim­
ited cost associated with this obligation. Annex II countries are additionally wary 
of the implication that by compensating countries for the impacts of climate 
change they are conceding liability for their role in raising atmospheric green­
house gas concentrations. Consequently Annex II stiffly resisted links between 
Article 4.4 and the Convention’s financial mechanism. The ’s focus on incre­
mental financing was interpreted by donors as precluding it from funding activi­
ties other than those that generate ‘global environmental benefits.’ Investments in 
coastal zone management, strengthening sea defences, or preparing for shifts in 
agricultural patterns are projects that have been viewed as generating domestic 
benefits and therefore outside the ’s ambit. 
At - delegations from those developing countries particularly vulnerable 
to the adverse effects of climate change overcame the resistance of major donor 
countries and secured the endorsement of policies, eligibility criteria, and pro-
gramme priorities that ensure that funding will be provided for a first, limited cat­
egory of adaptation projects (Stage I projects).19 Since then, the  Council has 
adopted an Operational Strategy that provides more detailed criteria for the fund­
ing of Stage I projects.20 A handful of projects have been approved as a result. 
During Stage I, developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to 
the impacts of climate change are eligible for full-cost financing of adaptation 
activities related to preparing their national communications and national climate 
change programmes. This is required under Articles 4.1 and 12 of the Convention. 
These ‘enabling activities’ are limited in nature, but can include funds for training, 
vulnerability assessment, and planning related to adaptation.  Operational 
Guidelines for the funding of enabling activities indicate a ‘typical cost range’ of 
‘up to $350,000 per country for the entirety of the enabling activities.’ These 
funds would be expected to include not only Stage I adaptation costs, but also costs 
of preparation and initial national communication.21 
The absence of any meaningful source for adaptation funding under the Con­
vention opened a further opportunity for building support for an alternative 
funding mechanism. Emerging proposals from the  had the potential to gen­
erate income that could be earmarked for adaptation. These resources would be 
free of the ’s incremental cost analysis, and would not necessarily entail addi­
tional financial resources from governments. 
How will compliance be enforced? 
The history of the treatment of compliance issues under the climate change 
regime is reflected in the text of Article 13 of the Convention and the subsequent and 
18 Kyoto Protocol, Article
11(2)(b); The New Delhi State­
ment of the First gef Assembly,
3 April 1998, available at
http://www.gefweb.com. 
19 Decision 11/cp .1, Initial guid­
ance on policies, programme
priorities and eligibility criteria
to the operating entity or enti­
ties of the financial mechanism. 
20 Operational Strategy
(Washington: gef), February 
1996 pp. 38-39. 
21 Operational Guidelines for
Expedited Financial Support for
Initial Communications from 
Non-Annex I Parties to the 
United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change,
gef/c .7/Inf, 10/Rev.1, 3 October
1997. In approving this
approach to expediting
national communications, the 
gef Council noted that ‘the 
financing amounts for the
preparation of enabling activi­
ties have been developed on
the basis of an average esti­
mate used for planning pur­
poses. However, the actual level
of support will vary from coun­
try to country and with the con­
tent of the enabling activities.’
Joint Summary of the Chairs,
gef Council Meeting April 2 - 4,
1996, Appendix: Council Deci­
sions, Decision on Agenda Item
5(b). 
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22 On the evolution of compli­
ance mechanisms under the 
unfccc , see H. Ott, ‘Elements 
of a Supervisory Procedure
under the Climate Regime’, Hei­
delberg J. of Int. Law, 56,
Number 3, (1996) and J. Butler,
‘Establishment of a Dispute
Resolution/Noncompliance
Mechanism in the Climate 
Change Convention’, unpub­
lished manuscript (on file with
the author). 
23 For further information on 
compliance under the Protocol,
see J. Werksman,‘Compliance
and the Kyoto Protocol: Building
a Backbone into a ‘Flexible’ 
Regime,’Yearbook of Interna­
tional Environmental Law Vol. 9 
(1998): p. 48. 
24 Cherzow Factory (Indem­
nity) case, pcij , Ser A, no. 17, p.
47, as cited in I. Brownlie, Princi­
ples of Public International Law,
4th ed. (Oxford 1990). 
25 The negotiating text by the
Chairman (fccc/agbm/1997/3/ 
Add. 1 and ocr . 1), dated 21 April
1997, prepared by the Chairman,
with assistance from the secre­
tariat, is a comprehensive docu­
ment reflecting all submissions
made by Parties to date and
structured in the form of a Pro­
tocol, and without attribution 
to the Parties. Prepared both to
assist the negotiations, and to
meet the Convention’s proce­
dural deadline (Article 15.2, and
17.2) requiring that any propos­
als for Protocols or Amend­
ments to the Convention be 
submitted 6 months prior to
the cop at which they are pro­
posed for adoption. Of particu­
lar importance to the negotia­
tions on the cdm in that with 
it, the negotiators recognised
that ‘whilst proposals addi­
tional to this negotiating text
may be put forward, these
should be clearly derived from
the submissions already within
it and should not introduce 
substantially new ideas.’ 
26 cnt , para. 139. 
27 cnt , para. 140. 
28 cnt , para. 143. 
ongoing work of the Ad Hoc Group on Article 13 (-13). The majority of delega­
tions did not support the inclusion of a robust mechanism for enforcing compli­
ance with the Convention’s soft and ill-defined obligations.22 Since the Convention 
entered into force, negotiations have focused instead on the idea of establishing a 
‘non-confrontational’ and ‘facilitative’ multilateral consultative process for resolv­
ing questions about the Convention implementation. However, the course of the 
Protocol negotiations revealed that strengthened commitments and more sophisti­
cated means for implementing those commitments would require a correspond­
ingly more elaborate system for identifying non-compliance — and for providing a 
range of incentives and disincentives for encouraging compliance. 
Proposals for project-based joint implementation appeared to offer a number 
of tools for promoting compliance with commitments of a future Protocol:23 
•	  could provide one of a number of ‘safety valves’ under the Protocol that 
would allow Parties experiencing difficulty in meeting their emissions reduc­
tion commitments through domestic action to bring themselves into compli­
ance by purchasing carbon offsets from overseas. 
•	 The threat of suspension of  privileges could be used to ensure Party compli­
ance with other aspects of the Protocol, such as reporting requirements. 
•	 The possibility that non-compliance by Annex I Parties could, through the 
imposition of financial penalties, provide a source of revenue for development 
assistance is very attractive to non-Annex I delegations. 
Establishing pre-set penalties, or financial safety valves, as remedies for non­
compliance with, or breach of, an international treaty raises complex issues 
regarding the nature of international legal obligations. Traditional concepts of 
state responsibility envision that international practice demands reparation for a 
breach that ‘as far as possible, wipe[s] out all the consequences of the illegal act and 
re-establish[es] the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that 
act had not been committed.’24 Such consequences are difficult to prejudge. Joint 
implementation between Parties with commitments and those without commit­
ments would have to meet the highest possible standard to conform to the spirit 
of reparation. Nevertheless, non-compliance, financial penalties, and the link to 
development assistance became the conceptual filter through which  was per­
ceived as acceptable to the majority of -77 countries. 
What were the initial positions on project-based ji? 
Proposals regarding project-based  between Annex I and non-Annex I Par­
ties were introduced at the outset of the Protocol negotiations and incorporated 
into the Negotiating Text by the Chairman ().25 The proposals ranged from 
absolute prohibitions on  (Iran),26 to proposals that would have limited  to 
Annex I Parties only (European Union),27 to more detailed elaboration of the con­
ditions under which non-Annex I countries would be entitled to participate in 
project-based  (United States).28 
Although the -77/China position stressed that ‘[e]ach Party included in 
Annex I to the Convention shall meet its quantified emissions limitation and 
reduction obligations () through domestic action,’ 29 individual members 
of the group began to rebel against an outright prohibition on . Most notable of 
these was Costa Rica, whose proposal was based on the country’s active  pro-
gramme. It later played a key role in designing the . 30 
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The Consolidated Negotiating Text () by the Chairman was prepared prior 
to the last scheduled session of the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (). 
It reflected the Chairman’s assumptions as to the ‘thrust of deliberations in the 
Group to date.’ It supported the prevailing position of the European Union and of 
the -77 by only allowing project-based  between Annex I Parties.31 
How did the decision to allow non-Annex I countries 
to participate in project-based joint implementation come about? 
The Brazilian government provided the basis for a breakthrough in the negotia­
tions of project-based  between Annex I and non-Annex I Parties with its ‘Pro­
posed Elements of a Protocol.’ 32 This sweeping proposal sought to radically rede­
fine the climate regime from the ground up.33 Drawing inspiration from  
climate models and emissions scenarios, the Brazilian Protocol sought to intro­
duce science-based ‘objectivity’ into the negotiations. The Protocol’s overall objec­
tive was to define a future level of ‘effective emissions’ that could be tolerated from 
Annex I countries on the basis of the predicted impact of these emissions on global 
mean surface temperatures. It proposed an ‘effective emissions ceiling’ for the 
combined emissions of Annex I countries for each of four five-year budget peri­
ods, running from 2001 to 2020. Differentiated individual effective emissions ceil­
ings would then be allocated among Annex I Parties on the basis of the relative 
proportion of effective emissions that were attributable to each Annex I Party 
from modelled emissions projections. 
For the purposes of the development of the , the most important element 
of the Brazilian proposal was the introduction of a ‘compulsory contribution’ or a 
financial penalty for non-compliance, which would be assessed against each 
Annex I Party that exceeded its effective emissions ceiling at the end of its budget 
period. The penalty would then be contributed to a ‘non-Annex I Clean Develop­
ment Fund’ for use in funding climate change projects in developing countries. 
The size of the penalty was designed to correlate to $10 for every tonne of 
carbon equivalent by which the Annex I Party had exceeded its ceiling. This 
amount was estimated to reflect the likely cost of achieving an equivalent level of 
emissions reductions through the ‘… implementation of non-regrets [sic] mea­
sures by non-Annex I Parties.’ 34 
Further, Brazil proposed an objective basis for distributing the funds among 
non-Annex I Parties: 
•	 First, funding would be provided to non-Annex I Parties in response to a ‘vol­
untary’ application subject to ‘the appropriate regulations approved’ by the 
. 
•	 Second, the funding eligibility of each non-Annex I Party would be capped at 
a level based on its relative responsibility for effective emissions during the pre­
ceding budget period. An Appendix divided potential proceeds from a Clean 
Development Fund into shares based on projected emissions from 1990 to 2010. 
The Appendix ranged from China at 32% to Niue at .00005%. 
•	 Third, up to 10% of the Brazilian Clean Development Fund would be available 
to non-Annex I Parties for use in adaptation projects. 
Critics of the Brazilian proposal doubted that such a radical restructuring of 
the regime could be managed in the months left before Kyoto. They pointed out 
that the logic of effectiveness resulted in a regime that penalised the large emitters 
29 cnt , para. 121.4. 
30 cnt , paras. 147-147.6. 
31 The Consolidated negotiat­
ing text by the Chairman
(fccc/agbm/1997/7), dated 13
October 1997, prepared just
prior to the commencement of
agbm-8, was the first effort to 
produce a text that had the
appearance of a Protocol.
Although significantly brack­
eted, and prefaced with the
caveat that it was offered ‘with­
out prejudice to’ the ntc and 
the original proposals from Par­
ties contained in the relevant 
misc docs , the Chairman’s 
assumptions as to the ‘thrust of
deliberations in the Group to
date’ were employed to sub­
stantially narrow the options
previously reflected in earlier
compilations. 
32 fccc/agbm/1997/misc .1/
Add.3, page 3. 
33 The inspiration for this pro­
posal seems to have come from
a number of sources. Its strong
foundation in climate science 
and ipcc modelling ties it
directly to Brazil’s chief negotia­
tor in the agbm process, Dr. Luiz
Gylvan Meira Filho, President of
the Brazilian Space Agency, and
ipcc lead author. Dr. Meira Filho 
was given the responsibility for
chairing the informal Contact
Group on what became the
cdm , and is widely credited for
successfully steering it through
the negotiations. The economic
aspects of the proposal, and in
particular the aspects that
allow trading between Annex I
Parties, bear some resemblance 
to proposals for a ‘Green Bank’ 
being made by Professor Gra­
ciela Chichilnisky of the Colum­
bia University Program on Infor­
mation and Resources. See G. 
Chichilnisky, Development and
Global Finance: The Case for an 
International Bank for Environ­
mental Settlements, 10 undp
Discussion Paper Series (undp
1997). 
34 fccc/agbm/1997/misc .1/
Add.3, at 24. 
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35 fccc/agbm/1997/misc .1/
Add.6, page 16. 
36 ‘Delegates Say Prospects
Brighten for CO2 Treaty,’ 
(Reuters News Service, 10
November 1997). 
37 Revised Text Under Negotia­
tion (‘rtun ’) fccc/cp/1997/2. 
Although the g-77 formulation 
of the Clean Development Fund
was received on 22 October 
1997, well after the Conven­
tion’s 1 June deadline for sub­
stantially new submissions. 
38 rtun , page, 9, n. 4, page 18, 
note 13. 
39 Earth Negotiations Bulletin,
Vol. 12, No. 68, 2 December 1997; 
author’s notes. 
40 Earth Negotiations Bulletin,
Vol. 12, No. 71, 5 December 1997. 
in Annex I through higher commitments, while rewarding the largest non-Annex 
I emitters with access to the largest share of the funds. There was, however, enough 
in the proposal to prove selectively attractive to a wide range of Parties. 
The first significant advance came with the formal endorsement by the -77 and 
China of a central aspect of the Brazilian proposal. In a submission to the final ses­
sion of the , the -77 endorsed the establishment of a Clean Development 
Fund as a means of enforcing compliance with Annex I commitments while gen­
erating revenues for development assistance. The Brazilian proposal was stripped 
to its essentials and incorporated into the position of the -77 and China as follows: 
A Clean Development Fund shall be established by the  to assist the 
developing country Parties to achieve sustainable development and con­
tribute to the ultimate objective of the Convention. The Clean Development 
Fund will receive contributions from those Annex I Parties found to be in 
non-compliance with its  under the Protocol. 35 
The United States embraced the ‘flexibility’ the Brazilian proposal appeared to 
offer to Annex I countries having difficulty meeting their commitments at home. 
Characterising the proposal as a ‘trading system’ and a ‘flexible financing instru­
ment,’ the head of the U.S. delegation expressed the view that the proposal for a 
Clean Development Fund, and its endorsement by the -77, represented a signif­
icant basis for hope in the approach to Kyoto.36 
The broad-based support for some variation of a ‘Clean Development Fund’ 
led the  Chairman to include the -77 paragraph in the Revised Text Under 
Negotiation (), which went forward to Kyoto.37 Significantly, however, the 
 continued to reflect resistance to project-based  between Annex I and 
non-Annex I Parties. There were no provisions for the calculation or transfer of 
emissions reduction credits that might result from such a fund. Instead, the -77 
text, and its placement in the  maintained its emphasis as a means of enforc­
ing compliance.38 Thus, just prior to -, the context was set for an exploration 
of how views of such diverging emphasis could somehow coalesce in the creation 
of a mechanism that would perform such a variety of functions. 
What happened to the Clean Development Fund proposal at the Kyoto conference? 
Work on what would become the  began almost immediately as delega­
tions arrived in Kyoto. Under the Chairmanship of Brazil, an informal contact 
group was established by the Committee of the Whole in the first hours of the 
negotiations to discuss the Clean Development Fund and other financial issues.39 
The brief history of the negotiations in Kyoto can be characterised as a struggle 
that merged the U.S.-backed proposals for project-based  and -77 proposals for 
a fund fed by compliance penalties. 
The European Union was trying to find its footing in the midst of this struggle. 
The initial response from the European Union regarding the emerging  was 
suspicion. As promoted by the United States, the  ran counter to the Euro­
pean Union’s position against project-based  with Parties that did not have 
reduction commitments. The version supported by the -77 would have created a 
new institution that seemed to threaten the continued viability of the  as the 
main source of Convention funding.40 
The -77’s emphasis on the compliance aspects of the Clean Development 
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tact groups. Compliance, and any role a Clean Development Fund might play in 
it, was assigned to a sub-group on institutional aspects of the Protocol. This sub­
group was dominated by Annex I Parties, which were therefore discussing the con­
sequences for themselves in failing to meet their commitments. Text was actually 
introduced that would have channelled financial penalties into a Clean Develop­
ment Fund.41 However, when it became apparent that it would not be possible to 
agree upon the specific binding consequences that might result from a determi­
nation of non-compliance, the direct link between compliance and the fund dis­
solved.42 
This side-tracking of the compliance issue allowed the contact group on a 
Clean Development Fund to focus on the role such a mechanism might play in 
facilitating project-based . In the course of two days of negotiation, the original 
-77 proposal evolved from a single paragraph attached to the Article on Annex I 
commitments43 to a free standing Article of ten paragraphs that was substantially 
in the form it would take in the Protocol.44 
Within 48 hours, the basic principles and design features for the  were 
agreed upon: 
•	 The group defined a mechanism rather than establishing a fund, reflecting its 
primary role as a processor of transactions, rather than a depository of finan­
cial resources, and assuaging, in part, concerns about the proliferation of inter­
national institutions, and threats to the role of the  as the regime’s financial 
mechanism. 
•	 It was agreed that credit for reductions resulting from  investments made 
from 2000 onward could be offset against a part of the investor country com­
mitments. This resolved the main point of principle that had been left hanging 
by the  Pilot Phase. 
•	 New institutional features emerged, including an ‘Executive Board’ and a role 
for the meeting of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the 
Parties (/). This provided multilateral, intergovernmental supervi­
sion in response to -77 concerns about the lack of fairness and transparency 
that many felt had characterised bilateral  transactions. 
•	 General criteria were agreed upon to provide a basis for certifying emissions 
reductions resulting from  projects. These guidelines reflected many of the 
same principles that had been accounted for in the  Pilot Phase, such as need 
for ‘country-driven’ projects and environmental additionality. 
•	 The task of adopting more specific procedures for auditing and verifying emis­
sions reductions was assigned to the /, reflecting ongoing concerns 
from a wide range of delegations that  transactions might be open to 
abuse. 
•	 A role in the operation of the  for ‘operational entities’ and private and/or 
public entities outside the Convention/Protocol institutions was agreed upon 
in principle. This created the possibility for the direct involvement of interna­
tional institutions and the private sector. 
•	 The operation of the  would be expected to generate funds to cover 
administrative expenses, thus helping to assuage concerns about the prolifera­
tion and the costs of new international institutions.45 
•	 A share of the proceeds from the operation of the  would be used to assist 
particularly vulnerable developing countries to meet the costs of adaptation. 
41 See fccc/cp/1997/crp .2, 7 
December 1997, Article 18, Alter­
native A. The crp (conference
room paper) series of docu­
ments were issued in Kyoto by
the Chairman, to reflect and 
consolidate progress from the
various working and contact
groups during the negotiations. 
42 See fccc/cp/1997/crp .4, 9 
December 1997, Article 19. 
43 See fccc/cp/1997/crp .2, 
Article 3(19). 
44 See fccc/cp/1997/crp .4, 
Article 14. 
45 It is worth noting that this
idea for making the system self-
financing nearly failed because
of the fear of those responsible
for national taxation – Trea­
sury/Finance Ministries – of
allowing a precedent to be
established for international 
taxation. It was pointed out
that this was simply a charge
levied on transactions, which 
would enable the cdm to be 
brought to life without new
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46 For further discussion of 
Small Islands Developing States
and Climate Change, see Slade
and Werksman, this volume. 
47 Kyoto Protocol, Article 3.12. 
This structure remained in place right through the endgame.At the last minute, 
France, operating outside the .. position, resisted the adoption of Article 12 
because of its unease over the scope for private sector involvement. The countries 
of the Alliance of Small Island States () were as anxious at the possibility of 
failure to adopt Article 12 as the representatives from United States, who felt they 
had an idea they could sell to the sceptics back home. This was a way for experi­
enced U.S. negotiators to argue domestically that developing countries were 
indeed going to be involved in the solution to climate change. 
The role of  was critical in this process.46 Together with Costa Rica, they 
played a vital part in overcoming the differences between, broadly speaking, the 
U.S. and Brazilian views. By demonstrating some enthusiasm for the concept 
while occupying high moral ground, they lent credibility to the idea of the  as 
it emerged. The small island states occupy a very interesting place in the  
debate. There is no doubt that they contributed hugely to its creation, but they are 
unlikely to be major beneficiaries of new project finance through the mechanism. 
They benefit in two ways, however, which helps explain the real value of the : 
•	 The  countries have interests that are identical to those of the (Article 2) 
objective of the Convention. Any action by any State or group of States which 
successfully responds to the objective reduces the risk of inundation or salt 
water intrusion into fresh water because of sea-level rise or more frequent and 
more severe storms. Being powerless to protect themselves from these risks, 
other than through international negotiation and agreement, they must invest 
trust, time, and expertise in the , even if others take a more immediate eco­
nomic return out of the system. 
•	 The  countries will receive an amount, to be determined, from each 
transaction, that will go into an adaptation fund. The more transactions, the 
more there will be in the fund. The more transactions producing a certifiable 
global benefit, the greater the chance of avoiding the need to draw on the adap­
tation fund. 
The cruel irony is that adaptation to climate change on a small island is hard to 
contemplate – where is the hinterland to which to retreat? Where are alternative 
sources to the existing fresh water ponds? Adaptation may involve building dykes 
and other hard structures or moving to islands within an archipelago with more 
relief, but will probably end with migrations away from the islands. What fund 
could pay the price of that kind of adaptation? What price can you put on loss of 
a culture? The  can, indirectly, produce a kind of insurance plan but it will 
never amount to compensation. 
What happens next in the Clean Development Mechanism negotiations? 
Under Article 12, the  will facilitate a form of project-based  between Annex 
I and non-Annex Parties, governed by a multilaterally agreed-upon set of rules, 
operating under the supervision of the / and an executive board. Emis­
sions reductions accruing from ‘project activities’ carried out in non-Annex I Par­
ties, once certified under agreed-upon principles, may be used by Annex I Parties 
to contribute to compliance with their emissions reductions obligations under 
Article 3 of the Protocol.47 
Thus, agreement on Article 12 resolved a number of critical aspects as to how 
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to the Protocol. However, many gaps remain to be filled, and the negotiating 
dynamic for the next stage of the development of the  remains fundamentally 
unchanged. This dynamic can now be characterised as pitting a market-based 
approach against an ‘interventionist approach’ based 
on traditional public sector development assistance. table 1 the provisions of article 12 
Both approaches stress the need for a system capable of 
article provision 
generating credible certified emissions reductions 
12.1 ‘Definition’ 
(), but differ on the best means of achieving this. 12.2 Objective 
12.3 ‘The transaction’ 
The market-based approach 12.4 Governance 
12.5 Principles for the certification of emissions reductions 
A market-based approach relies on healthy competi­ 12.6 Project finance 
tion in a transparent marketplace to provide the most 12.7 Auditing and verification 
efficient and effective means of encouraging hosts and 12.8 Administrative expenses and adaptation costs 
12.9 Involvement of private and/or public entities 
investors to design credible  project activities. The 12.10 ‘Banking’of certified emissions reductions 
private sector holds the capital and technology neces­
sary to the ’ success. Once the intergovernmen­
tal process has set the rules on the types of project activities that will be eligible for 
certification, the private sector would be entrusted with designing projects, and 
would be entitled to hold and transfer . 
The interventionist approach 
Interventionists are more sceptical of the private sector’s ability to fulfil the ’ 
stated purpose of assisting non-Annex I Parties to ‘achieve sustainable develop­
ment.’ Such an approach emphasises the need for the active involvement of public 
sector institutions, including home and host governments and international 
development institutions, in promoting the design of projects driven by broad-
based policy concerns rather than market disciplines. 
The market-based vs. interventionist debate is further complicated by the ten­
sion between those who wish to see the  up and running quickly with the 
lowest transaction costs possible, and those that remain cautious and willing to 
increase costs in exchange for greater accountability. Parties at both ends of this 
spectrum place the  at risk, either by undermining its credibility, or by weigh­
ing it down with an over-burdensome bureaucracy. 
What arrangements have been made for the governance 
of the Clean Development Mechanism? 
Decisions on the operation of the  will ultimately be made by its governing 
bodies. Article 12 entrusts the / and an Executive Board with the general 
functions of guiding and supervising the ’ operation. The division of labour 
between the two bodies is not entirely clear, and some refinements are likely to prove 
desirable. For example, the / may wish to delegate some of the more detailed 
work, such as the designation of operational entities, to the more focused body. 
The Kyoto Protocol left issues relating to the size, composition and modus 
operandi of the Executive Board undecided. The functions set out above suggest 
that the Executive Board will require a mixture of technical skills and political 
authority. The appropriate balance between these will depend, once again, on how 
interventionist the  is in the design, funding, and approval of project activi­
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table 2 possible division of labour for the administration of the cdm 
general function specific function cdm 
Governance • Provision of authority and guidance 
• Determination of ‘part of’ commitment available 
for offset 
• Supervision 
• Elaboration of modalities and procedures
for auditing and verification of project activities 
• Designation of operational entities to certify
emissions reductions 
• Provision of guidance on the participation
of private and/or public entities 
• Ensuring assessment of administrative








cer management • Validating and monitoring project activities,
such as baselines or benchmarks 




Project finance • Arranging funding of certified project activities cdm (unspecified) 
48 In un practice regional bal­
ance requires membership in
multiples of five, representing
Asia, Africa, Latin America and 
the Caribbean, (non-Annex I);
Eastern Europe and the West­
ern European and Others Group
(Annex I). Climate change insti­
tutions have traditionally
added an additional seat for 
small island developing coun­
tries. 
The political composition of the Executive Board will require consideration of 
the representational balance between regions and/or between investor and host 
countries. Annex I countries will no doubt argue against regional balance, as this 
inevitably leaves them with fewer seats than developing countries.48 It must be 
kept in mind, however, that the larger the role played by the private sector in fund­
ing  projects, the weaker Annex I Parties’ claims for a disproportionate pres­
ence on the Board are. If they are no longer in the position of donors, they have 
not bought their entitlement to a larger share of the vote. 
Article 12 does not rule out the possibility that the function of the Executive 
Board could be carried out by an existing institution that shares whatever design 
principles have been agreed upon by the Parties. Indeed, Article 12(1) ‘defines’ 
rather than ‘establishes’ the . This language is borrowed from Article 11 
(Financial Mechanism) of the Convention, where it was used to avoid the creation 
of a new institution, thereby allowing the  to operate the Convention’s finan­
cial mechanism. Developing countries are underrepresented on the  Council 
and would probably put forth considerable resistance to the authorisation of the 
 as the  supervisor. However, it does remain a possibility that the World 
Bank will be involved with the management of the . 
Is there a system established within the cdm to regulate 
the exchange of environmental and financial benefits? 
The transaction at the core of the  (Article 12(3)) is described so ambigu­
ously that it leaves unanswered the fundamental question of who finances  
‘project activities?’ It also does not address the relationship between the funding 
and the extent to which an Annex I Party can use the resulting  to offset its 
commitment. Article 12(3)(a) provides that non-Annex I Parties are to ‘benefit’ 
from project activities. Article 12(3)(b) allows Annex I Parties to ‘use’ the  
that project activities generate. However, there is no direct link between the pro­
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Guidance can be taken from Article 3.12, which provides that  can be 
acquired by one Party from another Party. This suggests, but does not require, that 
a project activity related investment takes place in exchange for a . Indeed, while 
Article 12.6 leaves open the possibility that the ‘ shall assist in arranging fund­
ing of certified project activities as necessary, it is not clear that the  will involve 
the transfer of funds in any traditional sense of public or private project finance. 
Explicit references to the need for financial additionality were not included in 
Article 12. This can be explained, in part, by the perceptions of some negotiators that 
private sector investments, which are expected to generate the bulk of  project 
activities, are by definition ‘additional’ to public sector . Such investments could 
not, therefore, erode the level of publicly provided development assistance. However, 
at and since the Kyoto conference, at least one delegation has proposed that it run its 
climate-related bilateral  through the  as a means of generating  offsets. 
Either way, the identification of investment tied to particular project activity 
will clearly help establish the overall ‘additionality’ of the resulting emissions 
reduction. Certification of  from  project activities will, after all, depend 
on proof that ‘reductions in emissions are additional to any that would occur in 
the absence of project activity.’ 
The gap in the transaction between Articles 12(3)(a) and 12(3)(b) allows for the 
development of a number of proposals that may take the  in unanticipated 
directions. The disjunction between the beneficiary of the investment and the user 
of the  raises the possibility that entities may act as intermediaries between 
investors and hosts to pool funds and build a portfolio of projects involving a vari­
ety of hosts. The creation of such financial instruments could introduce liquidity 
into the system, which would allow  or pools of  to be held or trans­
ferred. Finally, the transaction gap invites discussion as to how  might be 
appropriately shared between an investor and a host. 
In what may prove to be the most revolutionary aspect of the ,Article 12(9) 
invites the participation of private/and or public entities (i.e., non-state actors) 
into both sides of an Article 12(3) transaction. Proposals by multilateral develop­
ment banks, and both commercial and not-for-profit organisations, reveal that 
the non-state actors are already beginning to position themselves as potential par­
ticipants in the  project cycle.49 It is clearly in the interests of these actors that 
the system be as simple to use as is possible, generating a high number of transac­
tions, with incentives designed to maximise the involvement of the private sector 
in technology-based solutions to the climate change problem. The higher the 
number of transactions, the more players involved. This will increase the size of 
the constituency of beneficiaries of the mechanism, which will in turn rearrange 
the alliances of business interests in the Annex I countries. Business interests that 
might otherwise block attempts to implement the Protocol might support it if 
they were to profit from it. Creating business community support for the Proto­
col, and  within it, will certainly aid ratification in the United States. Finally, 
more transactions will also increase the capacity of the mechanism to finance the 
facilitation of further transactions, thus producing a virtuous circle. 
It is possible, however, that the risks of abuse in the system, or simple failure to 
take into account what the flexible mechanism is for–to reduce global greenhouse 
gas emissions–might increase with a dynamic system with many powerful private 
parties and governments receiving large amounts of new investment. This makes 
validation, monitoring, and certification vital to the integrity of the system. 
49 See the Prototype Carbon
Fund of the World Bank at 
http://www.worldbank.org and
plans by the Inter-American
Development Bank to establish
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What are the guidelines for certification, auditing, and verification? 
Drawing from the experiences and principles established in the  pilot phase, 
Article 12 recognises that the key to credible  will be the rules, procedures, and 
principles that will govern the validation of project baselines, the monitoring of 
project performance and the certificates of emissions reductions. The principles 
for emissions reduction certification, set out in Article 12(5) will require a return 
to the fraught political and methodological issues of environmental additionality 
that have been raised by both the  pilot phase and  operations. 
The /’s approach to emissions reduction certification could be any­
thing from laissez faire to heavy interventionism. Article 12 certainly opens the 
possibility that a  project activity could involve only minimal participation of 
governments or intergovernmental institutions. The system must be attractive to 
use and efffective in reaching the objective of the Convention. 
Laissez Faire 
A project activity certification scenario that was heralded as ‘ideal’ by an industry 
representative in Kyoto described an Annex I-based parent corporation investing 
in energy savings in a non-Annex I subsidiary and offsetting the resulting emis­
sions reductions to avoid domestic regulations. Certifying such activities would 
likely generate a high volume of  . However, without further regulatory 
constraint, this laissez faire approach runs the risk of undermining the ’ 
objective of achieving environmental additionality. It is not clear under these cir­
cumstances that the energy efficiency project saves carbon from the atmosphere 
and if it is being used to enable more carbon to be burned at home. Furthermore, 
the absence of constraints on the emissions of developing countries could lead to 
substantial ‘leakage’ of emissions. In a worst case scenario, the same parent cor­
poration could pay for its energy efficiency investment in one non-Annex I coun­
try by switching to cheaper but more polluting processes for a subsidiary in the 
same or another non-Annex I country. In these circumstances, the parent would 
enjoy an increase in emissions, both at home and abroad, and suffer no adverse 
consequences. 
Interventionism 
At the other end of the spectrum, the  certification requirements could be as 
exacting as the ’s project cycle. Before a  project can claim to have generated 
a global environmental benefit, a project designer must construct and position for 
validation a baseline of domestic activity that would have occurred had  fund­
ing not been provided. In order to avoid what the  describes as the ‘moral 
hazard,’ which might tempt governments to lower a domestic environmental base­
line in order to become eligible for a larger  grant, the project baseline must 
reflect a minimal standard of ‘environmental reasonableness.’ In other words, the 
level of emissions reductions credited to a project not must be based solely on what 
would have taken place, but on what should have taken place. Applied to the above 
scenario, this would require that a parent corporation demonstrate that its sub­
sidiary was operating in an environmentally reasonable manner before it took 
credit for emissions reduced through an additional investment. 
The ’s closely regulated project approach design was demanded primarily 
by Annex II Parties that were anxious for reassurance that their  contributions 
were being well spent, and on activities that would not have otherwise occurred. 
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The  has the potential to reverse this incentive. If the bulk of the financial 
resources flowing through the  are from the private sector, government 
finance departments will be less concerned with designing rigorous rules. Indeed, 
Annex I countries as a group will have an incentive to lower barriers to project cer­
tification, as it will increase the amount of emissions reduction units available to 
offset their obligations. 
Applying high standards for validating  project baselines by, for example, 
demanding the same standard of environmental reasonableness from  pro­
ject proponents as is currently sought from  project proponents, holds some 
appeal. However, doing so does increase the possibility that the flow of projects 
may remain limited. Good project flow is vital for sustained investment. 
Monitoring a project activity to ensure that it is achieving the emissions reduc­
tions units it has promised to its investors and certifying those reductions once they 
have occurred is to be carried out by as yet undetermined entities, according to 
modalities and procedures elaborated by the /. It seems appropriate that 
this task be carried out by entities wholly independent of the governments and 
operational bodies that are designing and implementing the projects. It has been 
suggested that internationally recognised accounting or consulting firms such as 
 International might perform this function. During the  Pilot Phase, both 
private sector and not-for-profit agencies have been developing the expertise and 
the public profile, which should leave them in position to play this role.50 Alterna­
tively, commercial certification agencies could be considered. It is quite possible that 
an organisation like Société Général de Surveillance (), while acting in the same 
way as any private company looking to earn profits, could provide a service to both 
private companies contracting in, and governments regulating, international trade. 
Once an emissions reduction is certified as a , it will have monetary value 
and can be traded as a financial instrument. Secondary markets in certified emis­
sions reduction are likely to develop as well. It would be sensible to consider how 
to build this into the design of the  now. There will be an overlap in expertise 
between those involved in emissions trading. Since private actors are already get­
ting trading regimes off the ground, one can confidently expect this expertise to 
be in place by the time the  exists. The Chicago Board of Trade and possibly 
trading institutions in the City of London can be expected to have skills available 
to facilitate the expansion of this market. What is increasingly clear is that there 
will be a connection between  projects and trading, in that  generated 
from the project will be used by private actors in markets which will accept their 
investments. Project participants can use carbon credits as a kind of insurance 
policy, a means of raising extra finance for new technology, to reduce the cost of 
debt, to hold as an investment asset, or to exchange in a domestic, regulated, ‘cap 
and trade’ market for CO2. 
What are the limitations on the use of the Clean Development Mechanism? 
The rapid negotiation of Article 12 did not resolve the concerns of all of the dele­
gations about the equity or the effectiveness of the . This is most clearly indi­
cated by the limitation in Article 12(3)(b), whereby  may only ‘contribute to 
compliance with a part of ’ Article 3 commitments, as determined by the 
/. Efforts to restrict this part to a specific percentage within the text of the 
Protocol were unsuccessful, and proponents of this ‘flexibility mechanism’ have 
indicated that they interpret the provision as being a qualitative guide rather than 
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51 Under Article 6.1(d), an
Annex I Party is prohibited from
acquiring emissions reduction
units unless it is in compliance
with its inventory and reporting
obligations under Articles 5 and
7. Furthermore, should a ques­
tion arise through the Proto­
col’s In Depth Review proce­
dures with regard to a Party’s
compliance with Article 6, it
may not apply its emissions
reduction units until the ques­
tion is resolved. 
a quantified cap. Any final decision as to the size or character of the limitation will 
depend upon an analysis of the volume of  the  is likely to generate. Also 
considered will be the transaction costs it may bear, and the extent to which it will 
have to compete with the Protocol’s other flexibility mechanisms. 
Limitations on the types of project activities 
Given the ongoing debate about the , it has been suggested that the / 
develop policies to guide which categories of projects will be eligible for certifica­
tion. This would be done under an elaboration of Article 12(5), to categories or 
project activities which are agreed upon in advance to have ‘real, measurable and 
long-term benefits.’ The absence of any mention of sinks in Article 12, in the con­
text of their express inclusion in the parallel language of Article 6, will provide a 
basis for exploring whether land use change and forestry activities should be 
excluded from certification until scientific uncertainties associated with those 
projects are reduced. 
Restrictions on participation: Eligibility criteria 
As has been discussed, the creation of flexibility mechanisms also allows the pos­
sibility of suspending the right to access those mechanisms as a means of ensur­
ing all participating Parties have put into place the necessary regulatory infra­
structure and as a means of encouraging compliance with the Protocol’s 
obligations generally. Based on U.S. proposals, such compliance conditionalities 
were attached to Article 6 (Joint Implementation amongst Annex I Parties).51 As 
the Parties begin to review the inconsistencies between the Protocol’s various flex­
ibility mechanisms, it may prove appropriate to extend similar rules restricting 
access to the  to investors and hosts from Parties that are in compliance with 
all the regime’s obligations. 
Restrictions on timing: Ex post certification 
Concerns about the risks associated with some or all of the project activities that 
pass through the  might be met by allowing  only after the project activ­
ity has been completed. For example, for an investment in the retooling of a power 
plant with a 20-year life span, only the actual emissions reduced during the com­
mitment period in question could be offset against that period’s assigned amount. 
There is some basis for this ex post approach in the text of Article 12, which refers 
to emissions reductions ‘accruing from’ project activities (suggesting that they 
must have already occurred to be credited). However, the text does not say ‘having 
accrued from’ and the ex post approach does not introduce any sense of urgency 
or dynamism into the enterprise or reorienting the global energy market towards 
sustainable development. There will, however, be pressure from investors to offset 
the full projected value of their investment as soon as possible, perhaps prior to 
their having ‘fully matured.’ 
Administrative expenses and adaptation costs 
A final revolutionary aspect of the  is Article 12(8), which authorises the 
/ to ensure that a share of the proceeds from certified project activities is 
used to cover administrative expenses and assist with adaptation costs. This was 
the last paragraph of Article 12 that was agreed upon. Its conclusion was slowed by 
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economic activity by an international body, which is usually the exclusive preserve 
of sovereign states.52 Similar revenue raising proposals had been floated in the cli­
mate change negotiations before, in the context of taxes on wellheads and bunker 
fuel. These were rejected as radical extensions of supranational authority. 
As adopted, Article 12(8) leaves open the possibility that expenses and costs can 
be recovered by national authorities. The Article is unclear as to whether the word 
‘proceeds’ is intended to mean financial profits generated by an investment (if 
any), or some valuation of the  generated. 
It is furthermore unclear what role the  will play in authorising the expen­
diture of adaptation funding once it is collected. The Parties should anticipate dif­
ficult questions as to what kind of projects should be funded in which developing 
countries.As adaptation funding is always likely to be scarce in the face of an incal­
culable demand, proposals to ‘stage’ adaptation can be expected. 
Both the administrative and the adaptation surcharge raise issues with regard 
to the ’ ability to compete with the Protocol’s other flexibility mechanisms. 
The other mechanisms are not, at present, required to cover their costs or to con­
tribute to adaptation. The rate at which  proceeds are tapped will need to be 
set with regard to the elasticity of investors’ demand for . 
Conclusion 
Since Kyoto, the  has been the focus of intense interest and speculation among 
governments, the private sector, and intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organisations that have all seen the potential within the text of Article 12 to further 
develop or to invent roles for themselves in carrying out its multifaceted functions. 
Because it holds the aspirations of so many different constituencies, progress in 
elaborating the details of the  may well provide the first indications of the 
longer-term prospects for the Protocol as a whole. 
By way of a contribution to the debate, this article suggests a textual interpre­
tation of Article 12. This perspective, together with some appreciation of the pri­
vate sector interest in the , could display how the  might be used, or per­
haps what would need to be in place before it could be used. 
•	  Annex I governments appoint a  agency responsible for its partici­
pation in the . Depending on the government concerned, one can imag­
ine this being (a) wholly within the government bureaucracy; (b) partly within, 
as described by European law as an ‘emanation of the State,’ where, for exam­
ple, the government may have a controlling share in the business; or (c) wholly 
privatised. 
•	 Developing country governments would set up agencies to use the , prob­
ably within their foreign trade departments, but in conjunction with their envi­
ronment/energy/industry departments. These agencies could sponsor and 
promote potential  projects. 
•	 Extensive capacity building efforts are undertaken, perhaps led by United 
Nations Development Programme, to ensure that developing countries are 
able to play the game effectively. 
•	 The two agencies engage in bilateral negotiations to select projects, which in 
their view meet  rules that have been agreed to by the /. 
•	 The investor and the host enter into a legal arrangement reflecting the terms of 
agreement including the level of investment and the rights to any  the pro­
ject may generate. 
52 As will be seen from a com­
parison of fccc/cp/1997/crp.4,  
Article 14 and Article 12 of the 
Kyoto Protocol, the characteri­
zation of how administrative 
costs could be raised was one of 
the last parts of the package to
be agreed upon. 
 
 












   
 





















268    
 
•	 The Executive Board is notified that the Parties have agreed to initiate one or 
more projects. 
•	 An Executive Board-approved operating entity validates the baseline for each 
project. 
•	 Executive Board-approved Certifiers are appointed. 
•	 Notice is given to contracting parties and the Secretariat of the  and 
posted on the web site. 
•	 Certifiers report to the Executive Board. Certifiers are paid for, perhaps half­
and-half, by the private developers and the Annex I governments. 
•	 On the bases of a report from the Certifiers, the Executive Board determines 
whether a  is awarded to the project. 
•	 The agreed upon  are then transferred to the investor. 
•	 The / periodically reviews reports from the Executive Board. 
Depending on how the Annex I government wishes to involve the private 
sector, another dimension could be added to this outline procedure. Each Annex 
I Party’s  Agency could co-operate with the Environmental Protection 
Authority/Agency to match domestic environmental regulation of CO2 emissions 
with the  project . In effect, the government would participate in side 
deals to enable private investment overseas to achieve reductions of CO2, which 
could be used to set against national emission targets. Given that these are likely 
to be subject to a trading regime, a permanent connection can be made between 
the  and emissions trading which would have a global reach but be subject to 
a more manageable domestic regime. 
The State may wish to have a set of contracts, enforceable in the national courts, 
with the private sector to ensure that they are not financially responsible for any 
breach that is incurred at the international level. Or, more accurately, to ensure 
that if a State incurs liability through the activities of the private sector, the State 
is indemnified. Equally, the private sector will want contractual rights to enforce 
commitments made by the State. 
This outline raises many questions about the : How will the expertise of 
the private sector be reflected in the operations of the Executive Board? How can 
the UN bureaucracy move fast enough to accommodate the entrepreneurial speed 
of the private sector? How are private sector actors kept true to the objectives of 
Article 12 since they are not subjects of international law? 
The private sector is so essential to the effective operation of the  that their 
views must be sought assiduously. What would make them active users of the 
system? Clearly speed and low transaction costs are prized. Both developers and 
financiers lose from delay. The technology producers and suppliers need clear 
market openings to attract investment; uncertainty dampens enthusiasm for 
unusual investments. We must acknowledge that, hitherto, renewable energy pro­
jects have been considered unusual ventures. One hopes this is changing fast, but 
it is sensible to anticipate the need to persuade those who are cautious or prag­
matic that this new mechanism could really make a difference in how they con­
duct business. 
The essence of this proposal is to establish safeguards that constantly connect 
enterprising commercial activity to the purpose of Article 12, the Kyoto Protocol, 
and the . Governments are responsible, under the law, for honouring that 
purpose.  can play a vital role in bearing witness, in contributing expertise 
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established from the start with the creation of the new agency. It is concluded with 
legal responsibility for meeting their targets under Article 3. In between the market 
acts, first by developing projects and thn by trading the . The private sector 
needs as much certainty as possible, as well as low transaction costs. The govern­
ments provide this by accepting responsibility for failing to pass monitoring and 
verification tests. However, this can be reflected in the market price for , sim­
ilar to the way the government debt is valued in the market today. 
Bringing the mechanism to life as soon as possible after its planned 2000 start-
date would be a remarkable achievement. It would begin to alter the language of 
development assistance. It would reorient technology transfer. It would also co-
opt many private actors into the international legal regime to protect the planet 
from accelerated global warming. The  may prove as brightly coloured a lure 
for the private sector as it has for the governments and academics. Bit by bit its 
operation will attract risk-takers and entrepreneurs. It will attract idealists as well. 
New business will grow up to specialise in using the system. The renewable energy 
industry will receive a huge boost. Developers will learn how to adapt their exist­
ing businesses to get the most out of the new system. 
If developing countries are to be true beneficiaries, they are going to have to 
learn to play the game well. Enormous capacity-building enterprises will have to 
be launched. There is already a risk that the  will be further marginalised as 
moneys flow to the largest developing countries, which already attract significant 
foreign investment. Ideally, developing country businesses should come to the 
 with projects they want to sell. Developing country-based  brokers are 
already emerging, even if governments act on their behalf initially. The  
should ultimately enable developing countries to set up markets for the secondary 
trading of  . 
Taking into account the risks identified above, there remain major opportuni­
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Modernizing biomass energy 
Eric D. Larson 
Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton University 
Abstract 
Biomass accounts for an estimated one-third of all energy used in developing countries 
today. Most of this biomass is used inefficiently and with significant pollutant emis­
sions by the more than 2 billion people who cook using direct combustion of biomass. 
Contrasting today’s use of biomass energy, several recent major assessments of 
future global energy supply show much larger roles for biomass energy by the middle 
of the 21st century as part of a global strategy for reducing CO2 emissions to the 
atmosphere. When biomass is grown renewably (i.e., at the same average rate at 
which it is used for energy), little or no net emissions of CO2 result. Most energy ana­
lysts are surprised by visions of such large biomass contributions to energy supply 
because biomass ranks near the bottom of the list of preferred energy carriers today. 
However, if biomass can be modernized, i.e. converted cost-competitively into more 
convenient forms such as gases, liquids, or electricity, then much more significant use 
of biomass is conceivable. 
This paper discusses modernizing biomass energy within the context of climate 
change mitigation. The paper begins by defining modernization, and reviewing its 
advantages and disadvantages. It then addresses agricultural, environmental, and 
socioeconomic implications of biomass energy modernization for developing coun­
tries. Examples of modernization in the context of electricity production and cooking 
are provided. Finally, challenges to modernization are noted, along with some sug­
gestions for addressing the challenges. 
Introduction 
Biomass has been called “the poor man’s oil” because its direct use by combustion 
for domestic cooking and heating ranks it at the bottom of the ladder of preferred 
energy carriers. It might more appropriately be labeled “the poor woman’s oil,” as 
women (and children) in rural areas of developing countries spend a considerable 
amount of time daily gathering fuelwood needs. They also suffer the brunt of 
indoor air pollution caused by direct combustion of biomass for cooking and 
heating. Nearly 60% of all human exposure to particulate air pollution is esti­
mated to occur indoors in rural areas of developing countries (Figure 1). Studies 
in India have measured the inhalation by some women of the carcinogen 
benzo(a)pyrene during cooking to be equivalent to smoking 20 packs of cigarettes 
per day (Smith et al. 1983). 
Note: 
Globally, photosynthesis stores
energy in biomass at a rate that
is roughly ten times the present
rate of total global energy use.
Some 40 to 50 exajoules (EJ)
per year (1018 joules/year) of
photosynthetic production (less
than 2% of the total) is used for
energy today (Hall et al. 1993;
Reddy et al. 1997; Nakicenovic et
al. 1998). For comparison, total
global energy use is around 450
EJ/year. The precise biomass
contribution is uncertain 
because the majority of it is
used non-commercially in rural
areas of developing countries. 
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total human exposure to par­
ticulate air pollution (Smith
1993) 
Biomass accounts for an estimated one-third of 
primary energy use in developing countries. The 
biomass share in many African countries exceeds 
70%. Over 2 billion people cook by direct combus­
tion of biomass ( 1997). Traditional energy 
uses such as this place a low value on biomass, per­
petuating inefficient use and the exploitation of low 
cost sources. The low efficiency of current biomass 
indoor 
use means that the level of energy services provided outdoor 
is disproportionately lower than the biomass con­
tribution to primary energy supply. At the same 
time, much of the biomass energy used today is 
extracted from natural forests, contributing to 
deforestation (Reddy et al. 1997), especially where 
urban residential and industrial fuelwood demands are being supplied (Goldem­
berg and Reddy 1990). 
The use of biomass in industrialized countries contrasts sharply with its use in 
developing countries. On average, biomass accounts for 3% or 4% of total energy 
use. Where policies supportive of biomass use are in place, e.g. in Sweden, Finland,  
and Austria, the biomass contribution reaches 15 to 20%. Most biomass in indus­
trialized countries is converted into electricity and process heat using cogenera­
tion systems (combined heat and power production) at industrial sites or at 
municipal district heating facilities. The principal biomass fuels used in industri­
alized countries are residues of industrial processes or of logging. The processes 
being employed in industrialized countries are clean and efficient—especially 
compared to the ways biomass is typically used in developing countries. 
How might biomass energy help reduce future carbon dioxide emissions? 
Because carbon in biomass is extracted from atmospheric CO2 by photosynthesis 
during plant growth, the subsequent release of CO2 to the atmosphere when the 
biomass is used for energy simply replaces the CO2 previously extracted by the 
plant. As long as biomass is grown at the same average rate at which it is used for 
energy, it is a carbon-neutral energy source. If the use of carbon-neutral biomass 
energy replaces fossil energy, net reductions in emissions of CO2 to the atmos­
phere result.Alternatively, if biomass is grown but not harvested, carbon will accu­
mulate (i.e., be sequestered from the atmosphere) in the growing biomass until it 
reaches maturity. In either case, the inputs of carbon as fossil fuel needed to grow 
biomass are a small fraction of the carbon stored by photosynthesis (Williams 
1994). 
The distinction between (i) growing and harvesting biomass in “perpetual 
rotation” for use as a fossil fuel substitute to reduce CO2 emissions and (ii) using 
planted trees to extract and sequester carbon from the atmosphere is important. 
Until fairly recently, interest in biomass as a mechanism for coping with global 
warming has focused on the latter. However, growing biomass on a “perpetual 
rotation” basis for use as a fossil fuel substitute would provide substantially greater 
CO2 mitigation benefits under a wide range of conditions (Hall, Mynick, Williams 
1991a, 1991b; Marland and Marland 1992; Marland and Schlamadinger 1997). With 
advanced biomass production and conversion systems (such as those discussed 
later in this paper), biomass substituted for coal can be as effective in reducing CO2 
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emissions as carbon sequestration in planted trees, per ton of biomass. However, 
fuel substitution can be carried out indefinitely, while carbon storage in trees can 
be effective only until the trees reach maturity. Moreover, there are often impor­
tant environmental and socioeconomic benefits beyond carbon emissions reduc­
tions, such as buildup of soil carbon, jobs created to manage planted tree systems, 
local revenue generated from sale of biomass, and local biomass availability for 
non-energy uses. Using a “perpetual-rotation” strategy, these benefits will be con­
tinuous, with long-term impact (Sathaye et al. 1995; Larson and Williams 1995). 
CO2 mitigation strategies involving carbon storage in planted trees will be pre­
ferred to fossil fuel substitution mainly in regions where biomass yields are too low 
to be economically interesting for bioenergy production, or in remote areas where 
the costs of transporting the biomass to markets are too high. 
How much of an impact could biomass energy have on future CO2 emissions? 
Several recent major assessments of future global energy supply prospects show 
large potential roles for biomass energy, including scenarios developed by the Shell 
International Petroleum Company (Kassler 1994), by the World Energy Council in a 
joint study with the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Nakicen­
ovic et al. 1998), and by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ( 
1996). The  conducted a detailed exploration of five alternative low-emissions 
energy supply scenarios () for satisfying the world’s growing demand for energy 
services in the 21st century (Figure 2) while limiting cumulative CO2 emissions 
between 1990 and 2100 to under 500 gigatons () of carbon as CO2. Fossil fuel 
“decarbonization,” with long-term subsurface storage (sequestration) of the 
extracted carbon, is required in the mid-21st century to meet CO2 emissions targets 
in all scenarios,particularly in the coal-intensive and high-demand variants. In all of 
the  scenarios, a substantial contribution from carbon-neutral biomass energy 
as a fossil fuel substitute is also included. Biomass energy use is greatest and fossil-
fuel decarbonization and carbon sequestration are smallest in the biomass-inten­
sive variant. In this scenario, biomass energy contributes 180  per year to global 
energy supply by 2050, with the majority being used in developing countries (Figure 
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mass would be derived from high-yield energy plantations covering nearly 400 mil­
lion hectares (Figure 4), an area equivalent to one-quarter of present planted agri­
cultural area. The remainder would be derived from wastes and residues. 
figure 3 
Primary commercial energy use
by source for the biomass-
intensive variant of the ipcc 
less constructions, shown for 
teh world, for industrialized 
countries, and for developing
countries (ipcc 1996). 
figure 4 
Land areas of biomass energy
plantations by region for alter­
native less variants (ipcc , 
1996). 
How are such significant contributions from biomass energy possible? 
Most energy analysts are surprised by visions of large biomass contributions to 
energy supply for several reasons: 
•	 First, historically the trend has been away from biomass as incomes rise; 
•	 Second, the photosynthetic efficiency of biomass is low, making biomass very 
land-use intensive and giving rise to potential conflicts with other land uses, 
such as food production; 
  
 




























•	 Third, many are also worried about environmental issues, ranging from chemi­
cal contamination arising from intensively-managed production of biomass 
energy crops to loss of biodiversity associated with large monoculture bioenergy 
plantations; 
•	 Fourth, the economics, energy balances, and CO2 emissions balances of most 
biomass energy systems developed to date have not been especially favorable. 
All such concerns must be addressed if biomass is to play the substantial role 
envisioned in the energy scenarios discussed above, but if biomass can be con­
verted cost-competitively into more convenient and more efficiently-usable forms 
such as gases, liquids, or electricity, i.e., modernized, then large contributions from 
biomass energy are conceivable. 
The  scenarios were developed with the key assumption of biomass mod­
ernization: 
•	 Efficient conversion of biomass into convenient-to-use energy carriers for use 
in efficient end-use systems renders biomass widely attractive and competitive 
in energy markets; 
•	 High efficiency of conversion and end use reduces the demand on land resources; 
•	 Dedicated production of suitable biomass energy feedstocks is also modern­
ized and expanded, and more effective utilization of wastes and residues is 
practiced; 
•	 The high value of electricity and fluid fuels that can be made from biomass 
enables biomass to be valued more highly, thereby making it possible to pro­
vide greater inputs of material and labor into the biomass production process 
so as to ensure sustainable, environmentally-acceptable production; 
•	 The higher value also expands the potential economical supplies of biomass. 
What does modernization of biomass production mean? 
In biomass production, modernization implies the choice of biomass feedstocks 
that (i) offer the potential for high yields, low cost, and low adverse environmen­
tal impacts, and (ii) are suitable for use in modern energy systems. Efforts to find 
optimal combinations of feedstocks, conversion technologies, and end-use sys­
tems have not been made in the case of most familiar, “new” bioenergy systems,  
which involve the production of synthetic fuels from grains, sugar cane, sugar 
beets, or rape seed. Crops such as these were originally optimized for food pro­
duction, which meant they were valued for tastiness, protein, starch or sugar con­
tent. As a result, these crops tend to be suboptimal for energy use. While relatively 
little biomass is grown specifically for energy today, biomass resources from a vari­
ety of activities indicate that very high energy yields are possible compared to that 
of conventional agriculture or forestry activities (Figure 5). 
While high yields can help minimize the amount of land required for biomass 
energy production, biomass is still a land-intensive energy resource. To meet the 
 2050 projection of area needed for energy plantations, the developing coun­
try establishment rate of high-yield plantations must be about 5 million hectares 
per year between now and 2050. For comparison, industrial tree plantations in 
tropical regions were established at an average rate of 2.6 million hectares per year 
between 1981 and 1990 ( Project 1992), and the 1989 Noordwijk Declaration set 
as a target achieving a global net afforestation rate of 12 million hectares per year 
by 2000 (Ministerial Conference 1989). 
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figure 5 
Actual yields from various bio­
mass activities (IPCC, 1996). 
Will biomass energy production compete for land with food production? 
Are there sufficient land resources to support the level of energy crop production 
envisioned by the IPCC while having sufficient land for production of food and 
other essential needs? The strategies for minimizing potential competition for 
land include agricultural modernization and using degraded lands for biomass 
energy production. 
The simultaneous modernization of biomass production for energy and bio­
mass production for food may help avoid competition for land. These “two mod­
ernizations” could be pursued synergistically. The availability of low-cost modern 
energy carriers (especially electricity) derived from biomass could spur rural 
enterprises and generate the income needed to pay for the capital investments and 
inputs required for modernizing agriculture (Larson and Williams 1995). Higher 
yield agriculture can in turn provide larger quantities of biomass residues that can 
be used for energy. If the potential for modernizing and intensifying agriculture 
were realized, land for biomass energy would be more available. 
Consider recent food-versus-fuel assessments for India (Ravindranath and 
Hall 1995; Sudha and Ravindranath 1999)—a country that most casual observers 
would consider to have little spare land. Ravindranath and Hall observe that the 
total area under crops in India was roughly the same in 1990 (around 125 million 
hectares) as it was 20 years earlier, despite population growth averaging about 
2.4% per year during these two decades. (Cultivable non-cropland has also 
remained stable at about 40 million hectares.) In looking to the future land 
requirements for agriculture, Ravindranath and Hall note that the average yield of 
India’s most important crop, rice, is only about half the Asian average, one-third 
of the yield in China and Japan, and one-fifth the Korean yield. They also note that 
in some states of India (Tamil Nadu and Punjab), the rice yield is double the 
Indian average. 
From these data and an analysis of the barriers to raising crop yields and crop­
ping intensities (i.e., cultivation of at least two crops per year through irrigation),  






    
 


















tripling average annual yields in India, and thereby for doubling or tripling food 
production without increasing cropped area. Such a scenario leaves substantial 
amounts of land for other uses. 
Targeting degraded lands for biomass energy production is another strategy for 
minimizing land use competition (Johansson et al. 1993; Hall et al. 1993; Williams 
1994; Ravindranath and Hall 1995; Sudha and Ravindranath 1999). Planting of tree 
or perennial-grass energy crops is more likely to lead to improvement of such 
lands than planting of annual row crops. In developing countries in aggregate, 
Grainger (1988 and 1990) and Oldeman, et al. (1991) have estimated that there are 
over 2 billion hectares of degraded lands. Grainger further estimates that some 621 
million hectares of these lands are suitable for reforestation. Houghton (1990) has 
estimated that previously forested area suitable for reforestation amounts to 500 
million hectares, with an additional 365 million hectares available from land in the 
fallow phase of shifting cultivation. There are a wide variety of technical, socioe­
conomic, political, and other challenges involved in successfully growing energy 
crops on degraded lands. However, the feasibility of overcoming such challenges 
is demonstrated by the fact that many successful plantations have already been 
established on degraded lands in developing countries (Hall et al. 1993; Parham et 
al. 1993). 
In 1996, China generated crop residues in the field (mostly corn stover, rice straw, 
and wheat straw) plus agricultural processing residues (mostly rice husks, corn­
cobs, and bagasse) totaling about 790 million tons, with a corresponding energy 
content of about 11 EJ (Gu and Duan 1998). To put this in perspective, if half of 
this resource were to be used for generating electricity at an efficiency of 25% 
(achievable at small scales today), the resulting electricity generation would be 
about half of the total electricity generated from coal in China in 1996. 
Where population densities are high, greater use of land for food production 
will be required, and dedicated energy crop production will be less feasible. In such 
regions, agricultural residues will be an especially important biomass energy 
source. In fact, biomass residues might play important roles in such regions pre­
cisely because the regions produce so much food—crop production can generate 
large quantities of byproduct residues. For example, in 1996 China generated crop 
residues in the field (mostly corn stover, rice straw, and wheat straw) plus agricul­
tural processing residues (mostly rice husks, corncobs, and bagasse) totaling about 
790 million tons, with a corresponding energy content of about 11  (Gu and 
Duan 1998). To put this in perspective, if half of this resource were to be used for 
generating electricity at an efficiency of 25% (achievable at small scales today), the 
resulting electricity generation would be about half of the total electricity gener­
ated from coal in China in 1996. 
What are potential environmental impacts 
of modernized biomass energy production? 
Modernizing biomass energy production raises environmental concerns, includ­
ing concerns about intensive agricultural management practices that energy plan­
tations might require and concerns about taking agricultural residues from the 































278    
 
habitat diversity are the primary issues. Such concerns must be effectively 
addressed if there is to be widespread grassroots public support for biomass mod­
ernization efforts, which will be required for modernized biomass energy to play 
significant roles in the world’s energy systems. 
There is no doubt that biomass can be grown for energy in ways that are envi­
ronmentally destructive. However, it is also possible to improve land relative to 
present use through the production of biomass for energy. The environmental 
outcome depends sensitively on the state of the land before biomass production 
is started and on how the biomass is produced (Kartha and Larson 2000; Larson 
and Williams 1995). Environmental issues associated with biomass energy pro­
duction are beginning to be widely addressed (Cook et al. 1991; Beyea et al. 1992; 
Davidson 1987; Gustafsson 1994;  1993; Sawyer 1993; Shell and  1993; WEC 
1994). 
Consider the challenge of sustaining the productivity of the land. Harvesting 
biomass removes nutrients that must be restored. With many modernized bio­
mass conversion systems (detailed below), it is feasible to recover most mineral 
nutrients as ash, which can be returned to the land. However, nitrogen is lost to 
the atmosphere at the conversion facility and must be replenished. Environmen­
tally sensitive measures can be taken to address this nutrient need. For example, 
when trees are the harvested crop, the leaves, twigs, and small branches in which 
nutrients are concentrated can be left at the site to reduce nitrogen loss; this also 
helps maintain soil quality and reduce erosion.Also, biomass species that fix nitro­
gen in the soil can be selected as the energy crop or for interplanting with other 
energy species to eliminate or reduce to low levels the need for artificial fertilizers. 
Biomass production for energy allows much more flexibility than agriculture in 
meeting fixed nitrogen requirements this way. 
Energy crops also offer flexibility in dealing with erosion and chemical pollu­
tion from herbicides, problems associated largely with planting frequency. If the 
energy crop is an annual crop, the erosion and herbicide pollution problems 
would be similar to those for annual row-crop agriculture; cultivating such 
crops—for energy or for agriculture—should be avoided on erosion-prone lands. 
However, potential biomass energy crops also include fast-growing trees that are 
harvested only every three to eight years and replanted perhaps every fifteen to 
twenty-four years and perennial grasses that are harvested annually, but replanted 
only once in a decade or so. Both of these alternatives tend to sharply reduce ero­
sion as well as the need for herbicides (Hohenstein and Wright 1994). 
Dedicated biomass energy production will support a much narrower range of 
biological species than productive, naturally vegetated land. However, if energy 
production is established on degraded lands, it will generally support a more 
diverse ecology than was possible before restoration. Similarly, if biomass energy 
production replaces monoculture food crops, the effect on the local ecology will 
depend on the energy crop species chosen, but in many cases the shift will be to a 
more ecologically varied landscape. 
What are potential socioeconomic impacts 
of modernized biomass energy production? 
Two key socioeconomic issues associated with modernizing biomass energy pro­
duction are the potential for rural employment and income generation and the 































Because it is an employment-intensive activity, the growing of biomass will gen­
erate rural jobs. Carpentieri, et al. (1993) estimate that large industrial plantations 
in Brazil today generate 1.9 to 3.6 direct jobs per square kilometer. Parikh and 
Reddy (1997) indicate that 20 jobs per square kilometer were created at one small-
scale fuelwood plantation site in India. While these employment levels may be rel­
atively modest, they are important locally, and additional indirect jobs are also 
likely to be created. Moreover, the income generation from biomass energy planta­
tions would often compare favorably to income generation from food crops. For 
example, in Brazil, where the selling price of purpose-grown biomass energy might 
typically be $2/GJ (Carpentieri, et al. 1993), the gross annual revenues generated by 
a plantation would be $400 to $600 per hectare, assuming biomass yields of 10-15 
dry tons/ha/yr. Such revenues are comparable to the revenues that are generated 
from soybean production in Brazil today. While gross annual revenues might be 
comparable, the cost of inputs for biomass energy production (especially for 
woody crops with 3 to 8 year rotations) are likely to be substantially lower than 
those for an annual crop like soybeans. Moreover, unlike the situation with Brazil­
ian soybeans, which are largely exported, biomass would be used locally for energy,  
which in turn could be consumed in additional income-generating industries 
within the region. (The comparison of soybeans with biomass production does 
not imply that the two would compete for the same land. As discussed earlier, it 
might be desirable to target degraded areas for multi-year rotation biomass energy 
production. Such areas may not be suitable for an annual crop like soybeans.) 
The prospect that low-cost energy from advanced biomass conversion systems 
will attract energy-intensive industries (and associated high-paying jobs) to rural 
areas is perhaps the single most important benefit that biomass production could 
offer to rural populations. This could provide the income needed in rural areas to 
modernize agriculture, as noted earlier, and also help stem urban migration. 
Concerns are sometimes raised about large biomass energy plantations dis­
placing local populations engaged in land-use activities that they do not want to 
abandon. This fear is based on the assumption that large plantations are required 
to take advantage of economies of scale to make bioenergy competitive. However, 
this supposition is not necessarily correct. Farm forestry in Brazil has been one 
approach that has been especially effective in involving small farmers in the high-
yield production of biomass (Larson and Williams 1995). There is extensive expe­
rience also in small-scale fuelwood production in India (Ravindranath and Hall 
1995). 
In a typical farm-forestry program in Brazil, a forestry company provides the 
material inputs and technical know-how for establishing trees on a farmer’s land 
(1 to 50 hectares of trees per farm) and contracts with the farmer to buy some or 
all of the first harvest for an agreed upon price that incorporates repayment for the 
initial inputs and services. The inputs include saplings (usually some species of 
eucalyptus), fertilizers (applied at planting), herbicides (applied at some point 
after planting), and pesticides. The company samples the farmer’s soil and pro­
vides fertilizers and tree species “tuned” to that farmer’s soil. 
Because of the sophisticated material inputs and the careful tending provided 
by the farmer, the biomass yields reported from small-farm plantings are not 
much below those reported for large-scale industrial plantations that are owned 
and operated by forestry companies. In addition, most programs in Brazil started 
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their contracting companies learn improved methods and approaches. Limited 
data suggest that even with present farm-forestry systems, the delivered costs for 
biomass are not much different than from large-scale plantations. 
Several hundred thousand hectares of farm forests have been established in 
Brazil since the mid-1980s with support from the private sector; federal, state and 
local governments; and farmers. The results of the small-farm forestry programs 
include minimal changes in land ownership and use patterns, increased reason­
ably priced local wood supplies, and a new revenue source for farmers—including 
former subsistence farmers. 
What does modernization of biomass conversion mean? 
Modernized biomass conversion implies the use of technologies that offer, at the 
scales appropriate for biomass energy conversion facilities, low unit capital costs 
and high thermodynamic efficiencies for making modern energy carriers—mainly 
electricity and high-quality liquid and gaseous fuels. High conversion efficiencies 
are needed to maximize the useful services derived from the biomass and to enable 
competitive use of relatively high cost biomass such as dedicated energy crops. 
Also, because long-distance biomass transport is costly, conversion facilities must 
be modest in scale, compared to fossil fuel conversion facilities, to be competitive. 
A number of systems that meet the above criteria for modernized biomass con­
version can be identified (Larson, 1993). Processes that begin with thermochemi­
cal gasification, which involves the conversion of solid biomass at 800-1000oC into 
a fuel gas containing carbon monoxide and hydrogen as the primary com­
bustibles, are especially promising. Such processes offer enormous flexibility in 
the choice of feedstock, because the only important feedstock properties are high 
yield, low cost, and low environmental impact. Some possibilities for moderniz­
ing biomass-based electricity production and biomass-based cooking fuels pro­
duction are discussed here. 
How can electricity production from biomass be modernized? 
The coupling of biomass gasification with gas turbine power generation is promis­
ing for modernizing biomass-based electric power generation at a scale of 30 to 100 
MWe (Williams and Larson 1996). Biomass-gasifier/gas turbine (/) systems 
have the potential to double the efficiency of electric power generation compared 
to conventional (steam turbine) technology and decrease unit capital costs, result­
ing in more competitive total costs per kWh (Table 1). / commercialization is 
the focus of demonstration projects in Brazil, Sweden, the , the , and else­
where (Waldheim and Carpentieri 1998; Sipila and Korhonen 1999). Potential 
applications of / systems include various co-product systems, e.g., animal 
feed and power (Salo and Horvath 1999) or cooking fuel and power [see below]; 
combined heat and power production in industries that generate biomass or bio­
mass-derived fuels as process byproducts such as the forest products industry 
(Larson and Raymond 1997; Weyerhaeuser et al. 1995); and stand-alone power gen­
eration (Carpentieri, Larson, and Woods 1993; Rensfelt and Everard 1999). 
The sugarcane processing industry serves to illustrate the potential impact that 
/ technology could have on modernizing biomass electricity production. 
Some 80 developing countries grow and process sugarcane. The production of 
sugar or ethanol from sugarcane generates a fibrous biomass byproduct (bagasse) 




















table 1 potential for ‘excess’ electricity generation
from sugarcane processing facilities in developed countries 
1995 Cane 2025 Cane 2025 ‘Excess’ 1995 Utility 2025 Cane 
Production Prod. @ 2%/yr. Electricity Elec. Prod. Elec./1995 
(million tc) (million tc) (TWh/year) (TWh) Utility Elec. 
Brazil 304 550 330 257 1.3 
India 260 470 282 364 0.8 
China 70 127 76 859 0.09 
Caribbean 48 87 52 42 1.2 
Indonesia 31 57 34 58 0.6 
Other Latin Am. 152 275 165 438 0.4 
Others 233 422 253 912 0.3 
Totals 1098 1988 1192 2930 0.4 
is typically used today as a fuel for combined heat and power generation at mills 
to supply the mill’s process energy requirements. 
Historically, there has been little electricity exported by sugar factories because 
of the low efficiency of the conventional bagasse-fired combined heat and power 
systems. However, sugar factories have the potential to become major exporters of 
electricity. Figure 6 shows the amount of excess electricity generation possible 
(above and beyond process electricity needs) per ton of sugarcane (tc) processed. 
Most existing sugar mills use low-pressure (~20 bar) boilers feeding inefficient 
steam turbines and generate no excess electricity from bagasse. A few mills in 
developing countries now utilize higher-pressure boilers (40-60 bar) and more 
efficient steam turbines (condensing-extraction steam turbines, ), which 
result in excess power generation of the order of 100 kWh/tc from bagasse. By 
making cost-effective changes to the process to reduce steam consumption, a  
system can export an additional 20 or 30 kWh/tc (middle bar, Figure 6). 
With bagasse as fuel, a sugarcane processing facility is limited in its potential to 
generate electricity outside of the cane crushing season, which typically lasts six 
months in many countries. By using a supplemental fuel during the off-season, 
however, considerably more power could be exported. A potentially attractive 
supplemental fuel is cane trash, the tops and leaves of the sugarcane plant. These 
are generated in quantities comparable to the amount of bagasse generated 
(Goldemberg et al. 1993). Today they are typically burned on the fields to facilitate 
replanting or harvesting, though the resulting air 
pollution has motivated some governments to ban 
this practice. Using cane trash to enable year-round 
power production, a sugar mill using  tech­
nology could nearly triple exportable electricity 
production compared to generating only during 
the crushing season. Adopting / technology, 
a sugar mill could nearly sextuple excess electricity 
production (Figure 6). 
Table 2 gives some perspective on the potential 
contribution of / “cane power” to overall 
electricity supply in developing countries. The 
table demonstrates an estimate of the electricity 
generation potential at sugarcane processing facil­






Electricity generated in excess
of on-site requirements per
tonne of sugarcane crushed at
a sugar or ethanol factory using
different cogeneration tech­
nologies (Larson, 1994). Exist­
ing technology is the back-pres­
sure steam turbine with steam 
pressure about 20 bar. CEST is a
condensing extraction steam
turbine with steam pressure
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recent average annual rate of increase in sugarcane production. For some 80 devel­
oping countries, “excess” electricity from cane residues in 2025 could amount to 
40% of the amount of electricity generated by all utility generating plants in these 
countries in 1995. For some countries-e.g., Brazil and some Caribbean nations-the 
contribution of cane-derived power could be much greater. 
How can cooking with biomass table 2	 comparison of electricity costs from biomass and

conventional (steam turbine) technology and be modernized?
 
gasifier/gas turbine technology (elliot and booth 1993)
 
Fluid cooking fuels emit far fewer toxic 
Gasifier/ pollutants than solid fuels (Figure 7), and 
Conventional Gas Turbine 
cooking with fluid fuels is far more effi-Technology Technology 
cient (Figure 8). Thus, if biomass can be 
Power plant capacity (MW electric)	 25 25 
converted efficiently into fluid cooking Biomass fuel cost at the plant ($/dry tonne) 40 40 
Electric generating efficiency (lower heating value %) 20 45 fuels, it becomes possible to meet larger 
Installed capital cost ($/kW) 1800 1300–1500 cooking energy demands than are being 
Power plant capacity factor (%)	 85 85 
provided by biomass use today and to do so 
Electricity generating costs (us$ per kWh) with far fewer detrimental health impacts. 
Capital recovery (8% real rate of return) 4.2 30.–3.5 
One option is to use “producer gas,” the Operating and maintenance 0.5 0.5 
Biomass fuel 3.6 1.6 product of thermochemical biomass gasi-
Total generating cost 8.3 5.1–5.6 fication (Dutt and Ravindranath 1993). 
There is considerable experience world­
wide in the use of “town gas,” the product of coal gasification, which has the same 
principal combustible components as producer gas (carbon monoxide and hydro­
gen). Town gas was widely used in urban areas of industrialized countries in the 
late 1800s through the mid-1900s as fuel for cooking and heating. Town gas con­
tinues to be used in urban areas in China, India, and some other developing coun­
tries. Producer gas from biomass is attractive because it can be generated using rel­
atively simple, small (village-scale), low-cost devices that convert 60 to 70% of the 
energy in the original biomass into fuel gas. Some provinces of China that are par­
ticularly rich in agricultural residues (e.g., Jilin and Shandong) have recently 
launched major programs to introduce producer gas from crop residues for cook­
ing in villages (Dai et al. 1998; Cao 1998). With proper use, producer gas is a much 
figure 7 
Measured emissions (to room
air) of products of incomplete
combustion (PIC) from flue-less

























more convenient, efficient and clean cooking fuel 
than direct burning of the biomass. However, its use 
presents the possibility of accidental carbon monox­
ide poisoning. 
Liquefied petroleum gas (, conventionally a 
mixture of propane and butane) and dimethyl ether 
(, with chemical formula CH3OCH3) are two 
non-toxic fuels that can also be made from biomass 
via gasification, followed by catalytic synthesis of the 
gas into liquid products, and then refining of the raw 
synthesis products (Larson and Jin 1999a,b; Andren 
et al. 1999). Both are gases at atmospheric pressure, 
but can be stored as liquids under moderate pres­
sures. Fossil fuel derived  is already used for cooking in developing countries, 
e.g., many urban Chinese households use , and an estimated 30 million rural 
households also use some (Wang 1997). DME has received some attention as a pos­
sible cooking fuel (Chen and Niu 1995), but is not being used for this purpose 
today. 
The production of  or  from biomass is now conceivable as a result of 
recent technological developments, both in / for electricity generation (dis­
cussed earlier) and in oil and gas industry technologies for synthesizing liquid 
hydrocarbons from natural gas or gasified coal.“Gas-phase” hydrocarbon synthe­
sis technologies were first introduced commercially over 50 years ago, but the eco­
nomics of these are prohibitive except at scales far larger than can be conceived of 
with biomass. However, “liquid-phase” synthesis technologies, which improve 
economically at a smaller scale, are emerging (Knott 1997; Tijm et al. 1997; Rentech 
1999), driven by interests of the oil and gas industry in converting remote pockets 
of natural gas into liquids that can then be transported significant distances to 
markets (Fouda 1998). 
Liquid-phase processes provide for potentially attractive economics for “once­
through” co-production of liquids and electricity (Choi, et al. 1997). In this case, 
gas containing CO and H2 is passed once through the synthesis reactor. Any gas 
not converted to liquids goes to a gas turbine to generate electricity. Liquid-phase 
synthesis provides for much greater single-pass conversion of gas to liquids than 
is possible with gas phase synthesis (Bechtel Group 1990; Lewnard et al. 1993). As 
a result, liquid-phase synthesis gives efficiencies of liquids production in a once-
through configuration that cannot be achieved without additional reaction steps, 
recycle loops, and process energy consumption with traditional gas-phase syn­
thesis. The economics with once-through processing are better as well. 
Illustrating the significance of the liquid-phase once-through concept for 
modernization of biomass-based cooking, Larson and Jin (1999) have estimated 
the cost of co-producing synthetic  and electricity from corn stalks gathered 
from a radius of 11 km in Jilin Province, China. They estimate that the cost of bio­
mass-derived  would be competitive with current  prices in rural areas of 
that province (Figure 9). 
Jilin is home to 2% of China’s population and grows 14% of China’s corn, which 
amounts to about 35 million tons of corn stalks annually. About half of these are 
used for soil conditioning and fertilization, for livestock fodder, and for industrial 
feedstock (Cao 1998). A large number of rural households burn stalks for domes-
figure 8 
End-use energy consumption
for cooking with alternative
cooking fuels and stoves (Dutt
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Estimated production cost of
Fischer-Tropsh LPG from bio­
mass in a "once-through" facil­
ity as a function of sale price for
co-produced electricity (Larson
and Jin, 1999). 
tic cooking and heating, contributing to poor indoor air quality in many homes. 
However, now, with rising farm incomes, there is a shift away from the domestic 
use of stalks and toward coal briquettes. The unused stalks are burned in open 
fields to prevent buildup of undecomposed residues that can harbor insect infes­
tations, which is creating new and serious outdoor air pollution problems. 
Because of the high efficiency of converting biomass to LPG (and using it in 
cooking), Larson and Jin estimate that less than 30% of the total Jilin corn stalk 
supply converted to  and electricity would be sufficient to meet all rural Jilin 
cooking fuel demands. The co-produced electricity would be equivalent to more 
than triple the present per household electricity demand in rural Jilin households. 
For China as a whole, Li, et al. (1998) project that some 376 million tons of agri­
cultural residues will be available for energy use in 2010 (from a total residue gen­
eration of 726 million tons). Converting the available residues to LPG could meet 
the cooking fuel demand of some 560 million people, about 40% of China’s pro­
jected 2010 population. Electricity would be co-produced at about 2.5 times the 
rate projected for the Three Gorges hydroelectric facility. 
What are some key practical challenges to modernizing biomass? 
Sound technology, with the potential for economic viability, is an essential ele­
ment of strategies that seek to modernize biomass energy on a wide scale. Because 
biomass conversion technologies are typically relatively small, however, establish­
ing cost-competitiveness is challenging due to the well-known phenomenon of 
unit costs rising as unit sizes fall. On the other hand, small unit size is a potential 
advantage in that it facilitates achieving economies of scale in manufacturing and 
economies of scale in learning through repeated applications. This advantage can 
be exploited only if there is a sufficient scale of demand for the technology. Criti­
cal levels of demand needed to achieve cost reductions through scale economies 
can be created through regulatory or other mechanisms. 
For example, in Brazil the demand for ethanol fuel was created initially by sub­
sidies that made it attractive for private producers to make ethanol instead of 
 































sugar. Ethanol production grew at over 30% per year for the first decade of the pro­
gram, reaching some 12 billion liters per year by 1985. Considerable technology 
learning took place and standard distillery designs were developed by equipment 
manufacturers, both of which helped reduce the costs of ethanol production and 
enabled the industry to continue producing ethanol at a high level of output even 
as subsidies started to be reduced beginning in the mid-1980s (Moreira and 
Goldemberg 1999). Even with the recent large drop in prices paid to producers in 
mid-1999, ethanol production is expected to continue at a high level due to the cost 
reductions that have been achieved since the inception of the program. 
An approach to encouraging widespread replication of village-scale biomass 
energy systems is the granting of rural concession areas, analogous to those 
granted for oil and gas exploration and production (Shivakumar et al. 1998). The 
key steps in developing a resource using a concession approach include: 
• a regional survey to identify prospective areas to be developed; 
• delineating the resource area into concession areas; 
• soliciting bidders under published terms and conditions; and 
• licensing successful bidders. 
The key objectives in applying a concession approach to replicating bioenergy 
systems are (i) to encourage the development of a large number of applications 
and (ii) to enable successful bidders to take advantage of equipment and learning 
cost reductions, as well as administrative and overhead cost reductions, arising 
from multiple applications in their concession area. 
A concession approach could be envisioned, for example, for the installation 
and operation of village-scale biomass-based electricity generating systems 
throughout a rural concession area. Any single village may generate a relatively 
small amount of power, but many villages all generating power could make sig­
nificant contributions to electricity production from a national perspective. Con­
cessionaires would be able to provide electricity to customers at competitive rates 
as a result of reducing overhead costs associated with contract negotiations, with 
marketing, manufacturing, installation, operation, and maintenance, etc. The 
Global Environment Facility is currently supporting pilot projects involving con­
cession approaches to rural electrification based on renewable energy in 
Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, and the Philippines. 
In addition to scale, another important consideration in many projects where 
biomass-based electricity generation is involved is access to the electric utility grid. 
This is important because the economics of any power generating system depend 
on how extensively the installed capacity is utilized, i.e. on the system capacity 
factor. Often in rural areas, local demands for electricity will initially not be high 
enough to give economically viable capacity factors for biomass generating sys­
tems. To remedy this problem, power might be exported from the rural area to 
urban demand centers via the utility transmission grid until the size and diversity 
of local power demands grow. Even where grid extension has been judged uneco­
nomical for electrifying a rural area, it may nevertheless be economical if the elec­
tricity were transmitted from, rather than to, the rural area (Kartha, et al. 2000). 
When electricity is sent to urban areas from rural areas, transmission lines can be 
utilized at high capacity, making transmission more cost-effective than when elec­
tricity flows from urban to rural areas to meet sporadic and low levels of electric­
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which many remote hydroelectric installations and mine-mouth coal power 
plants currently provide power to urban centers. 
Utilities worldwide have historically been reluctant to purchase power from 
independent generators, but regulatory measures have been used successfully to 
overcome this reluctance. For example, in the United States, the 1978 Public Utili­
ties Regulatory Policy Act () forced utilities to buy and pay fair prices for 
purchased electricity.  led to the installation of several thousand megawatts 
[C1]of biomass-derived electricity generating capacity in the  in the 1980s (and 
ultimately to the ongoing deregulation of the electric power industry). Similar leg­
islation is starting to be enacted in a few developing countries. A law in Brazil that 
would mandate fair buy-back rates for biomass-generated electricity is currently 
in the public hearing stage—bagasse-based electricity generation at sugarcane 
processing facilities is expected to grow significantly once the law is enacted. India 
has in place a fixed purchase price for biomass-generated electricity that has 
encouraged expansion of biomass generating capacity there. 
Who will make biomass energy modernization happen? 
Strong institutions and leadership at international, national and local levels, as 
well as the involvement of the private sector, are needed to help surmount practi­
cal challenges to widely implementing modernized biomass energy systems 
(Kartha and Larson 2000). 
International institutions have important roles to play (Reddy et al. 1997; 
 1999), including 
•	 helping to launch initiatives that encourage South-North joint ventures aimed 
at developing, adapting, or transferring technology for converting biomass to 
modern energy carriers; 
•	 facilitating investment and financing for biomass energy modernization; and 
•	 setting policies and programs that support strong national programs, e.g.,  
those aimed at restoring productivity to degraded lands through biomass 
energy production. 
At the national level, coherent policies and regulation regarding biomass energy 
development are essential to clarify rules and roles of participants. Also, rationaliz­
ing electricity tariffs and fossil fuel prices, e.g., by lifting subsidies or otherwise 
more fully reflecting costs (including social and environmental costs) will help to 
level the playing field for all energy sources. National-level land-use planning 
(Kinzig et al. 1999) and promulgation of socioeconomic and environmental guide­
lines for biomass energy projects is also important in order to provide investors 
and project developers a uniform and consistent set of principles and specific rules 
for developing biomass energy systems. Generating and providing information 
and technical assistance relating to biomass resources and technologies are addi­
tional important roles for national-level institutions, as is facilitating project 
financing. Strong national-level institutions supporting the development of bio­
mass energy are needed to foster the establishment of strong local institutions. 
Motivated local institutions engaged in the design, implementation and ongo­
ing management of individual biomass energy modernization projects is essen­
tial. Local coordinating institutions can provide forums for articulating local 
needs and concerns, and for building political consensus. Not only does local par­















strated that such participation generates a sense of ownership that is a critical 
ingredient for the success of projects over the long term. 
Finally, the private sector has essential roles to play in expanding biomass 
energy modernization, with appropriate public-sector oversight and competitive 
bidding for projects. Especially important capacities for the private sector relate to 
technology, including manufacturing, marketing, installation, operation, and 
maintenance (Jain 1995). Commercial enterprises can be effective entities for facil­
itating repeated application of technology by applying accumulated experience 
and knowledge to new projects. Also, the private sector’s inclination toward entre­
preneurial risk-taking and its capability for international partnering can facilitate 
financing, development, and spread of improved technologies. 
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Abstract 
Increased energy efficiency at the point of end-use is a key strategy for addressing a 
range of energy related problems, including greenhouse gas emissions. There are 
energy efficiency alternatives that can be implemented at low cost,and perhaps with 
some cost savings – these activities offer no-regrets opportunities for climate change 
mitigation. In addition, high levels of end-use energy efficiency will be key for sus­
tainable growth of energy systems, which will be required for economic growth and 
the concurrent increased demands for energy services. 
This paper briefly reviews the role of energy in development, and the main expe­
riences and considerations associated with energy efficiency as a strategy for least-
cost provision of energy services.A major challenge for society is accelerating the rate 
of energy efficiency improvement to meet the increasing demand for energy services 
and to ameliorate the negative impacts of increased energy supply at the same time. 
Thus, the primary focus of this paper is the discussion of various policies and incen­
tives that are conducive to energy efficiency, within the context of development. 
Introduction 
The overall objective of an energy system should be to provide energy services at 
affordable cost without socially unacceptable side effects. Energy services, such as 
illumination, refrigeration, torque, cooling and heating, and cooking, are what 
satisfy people’s daily needs, not pure kilowatt-hours (kWhs) of electricity or liters 
of gasoline. Energy services may also allow access to other forms of service 
through, for example, transportation or internet use. Energy commodities are a 
means to an end, not an end unto themselves. There are many alternative and 
superior means of providing energy services with reduced external impacts from 
energy supply. 
If the present trends in energy demand and the energy supply mix persist, the 


























   
 








294    
 
1 See WEA 2000 for a recent 
review of global energy issues. 
will continue to worsen (Goldemberg et al. 1988). Improved efficiency in the 
extraction, conversion, and distribution of energy, along with increased reliance 
on renewable sources of fuels and electricity, are key strategies to substantially 
improve the situation. It is clear that minor adjustments of the present energy 
system, such as lower emissions of various pollutants or increased energy security, 
will be insufficient to meet objectives formulated by society ( 1997). 
Placing stress on energy services rather than energy supply brings improved 
energy efficiency into focus, especially at the point of end use. Historically, society 
has neglected energy end-use efficiency improvements compared to efforts to 
expand and improve efficiency of conventional energy exploration, conversion, 
and distribution. However, interest in end-use efficiency strategy as a means of 
meeting the demand for cost-effective energy services is growing. While there are 
many historic examples of impressive increases in end-use efficiency, countries 
around the world are still very far from reaching the ultimate limits of efficiency, 
as defined by the laws of physics. 
The share of energy being consumed by developing countries will continue to 
increase in the coming decades. At the same time, developing countries will also 
be facing the task of accelerating socioeconomic development and increasing 
standards of living, closing the gap between industrialized countries and develop­
ing countries. The proportion of global primary energy supply consumed by 
countries that are members of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development () and transition economies is projected to decrease from 68% 
in 1995 to 54% by 2020. Conversely, consumption by China and the rest of the 
developing world are projected to increase from 32% to 46 % in this time period 
( 1998). 
Solutions to energy planning and policy will differ between countries and 
regions depending on available resources, technical skills, geography, culture, and 
other conditions. Developing countries tend to have relatively abundant and inex­
pensive labor, whereas capital may be scarce and expensive, which may lead to diff­
erent energy planning solutions than those employed in industrialized countries. 
These solutions are reliant on national research and development to devise energy 
strategies that are tailored to the nation’s specific needs, at times utilizing labor-
intensive, capital-frugal techniques. In this context, energy efficiency is an 
approach, or strategy, that can help simultaneously meet multiple development 
objectives. 
In this article we briefly review how energy is used and what factors influence 
energy demand. We also discuss the potential for end-use energy efficiency 
improvements and explain some barriers to capturing economically cost-effective 
solutions by the market. Different policy instruments to overcome such barriers 
are also discussed. 
What are the trends in energy use? 
Before the industrial revolution, plants and animals were the primary sources of 
energy. Since then, energy use has grown exponentially. Today coal, oil, and gas 
contribute 77% of global primary energy demand.1 Nuclear power and hydro 
power account for about 6.3% and 2.3% respectively, and the remaining 14% is 
wood fuel and other biomass-derived fuels. Developing countries use a much 
larger share of biomass fuels than industrialized economies. They also tend to use 












   


















   295
 
Globally, nearly 40% of all fuels and electricity are used in buildings for heat­
ing, cooling, lighting, cooking, and for running equipment and appliances. A sim­
ilar amount is used in industry in a large number of processes such as electrolysis, 
distillation, melting, and drying, as well as lighting, ventilation, compressed air, 
etc. The remaining 25% is used for transporting goods and people – although the 
transportation share of total energy use is increasing in many countries. 
Two-thirds of all total primary energy is used by the wealthiest 25% of the 
global population. This is a reflection of the much higher levels of energy services 
enjoyed by affluent, industrialized countries. The economic elite in developing 
countries also frequently have energy consumption patterns that are similar to the 
affluent in industrialized countries. In many developing countries, energy 
demand doubles every six to ten years, while it remains stable or grows gradually 
in industrialized countries. 
National energy intensities, as expressed by energy use per unit of gross domes­
tic product () are decreasing in several industrialized countries and some 
developing countries (Nilsson 1993). These trends are a result of energy efficiency 
The average efficiency of electricity generation in central station power plants 
has increased by a factor of six since the turn of the century. However, even in 
industrialized countries about 70% of the potential energy of primary fuel is 
wasted in the process of delivering kWhs of electricity. 
improvements and structural changes, i.e., a shift of economic activity to less 
energy-intensive sectors of the economy. For example, in  countries the pro­
portion of  earned by industry dropped from 37% to 32% between 1974 and 
1989. In addition, there are structural changes towards less material and energy 
intensive products within industry. 
The basic materials industries account for most of industrial sector energy use. 
Declining consumption intensity of many basic materials such as steel, cement, 
ammonia, and chlorine in industrialized countries – as measured by kg per  
– is an indicator of structural change (Williams et al. 1987). This trend is driven by 
market saturation of goods such as fertilizers and refrigerators, and improved and 
lighter construction, which reduces the amount of material needed for a given 
product. In addition to the slowing growth in demand for many basic materials, 
the processes by which they are produced have become more energy-efficient, 
even during long periods with decreasing energy prices. 
While maintaining a certain level of energy services, primary energy use can be 
reduced and energy efficiency improved essentially in two ways: higher end-use 
and conversion efficiencies. The efficiency by which energy services such as refrig­
eration, light, and transportation are provided is increasing as a result of technol­
ogy development. For example, the efficacy in lumens per watt for a modern light 
source is several times higher than for Thomas A. Edison’s original carbon fila­
ment lamp, which in turn was more efficient than candles or wick-lamps. 
Energy conversion and distribution losses have also been reduced. The average 
efficiency of electricity generation in central station power plants has increased by 
a factor of six since the turn of the century. However, even in industrialized coun­
tries about 70% of the potential energy of primary fuel is wasted in the process of 
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electricity saved at the point of end-use, three to four units of primary fuel are 
saved. For many developing countries the leverage is even greater. 
Increased use of modern energy carriers such as electricity and fluid fuels has 
contributed to lower energy intensities. In particular, the flexibility of electricity 
as an energy carrier has contributed to technological innovation and increased 
industrial productivity. The advantages of electricity have led to increasing shares 
of electricity in the energy balances of most countries. For example, Swedish 
industry replaced nearly all direct hydropower and steam engines with electric 
motors in the relatively short period between 1900 and 1955. 
In developing countries, the demand for energy services is increasing as 
economies grow. Higher incomes are leading to increased demand for energy-
intensive basic materials and energy-consuming products, such as televisions, 
cars, air-conditioners, and refrigerators. Thus, during economic growth, develop-
While most of the world’s iron-making is based on the use of coke, coal-poor, bio­
mass-rich Brazil has developed a modern charcoal-based process based on the 
efficient use of eucalyptus grown on plantations; this iron is processed into a 
high-quality steel that is competitive in world markets ( 1997). 
ing countries may partially repeat the experience of industrialized countries by 
undergoing a phase of increased energy use per unit of GDP while building infra­
structure, expanding basic industries, and accommodating changing consumer 
preferences. 
Perspectives on energy planning and policy are quite different between indus­
trialized countries, developing countries, and economies in transition. Even 
within each of these groups there is significant variance; however, some common 
trends are apparent. Industrialized countries generally have mature energy supply 
systems, growth in supply is low, and in many areas there is an over-capacity of 
supply. Access to electricity and other modern energy carriers is nearly universal. 
Saturation effects are evident in equipment for end-use services such as refrigera­
tion, lighting, torque, and cooking. Capital for energy efficiency projects can, in 
principle, be raised easily through the financial markets. 
By comparison, developing countries are experiencing tremendous growth in 
demand for energy services. There is still substantial room for growth in services 
and energy supply, since many people do not have access to any electricity or com­
mercial energy and those who do face limitations and reliability problems. Resi­
dential sectors are frequently without appliances that the industrialized world 
tends to take for granted, such as refrigerators, electric lights, and televisions. Even 
if such appliances were available at the residential level, the electricity to operate 
them might not be available. Customers in all sectors also face constraints on the 
quality and quantity of energy services due to the availability of economically fea­
sible technologies.As a result, most developing country governments are currently 
considering methods for providing energy services, often focusing on expanding 
energy supply infrastructure. 
The energy services in European economies in transition (EITs), economies 
that were formerly centrally planned, are similar to those of other industrialized 
countries in some respects, i.e. the level of service available. However, the oppor­
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Energy supply infrastructures are adequate, yet they are often obsolete, polluting, 
and oversized due to economic downturns and removal of energy subsidies. 
Demand for more services and transportation fuels is also increasing rapidly, 
especially in the road transportation sector. 
What are the opportunities for energy e≤ciency? 
A whole-system approach is required in order to provide energy services in the most 
efficient manner. This method begins with analyzing the types of services needed 
and the most efficient means of supplying those services using mainly locally avail­
able resources. An example of this is designing an energy-efficient building using 
solar energy. Decisions are then based on the technologies and the type and quantity 
of energy supplies that can help fulfill any remaining need for energy services at the 
lowest cost – ideally also including social and environmental costs. 
When energy efficiency measures result in saved units of energy, they can then 
be used for other purposes. These surplus units, sometimes called ‘negawatts,’ can 
provide the same services as generated units except they are generally cheaper, 
cleaner, faster to obtain, safer, less interruptible, and less burdensome on national 
security than generated units of energy. As a result, investing in energy efficiency 
can provide higher returns of services to society for a given financial investment 
than investing in energy supply. This type of energy system design philosophy is 
called end-use oriented, least-cost method, or a bottom-up approach. 
Within the context of the least-cost method, developing countries might invest 
in more energy efficient and water efficient irrigation systems to reduce the cost of 
pumping. In situations such as villages that maintain a local power supply, energy 
efficiency investments can help reduce capacity requirements or enable a given 
capacity system to provide more energy services. 
End-use oriented, least-cost energy strategies are aimed at achieving the great­
est developmental gains for society, given the limits of available capital and tech­
nology. End-use, least-cost development saves financial resources, which can then 
be devoted to other services such as health care, education, commercial develop­
ment, and job creation. This strategy will help to get the most use from energy ser­
vices out of the available resources. Energy services are vital for many important 
areas of development, and having high quality energy services is indispensable for 
keeping a nation’s citizens and businesses healthy. 
What is the potential for modern technology transfer? 
In some cases, technology transfer from industrialized countries to developing 
countries has taken the form of shipping old, obsolete, inefficient, and polluting 
equipment to the developing country. This practice has helped to encourage rep­
etition of the detrimental formative development patterns of the industrialized 
world. The operation and maintenance of these inefficient technologies can also 
tie up the developing country’s economic resources. The transfer of state-of-the 
art technologies will provide developing economies with many of the additional 
benefits of energy efficiency, including improved national energy security, 
reduced trade imbalances from energy imports, greater demand for skilled labor, 
and increased industrial competitiveness. 
Developing countries have the opportunity to ‘leapfrog’ the steps taken by 
industrialized countries and develop new technologies, or use the most efficient 
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most widely cited, example of leapfrogging is the direct application of modern 
technology for telecommunications in developing countries, e.g., optical fibers 
and cellular phones. By jumping directly to the advanced technologies, many 
countries have avoided wasting resources on labor and material-intensive copper 
cables when expanding infrastructure. 
In the context of energy efficiency, one historical example of leapfrogging is in 
Mexico, where the world’s first plants for producing iron by direct reduction 
(without smelting) were built. This technology, used in conjunction with electric 
arc furnaces for steel-making, is especially well suited to many developing coun­
tries because favorable returns can be realized at scales of 100,000 tons of annual 
capacity or less, compared to the 2.5 to 3.5 million ton per year needed for con­
ventional blast furnaces plus oxygen-blown converters. Another example is in 
Brazil. While most of the world’s iron-making is based on the use of coke, coal-
poor, biomass-rich Brazil has developed a modern charcoal-based process based 
on the efficient use of eucalyptus grown on plantations; this iron is processed into 
a high-quality steel that is competitive in world markets ( 1997). 
New technologies for demand-side efficiency are becoming widely available, 
with lower costs, increased efficiency, and improved service. In contrast, many of 
the fuels needed for supply-side electricity generation are becoming more difficult 
and expensive to find. In the residential sector, the available ‘state-of-the-shelf ’ 
technologies for lighting, heating and cooling for indoor air and water, cooking, 
and appliances have dramatic improvements in efficiency and life-cycle cost of 
operation over those currently in use or most frequently purchased. There are 
technologies available to the commercial and industrial sectors, such as improved 
lighting systems, drive-power and motor systems, industrial process heat and 
chemical reactor systems, along with heating, ventilation, and air conditioning 
systems that use up to 90% less energy to provide the desired services. 
What is the potential for improved efficiency? 
Research into various areas of energy end-use suggests that actually implement­
ing the best designs and technologies available today could reduce energy use dra­
figure 1 
Electricity use in refrigerators in
Denmark. Technical develop­
ment typically leads to
improved energy efficiency.
Based on data from Professor 
Jorgen Norgard, Department of
Buildings and Energy, Technical
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matically and improve energy efficiency several times relative to present levels 
(von Weizäcker et al. 1997). For example, the best new refrigerators use less than 
half as much energy as the present average refrigerator in use. Advanced technol­
ogy, which is not yet commercially available, uses as little as one-fifth of the pre­
sent average. 
The amount of potential for energy efficiency improvement is sometimes 
debated, and confusion arises due to varying conceptions of ‘potential.’ Defini­
tions range from what may be technically possible to what may be perceived as 
economic and achievable in practice. Estimates of the potential for saving energy 
by improving end-use efficiency typically vary from 5%–15% up to 75%–95%, 
depending on the end-use application and technical and economic assumptions 
(see Figure 2). At the lower end, typically, are estimates of the overnight potential 
for profitable changes with short payback times in existing installations. Reported 
payback requirements for investments in energy efficiency are typically one to 
three years. An example of low-cost overnight measures is improved control or 
time-scheduling of lighting and ventilation systems. 
Over the longer term, energy efficiency opportunities arise when equipment is 
replaced at the end of its lifetime, during new construction, or when a building is 
renovated for reasons other than improving energy performance. Taking these 
opportunities to apply energy-efficient technology can reduce energy use by more 
than 50% relative to the average technology used. The potential increases further 
when requirements for short payback times are relaxed, and a more long-term 
economic perspective is applied. Using best available ‘off-the-shelf,’ or advanced 
technology, takes us even closer to the theoretical minimum energy use for any 
given service. 
Evaluating end-use technology investments based on life-cycle cost () 
analyses frequently shows a broad minimum in the  curve. In other words, the 
net present value of capital plus energy costs does not change much when capital 
is substituted for energy. For a given energy service, there are many alternative 
choices with different levels of energy efficiency and capital costs but with the 
same . Examples include selecting air-handling unit sizes for a given task, 
figure 2 










   
 










may result in greater energy
efficiency improvements at
lower cost than when com­
ponents are viewed in isola­
tion. (Adapted from Nilsson
1995) 
In the context of energy efficiency, one historical example of leapfrogging is in 
Mexico, where the world’s first plants for producing iron by direct reduction (with­
out smelting) were built. This technology, used in conjunction with electric arc 
furnaces for steel-making, is especially well suited to many developing countries. 
sizing pipes in a pumping system, adding extra insulation to a house, or different 
vehicle technology alternatives. Thus, there is little economic risk involved in 
making an extra investment associated with a higher energy efficiency alternative. 
Potential estimates and efforts to improve efficiency sometimes concentrate on 
reducing energy losses in individual components, such as air-conditioners or boil­
ers. Greater opportunities for cost-effective energy efficiency improvements are 
typically identified when using a system-wide approach, as illustrated in Figure 2. 
The cost of improving the efficiency of only a cooling or heating system of a house 
may increase to a point where it becomes uneconomical to continue making fur­
ther efficiency improvements. However, system-wide efficiency measures, for 
example through improved insulation and building design, may bring cooling and 
heating needs down to a level where the conventional cooling or heating system 
can be replaced by a much less expensive system or eliminated altogether. 
It is also worth noting that the energy efficiency potential is changing as higher 
efficiency technologies are continuously being introduced into the market. A 
common misconception about energy efficiency is the idea of ‘ever-rising costs’ to 
achieve greater energy efficiency (H. Nilsson 1995). An example of this is the idea 
that improved designs for energy-efficient and -free refrigerators will auto­
matically require more expensive insulation materials and compressors. However, 
this perspective does not take into account the dynamics of real markets, where 
factors such as technological breakthroughs and development, learning, produc­
tion volume, and industrial retooling bring costs down. It also ignores the reality 
that energy efficiency improvements often are introduced in conjunction with 
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The greatest opportunities for energy efficiency typically arise at the time of 
new construction. The cost of retrofitting an existing building to a certain level of 
performance is considerably higher than installing technologies during construc­
tion. Failure to do so may result in lost opportunities, i.e., it may be prohibitively 
expensive to improve an existing building or to replace a new but inefficient 
household appliance. In countries with high rates of economic growth and asso­
ciated investments in industry, buildings, etc., it is particularly important to seize 
these energy efficiency opportunities when they are available. 
Energy scenarios can be used for exploring various development paths for the 
global energy system. Such scenarios can demonstrate that solutions to current 
energy problems are possible, and that sustainable energy futures, for example 
with 60% to 70% reductions in carbon dioxide emissions relative to present levels, 
Improving a work environment through installing energy efficient lighting and 
air-handling will save energy, but the value of a 5% to 10% office worker pro­
ductivity increase that may potentially result from the change may be ten times 
higher. 
are compatible with the need for increased levels of energy services. A key element 
in sustainable energy scenarios is an accelerated rate of energy efficiency improve­
ments relative to historic rates. Best available technologies or advanced technolo­
gies are assumed to reach high levels of market penetration in such scenarios. In 
addition, sustainable energy future scenarios are based on a greater utilization of 
renewable energy and other advanced technologies.2 
What are the non-energy benefits? 
End-use oriented, least-cost energy strategies do more than just save energy and 
money for consumers and capital developers. There are many non-energy bene­
fits to this approach as well. As discussed earlier, energy-efficient design of services 
may help save capital, thereby allowing funds to be put toward providing energy 
services to customers that might not previously have had access. In addition, this 
saved capital can be used for improving other aspects of people’s lives such as 
health care and education. 
The improvements in productivity, quality, process control, etc. from energy 
efficiency practices can help boost productivity and product output while creat­
ing new jobs in industry. This productivity improvement can enable these indus­
tries to compete internationally, which will, in turn, attract more capital invest­
ment to the country. Many energy efficient technologies, such as high-efficiency 
motors and lights, allow increased operation control, resulting in large increases 
in material, energy, and labor productivity. Increasing the competitiveness of a 
business also facilitates attracting investment, gaining international market share, 
and earning foreign currencies. 
At the individual project level, the non-energy benefits may dwarf the eco­
nomic value of direct energy savings. This is often observed when implementing 
day-lighting technologies or modern artificial lighting, which substantially reduce 
maintenance costs in addition to energy costs. Improving a work environment 
through installing energy efficient lighting and air-handling will save energy, but 
the value of a 5% to 10% office worker productivity increase that may potentially 
2 For further information, see 
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3 See, for example, Fisher and
Rothkopf 1989; Jochem and
Gruber 1990; Golove and Eto 
1996; and Reddy 1991. 
result from the change may be ten times higher. Other non-energy benefits can be 
more difficult to quantify. For example, shifting from cooking on inefficient 
wood-stoves to efficient stoves using electricity or a fluid fuel such as biogas can 
substantially improve indoor air-quality and reduce negative health impacts from 
indoor air pollution. 
An end-use, least-cost energy strategy will also help to make a nation’s energy 
system more reliable on a local level, and more secure on a national scale. Energy 
efficiency improvements reduce the need to invest in large power plants and large, 
extensive transmission and distribution systems. It simplifies the system by 
moving the energy service, creating capacity (efficiency projects) closer to the end-
user. This has a financial value in terms of both risk reduction and reliability. 
Nationally, energy efficiency improvements may help to keep resources within the 
country rather than draining money from the economy to burn more oil, coal, and 
natural gas imported from other countries. Energy efficiency improvements can 
also help support current industry and develop new national industries in 
efficiency technologies, as well as design strategies and distributed energy systems 
utilizing alternative energy supply technologies. 
Nations using energy efficiency and renewable energy strategies will suffer less 
local and regional environmental pollution. Indoor and outdoor air quality will 
be greatly improved by reducing or eliminating the use of inefficient energy tech­
nologies that send large amounts of pollution into the local air for cooking, indus­
trial process heat, transportation, and electricity generation. This pollution takes 
the form of particulate matter, nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds, 
ozone, sulfur dioxide, etc., all of which adversely affect human health. 
What is to be done to implement energy efficiency? 
Barriers to energy efficiency 
There are many barriers to the successful implementation of an end-use, least-
cost strategy for energy services. These barriers can help explain why a system may 
require outside intervention in order to accomplish development goals. The out­
side agent may be a government agency, a private sector company, a non-govern­
mental organization (), or an international lending or aid institution. 
Among the barriers to end-use, least-cost planning is the traditional ‘supply­
side’ mentality of energy planners, international financial institutions, and gov­
ernment agencies. These organizations have traditionally pursued supply expan­
sion as a first step toward increasing energy services rather than focusing on 
energy services. This approach is typified by an increased supply of raw energy 
being defined as an end unto itself, rather than as one of many possible means to 
an end. It often fails to fully realize the true end-goal of improved access to qual­
ity energy services. It is akin to the old adage of throwing money (or energy) at a 
problem and hoping for the best solution. 
There are several other reasons why energy efficiency improvements that are 
apparently economically attractive are not implemented. There is an extensive lit­
erature on this subject.3 A complete list of specific barriers would be very long. 
However, there are three general categories of barriers that can be identified: 
• low fuel and electricity prices; 
• differences in economic criteria between energy users and suppliers; and 
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Such scenarios can demonstrate that solutions to current energy problems are 
possible, and that sustainable energy futures, for example with 60% to 70% 
reductions in carbon dioxide emissions relative to present levels, are compatible 
with the need for increased levels of energy services. A key element in sustainable 
energy scenarios is an accelerated rate of energy efficiency improvements rela­
tive to historic rates. 
The environmental, security, and other external costs associated with energy use 
are generally not reflected in fuel and electricity prices. For example, it has been esti­
mated that if the environmental costs associated with electricity production in coal 
and oil-fired power plants were included, the cost of electricity from such plants in 
Europe would approximately double. Even though it is difficult to quantify envi­
ronmental externalities, such as the cost of future climate change, risks associated 
with nuclear power, or the cost of keeping oil flowing from the Middle East, the deci­
sion not to consider them quantifies them implicitly by setting their value at zero. 
Direct or hidden energy supply subsidies are common in many countries. It is 
estimated that between $250 and $300 billion is spent in subsidies globally 
per year ( 1997). Prices are sometimes used as political instruments–fuels 
and electricity may be subsidized or even given away for free to obtain public sup­
port. Artificially low electricity rates may be sometimes offered to attract indus­
tries. Energy-intensive industries that compete on international markets are typi­
cally exempt from energy taxes or receive a tax refund based on the amount they 
export. The long-run marginal cost for new fuel or electricity production is high 
in most areas, but prices to end-users are usually based on the lower average cost of 
production. 
Under-investment in end-use energy efficiency that results from low energy 
prices is further compounded by the difference in economic criteria between energy 
users and suppliers. This is caused in part by differences in the access to financing. 
Investments in new power plants are often evaluated using real discount rates of 4% 
to 6%. In contrast, end-users often require one to three-year payback times on 
investments in energy efficiency, implicitly assuming discount rates of 30% to 100%. 
A primary reason for this is that end-users do not have the same access to capital as 
large energy suppliers. Consequently, from a whole-system perspective, there is 
over-investment in supply and under-investment in energy efficiency. 
The difference in economic criteria is also related to the fact that energy is a low 
priority to most end-users.As a result, information and awareness about the oppor­
tunities to improve efficiency are limited. In many instances there are misplaced 
incentives, e.g., when a landlord buys equipment for which a tenant must pay oper­
ating costs. The high required rates of return are also in part a reflection of the trans­
action costs involved in finding and evaluating investment options, and the risk that 
the investor will not receive the expected benefits. One important policy objective is 
improving the market mechanisms by reducing transaction costs and thereby help­
ing consumers, architects, engineers, and managers make better choices. 
Getting there: Policies and implementation practices 
A successful energy policy builds upon a vision of a nation’s development. This 
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ments to be made, the types of jobs created, and how to optimize the capital invest­
ment under the constraints of competing demands for resources. Analyzing a 
nation’s assets (including natural resources, skilled labor, and capital) and defin­
ing goals will help direct a coherent development strategy along with an intelligent 
energy policy and a well thought out plan to implement it. 
There are a variety of policy tools that can be used to stimulate increased energy 
efficiency. It is critical to try to foresee the logical short- and long-term responses 
to some of these policy measures to determine if they will have the intended effect. 
Consideration of the incentives that will be in place after a given policy is imple­
mented will help to forecast responses to the policy in terms of natural resource 
issues, technology development, and socioeconomic behavior. Policies may be 
general in nature, e.g., energy or carbon taxes, or targeted to overcome or remove 
barriers for specific sectors or technologies. 
It is also important to develop a full understanding of the balance of incentives 
and disincentives (motivators not to participate in an activity) needed to trans­
form energy consumption patterns toward policy goals that address energy 
efficiency both directly and indirectly. For example, electric utilities often have 
incentives to generate and sell increasing amounts of electricity. They are 
rewarded for selling electricity and penalized for reductions in its use. Incentive 
systems or regulations need to be established to reward utilities for providing 
energy services, rather than units of energy, as efficiently as possible. An impor­
tant step toward that end is to allow utilities to collect profits from implementing 
energy efficiency measures. 
There are many forms of policies and market mechanisms for promoting and 
supporting energy efficiency programs in energy service markets. These include: 
• voluntary and compulsory standards and building codes; 
• energy labeling of equipment; 
• regulation of monopoly energy companies; 
• design guidelines and education for architects or industrial engineers; 
• Research Design and Development () efforts; 
• energy service company () activities; 
• market transformation programs; 
• public-private initiatives and voluntary agreements; 
• government procurement policies, consortiums, and financial incentive pro­
grams; and 
• other market mechanisms. 
Each of these programs or policies has the potential to increase energy 
efficiency. Each also has unique benefits and drawbacks. 
An effective method of initiating energy efficiency strategies is the implementa­
tion of policies that rely on market mechanisms. Energy efficiency potential is a 
dynamic entity and it will continue to increase. Policies that rely on market mecha­
nism are more likely to capture this potential and spark entrepreneurial activity. In 
some areas market mechanism strategies may have a greater impact than, or be an 
important complement to, the energy efficiency command and control structures 
that are typically favored by governments, such as taxes, regulations, and standards. 
Market approaches can go a long way toward achieving the goal of an energy-
efficient and developed economy. However, regulations and energy taxes may still 
be used for shaping energy demand. During the design of a manufacturing process 
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or building or when an appliance is being purchased, the cost of operation due to 
energy prices is often not considered. Hence, policies that rely on manipulating 
energy prices are only one strategy for encouraging energy efficiency and may not 
be the most effective for achieving policy goals. 
The use of market mechanisms that push the performance of the products and 
services in a more energy efficient direction, in any given market, is sometimes 
called market transformation. One technique for transforming markets is ‘fee­
bates,’ where a certain standard is set for a product by a government agency or 
other independent source. Products that perform above the standard receive a 
rebate off of their sale price; products that perform below the standard are charged 
a fee that is attached to their sale price. The program is revenue neutral; the fees 
pay for the rebates. The effect is to encourage manufacturers to produce efficient 
products, and for consumers to buy them. Consumers with more socially and 
environmentally attuned buying habits are rewarded while those imposing 
energy-related costs on society are penalized. This is a market approach that incor­
porates the ‘polluter pays’ principle. 
Market transformations are limited in their effectiveness, however. Customers 
still need individual attention because the existing stock of houses or electric 
motors is much larger than the new capital equipment purchases. Transforming 
markets may not remove inefficient equipment if it has a long lifetime. There will 
These surplus units, sometimes called ‘negawatts,’ can provide the same services 
as generated units except they are generally cheaper, cleaner, faster to obtain, 
safer, less interruptible, and less burdensome on national security than gener­
ated units of energy. As a result, investing in energy efficiency can provide higher 
returns of services to society for a given financial investment than investing in 
energy supply. 
still be a need for programs designed to eradicate obsolete, inefficient equipment 
in homes and businesses. Market transformations only work at the point of pur­
chase or design. They cannot address the abundance of less efficient equipment 
that is currently being used in all sectors. 
On the opposite end of the policy spectrum, regulations and standards can be 
an effective way of ensuring a base-level of energy efficiency. Typically, product reg­
ulation determines a minimum acceptable level of energy consumption or perfor­
mance, and requires that it be met. This type of regulation succeeds in eliminating 
the worst products or services from the market and can be very effective in improv­
ing the overall performance levels of new investments. However, manufacturers or 
designers may view the regulation only as a requirement to meet, rather than as a 
starting point. There is little incentive to increase energy performance beyond the 
minimum set by the government.An often heard comment about regulation is that 
when, for example, an architect exclaims proudly that the building he designed 
‘meets code,’ he is really saying that if he built it any worse he would be fined. The 
result, from refrigerators to commercial buildings, is that energy performance 
tends to clump around the government’s mandated standard with little variation 
between companies. The government must then revise the code or standard every 
few years, as technologies and design strategies improve, rather than having this 
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Thus, energy efficiency strategies offer low or negative cost, and can be 
approached as no-regrets opportunities for mitigating climate change. 
regulatory and voluntary standards can be effectively used in combination with 
market-based approaches to stimulate improvement in energy efficiency. 
The government can also help to coordinate voluntary programs that help to 
encourage companies or consumers in a market to come together, and in so doing 
receive benefits for cooperation that might not otherwise been available to the 
market. This approach has been successfully implemented in Sweden through a 
number of technology procurement or market transformation projects to 
improve the performance of appliances, buildings, and industrial equipment. 
Similar approaches have been tried in North America, for example through the 
Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles program, the Super Efficient Refrig­
erator Program, and the Green Lights program. 
In summary, energy efficiency should be an intrinsic part of energy policy, and 
energy policy an intrinsic part of development policy. Thus, policy strategy should 
include energy efficiency as an integral component of the development process. 
Policy strategy should foster a comprehensive and coherent set of incentive sys­
tems that encourage energy efficiency in all areas of development. The implication 
of this is that energy efficiency will always be considered when a project or invest­
ment is being planned. 
Summary 
Energy efficiency, like other productivity improvements, helps to enhance devel­
opment by providing increasing levels and quality of service. There is no trade-off 
between protecting the environment and providing critical development services. 
Energy-efficiency strategies incidentally provide environmental protection to 
those populations who need it most—those who are most likely to suffer from 
environmental problems and who can least afford to recover from them. Increased 
energy efficiency is a key element in sustainable energy futures with low carbon 
dioxide emissions. 
There are several historical examples of impressive increases in energy 
efficiency, and the potential for continued improvements is great. Theoretically, 
the same level of energy services could be provided using only a fraction of the 
energy supply used today. With the existing technology, it is cost-effective to 
reduce energy use by 50% or more in some applications. Bottom-up studies sug­
gest that industrial countries can reduce their energy demand by 10% to 30% at 
low or negative cost to society, even when external costs are not included. Thus, 
energy efficiency strategies offer low or negative cost, and can be approached as 
no-regrets opportunities for mitigating climate change. 
The major challenge for society is to accelerate the rate of energy efficiency 
improvement in order to meet the need for energy services, particularly in devel­
oping countries, and at the same time to ameliorate the negative economic, social, 
and environmental impacts of increased energy supply. Various policies can and 
should be used to promote energy efficiency, including codes and standards, pro­
curement policies, , market transformation programs, financial incentives, 
etc. The preferred solutions, however, must be sensitive to a range of technology 
and country-specific conditions. 
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It is unrealistic to think that developing countries can achieve their develop­
ment objectives without increasing their energy consumption. A wide variety of 
strategies will be needed to implement a coherent policy of providing energy ser­
vices while establishing the most efficient means of energy supply to provide the 
raw inputs needed for those services. Energy efficiency is a cornerstone of sus­
tainable development in industrial and developing countries alike. 
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Most developing countries are neither prepared
to address nor interested in climate change 
Luis Gómez-Echeverri 
United Nations Development Programme 
Abstract 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (unfccc) has the 
potential to become one the most important instruments to-date for addressing 
urgent global and local environmental and developmental priorities. It is also one of 
the most inclusive in that it incorporates important actors from government as well 
as private sector and civil society. Because of the importance of their full participa­
tion, the success of the Framework Convention rests greatly on the effectiveness of 
the instruments established for international cooperation by its signatories. Also cru­
cial to the success of the Framework Convention will be the engagement of all coun­
tries, both rich as well as poor. But the engagement of developing countries will only 
come through programs and actions that also address urgent development and 
poverty eradication priorities. Thus, while it is obvious that the mechanisms of the 
unfccc and Protocol will be essential in mitigating and adapting to climate change, 
they will not be sufficient in-and-of-themselves. Other mechanisms such as a 
strengthened and well-replenished Global Environmental Facility and Official Devel­
opment Assistance (oda) will be needed to reinforce the Convention and its objec­
tives. Without them, many developing countries will not have capacities required to 
make the Framework Convention a success. 
Introduction 
Climate change is one of the most serious environmental problems that human­
ity faces today. Unfortunately, most countries are lacking the basic tools, the insti­
tutions and the capacities needed to cope with and mitigate its effects. Further­
more, the dismal condition of poverty and deprivation under which a large 
portion of the world’s population lives provides a poor platform on which to 
embark on a major attack on climate change. Millions of people in the developing 
world live in extreme poverty. Some two billion do not have access to the most 
basic energy services. In the last few decades of the 20th century, and mostly due 
to the precarious living that is often associated with poverty, a growing vulnera­
bility to extreme weather events has resulted in a dramatic increase in death and 
physical destruction. This combination of increasing levels of poverty, lack of 
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1 Greenhouse gases are those
that absorb infrared radiation 
in the Earth’s atmosphere,
while allowing solar radiation
to pass through it. This process,
known as the greenhouse
effect, maintains the Earth’s 
atmosphere at a much warmer
temperature than it would oth­
erwise have - the Earth could 
not sustain life without it. How­
ever, since industrialization the 
amount of greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere has been
steadily increasing. The green­
house gases include water
vapor, carbon dioxide (CO2),
methane (CH4), nitrous oxide 
(N2O), halogenated fluorocar­
bons (hcfcs), ozone (O3), per-
fluorinated carbons (pfcs), and 
hydrofluorocarbons (hfcs). 
2 De Moor and Calami, Per­
verse Incentives Subsidies and 
Sustainable Development: Key
Issues and Reform Strategies.





tion of most policymakers around the world today. It is against this background, 
therefore, that negotiators of the United Nations Convention on Climate Change 
(), and more specifically its Kyoto Protocol, need to frame their debates 
and agreements in order to engage the attention and the participation of the 
majority of the world’s population. 
Significant resources are needed to strengthen institutions and capacities in 
developing countries. Without these assets these countries will not be able to 
adopt, adapt, and develop the technologies needed to eradicate poverty and 
address the challenges of climate change. Some of the mechanisms emerging from 
the negotiations of the United Nations Convention on Climate Change and its 
Kyoto Protocol will be helpful, but not sufficient. Other mechanisms such as the 
Global Environmental Facility () need to be revisited and retooled. Further, 
Official Development Assistance (), which is currently undergoing one its 
worst crises to date, needs to be revived so that it can become a real force of change 
and support in the effort of many countries to escape marginalization while simul­
taneously contributing effectively to the climate change agenda. However, building 
institutions and capacities, particularly in developing countries, is a task that 
requires time in addition to resources, while the dual threats of climate change and 
poverty continue to grow. Both need to be addressed urgently and with equal force. 
The good news is that, more often than not, projects to adapt to climate change 
or to mitigate greenhouse gas () emissions1 can also be instrumental in 
enhancing good governance and in addressing poverty reduction and the sustain­
able development priorities of developing countries. Within the energy sector, for 
example, climate change mitigation projects could stimulate the introduction of 
new, cleaner, and in many cases less expensive technologies to cater to the energy 
demands of developing countries and of the two billion people who are currently 
without energy services. Alternatively, the same two billion people could continue 
to rely on fuel wood, resulting in continued deforestation (as well as acute health 
risks), or they could come to depend on energy produced with current fossil fuel 
technologies, which are harmful to the atmosphere. Another, adaptation-ori­
ented, example of the enhancement of good governance is in the area of land use 
and watershed management. Improvements in natural resource management can 
lower risks, reduce loss of human life, and thus facilitate adaptation to the heavy 
rains, floods, and severe storms that are associated with climate change, while 
simultaneously enabling populations to use their resources with minimal or no 
impact. 
The bad news is that countries have not been as effective in promoting sus­
tainable development or supporting the development of the clean and benign 
technologies needed for the reduction of  emissions. Worse, as revealed in a 
recent study commissioned by the Earth Council, around the world subsidies 
amounting to some $700 billion per year actually encourage ecologically destruc­
tive and socially inequitable practices.2 Further, research and development in 
renewable energy is rarely prioritized as it should be. Finally, there is an overall lack 
of information regarding the linkages that exist between economic and environ­
mental concerns. Specifically, there has been little effort to disseminate informa­
tion regarding the probable impacts of climate change on human wellbeing in 
developing countries, including issues of health, food security, and sustainable 
development in general. 
 
 




















The unfccc, its Protocol, and the involvement of developing countries 
The  is the most far-reaching environmental global treaty to date and, 
given the actors involved, the one that most directly mirrors the dynamic processes 
of today’s globalization. The significance of these two characteristics is that the 
Convention, through its Kyoto Protocol, has the potential either to become the 
most important instrument to date for meditation between global and local sus­
tainable development and environment priorities, or to irreparably exacerbate the 
divide between these concerns. The primary reasons this treaty is so uniquely 
powerful are: 
•	 It is the first time that countries have agreed to such a far-reaching environ­
mental treaty. 
[The] Kyoto Protocol has the potential either to become the most important 
instrument to date for meditation between global and local sustainable devel­
opment and environment priorities or to irreparably exacerbate the divide 
between these concerns. 
•	 It is the first time that major investors and the business sector will be largely 
responsible for the success or the failure of an environmental treaty. 
•	 It is the first time that the world’s ‘big players’ from the private sector, financial 
sector, governments, and non-governmental organizations are all participat­
ing, which implies that each sector recognizes the imperative nature of the issue 
and the significance of the decisions that are likely to result. 
• It is the first time that the future of a Convention rests on the ability of countries 
to address climate change problems through major technology and financial 
resource transfers in a combination of institutionalized and free market regimes. 
This new context demands a major capacity building effort for developing 
countries. Globalization and the liberalization of trade have drastically changed 
the rules of global governance. One of the most significant developments of recent 
times, for example, has been the growing role of the private sector. From the per­
spective of many developing countries, the increased participation of the private 
sector has considerable implications for global governance: Where developing 
country governments previously had some leverage to dictate the rules of engage­
ment in the global economy, the rules are now often dictated by geographically 
distant players and based on issues such as a country’s level of competitiveness, 
political risk, and economic stability. Because of this, the key role to be played by 
the private sector in the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol needs to be assessed 
within the context of its contribution—negative or positive—to global governance 
and the governance of the climate change regime. Furthermore, developing coun­
tries need to strengthen their capacities so that they can influence the decisions 
being made in and for their countries, pushing them in truly beneficial directions. 
The group of countries that are considered ‘developing’ is far too politically, 
economically, culturally, and geographically diverse to unanimously ascribe to a 
specific set of concerns. However, it is reasonably safe to say that all developing 
countries share the following broad concerns: 
•	 The Ethical Concern: One of the primary aspects of equity is what is sometimes 
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need ‘space’ to grow and develop, meaning that they do not consider it reason­
able to sacrifice domestic growth for the global good, especially in light of their 
minimal contribution to the climate change problem to date. Thus, at this 
point, most developing countries will logically prioritize local environment 
and development concerns over global ones. In order to strike a balance that 
allows for sustainable economic advancement in developing countries while 
enabling  emissions mitigation, industrialized countries will have to com­
pensate at the global level by becoming less wasteful and restricting pollution 
further. This is cited as a matter of equity, as industrialized countries have 
already attained high levels of development, with significant costs to the global 
environment. 
•	 The Economic Concern: Another primary concern to be addressed has to do 
with the different ways to measure the costs and benefits of  abatement. 
 abatement may be evaluated either in terms of the cost to achieve some 
global effect or in terms of the cost that it has at the local level. In the context 
of the global effect of the reduction, there is a marginal cost associated with 
 abatement.. In the context of the costs of local needs and effects, which is 
the perspective that developing countries require,  abatement is charac­
terized in terms of opportunity costs and benefits. It would be ideal to find 
solutions that are equitable to both. 
•	 The Financial Concern: Through the approval of mechanisms for emissions 
trading, both among developed countries and between developed and devel­
oping countries, the Kyoto Protocol is creating a new commodity—carbon off­
sets. The current rules of finance that govern the trade of privately and publicly 
produced goods are not adequate, as this new commodity will be a public good 
that is produced privately. New rules will need to be created. How this new 
product is marketed touches on the ethical, the political, and the economic. 
How it will ultimately be traded will have a major effect on the ability of devel­
oping countries to participate. In turn, how they are able to participate will 
influence both future  emissions mitigation and current development 
strategies for many developing countries. 
When the negotiations began, many developing countries argued that climate 
change was the problem and the responsibility of industrialized countries. How­
ever, recent data and information have demonstrated that developing countries 
will be the hardest hit by the impacts of climate change, and that economic and 
social costs will be immense.According to a report of a working group of the Inter­
governmental Panel on Climate Change (), a doubling of carbon dioxide in 
the atmosphere may cost developing countries between 2% and 9 % of their gross 
domestic products ().3 Further, as a recent World Bank World Development 
Report points out, these estimates are based solely on those costs that are readily 
quantifiable. They do not account for non-monetary resources such as life preser­
vation, cultural stability, and sustainable livelihoods.4 
Surprisingly, the potential costs and negative implications do not match the 
frequent lack of interest or urgency given to climate change. Here again, capacity 
building efforts are urgently required to clearly demonstrate the close linkages that 
exist between climate change, poverty reduction, and development. Efforts are 
also needed to resist the natural tendency to avoid addressing problems that 
require solutions that have high immediate costs and uncertain benefits in the 



































Is climate change really a serious problem? 
Climate change is a natural process that has been occurring for thousands of years. 
Species have been ‘adapting’ by shifting to places where they can thrive despite 
changing climate conditions. With the advent of the industrial revolution, the 
anthropogenic emissions of  increased dramatically and, over the course of 
the 20th century, exponentially. Emissions from human activities have also been 
accumulating over the decades, and it is expected that as a result climate change 
will happen faster in the coming decades than it has in the last ten thousand years. 
Changes in land-use practices, mostly to accommodate increasing human popu­
lations, have also fragmented ecosystems so drastically that the ability of species 
to adapt is being impeded. Ecosystem resilience has further been compromised by 
pollution and other stresses caused by present production processes as well as 
heavy demands on natural resources. This degradation of natural systems is fairly 
ubiquitous in industrialized countries, and to some degree, it is the foundation of 
the economic success of these countries. However, it is becoming painfully appar­
ent that the damage done by ignorant or irresponsible development will be egre­
giously detrimental in the long-term, both globally and locally. 
According to assessments of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(), developing countries will suffer greatly as a result of climate change. Shifts 
in regional temperatures due to climate change will have impacts on health, as the 
ranges for disease vectors expand, bringing the threat of illnesses such as malaria, 
dengue fever, and yellow fever to larger populations than ever before. Agriculture 
around the world, especially in developing countries, will be threatened by floods, 
droughts, and inordinately heavy rains. Close to 70% of the global population lives 
in coastal areas, and will therefore feel the threat of even a slight rise in sea level 
due to altered hydrological cycles and melting ice caps. Finally, natural water reser­
voirs in mountainous regions stand to be depleted, and freshwater supplies on 
islands are already threatened by salinization. 
However, despite evidence pointing to the severe social, economic, and envi­
ronmental costs of climate change, most people do not take the threat of climate 
change seriously. Given that the benefits of mitigation will not be apparent for 
years to come, it is understandable that paying for mitigating it is unappealing. In 
addition, the science of climate change is relatively new and imperfect, rendering 
assessments of the impacts today and projections for the consequences tomorrow 
controvertible. These two factors have given players on both sides of the climate 
change debate the opportunity to manipulate data to push agendas that either 
support or oppose serious climate change abatement measures. Unfortunately, the 
ambiguity and ambivalence caused by these two factors have also given policy­
makers reasons to hesitate on attacking the biggest problem of the climate change 
regime—the global dependence on fossil fuels, which contributes about 80% of 
the carbon dioxide being emitted into the atmosphere every year. 
Despite the lack of consensus as to how it should be addressed, there has at 
least been a remarkable increase of awareness and concern for climate change on 
the part of policymakers since the mid-1990s. Particularly in the months prior to 
the third meeting of the Committee of the Parties ( 3) in Kyoto in December 
of 1997, the media focused the world’s attention, not on the complexities or the 
tenuous nature of the science, but on a few important issues that would appeal to 
the global population. The attention centered on the main causes of  emis­
sions, a few of the most significant impacts, and some important measures that 
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needed to be taken if the international community was serious about addressing 
the problem. 
The much-publicized Kyoto Protocol to the Convention that emerged from 
 3 was a modest but important step for the climate change regime. It was a 
precedent-setting legal document in that, for the first time since the advent of the 
climate change discussion, a group of countries agreed to legally binding emis­
sions reduction commitments. While the Parties to the  were able to hash 
out the fundamental agreement at that time, it was also understood that there was 
still much work to be done in future meetings. However, the advancement of the 
Kyoto Protocol means different things to different people and countries. For some, 
it means finalizing negotiations on the implementation and compliance mecha­
nisms. For others it means obtaining commitments from developing countries. 
For developing countries, it means negotiating a package that will enable them to 
address poverty reduction and their urgent development priorities while helping 
to address climate change. 
Importantly, many players are not waiting for ultimate mandates to take action. 
Some private corporations, such as BP Amoco, have taken bold and progressive 
steps to reduce their emissions voluntarily and to develop new technologies in 
anticipation of future regulations. Several countries and companies have partici­
pated in ‘Activities Implemented Jointly,’ of which there are now over 150 ongoing 
5 Joint Implementation Quar- or being planned.5 More importantly, many countries are considering policies that 
terly, July 2000: Volume 6, no. 2: are ‘good-for-the-environment-anyway,’ which are those that are aimed at eradi­
p. 14. 
cating poverty and advancing sustainable development, but may simultaneously 
address climate change mitigation, natural resource management, pollution 
abatement, improvement of environmental quality, or basic development needs 
such as adaptation to climate change. Approaches such as these promise to be 
some of the most effective defenses against climate change. Unfortunately, they are 
not necessarily the ones receiving the most attention or support from donor coun­
6 Reid,W.W. and Jose Golden-
berg, “Developing Countries are
Combating Climate Change:
Actions in Developing Coun­
tries that Slow Growth in 
Carbon Emissions,” Energy
Policy, 1997, 26 (3): pp. 233 -237. 
… the primary challenge for negotiators is overcoming the uncertainty of the 
information produced by the relatively young science of climate change. By 
focusing less on the science and more on the positive impacts that climate change 
activities will have on the quality of life, negotiators may be able neutralize those 
who are fighting against aggressive mitigation measures. 
tries. Instead, Official Development Assistance () and other funding mecha­
nisms that support developing country activities to promote clean and sustainable 
development and the eradication of poverty are decreasing at a rapid pace. 
Several countries have also adopted policies that promote better natural 
resource management, increased energy efficiency, adoption of technologies that 
use renewable sources of energy, and cleaner technologies for conventional energy 
sources, independently of the negotiations. A recent study6 presents some inter­
esting evidence that demonstrates that there have been some significant  
reductions in several developing countries including China, India, Mexico, Brazil, 
and South Africa, primarily due to the introduction of these measures. Many 
countries have been adopting such regulations, not so much out of concern for cli­
mate change, but because they are interested in promoting sustainable develop­





























eral, these activities have been based on the principle that the best way to ensure a 
better quality of life for future generations is by improving the current quality of 
life. Evidence of these successes coupled with a campaign to explain and promote 
the linkages between climate change and development could provide the best basis 
for future information dissemination and progress on the implementation of the 
Kyoto Protocol. 
Having witnessed and experienced unprecedented weather-related catastro­
phes such as Hurricane Mitch in Central America and the Caribbean in 1998, many 
A true irony of the climate change negotiations is that those countries that are 
most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change are also those with the weak­
est, least consistent negotiating teams. 
countries are also beginning to introduce measures to adapt to sudden and violent 
changes in the weather. It is doubtful that these actions are based on the science of 
climate change, or on a concern about whether the atmosphere is influenced by 
human activities. Rather, these decisions are based on a more basic understanding 
that better land use practices, reforestation, improved watershed and coastal man­
agement, and better infrastructure will protect their lives, livelihoods, and prop­
erty. The success of these countries in lowering and managing risk will provide the 
best foundation for future endeavors on the adaptation side of the . 
Is climate change a priority for most people around the world? 
Globally, most people do not seem too anxious about climate change, and there is 
a great deal of skepticism as to whether it actually warrants concern. Thus, it might 
seem that the biggest challenge facing those charged with doing something about 
climate change would be to convince this majority of the global population to 
believe in the reality of climate change and its consequences. If this were the case, 
if a global consensus on the urgency of the issue were a prerequisite to the success 
of the implementation of the , negotiators would stop wasting their time. 
Many in developing countries will not, at least not in the foreseeable future, pay 
any attention to an issue that may cause a problem for the sustenance of life in the 
distant future when their principal concern is the preservation of life today. It 
would therefore be fruitless to spend resources simply trying to convince the 
global population of the need for unity and action. Instead, the primary challenge 
for negotiators is overcoming the uncertainty of the information produced by the 
relatively young science of climate change. By focusing less on the science and 
more on the positive impacts that climate change activities will have on the qual­
ity of life, negotiators may be able neutralize those who are fighting against aggres­
sive mitigation measures. This tactic will also probably have the additional bene­
fit of effectively gaining the attention of developing country policymakers. 
The revolutionary principles that were established at the United Nations Con­
ference on Environment and Development () in 1992 made the Frame­
work Convention on Climate Change possible. The most important principle of 
this landmark event was the confirmation of the inextricable link between envi­
ronment and development. At the time,  created an unparalleled fervor, 
and set the stage for environmental-political evolutions around the globe. How­
ever, over time this enthusiasm has dwindled and been dampened. The review 
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conference scheduled to take place in 2002, the  + 10, will provide an excel­
lent opportunity not only to revive these commitments, but also to strengthen the 
relationship between the  and poverty reduction and sustainable devel­
opment. To reinforce the point,  + 10 should perhaps be called  + 
10: A World without Poverty, with Nature’s Help. 
It is fortunate that  + 10 will most likely coincide with the beginning of 
the implementation of the Clean Development Mechanism (), which is one 
of the Kyoto Protocol instruments designed to link climate change and develop­
ment. This is an excellent opportunity to highlight climate change mitigation 
measures that provide considerable development opportunities. A more power­
ful, more equitable Kyoto Protocol and a more comprehensive Clean Develop­
ment Mechanism will emerge from this stronger link. As the  evolves and 
becomes a tool that can be adapted to the needs of developing countries regard­
less of size or wealth, it will inevitably gain momentum while promoting capacity 
building, technology transfer, and development. With the fortification of the 
, developing country Parties will strengthen their commitments to the Con­
vention, as the link between the climate change and development activities 
becomes more apparent. However, this stronger link will, by definition, also 
require a readiness on the part of wealthier countries to do their part in address­
ing the climate change problem, for which they are primarily culpable. It also 
requires a readiness to transfer vast resources and the necessary technologies for 
addressing and reducing  emissions in developing countries. 
How are developing countries participating in the negotiations? 
The fact that the majority of their populations either don’t understand or don’t 
care about climate change has fortunately not hindered developing country gov­
ernments from actively participating in the negotiations. However, developing 
countries are doing so with different motivations than industrialized and transi­
tion economies, and, by no fault of their own, with different capacities to influ­
ence events. 
Small island populations are among those most vulnerable to the impacts of 
climate change. Impacts such as sea level rise, increased frequency and strength of 
extreme weather events, and saltwater encroachment on limited island freshwater 
supplies are already being felt by many island populations. However, most of the 
developing countries comprised of small islands are not individually politically 
powerful. In recognition of this, a group of these countries organized themselves 
into the Association of Small Island States (). With 43 member states,  
is now a fairly effective political force and has been one of the strongest influences 
throughout the climate change negotiations. Through , the leaders of these 
island countries have been more consistent in their negotiating tenacity than any 
other developing-country group. Their negotiating team and its bold proposals 
have set examples of how even the smallest developing countries can influence the 
events of such complex global negotiations (see Slade and Werksman, this 
volume). 
At the other end of the spectrum, large developing countries such as Brazil, 
India, and China, with a cumulative population of over two billion, have also had 
a major influence on the negotiating process. Through strong, well-prepared del­
egations, these countries have developed some of the most important proposals 


























for example, led to the formulation of the Clean Development Mechanism. 
As a unit, the Group of 77 and China have been extremely useful and effective 
in providing analysis, synthesis, and political advice to a large group of develop­
ing countries which, because of small and/or weak delegations, have had difficulty 
keeping pace with the negotiations, and interpreting the implications. The Group 
of 77 and China have been less effective, however, in uniting its developing coun­
try members into an organized movement to counter the well-rehearsed and orga­
nized positions often presented by wealthier Parties. Instead, Group of 77 coun­
tries have formed subgroups independently, based on common interests. For 
Between the provision of sound policies and regulatory frameworks on the part 
of the governments, and the financial and managerial efficiency of private sector 
players, public-private partnerships could potentially provide a crucial formula 
for the successful implementation of the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol. 
example, those that would like to see land use change and carbon sequestration 
issues reflected and made possible through the  have pulled together to influ­
ence the negotiations on this issue. However, these same countries are not neces­
sarily willing to work together for any other cause. Other groups have formed 
based on regional affiliations, usually when there is a limited set of issues upon 
which they can agree. Thus, in general, the most effective element of the Group of 
77 subgroups seems to be information exchange and preparation for COPs, rather 
than actual negotiation. 
A true irony of the climate change negotiations is that those countries that are 
most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change are also those with the weakest, 
least consistent negotiating teams. Because of their lack of strength in the negoti­
ating forum, this rather large group, which is mostly comprised of the poorest 
states, has had little chance of influencing the negotiations, and as a result, does 
not stand to benefit much from the process. Often overlooked because of their 
minimal contribution to current  emissions, these countries could truly ben­
efit from the new, cleaner technologies that are being discussed as methods of 
emissions mitigation and from capacity building programs. 
Should we leave it all to governments? 
One of the most interesting features of the  and its Kyoto Protocol is 
inclusiveness. Never before, with the exception perhaps of the World Trade Orga­
nization negotiations, have global negotiations included so many sets of actors. 
This is both good and bad. Good in that this all-encompassing approach has 
undoubtedly led to a greater awareness of global environmental problems. It is 
also good that there are more resources, both intellectual and financial, con­
tributing to the complex solutions required. At the same time, it is not good that 
the variety of actors has introduced such a diverse set of motivations and interests. 
Overall, however, one can hope that any process that is this comprehensive will 
result in a treaty that has more sense of ownership and commitment. 
The role of the private sector—both local and international—is another unique 
component of the Kyoto Protocol. Given the large proportion of investments 
comprised by private capital throughout the developing world, it is only natural 
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mentation of the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol. Around the world, private 
companies are currently making investment decisions on production systems that 
will need to be amortized over several years or decades. Each of these decisions, 
therefore, is a potential vote for or against the environment, and has the promise 
of pushing the production and consumption patterns in directions that could 
either assist or damage the chances for  emission mitigation and poverty 
reduction. In many countries, these decisions are currently being made with little 
regard as to whether they support poverty reduction,  emissions reductions, 
or sustainable development. Additionally, while many of the larger, more eco­
nomically stable developing countries have policies and measures in place to reg­
ulate private investment, the majority have weak or non-existent rules of engage­
ment for orienting private activity. In the absence of regulation, investors will tend 
to opt for projects that provide short-term benefits, rather than those with long­
term sustainability. As such, while it would be unthinkable to formulate a treaty of 
this scope and magnitude without the full inclusion of the private sector, the Kyoto 
Protocol will need to prioritize developing-country capacity building in this area 
in order to improve the chances for successful relationships. 
The design of the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol are such that the public and 
private sectors will be reliant on each other for success. This interdependence has the 
potential to foster powerful relationships between the two sectors. Between the pro­
vision of sound policies and regulatory frameworks on the part of the governments, 
and the financial and managerial efficiency of private sector players, public-private 
partnerships could potentially provide a crucial formula for the successful imple­
mentation of the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol. These relationships will not 
happen automatically or come easily, and capacity building and technology transfer 
initiatives will need to be built into the Kyoto Protocol and play a major role. 
Why is international cooperation so important in the Convention? 
There are an increasing number of problems in today’s interdependent world that 
can only be solved through the cooperation of groups of countries or with the 
unity of the international community as a whole. Few examples of this are as obvi­
ous as climate change, poverty eradication, and sustainable development. In the 
area of climate change, global collaboration has been targeted as crucial to the suc­
cess of the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Clean Development Mecha­
nism. In recognition of this, much of the  and Kyoto Protocol negotia­
tions, particularly in the most recent , have been largely dedicated to securing 
international cooperation. 
In this context, it is unfortunate that Official Development Assistance (), 
one of the most important instruments for promoting international cooperation, 
is going through an extreme crisis.  levels are at an all-time low exactly when 
there is the most need for it. Ironically, developed countries are wealthier and 
better able to afford  than ever before. There are several theories as to the rea­
sons behind the decrease in  resources and the decreased donor country inter­
est. However, whatever the pretext, it is unjust and irresponsible to believe that the 
world can progress without  and other mechanisms that facilitate the trans­
fer of wealth between rich and poor countries. In fact, unless this trend is reversed, 
it will seriously compromise the success of many international treaties including 
the  and the Kyoto Protocol. Without assistance that reaches past climate 
























to innovate, to establish the proper infrastructures, or to adopt the new technolo­
gies required for  emissions mitigation. Given the inextricable link between 
climate change and sustainable development, the lack of capacity, institutions, 
instruments, and measures to promote development that will result from insuffi­
cient  will eventually place insurmountable obstacles in the path of climate 
change mitigation activities. 
On the same token, it is also not reasonable to expect the private sector to 
assume the financial responsibility for developing countries. While it is undeniable 
that private sector investment in developing countries has increased dramatically 
in recent years, the bulk of this investment has been going to a select few sectors in 
a select few countries—those with large, secure markets and highly developed 
financial systems. This automatically discounts the participation of the poorer 
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin America, meaning that most of 
these countries must continue to rely on  or concessionary lending in order to 
attend to their most urgent development priorities. Further, in the private capital 
flow structure, there is no mechanism to mediate among and between govern­
ments, civil society organizations, and the private sector on issues of development. 
Conclusion 
Meeting the challenge of climate change will provide one of the best opportuni­
ties for renewed, stronger international cooperation and for a revived system of 
. If designed properly, the , one of the principal instruments of the Kyoto 
Protocol, could contribute intensely to a revitalization of  and vice-versa. The 
 will be a means by which developed country private sector industries can ful­
fill their Kyoto Protocol commitments with sound investments that simultane­
ously build capacities in and transfer technologies to developing countries. The 
prerequisite of developing countries for these ventures should be that they 
advance the agenda of poverty reduction and sustainable development priorities. 
In this scenario, even with the structure of the Kyoto Protocol fortifying it, private 
capital will only go so far. Without the added capacity-building support that can 
be provided by  and other mechanisms such as the ,  projects may be 
severely handicapped, and a large majority of countries—those that are techno­
logically excluded—will never be able to contribute or benefit. 
Finally, the new era of revitalized international cooperation for climate change 
and sustainable development initiatives will need to take into account the great 
technological divide that currently exists between developing and developed 
countries. If the Convention is truly to act as a global treaty, then there must be 
serious efforts to build capacities and transfer technology with the concrete objec­
tive of narrowing this divide. 
Luis Gómez-Echeverri is a senior official at the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme. He was formerly the director of the undp Environment Programs, and is 


















A Review of the Latin American 
contribution to climate change mitigation 
Carlos. E. Suárez 1 
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Abstract
 
This article describes the past, present, and future contribution of the Latin America
 
and Caribbean Region (lac) to the control and reduction of greenhouse emissions,
 
with particular attention to carbon dioxide (CO2).
 
The first section contains an introduction to and an analysis of the evolution of 
the Decarbonization Energy Index (dei) from 1970 to 1990,and from 1990 to 1997.The 
main conclusion of this analysis is that, globally, lac has the lowest regional dei. lac 
is also among the regions that have shown the greatest decline in the Index, espe­
cially between 1970 and 1985. The second section is based on data produced by the 
Energy Economic Information System (siee) of Latin American Energy Organization 
(olade) and is essentially a more detailed analysis of the evolution of the dei at the 
subregional/country level within lac. 
Based on these physical values, the discussion turns to the development of a new 
approach for determining economic/monetary values for the lac contribution to cli­
mate change mitigation. The author’s conclusion is that at us$30 per ton of CO2, the 
total value of the lac emissions mitigation activities from 1970 to 2017 could be worth 
as much as $261.7 billion.This is equal to about 40% of the total lac foreign debt in 1997. 
The final section discusses possible future mitigation contributions of the region, 
even though no country in the region is legally bound by the United Nations Frame­
work Convention on Climate Change (unfcc) to make absolute ghg emissions 
reductions. This discussion focuses first on the general measures that are being 
undertaken, and then moves on to the specific measures and policies that a sample 
of lac countries have been examining and implementing to the extent that the insti­
tutional, financial, technological, and human resources are available at the national, 
regional, and international level. 
How has the Latin American/Caribbean region 
contributed to ghg emissions mitigation to date? 
The global situation 
The Latin American/Caribbean region has the lowest coefficient of specific CO2 
emissions per energy unit (sometimes also called “Decarbonization Energy 
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2 The dei presented here was
calculated on the basis of the 
energy data for Primary Energy
Consumption published yearly
by the BP Amoco Statistical
Review of the World Energy and
standard CO2 emissions coeffi­
cients for each energy source. It
could be alternatively calculated
for most countries and regions
using the International Energy
Agency’s (iea) energy statistics
or other regional sources, such
as the “Energy and Economic
Information System” developed
by the Latin American Energy
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figure 1 
3 This analysis is focused on
CO2 because, of the green­
house gases, CO2 is the best
single indicator of emissions
trends. In the absence of spe­
cific data for each sector and 
energy source in every country,
international emissions coeffi­
cients have been kept constant
for the whole period. 
4 Tons of carbon equivalent. 
5 See 
http://www.bpamoco.com/
worldenergy/ for 1999 report. 
6 Ibid. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on energy data from the BP Sta­
tistical Review of World Energy, June 1998.5 
figure 2 
Index”—),2 and is among the regions that have 
shown the greatest decline in this coefficient, especially 
between 1970 and 1985 (see Figures 1 and 2).3 
Emissions from the total energy system in Latin 
America and the Caribbean in 1997 were 0.597 tons of 
CO2 Tn C/toe
4—83% of the world average. The reason 
for this comparatively low level is that the Energy Bal­
ance in the region is heavily reliant on natural gas and 
hydroelectricity, and very little coal is used. This index 
has also been reduced by 18.4% between 1970 and 1997 
compared to the world reduction average of 10.7%. The 
average value for  is particularly important when 
one takes into account that the value for natural gas, the 
lowest among fossil fuels, is 0.608 Tn C/toe. 
As illustrated in Figure 2, the  levels for develop­
ing country regions tend to be above the global average. 
Figure 2 also shows that industrialized countries and 
economies in transition are all below the global aver­
age, but higher than . 
The lac Situation 
The regional information that is represented in Figures 
3 and 4 is based on data produced by the Latin America 
Energy Organization () and the Energy Eco­
nomic Information System (). 
For the purpose of this discussion, biomass is 
included in the group of primary energy sources and 
CO2 emissions are calculated in detail for each sector of 
final energy consumption. The latter calculation 
includes the main transformation processes such as 
power production and refineries, as well as natural gas 
flaring. The  is represented here in terms of kilo­
grams of CO2 per barrel of oil equivalent ( 
CO2/boe). 
1970 to 1997 
From 1970 to 1988 there was a steady decline of the  in the Latin American 
Caribbean Region. A stabilization of the Index began in 1988, and continued 
through 1997. Including the stabilization, there was a  total decline of 17% 
between 1970 and 1990. During this time period, Brazil achieved the most signifi­
cant reduction (29%). Mexico and the Southern Cone saw reductions of 17% while 
the Andean Zone, the Caribbean, and Central America experienced reductions of 
only 5 to 7% (See Figure 4). 
The continued decrease of the Index was essentially the result of the replace­
ment of oil derivatives, coal, and biomass with hydroelectricity, natural gas, and 
geothermal and nuclear energy. These substitutions were primarily made for 
energy reasons and/or to reduce dependence on fossil fuels, rather than for climate 
change reasons. A detailed analysis of energy balances in the countries and regions 
of  reveals that the reduction of the Index occurred for reasons that include: 
Source: Author’s calculations based on energy data from the BP Sta­





















•	 A significant increase in the use of primary electric­
ity (hydroelectric, geothermal, and nuclear power) 
in all regional energy services, particularly through 
the mid-1980s (from 26.5% in 1970 to 41.3% in 1990, 
and 43.9% in 1997). 
•	 A decrease in the use of biomass in the residential, 
commercial, and service sectors, as well as in the 
industrial sector (total biomass used for primary 
and secondary energy consumption went from 
29.9% in 1970 to 20.5% in 1990, and 17.1% in 1997). 
•	 Significant reduction of natural gas flaring, espe­
cially in the Andean Zone, Mexico, and the South­
ern Cone, as a result of the implementation of 
national control measures (from 47.6% in 1970 to 
12.3% in 1990, and only 10.1% in 1997). 
•	 An increase in the use of natural gas, both for power 
production and other sectors (from 13.7% of pri­
mary and secondary energy consumption in 1970, to 
19.0% in 1990, and 21.6% in 1997). 
•	 An increase in the use of electricity in the final con­
sumption sectors, also contributing to a sustained 
decrease of the sectoral Index of CO2-specific emis­
sions. 
•	 A widespread decrease of dependence on oil deriv­
atives, especially heavier forms, as well as coal to 
some extent. 
•	 The use of the ethanol fuel from sugar cane as a sub­
stitute for gasoline in Brazil. 
•	 In Argentina, the development of natural gas vehi­
cles. The Argentine fleet of nearly 450,000 vehicles 
in 1995 represented about 10% of the total cars on 
the country’s streets, and was the largest fleet of its 
kind in the world. 
The influence of the increased use of primary elec­
tricity is illustrated in Figures 5 and 6. The figures 
clearly demonstrate that the Decarbonization Index 
for Power Generation (TnCO2/GWh) also decreased 
systematically during the 1970s and 1980s. This trend is 
evident until it concludes in 1990 at a value that is 37.5% 
lower than that of 1970. 
In this case, the reduction of the Index corresponds 
with the substitution trend and the increase in the 
energy efficiency of power production in similar pro­
portions. 
From 1970 to 1990, there were significant changes in 
the structure of power generation inputs in . The  
proportion of primary electricity, such as hydroelec­
 325 
figure 3 
Source: Energy and Economic Statistical System (siee/olade),
December 1998. 
figure 4 
Source: Energy and Economic Statistical System (siee/olade),
December 1998. 
figure 5 
Source: Energy and Economic Statistical System (siee/olade),
December 1998. 
tric, geothermal, and nuclear power, increased from 26.5% to 41.3%, while natural
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figure 6 
Source: Energy and Economic Statistical System (siee/olade),
December 1998. 
7 Kilogram of carbon dioxide
per barrel of oil equivalent. 
8 Ton of carbon dioxide per
giga watt hour. 
oil derivatives and biomass products from 51.4% to 32.0%. The only negative 
change during this time was the increase of the proportion of coal from 8.3% to 
11.6%. 
Figure 6 illustrates that, at the regional level, the 
average course of the Index for  was the result of 
very different processes at the subregional level. In Cen­
tral America, the Southern Cone, and Brazil, the reduc­
tion was significant—between 70 and 80%—and basi­
cally continued through 1985. In the Andean Zone, the 
reduction did not begin until 1983, but continued up 
through 1991. The total Andean Zone reduction 
between 1970 and 1990 was 40%. The Caribbean saw a 
reduction of 12.2%, but the trend fluctuated and the 
Index began to rise again. Finally, in Mexico the Index 
increased almost 100.0% between 1970 and 1990. 
1990 to 1997 
In recent years the evolution of the  for the total 
energy system (kg CO2/boe7) has remained stable at 
values similar to those of the late 1980s. At the subregional level there has also been 
some stabilization, but with more variability, and overall, a Brazilian increase has 
compensated for the decreases in other subregions. 
With regard to fuel source substitution, even if the proportionate number of 
primary electricity sources continues to increase, the pace in the 1990s was slower 
than that of the previous period of time. This trend is also evident in the evolution 
of CO2-specific emissions from power production (Tn CO2/GWh 
8), where a sta­
bilization began in the 1990s (see Figure 5). The index reduction during this time 
was mainly due to an increase in average efficiency of power production, rather 
than the substitution process, which had slowed. 
At the subregional level, it appears that in all cases in the last few years of the 
series there is a trend of specific emissions increases that could indicate the begin­
ning of a full reversal of the past decrease of the Index (see Figure 6). An exami­
nation of these trends in order to identify the underlying reasons reveals two key 
instigating factors: 
First, there has been significant advancement in power production technology-
specifically, the development of the natural gas turbine (both open cycle and com­
bined cycle). This has increased energy efficiency considerably, while simultane­
ously lowering the necessary amount of capital and the total cost of producing 
electricity. Strictly from the climate change perspective, this advancement will be 
extremely beneficial, as natural gas technology replaces other fuels such as oil or 
coal, or even old steam turbines functioning with natural gas but at lower effi­
ciencies. However, when the new technology replaces primary electricity sources 
like hydroelectric, geothermal, nuclear, or other renewable resources that have 
zero CO2 emission levels, the total and specific emissions of CO2 and other  
will increase. This is the situation in several  countries. 
On the other hand, beginning in the mid-1980s, a series of profound institu­
tional and regulatory changes began in the  regional energy system, leading to 
partial or total privatization of energy systems that had previously, for the most 





























and is presently progressing at various speeds and with varying characteristics in 
the different countries of the region. 
These changes have been financially beneficial for the enterprises concerned, 
and for the microeconomic and/or energy efficiency of the regional system. How­
ever, from the climate change perspective, this new trend may be negative, due to 
the replacement of an energy development strategy that was based on the use of 
local resources (especially renewables with zero emissions), with a strategy that is 
based on private sector behavior—prioritizing the minimization of direct cost in 
the short term, reduced capital costs, and various economic and/or financial risks. 
The impact of the move toward privatization is already apparent in several  
countries. Post-privatization power stations are typically strictly thermal and 
largely based on open cycle and/or combine cycle gas turbines. The relatively few 
new hydroelectric projects are those that were designated within the framework of 
the previous strategy. 
Both technological advancement and privatization are processes that reinforce 
themselves. If one also takes into account the variability of oil prices at the inter­
national level and the increasing availability of natural gas in different  coun­
tries, the possibility of maintaining the previous regional  trend becomes 
questionable for both power production and for the total energy system. 
What are the economic implications of the lac contributions? 
From the climate change perspective, the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change () has established the need to reduce  emissions 
at the global level. In 1997, at the third Conference of the Parties (-) in Kyoto, 
some concrete and obligatory emissions reduction commitments were agreed to, 
for industrialized (Annex I) countries in particular. In order to achieve these reduc­
tions, a series of actions have been proposed with different cost levels. Recent stud­
ies undertaken by United Nations Environment Programme’s () Collaborat­
ing Centre on Energy and Environment () at Risø National Laboratory in 
Denmark (Risø) indicate that the cost of the various alternatives for CO2 emissions 
mitigation vary depending on the country where the mitigation occurs, the tech­
nologies used, and the type of project. In the European countries surveyed, the esti­
mated cost ranged from ..$20 to ..$100 per ton of CO2, 
9 while in developing 
countries the values ranged between ..$2 and ..$80 per ton of CO2. 
10 
When calculating the potential value of the  mitigation efforts between 
1970 and 1997, even using the conservative figure of ..$30 per ton of CO2, the  
region’s contribution has significant economic value. The CO2 emissions that have 
been avoided in the regional energy systems as a result of energy source substitu­
tion and the use of primary electricity sources with zero  emissions can be 
estimated using a comparison of the real values between 1970 and 1997 with a pro­
jection of what would have occurred based on the 1970 CO2-specific emissions. In 
this case, the difference amounts to 3.57 billion tons of CO2. 
11 The projects and 
developments that have engendered these ‘non-emissions’ will also continue to 
function for at least another 20 years on average, avoiding an additional 5.15 bil­
lion tons of CO2. 
12 
The combined total of the previously avoided CO2 emissions and those pro­
jected over the next 20 years is 8.72 billion tons. Using the value estimate of ..$30 
per ton of CO2, again, the total value of the  contribution is about ..$261.7 
billion, which equals about 40% of the total  foreign debt.13 However, accord­
9 In Table IV of the UNEP 
Greenhouse Gas Abatement 
Costing Studies Phase One
Report, Denmark, August 1992,
values range from 15 to 75 Euro­
pean Currency Units per ton of
CO2 for various European coun­
tries. This equals about U.S.$20­
100 per ton of CO2. 
10 See note 2. Studies on sev­
eral developing countries in
previous drafts of this report
yielded data ranging from
U.S.$2 to U.S.$80 per ton of CO2. 
In the case of Brazil values vary
from U.S.$45 to U.S.$80 per ton
of CO2. Options with negative
costs were not considered. 
11 When comparing real emis­
sions for the 1970-1997 period
with those that would result 
from applying the CO2-specific
emissions for 1970 of 363 kg
CO2/boe to the total Energy
supply, there is a difference of
about 3.57 billion tons of CO2, 
valued at U.S.$30 per ton, which
amounts to U.S.$107.1 billion. 
12 If the savings for 1997, the
last year of this timeframe, are
considered in relation to the 
1970 DEI, to remain constant for 
an additional 20 years, the total
is 5.15 billion tons of CO2 which, 
valued at U.S.$30 per ton, would
total U.S.$154.5 billion. The sum 
of the figure from this note and
note 5 is U.S.$261.6 billion. 
13 This has been estimated on 
the basis of data from 
siee/olade , December 1998 






















328    
 
ing to the present international rules and conventions, the economic value of CO2 
emissions reduction resulting from these 27 years of concrete action in  coun­
tries cannot be recovered. 
Up until now, the climate change negotiations have not considered the contri­
butions already made by Non-Annex I countries, which are under no obligation 
to cut down their  emissions. Thus, past efforts have no “emissions credit” 
value on the international market and, according to the guidelines currently under 
discussion, may not be capitalized by  in order to finance other development 
needs, such as health or education or partial repayment of the regional foreign 
debt. 
However, recent debates in Kyoto and Buenos Aires have focused on determin­
ing both a mechanism for future trading of saved emissions, and the possibility of 
banking surplus emissions from one commitment period to the next. It seems 
only just that within the framework of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action the rele­
vant international organizations and both industrialized and developing coun­
tries might analyze how past Non-Annex I emissions reduction efforts, especially 
those with beneficial effects that continue into the future, might be valued and/or 
rewarded. 
The  region may be able to continue contributing to  emissions con­
trol in the future as part of the essential and ongoing process of socioeconomic 
sustainable development. However, such contributions will not occur based 
strictly on market forces. Specific policy measures will be required to optimize 
socioeconomic aspects of  emissions control, consistent with the microeco­
nomic behavior of the private sector. In addition to national policy measures, new 
international procedures will be necessary for the transfer of economic resources 
to developing countries in general, and  in particular, as a counterpart of their 
contributions, past and future, towards a more efficient solution of the global cli­
mate change problem. 
How will the lac region contribute to climate change mitigation in the future? 
General outlook 
After the long economic crisis of the 1980s, the  region began a new process of 
growth during the 1990s. There have been some small slumps, however. For 
instance, the region experienced a financial slip due to circumstances in Mexico in 
1995. But today, World Bank studies indicate that the  growth will accelerate. 
Projected growth rates over the 10-year period starting in 1998 are as follows: 








This means a total regional  increase of 43.6% through 2007. The future 
growth of  emissions in general, and of CO2 in particular, will depend on the 
one hand on the evolution of efficiency in energy use (energy intensity of ) 
and on the other hand, on the evolution of the Decarbonization Energy Index. As 
previously discussed, the  has been regionally stable for the last 10 years, fol­
lowing an 18 year period of decrease. In some  subregions, such as Brazil and 
Mexico, and through some activities such as power production, the regional Index 
has begun to increase, which is a rather worrisome trend. 
























For the Index to decrease again, it will be necessary to develop a strategy that 
utilizes natural gas, the least atmospherically detrimental of the fossil fuels, in 
capacities beyond power generation. In effect, this approach would essentially 
replace oil derivatives in the transportation, industrial, and/or residential sectors 
in all countries where natural gas (or Liquefied Petroleum Gas—) might be 
available. To this end, there are primary electricity sources, such as water, wind, 
geothermal resources, and nuclear resources, that are comparatively advantageous 
from the climate change perspective. Sustainably produced biomass presents 
another possibility,14 and has the added benefit of potential net absorption so long 14 For further information see 
Larson, this volume. as the carbon sequestration during growth outweighs the release during use. How­
ever, there is a complication with this substitution methodology, as these systems 
are often more capital intensive than the alternatives, and their benefits are evident 
only in the long term. 
The most recent global financial crisis, which began in the late-1990s in Asia, 
moved through Russia, and then hit , tightened the financial and economic 
markets. The result was not only a short-term economic crisis, which is clearly 
indicated in the World Bank statistics for 1999 mentioned earlier, but also a 
scarcity in financial resources and an increase of their cost. This situation, com-
The combined total of the previously avoided CO2 emissions and those projected 
over the next 20 years is 8.72 billion tons. Using the value estimate of ..$30 per 
ton of CO2, again, the total value of the  contribution is about ..$261.7 bil­
lion, which equals about 40% of the total  foreign debt. However, according 
to the present international rules and conventions, the economic value of CO2 
emissions reduction resulting from these 27 years of concrete action in  coun­
tries cannot be recovered. 
bined with the normal behavior of the private sector, which is now responsible for 
a significant share of the energy system in several  countries, makes the devel­
opment of the long term primary electricity solutions proposed here very difficult. 
It is therefore necessary for both national governments and international organi­
zations to determine a way to internalize the costs of the alternative primary 
energy options, and in so doing, create climate change mitigation opportunities 
within the present institutional framework. 
As previously mentioned, improving energy efficiency is also important for the 
reduction of  emissions reductions in general, and CO2 in particular. But 
again, in general, measures for rational use of energy imply a long-term strategy 
with initial investments that will eventually be recovered through energy savings. 
The international community and the national governments somehow need to 
develop policies and measures for a concrete application of the “polluter pays” 
principle in relation to the  emissions which are at the heart of the climate 
change issue. 
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that all of the  countries have signed 
and ratified the United Nations Framework Conventions on Climate Change 
() and have recently undertaken the tabulation of National Greenhouse 
Inventories in response to  requirements with the financial and technical 
support of the  through the  and the U.S. Country Study Program. The 
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Finally, it is important to acknowledge that all of the  countries have signed 
and ratified the United Nations Framework Conventions on Climate Change 
() and have recently undertaken the tabulation of National Greenhouse 
Inventories in response to  requirements with the financial and techni­
cal support of the  through the  and the U.S. Country Study Program. 
Some of the country activities also include the analysis of future mitigation 
options, even if they have no obligation to reduce their absolute emissions. 
Country level analyses 
Based on the National Greenhouse Inventories and the related analyses, the fol­
lowing is a synthesized description of the policies and/or measures that have been 
proposed in some  countries as examples of the present and future efforts 
being made in the region (see Reference section for all citations). 
Argentina 
In the Argentine Government’s presentation to the fifth Conference of Parties 
(-) in Bonn, Germany, the following mitigation options were listed: 
•	 Development of afforestation projects through an active policy that distributes 
the fiscal and private costs at both the national and provincial level; 
•	 Control of emissions related to solid waste management; 
•	 Control of emissions from livestock production through better diets and 
enhanced production methods; 
•	 Use of no-till methods in agriculture, which will result in lower fuel consump­
tion and better soil conservation; 
•	 Control of fugitive emissions, including specific government standards for 
maximum flaring in oil and gas production; 
•	 Development of wind resources through subsidies at the national and provin­
cial levels, with the corresponding fiscal costs; 
•	 Development of hydroelectric projects as alternatives to thermal power pro­
duction, with fiscal and other environmental costs; 
•	 Increase of co-generation projects in the industrial and services sectors; 
•	 Increase of the volume of natural gas vehicles, especially for public transporta­
tion, such as buses, and for light duty trucks. 
It is important to stress that all of these mitigation options were proposed 
against a baseline scenario that already incorporated better performing technolo­
gies following historical trends. 
At - the Argentine government proposed a voluntary commitment for 
the reduction of Argentine  emissions for the period 2008-2012. Taking into 
account the normal uncertainty about the rate and structure of socioeconomic 
development, the proposal was submitted with the assumption of a dynamic 
target related to  as follows: 
with E in tons of carbon equivalent and I constantly equal to 151.5 and
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This implies a  emissions reduction of between 2% and 10%, relative to the 
baseline scenario for the period 2008 to 2012, following different assumptions on 
the  rate of growth and on agricultural and livestock production strategies. 
Bolivia 
The energy sector is not responsible for the largest proportion of  emissions 
in Bolivia; it is second to land-use changes. Nonetheless, most of the proposed 
mitigation measures are energy-related. 
Importantly, Bolivia has initiated a policy for the sustainable use of natural gas 
resources as a clean fuel not only for the country’s needs, but also for export. Brazil 
is the primary importer of Bolivian natural gas. The Bolivian policy has allowed 
Brazil to significantly increase the portion of its energy balance fulfilled by this 
comparatively clean fuel. This policy is especially beneficial when natural gas 
replaces or avoids the use of coal and/or oil derivatives. 
In order to avoid the increase of CO2 and methane (CH4) emissions associated 
with natural gas production through flaring, starting in 1994 the Yacimientos 
Petrolifieros Fiscales Bolivianos ()15 initiated measures to reduce flaring to 
the minimum technical level by increasing the processing and re-injection of nat­
ural gas. At the national level, programs for the expansion of the power system 
have been adapted in order to reduce  specific emissions. 
In this mitigation scenario, in addition to the proportionally increased use of 
natural gas in the transportation and residential sectors, there are proposals 
related to conservative use of energy in lighting, refrigeration, water heating, and 
for the use of biomass in rural areas. One important consideration for this type of 
policy is that it requires an initial investment in order to enable the increase in 
energy use efficiency. 
Costa Rica 
The Costa Rican  emissions inventory has already been done, but there has 
been no formal mitigation proposal. Nevertheless, Costa Rica, through the Costa 
Rica Joint Implementation Office, has been one of the most engaged countries in 
the Joint Implementation () Pilot Phase since 1994. As a result, there is now a 
series of specific projects related to wind farms, hydroelectric plants, park and nat­
ural reserve management programs, and forest development, all of which should 
result in significant  emissions reductions, or the increase of carbon seques­
tration from the atmosphere. At the same time, these projects are indicative of 
important foreign investments and a national increase in labor demand through 
projects related to sustainable development. Costa Rica has also proven itself to be 
a leader in the climate change regime through the development of new financial 
tools like Certified Tradable Offsets (), which represent specific amounts of 
sequestered carbon and can be exchanged with investors. 
Colombia 
Colombia has completed a preliminary inventory of  emissions for 1990, and 
a study of the options for reducing  emissions through 2010. The study pro­
poses twenty-four mitigation options, all of which are related to forestry or energy. 
The mitigation potential for the proposed reforestation measures is estimated at 
about 24 billion tons of CO2 per year. The energy sector initiatives have a poten­
tial of about 12.5 billion tons of CO2 per year. Together, the efforts in these two sec­
15 Bolivian Fiscal Controller for 
Petroleum Deposits. 
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tors could reduce the baseline scenario emissions for Colombia in 2010 by about 
21%. There are varied approaches to reforestation. The energy sector strategy is 
based on an important development in the use of natural gas, for both power pro­
duction and final use, to replace oil or carbon alternatives. This approach involves 
co-generation projects and rational use of energy measures in the industrial and 
residential sectors. 
As with other  countries, it is important to stress that the use of natural gas 
for power production is a mitigation tool only when it is supplanting oil or coal, not 
when it replaces hydroelectric development. This is becoming a difficult procedure 
to maintain due to institutional, financial, and local environmental problems. 
Ecuador 
The studies conducted in Ecuador of potential mitigation scenarios thus far have 
examined the traditional Rational Use of Energy () measures for lighting, 
cooking, water heating, and refrigeration in the residential and service sectors, 
combining price policies and technological developments. There are also  and 
fuel substitution options for the industry and transportation sectors. Because 
Ecuador is an oil and natural gas producing country, there are also suggestions for 
specific measures that will reduce natural gas flaring. In addition, there are pro­
posals for the development of afforestation projects in order to reduce the defor­
estation process and increase carbon sequestration. 
These measures can produce important reductions in  emissions against 
the baseline scenario. It should be noted that there is a problem in Ecuador that is 
an issue in other Latin American countries, but is not typically expressed explic­
itly. Most of the measures proposed, even those that are cost effective in the long 
term, require significant initial investments that call for financial resources within 
a socioeconomic context that has other investment requirements, both for eco­
nomic and social reasons. The means of securing those financial resources is one 
of the main obstacles to executing these policies and projects. 
Mexico 
In addition to the issue of global climate change, Mexico is also facing a significant 
domestic atmospheric pollution problem, especially in metropolitan areas. The 
country is therefore taking important steps related to both. 
Even though Mexico’s emissions account for less than 2% of the total global 
emissions, it is ranked among the most important emitters, and within the top 20 
in terms of emission per capita. 
The mitigation measures in the energy sector are -oriented, with specific 
programs for lighting, co-generation, fuel, and electricity use following Mexican 
Official Standards that are controlled by the National Commission for Energy 
Saving (), with the financial support of Fideicomiso para el Ahorro de 
Energía Eléctrica ().16 There is also a concrete energy policy that provides for 
the substitution of coal and oil products by natural gas from both local and U.S. 
sources. This natural gas strategy signifies the development of the transportation 
network and the power production based on combined cycle technology. The effi­
cient lighting program (Illumex) has already been very successful and will be con­
tinued and expanded both in the residential and services sectors. 
In addition to the energy sector measures and policies, there are also programs 












   
   
 
   
  
  







Protected Areas, Commercial Forest Plantations, and Forest Development Pro­
grams, all of which have had positive results with respect to CO2 sequestration. 
Some of the projects in the forest and energy areas are related to Joint Implemen­
tation proposals. 
Andean Pact 
The Andean study, promoted by the Risø/ Center on Energy and Environ­
ment through the “Economics of  Limitations Project,” analyzes the addi­
tional mitigation options that are possible through an integration process at the 
regional level, in addition to the measures considered at the country level. In this 
case, mitigation options were identified through the integration of power systems 
in the border area between Bolivia, Chile, and Peru with hydrological projects 
instead of thermal power options, in addition to the replacement of petroleum 
products with natural gas for power production. There are also similar possibili­
ties along the border between Ecuador and Peru, as well as between Colombia and 
Ecuador. In the latter case, this would involve an expansion of the Colombian nat­
ural gas transport network into Ecuador in order to substitute for oil products 
with natural gas for power production. 
It would be a very positive step to develop this type of regional integration 
analysis in other areas, such as 17 or Central America, in order to iden­
tify additional mitigation options. 
Uruguay 
Even though the absolute net emissions of  from Uruguay are comparatively 
small globally (5 billion tons of CO2), it is important to highlight the current mit­
igation efforts there. 
Uruguay is a highly agricultural country, and it has excellent conditions for 
forest activities.Accordingly, there are several programs in place that involve direct 
seeding and efficient use of fertilizers. In 1987, a law was enacted to support these 
activities, with an important increase in newforested areas that should mean the 
absorption of the equivalent of about 28% of the country’s total CO2 emissions. 
These land-use trends will increase in the future. In addition, there are several 
studies and concrete projects aimed at developing the use of natural gas (imported 
from Argentina), as well as the integration of power networks at the  
level in order to reduce the regional  emissions. The  strategy is a 
concrete example of the advantages of the regional integration process. 
Venezuela 
Venezuela’s economy is based on oil and natural gas production, as well as mining 
activities and the production of steel and aluminum, all of which are energy-
intensive activities, basically oriented toward foreign markets. 
This situation raises a question regarding the “export and import” of  
emissions. Unfortunately, at this point, there is no accounting system for this type 
of “international trade” and the emissions are accounted for in the producing 
countries. This is disadvantageous for developing countries, which are the main 
providers of energy-intensive commodities to industrialized countries. 
The baseline scenario calculated for Venezuela does not take into account any 
mitigation policy except the normal improvement in efficiency and new technol­
ogy. In the mitigation scenario, the options being considered include the control 
16 the Trust for the Conserva­
tion of Electrical Energy. 
17 mercosur is the Southern 
Common Market in Latin Amer­
ica. Its members are Argentina,
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of fugitive emissions at the natural gas production and transport level, taking into 
account the importance of the natural gas industry in the country. At the end-use 
level, there is a mix of classical  measures, as well as substitution strategies, in 
order to increase the use of natural gas in all sectors, including transportation. The 
tactic for power production is to continue with hydroelectric development as far 
as possible. 
Forest activities are also very important in Venezuela, considering 60% of the 
country is forested and 70% of the total land area is in the Amazon Basin. In this 
case, there are contradictory trends. On the one hand, there are pressures to exploit 
the forest resources, despite government controls through annual permits and 
long term concessions. The annual deforestation rate is significant. It is estimated 
that between 300,000 and 600,000 hectares are lost per year, although this infor­
mation is not well documented. On the other hand, there are several programs for 
reforestation for industrial purposes and for protected area management. There 
are calculations that indicate that for the year 2025 the total potential stock of 
sequesteredcarbon in forest areas could be nearly 1.5 billion tons of carbon, with a 
unit cost between $4 and $20 per ton. It is therefore very important for 
Venezuela to support in-depth forest studies and institution building at the coun­
try and regional level in this particular area. 
This small sample of mitigation options under consideration in the Latin 
American/ Caribbean region demonstrates that the region has significant poten­
tial to continue its historic trend of decreasing specific ghg emissions without 
arresting the progress of urgently needed socioeconomic development. However, 
it will be very important to secure international support, regional cooperation, 
and action at the national level so as to overcome financial, institutional, techno­
logical, social, and cultural barriers, which would otherwise threaten the viability 
of the proposed measures and programs. 
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Abstract 
This paper is an examination of carbon dioxide emission mitigation scenarios within 
the forestry and energy sectors in Mexico. It is primarily intended to illustrate how, 
using a proper strategy, it is possible to identify development options that result in 
significant CO2 emission reductions while simultaneously advancing national sus­
tainable development priorities. 1 
Introduction 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change () was 
agreed to in 1992 at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Devel­
opment in Rio de Janeiro. The Kyoto Protocol to the Convention was developed 
and agreed to five years later at the third Conference of Parties ( 3). Using 1990 
emissions levels as a baseline, the Protocol instituted mandatory reductions of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) for industrialized (Annex I) countries. It also estab­
lished the possibility of trading ‘units’ of emissions reduction between Annex I and 
developing (non-Annex I) countries through the Clean Development Mecha­
nism, which is expected to begin operating by the end of the year 2000. 
Both the Convention and the Protocol state that the different actions and poli­
cies directed at the mitigation and/or reduction of the impacts of potential change 
in the Earth’s climate should be framed within the context of sustainable devel­
opment. In order for Non-Annex I countries to participate in emissions reduction 
activities, the identification of mitigation options and future emissions reduction 
paths that simultaneously advance sustainable development priorities within the 
participating countries will be critical. Another crucial element will be the inclu­
sion of mitigation options that not only involve both the forestry and energy sec­
tors, but also encompass integrated scenarios that enable full examination of alter­
native emissions paths in each country. 
1 This article is based on Shein­
baum and Masera,“Mitigating
Carbon Emissions while 
Advancing National Develop­
ment Priorities: The Case of 
Mexico” in Climatic Change
(November 2000 issue). Some
of the text and graphics
throughout this paper have
been re-published here with
the kind permission of Kluwer
Academic Press. Please refer to 
this article for a more complete
discussion of the approach, the
model, scenarios, and results. 
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The case of climate change mitigation in Mexico is particularly pertinent for 
several reasons. First, Mexico is among the 20 countries with the highest levels of 
greenhouse gas emissions in the world. Second, Mexico has been a member of 
both the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development () 
and the North American Free Trade Agreement () since 1994, and has there­
fore been subject to pressures to cap future  emissions or emissions growth. 
Third, Mexico is an oil exporting country and relies heavily on fossil fuels for its 
domestic energy needs. At the same time, however, Mexico is clearly a developing 
country in terms of its average income per capita, unavailability of basic services 
for a significant portion of its population, and its per capita emissions rate. In 
addition, the government does not have sufficient capital to make incremental 
investments in emissions mitigation options. 
The current situation 
About 96% of Mexico’s primary energy comes from fossil fuels. Carbon dioxide 
2 One TgCO2 is equivalent to emissions related to energy use grew from 297 TgCO2
2 in 1990 to 331 in 1994 
one million tons of carbon diox­ (Sheinbaum and Rodríguez 1997). This has been compounded by severe defor­
ide; one ton of CO2 is equiva­
estation and forest degradation, which has been estimated at a loss of 670,000 ha lent to 3.67 tons of carbon (tC). 
per year (Masera et al. 1997). Approximately 136 TgCO2 are emitted each year as a 
result of land use changes, 185 TgCO2 if forest regrowth on abandoned land is not 
taken into account. Total carbon dioxide 
figure 1 emissions reached 434 TgCO2 per year (118 








land use changes (Government of Mexico 
1997) (see Figure 1). 
There are currently several activities 
Residential & being conducted in Mexico that simultane-Commercial 5% 
ously address national development priori-Agriculture 1% 
ties while helping to reduce the  emis-
Industrial 
Processes 3%	 sions. Within the energy sector these 
activities include improvements in energy 
efficiency in the industrial, transportation, 
commercial, and residential sectors; switch-
total 444 million tons co2 ing to less carbon intensive fuels; and the 
establishment of standards for new equip­
ment. Forestry sector projects that focus on conservation and management of 
native forests as alternatives to deforestation, afforestation of degraded and defor­
ested lands, and promoting agroforestry systems also have the potential to miti­
gate net  emissions. These measures are summarized in Table 1. 
Energy Sector 
Starting in 1989, several institutions were created in Mexico with the purpose of 
promoting energy efficiency. These include the Comisión Nacional para el Ahorro 
de Energía (—The National Commission for Energy Savings), Programa 
de Ahorro de Energía del Sector Eléctrico (—The Electricity Sector’s Energy 
Saving Program) and the Fideicomiso para el Ahorro de Energía Eléctrica (— 
The Trust for the Conservation of Energy), which is a revolving-loan trust fund to 
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table 1 summary of current measures in mexico 
table 1 with climate change mitigation impacts 
sector	 measures and policies 
Energy	 Institutions: Comisión Nacional para el Ahorro de Energía (conae—The 
National Commission for Energy Savings), Programa de Ahorro de Energía del
Sector Eléctrico (paese—The Electricity Sector’s Energy Saving Program) and the
Fideicomiso para el Ahorro de Energía Eléctrica (fide—The Trust for the Conser­
vation of Energy). 
Energy Efficiency Standards: Several standards are in place including policies for
domestic refrigerators and coolers, room and central air conditioners, three phase
electric motors, and non-residential lighting. 
Demand-Side Management Programs: There are specific programs for residential
lighting, commercial lighting, industrial motors and compressors, and municipal
pumping. Other programs include a roof insulation initiative and daylight savings. 
Energy Efficiency Demonstration Projects: These include installation of high-effi­
ciency burners and heat recovery systems in industry,and several projects in build­
ings. 
Cogeneration: Promotion of more than 20 large projects with more than 600 mw 
of installed capacity. 
Renewable Energy: There are programs for rural electrification with photovoltaic
systems, water heating with solar thermal systems and large scale wind power
generation. 
Fuel Switching: Planning for future power expansion is based on natural gas fired
(combined cycle) power plants instead of the traditional thermal (fuel-oil fired)
power plants. 
Forestry	 Natural Protected Areas (npa): There are currently 111 npas covering 12 million ha.
Seven million additional hectares are under special management for protecting
wildlife. 
Sustainable Forest Management: Approximately us$13 million per year of subsi­
dies are provided through prodefor to improve harvesting systems in native 
forests. 
Afforestation: Approximately 200,000 ha of degraded lands are afforested for
restoration purposes each year (for a net of 70,000 ha per year) through pronare . 
Commercial Plantations: Subsidies of us$30 million per year are being provided to
establish fast-growing plantations in degraded forest and on agricultural lands. 
Energy efficiency standard 
There are several standards already in effect, including criteria for domestic refrig­
erators and coolers, room and central air conditioners, three phase electric 
motors, and non-residential lighting. According to , energy standards save 
2000 GWh of electricity per year ( 1996). 
Demand-side management programs 
Residential lighting: In the residential sector, the primary state-owned national util­
ity, Comisión Federal de Electricidad (—The Federal Electricity Commission), 
implemented 12 projects between 1989 and 1996 to promote the use of compact flu­
orescent lamps () in Mexican households. By September 1996 these projects 
were responsible for the adoption of about 1.2 million  in Mexican homes, 
resulting in energy savings of 160  per year (Friedman et al. 1993 and 1995). 
Incentives: The incentive program, which started in early 1998, is intended to 
achieve energy savings of 3,250 MWh in the year 2000 by promoting the intro­
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duction of efficient technologies for residential lighting, commercial lighting, 
industrial motors and compressors, and municipal pumping ( 1996). 
Roof insulation: Since 1991  has been promoting domestic roof insulation in 
northern Mexico by providing financing to homes using more than one MWh per 
month of electricity during the summer. Over 75,000 homes in northern Mexico, 
mostly in Mexicali, have been insulated to reduce cooling loads, with reported 
electric savings of up to 35 % (DeBuen 1993). 
Daylight savings: Summer daylight savings time was implemented in 1996. Eval­
uations of its success claim a national savings of 0.7% of national electric consump­
tion (1.3 billion KWh TWh) and reduction of peak load by 500  ( 1997). 
Industry
Specific work in the industrial sector has included promoting the use of new, high-
efficiency burners; improving current systems; and encouraging fuel switching. 
Additional activities include the instrumentation and control of boilers and burn­
ers and the promotion of energy management systems. Work in the public sector 
includes strengthening the relationship with Petroleos Mexicanos (), the 
national oil company, as well as studies of recovery in rigs and platforms and the 
use of turbo compressors at terminal stations. Energy savings related to these pro­
grams are estimated to be around 480 GWh/yr ( 1995;  1995a). 
Buildings 
Efficiency demonstration projects have been carried out in office buildings, edu­
cational facilities, commercial malls, department stores, restaurants, hotels, super­
markets, hospitals, and other establishments. The resulting energy savings have 
varied between 20 and 37%, with a maximum payback of three years on invest­
ments, and a total energy savings of 24 GWh per year ( 1995b). 
Cogeneration 
As of 1994, Mexico had installed industrial cogeneration facilities with a combined 
capacity of nearly 3 , mostly in  refineries and petrochemical facilities. 
More recently, the Regulatory Energy Commission authorized close to 20 permits 
for cogeneration, which represents an installed capacity of around 600 . How­
ever, most of this installed cogeneration capacity has been used exclusively for on-
site demand due to barriers related to electricity costs that have to be paid by the 
electric utilities (Sheinbaum et al. 1997-1998). 
Renewable energy 
Rural electrification: In 1994 a rural photovoltaic electrification program enabled 
35,000 small household systems to be installed for communities that did not have 
access to the electricity grid (Mexican Secretary of Energy 1997). 
Solar thermal systems: Water heating solar systems are being applied in a vari­
ety of capacities, both at the household level and in the commercial sector, includ­
ing at one of the principal hospitals in Mexico City. 
Wind power generation: The main wind power generation system in Mexico is in 
the southeast region of the country (La Venta to Oaxaca). It is connected to the 
national and interconnected grid system. It has a power capacity of 1575 kw (equiva­
lent to 15,750 bulbs of 100 watts) and a capacity of nearly 40%. There are plans to 
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Fuel switching 
Most of the expansion in the electric power sector through the year 2005 will take 
place by adding natural gas fired (combined cycle) power plants (9500  from 
1996 to 2005) instead of the traditional thermal (fuel-oil fired) power plants. In 
addition, the majority of the industries in the regions with the highest local pol­
lution indexes, especially those in the larger cities, have switched from fuel oil to 
natural gas. 
Forest sector 
Mexico has 49 million ha of native forests, half of which are temperate and half 
tropical (Masera et al. 1997). There are an additional 21 million ha classified as 
degraded forestlands. About 80% of total forestland is communally owned by 
rural communities. Approximately 95% of all timber harvesting in Mexico is con­
ducted in native, mainly temperate, forests ( 1996). There are several 
programs in place to reduce deforestation and forest degradation in the country. 
The main forestry activities that will result in  emissions reductions are: 
Promotion of sustainable forest management in native forests 
By the end of the year 2000, the Mexican government plans to support the estab­
lishment of sustainable forest harvesting systems on more than 3 million ha of 
native tropical and temperate forests. Most of these forests are collectively owned 
by rural communities and are either unmanaged or have been managed using 
inadequate methods that have favored degradation and conversion to other land 
uses. Several incentives are in place that will help achieve the stated objectives, 
including a government program, el Programma para el Desarrollo Forestal 
(—The Program for Forest Development), which allocates between 
$9 million and $13 million per year toward these initiatives ( 
1996). Through , forest owners, mostly rural communities and ejidos,3 
receive subsidies that enable them to prepare integrated forest management plans 
for timber and non-timber forest products, to conduct forest inventories, and to 
improve the current management of timber and non-timber resources. 
Commercial plantations 
Approximately 25,000 ha will be established as commercial plantations by the end of 
2000. Most of these plantations are sown with fast growth species that are intended 
to be used for cellulose production. A newly approved law places several constraints 
on the establishment of these plantations to insure that they will not cause major 
environmental or social problems (Alvarez-Icaza and Viveros 1996). Since 1997 a 
subsidy of $30 million per year, as well as several fiscal incentives, have been pro­
vided to encourage the establishment of plantations ( 1996). 
Agroforestry systems 
Agroforestry systems combine the production of crops and trees in the same area 
for the purpose of obtaining both agricultural and forest products.As of 1997 there 
were 0.86 million ha dedicated to agroforesty systems in Mexico—about 0.8 mil­
lion ha of this is producing shade coffee and 0.06 million ha is sown with cacao 
(Masera and Ordonez 1997). There is a large area of fallow lands, the exact size of 
which is currently unknown, that are also managed as agroforestry systems. Agro­
forestry systems offer a promising economic alternative to conversion of forests to 
3 Ejidos are a form of collective
land ownership. In the case of
forestlands, members of the 
ejido are allowed to use the
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4 The study was funded by the
U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID). Portions
of the original text, para­
phrased or verbatim, may
appear in this document. 
pasture and agriculture, especially for tropical deciduous and tropical evergreen 
forests. There are currently several large governmental programs planned for 
implementation in different tropical regions of Mexico. Specifically, in the humid 
tropics, the program Desarrollo Sustentable del Tropico Humedo (Sustainable 
Development of the Humid Tropics) plans to reduce the extent of slash and burn 
agriculture by intensifying corn production, establishing soil conservation prac­
tices, and promoting different types of agroforestry systems. 
Restoration plantations (afforestation) 
Afforestation involves planting trees in both deforested and degraded lands. The 
objective is to enable the regeneration of vegetation in order to recover degraded 
areas, protect water basins, and reduce soil erosion. The afforested area has 
increased substantially over the last few years, but the national results of these pro­
grams are still modest (0.2 million ha). The government reforested 200,000 ha 
every year from 1995 to 2000, for a total of 1 million ha in the period ( 
1996). However this area should be adjusted by the trees’ survival rate, which is 
currently 34%, leaving a net of 0.46 million ha by the end of 2000. 
Other programs 
Mexico has currently 111 Natural Protected Areas (NPAs), covering 11.9 million ha 
of tropical, temperate, and semi-arid forests. Financial resources are not sufficient 
to adequately protect all of these areas, so the government has decided to give pri­
ority to the 10 NPAs deemed most important. Two programs directed at slowing 
the rate of conversion of forest to other land uses are the Unidad de Manejo de 
Vida Silvestre (—Wildlife Management Units) and the Programa para la 
Defensa de la Frontera de la Selva (—The Program for the Defense of the 
Forest Frontier). The former provides incentives to individuals and organizations 
for the management of fauna and vegetation for conservation purposes. It is cur­
rently being applied to 7 million ha of semi-arid, temperate, and tropical forests 
(Government of Mexico 1999). It is a voluntary agreement between landowners 
and government. The  provides incentives to owners of land with marginal 
crop and pasture productivity to reconvert them to forests. The program currently 
covers 20,000 ha per year. A recently approved program, Programa Nacional de 
Leña (—The National Fuelwood Management Program), will devote 
funds to encouraging the sustainable use of fuelwood in the countryside, which 
currently accounts for 78% of total wood demand in Mexico (Government of 
Mexico 1999). 
Building future carbon emission and sequestration scenarios 
There are several crucial steps that will be necessary in order to effectively link mit­
igation strategies with sustainable development priorities at the country level. The 
authors conducted a study of the options within the energy and forestry sectors 
that would address both the global responsibility of  emissions reductions 
and the national priority of sustainable development. A 15-year time period from 
1995 to 2010 was used for this study.4 
Development and adaptation of country-specific analytical tools 
There are several existing tools for carbon emission mitigation analysis. However, 
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vantages: a) there is little control over the actual computational procedures; b) the 
users depend on the package programmers for any modifications; c) the form in 
which the data must be entered may not coincide with that in which information 
is available, so that a certain amount of exogenous data-processing must be com­
pleted before the package can be used; and d) most packages impose major con­
straints on the planning process (Reddy 1995). 
For these reasons, the first step in this analysis was to develop and adapt exist­
ing tools to Mexico’s particular priorities. Specifically, the authors chose to create 
an integrated analysis of energy and forestry options, and developed a bottom-up 
accounting simulation model for Mexico that simulates energy consumption by 
end uses. The model has three basic submodels, which enabled the authors to con­
duct estimates for both the base year and projected scenarios. The submodels 
included: a) an end-use-based simulation of the Mexican energy system and its 
associated  emissions; b) a simulation of forest sector options, based on the 
demand for forest products and other services from the forest sector, accounting 
for both emissions and carbon sequestration; and c) a financial module comprised 
of an estimation of CO2 mitigation costs and an incremental cost curve.
5 
Identification of Mexico’s future sustainable development priorities 
Through the end-use analysis of energy needs and a demand-based analysis of 
forest products, the authors identified a set of key activities that address national 
development priorities while simultaneously helping to reduce the current rate of 
 emissions growth. Within the energy sector, these activities include increases 
in energy efficiency in the industrial, transportation, commercial, and residential 
sectors; switching to less carbon intensive fuels; and the establishment of stan­
dards for new equipment. Within the forest sector, the authors recommendations 
included the adequate conservation and management of native forests, the sup­
port of afforestation of degraded and deforested lands, and the promotion of 
agroforestry systems. 
Building reference scenarios and mitigation scenarios 
The study examined two scenarios for the year 2010: a reference scenario and a 
mitigation scenario. In the energy sector, the reference scenario was based on an 
assumption of intensity frozen at 1994 levels. In the forest sector, the assumption 
was a constant rate of deforestation based on a percentage of the remaining forest 
area. The economic and population growth rates that were used to determine the 
demand for energy and forestry products were based on official projections. 
The mitigation scenario focused on specific rates of penetration of mitigation 
technologies by sector. Only a limited set of options were analyzed; thus, the results 
presented should not be viewed as the total or maximum potential carbon mitiga­
tion for Mexico. This is particularly true for the energy sector, where data availabil­
ity restrictions hindered a truly in-depth analysis of the transportation sector. 
Transformation of sustainable development priorities 
into greenhouse gas emissions mitigation 
The final step of the analysis was to demonstrate the implications of the scenarios 
in terms of  emissions and sequestration, and the associated costs. For this 
purpose, the authors used appropriate emission factors and methods to transform 
the identified targets in each scenario. For example, the number of compact fluo­
5 See Sheinbaum and Masera 
2000 for a complete descrip­
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rescent bulbs to be installed or the area to be restored through reforestation would 
be expressed in terms of  emissions and sequestration figures. 
The costs calculated in the model included the investment, operation, and 
maintenance costs needed to achieve the energy and forest services for targeted 
years. The model combined the different options in order to determine the least 
cost “path” of the carbon mitigation scenarios. 
Results 
Baseline scenario 
Without any mitigation activities, the total Mexican CO2 emissions would reach 
879 Tg per annum by 2010. Energy emissions can be expected to grow 149% in the 
15-year timeframe used for this analysis (see Figures 2 and 3). A net loss of 10.4 mil­
lion ha of forests, 20% of the existing area, is predicted by the baseline scenario. 
Because the net deforestation rate is propor­
figure 2 
tionate to the remaining forested area, the area 
co2 emissions from energy use: deforested annually would decline in themexico 1965 –2010 baseline scenario 
future. As a result, annual carbon emissions 
from deforestation will decline 33% between 
1995 and 2010. 
Mitigation scenario 
Energy sector 
For the purposes of this study, the mitigation 
options related to energy use included com­
bined cycle plants, efficient industrial electric 
motors, efficient industrial boilers, industrial 
cogeneration, efficient commercial and resi­
dential lighting systems, efficient potable 
water pumping, inter-modal substitution of 
passenger transportation methods in the 
Mexico City Metropolitan Area (), and 
wind power generation. The assumptions used 
for the mitigation scenario analysis were as 
follows:6 
Combined cycle plants: The assumption was 
that rising demands for electricity could be sat­
isfied by installing systems based on natural gas 
combined cycle plants, rather than fuel oil 
thermoelectric plants. By the year 2010, it is 
projected that the required installed capacity 
will have reached 51,464 , 43% of which 
could be produced by combined cycle plants. 
Efficient industrial motors: It was assumed 
that all the motors sold from 1999 to 2010 
would be high efficiency units. Substitution 
was considered for motors between 5 and 125 
horsepower (hp), with energy savings of 15% 
per motor. This substitution would create a cumulative energy savings of 754 GWh 
by the year 2010 (Rodriguez 1997). 
figure 3 
mexico 1995 –2005 – 2010 
6 For a detailed description of
the methodology, see Shein­
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Industrial cogeneration: The models used the assumption that all new industrial 
plants would implement cogeneration in their processing. Energy needs were cal­
culated assuming that the exhaust heat of a gas turbine would satisfy the thermal 
necessities of industrial processes. Under these conditions, the cogeneration 
system would supply more than enough power for the industrial process, with the 
cogeneration potential for new plants reaching 8664.3  by the year 2010 (Shein­
baum 1997). 
Industrial boilers: According to Selmec (1994), 10,000 boilers with capacities of 
between 10 and 2000 hp are currently installed in the Mexican industrial sector. 
The mitigation scenarios assumed fuel switching (from diesel and fuel oil to nat­
ural gas), insulation, and burner substitution for 20% of all industrial boilers by 
2010 (Aguillon 1997). 
Efficient lighting in commercial sector: It was assumed that 5 million efficient 
lighting systems would be installed by 2010 due to the expected increases in elec­
tricity prices and decreases in the costs of efficient lighting technology (Shein­
baum and Vazquez 1997). 
Compact fluorescent lamps (cfls) in the Residential Sector: ’ incentive 
program estimates that 9.6 million lamps (out of a stock of more than 150 million 
lamps) will be replaced by  by the year 2010. The mitigation scenario used the 
assumption that for each lamp considered within the incentive program, another 
one would be installed, resulting in energy savings of 500 GWh by the year 2010 
(Sheinbaum and Vazquez 1997). 
Efficient water pumping: It is estimated that corrective and maintenance mea­
sures could save approximately 35% of the national water pumping electricity con­
sumption (Carmona 1997). This assumption was applied in the mitigation models. 
Inter-modal transportation substitution in the mcma: Replacement of small 
gasoline-powered buses with large diesel buses and increased use of electric mass 
metro and light train lines are considered the most viable emissions mitigation 
technology options for the . The mitigation scenario assumed the substitu­
tion of 60,000 microbuses with 30,000 diesel buses, as well as increased service 
from the metro and light electric trains (Dartois 1997). 
Large scale wind electricity generation: Based on different studies of the poten­
tial for wind power generation in Mexico, the model used the assumption that 
5000 MW of large wind power plants would be installed in the country by the year 
2010, which equals about 14% of the total installed capacity in 2000. Using a capac­
ity factor of 0.3, the generation capacity of these plants would be 1314 GWh 
(Caldera 1997). 
Forest sector 
The analysis covered three forestry mitigation strategies in detail: management of 
native forests, afforestation for forest restoration, and agroforestry systems. 
Management of native forests: Sustainable management of native forests is one 
of the best options available to Mexico for avoiding carbon dioxide emissions from 
forest degradation and deforestation. At the same time, this scenario also offers 
important development benefits, such as local employment opportunities, 
increased wood and non-wood forest product outputs, and soil and biodiversity 
conservation. Currently, about 95% of all timber harvesting in Mexico occurs in 
native forests, which are mostly communally owned by 10 million people grouped 
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reference scenario mitigation scenario (year 2010) 
Medium gdp growth scenario (nearly 4%/yr);

Reduction of population growth from 1.6% in 1995 to 1.1% in 2010
 
Energy intensity levels frozen
at 1994 values 
Fuel oil thermoelectric plants
as the dominant additional 
installed capacity within the 
power sector 
Conventional technology 
Net deforestation rate 
(deforestation minus
afforestation) at 1.5% per year
(based on early 1990s) from
1995 to 2010 
Total deforested area will 
reach 10.4 million ha by 2010 
Combined cycle plants: The required installed
capacity will reach 51,464 mw , of which 43% 
will be combined cycle plants. 
Efficient industrial motors: Cumulative 
energy savings of 754 GWh by the year 2010. 
Cogeneration: 8,664 mw for the year 2010. 
Industrial boilers: Fuel switching (from diesel
and fuel oil to natural gas), insulation, and
substitution of burners for 20% of all indus­
trial boilers by 2010. 
Efficient Lighting in Commercial Sector: 5 mil­
lion lighting systems will be installed by 2010. 
CFLs in the Residential Sector: 15 million cfls 
will be installed by 2010 (double the incentive
program estimate). 
Efficient Water Pumping: Corrective and 
maintenance measures used to save approxi­
mately 35% of the national water pumping
electricity consumption. 
Transportation in the Metropolitan Area: The 
substitution of 60,000 gasoline microbuses
by 30,000 diesel buses and increased service
from the metro and electric light trains. 
Wind Electricity Generation: 5000 mw of 
large wind power plants. 
Forest Management: 361 thousand ha per
year of deforestation avoided by sustainable
management of native forests. 
Afforestation: Additional 1.3 million ha desig­
nated as restoration plantations by 2010. 
Agroforestry: Additional 200,000 ha being
used for agroforestry systems by 2010. 
Source: Adapted from Sheinbaum and Masera 2000. 
tainable management of native forests will be particularly beneficial socially as 
well as environmentally. 
In the mitigation scenario, the area of native forest under management was 
estimated at 4.4 million ha. This was determined using the expected rates of defor­
estation, offset by the area to be converted to improved management systems. 
Based on projected population and economic growth, the mitigation scenario also 
factored in the demand for wood products up through 2010. Long-term unit 
carbon sequestration ranges between 618 t of CO2/ha for temperate forest and 763 
t of CO2/ha for tropical forest. 
Afforestation: The scenario was based on the planting of trees in both defor­
ested and degraded lands. The afforestation penetration estimation for this part 
of the scenario was based on governmental policies and goals for the year 2010, 




















   347
 
lion ha of afforested land within the analysis period. In this case, the annual carbon 
balance for the period from 2000 to 2010 
shows a steady increase from 2.8 to 12.1 TgCO2. figure 4 
Agroforestry: The model examined several avoided emissions of co2 mitigation scenario (2010) 
different systems of combining trees and crops 
for the purpose of producing both agricultural 
and forest products. It used a conservative esti­
mate of an additional 0.2 million ha under 
these systems by the year 2010. The rate of 
carbon sequestration varies greatly depending 
on the particular system, but usually ranges 
between 73 and 440 t of CO2 per year in 2000, 
and up to 2.0 TgCO2 per year by 2010. 
Figure 4 illustrates the avoided CO2 emis­
sions for different energy and forestry options 
for the year 2010. The total mitigation poten­
tial for the options examined reaches 45 Tg of 
CO2 in the energy sector and 262 Tg of CO2 in 
the forest sector by 2010. 
Mitigation costs 
Within the energy sector, annual costs per unit range from $45.90 per ton of 
CO2 for residential lighting to $106.40 for 
figure 5industrial motors. The average costs for 
costs for different mitigationforestry options range from $3.50 per ton 
alternatives in mexico of CO2 to $5.40 depending on the option 
(see Figure 5). The mitigation options that 
resulted in higher costs than the baseline sce­
nario are forest management in tropical areas, 
restoration plantations, agroforestry systems, 
increased used of the metro and light trains in 
the , and integration of efficient indus­
trial motors. It should be noted that even cost-
effective options, such as efficient lighting or, 
very specifically, the sustainable management 
of native temperate forests, usually require 
substantially higher investment costs than 
conventional technologies. Also, specifically 
in the case of forestry options, costs are 
extremely site-dependent; thus, the average 
values presented here may be much higher or lower for specific projects. However, 
the analysis showed that if mitigation scenario options were added one-by-one, 
they could be achieved at almost no additional net cost compared to the baseline 
scenario (Sheinbaum and Masera 2000). 
Discussion 
The analysis identified a mitigation potential of 393 Tg of CO2 for Mexico by the 
year 2010. If this potential were realized, Mexico would reduce its total emissions 
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7 Through Scolel Té, for exam­
ple, companies, individuals, or
institutions wishing to offset
greenhouse gas emissions can
purchase “proto-carbon credits”
from a local Trust Fund. The 
objective of Scolel Te is to
develop a prototype scheme for
sequestering carbon dioxide in
sustainable forest and agricul­
tural systems. For more infor­
mation, please refer to the
Scolel Té website: 
http://www.ed.ac.uk/~ebfr11/ 
baseline scenario predicts. This means that the per capita emissions rate would 
drop by 30% in the same period of time (from 6.2 to 4.3 tons of CO2 per capita), 
instead of increasing by 26% (See Figure 3). Thus, by properly implementing a 
series of promising mitigation options in the energy and forest sectors, Mexico has 
the opportunity to significantly advance national development priorities for the 
period from 1995 to 2010, while keeping its per capita carbon emissions low and 
experiencing a very modest increase in total emissions. Therefore, in principle, 
there should be no contradiction between the national and global interests. 
Forestry options, particularly sustainable management of native forests, show 
the largest carbon mitigation potential for Mexico in the short term. Forestry and 
energy projects specifically aimed at carbon mitigation are already operating suc­
cessfully7 (Scolel Té 1997; Montoya et al. 1995; De Buen and Masera 1994) or are 
waiting only for approval of financial resources (- 1998). It should 
be noted, however, that forestry options are ultimately limited by the amount of 
available area, and unless effective actions are taken in the energy sector, emissions 
will eventually continue growing at a rapid pace (see Figure 3). While resulting in 
a lower short-term carbon emissions reduction rate, there are several energy 
options, such as , that would be extremely cost effective given Mexico’s strong 
dependence on relatively cheap oil resources. In this case, it will be necessary to 
employ a consistent and strategy, starting immediately, to insure that efficient 
technologies and renewable resources are integrated into policymaking over the 
next decade, and continue to be essential elements of development thereafter. At 
the same time, the large amount of carbon that could be potentially captured via 
forestry projects could provide Mexico with additional time for the development 
of a renewable energy path. 
Conclusions 
While it has been determined that Annex I countries are primarily accountable for 
the rising GHG emissions levels, Non-Annex I countries such as Mexico also have 
minor responsibilities both historically and in the present. The participation of 
these countries is very important to climate change mitigation. It is therefore crit­
ical that strategies be developed to support projects that will abate the future 
growth of  emissions in these countries while addressing their sustainable 
development priorities. 
As demonstrated in this paper, Mexico is not a passive spectator in the climate 
change regime. Several actions have already been taken that, without explicitly 
addressing climate change, have a definite impact on emissions reductions. This 
paper also illustrates that future emissions paths can be identified in which there 
is no contradiction between sustainable development and climate change mitiga­
tion. The authors have shown that emissions of  gases can be cut by replacing 
conventional technologies with efficient ones, by introducing renewable energy 
technologies, and by implementing sustainable forest management, afforestation, 
and agroforestry systems. Many of these mitigation alternatives are “no regret” 
options for Mexico, not just because most of them are cost-effective, but because 
they simultaneously address sustainable development goals. Energy efficiency and 
increased use of renewable resources will lead to improved economic productiv­
ity, less investment to satisfy the increasing energy demand, and the possibility of 
raising the quality of life for those who do not currently have access to electricity. 
In the forest sector, in addition to carbon sequestration, the alternatives presented 
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in this paper are likely to have tangible benefits at the local level, such as genera­
tion of income opportunities, conservation of biodiversity, and the preservation 
of soils and watersheds. 
However, the mitigation potential identified will not be reached automatically. 
Strong and consistent efforts are needed at the local, national, and global levels. 
Locally, one of the main barriers to overcome is the increase in investment costs 
associated with carbon mitigation options. This is true for both energy and 
forestry options—even for those alternatives that will be cost-effective on a life-
cycle scale, because they may require higher initial investment. This is true of 
options such as cogeneration and sustainable management of native temperate 
Forestry options, particularly sustainable management of native forests, show 
the largest carbon mitigation potential for Mexico in the short term…It should 
be noted, however, that forestry options are ultimately limited by the amount of 
available area, and unless effective actions are taken in the energy sector, emis­
sions will eventually continue growing at a rapid pace. 
forests. As such, innovative schemes are needed to reduce up-front costs so users 
can afford to invest in  mitigation alternatives. 
At the national level, energy and land-use policies should be established to 
address long-term concerns, as opposed to the six-year planning cycle that is cur­
rently employed by the government of Mexico. Internationally, industrialized 
countries need to significantly increase the transfer of funds and technology to the 
Non-Annex I countries. These funds, channeled through mechanisms such as the 
, could play a critical role in removing the investment barriers associated with 
several energy and forestry mitigation options. Appropriately managed, new 
funds and better access to technology could also catalyze the “leap-frog” from 
obsolete technology to state of the art systems (Goldemberg 1998). 
Specific actions that can help in the design of appropriate  mitigation 
options and scenarios in Non-Annex I countries include: 
•	 Supporting the development of locally-adapted tools and methods that allow 
an integrated assessment of future mitigation scenarios in terms of the coun­
tries’ own defined sustainable development needs. 
•	 Promoting an integrated approach to scenario building, where energy and 
forestry options can be examined and combined. 
•	 Increasing and strengthening local capacity and institutions for the identifica­
tion of mitigation options, project formulation, implementation, and moni­
toring (cooperation between developing countries is very important in this 
respect). 
•	 Encouraging technology adaptation, and building on indigenous knowledge 
when possible and appropriate. 
•	 Insuring and encouraging the effective participation of local communities, 
from the identification of options to the implementation of alternatives (e.g., 
Scolel Té Project, Mexico). 
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Abstract 
Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the countries 
of the world have been debating climate change mitigation strategies for the past 
decade. In 1997, the strategy discussion was still ongoing. However, that year, at the 
Third Conference of Parties (cop-3) in Kyoto, a Protocol was agreed to (still in the rat­
ification process at the time of this writing) that included provisions to allow coun­
tries to meet their reduction commitments by buying credits from other countries. 
Costa Rica has been a pioneer in developing and selling emission reduction cred­
its. Deforestation is the second largest source of CO2 emissions to the atmosphere 
and forest growth absorbs carbon dioxide gases (CO2), which contribute to global 
warming. Costa Rica’s carbon credits come primarily from the conversion of culti­
vated fields and pastures into forests, as well as from the reduction of deforesta­
tion. In 1996 the country sold its first 200,000 tons of carbon emission reduction 
credits to Norway for us$10 per ton. However, in late 1997 when it tried to auction 
an additional 1,000,000 tons of carbon credits with a floor price of us$20 per ton, 
it received no bids. The country is currently evaluating its strategy. Preliminary 
results show that, depending on the final rules, regulations, and carbon prices, 
carbon trading is likely to promote the expansion of national park areas and to 
induce some farmers to switch from traditional agricultural to forest plantations 
and private forest conservation. 
These conclusions are very important for two reasons. First, more than 75% of the 
projects with CO2 mitigation potential from Latin American and African countries are 
forest-related. Second, forest projects constitute the least cost option of the emerg­
ing us$9 billion per annum carbon market between industrialized and developing 
countries. However, if the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (ipcc) does 
not clearly recommend including forest projects in the overall climate change miti­
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1 Estimates of annual global
emissions from deforestation 
range from 0.6 to 2.8 billion
tons, compared to around 6.0
billion tons from fossil fuel 
combustion (Houghton 1991;
Smith et al. 1993). 
in limbo. Moreover, if forest projects are excluded, then fuel-switching projects in 
large developing countries like China and India will become the least cost options 
and will capture the bulk of the market, effectively limiting the participation of Latin 
American and African countries in climate change mitigation activities. 
Some background on global warming 
During the last decade, many scientists and policymakers became convinced that 
increased emissions of carbon dioxide or other “greenhouse gases” (methane, 
nitrous oxide, and related synthetic compounds) were contributing to the warm­
ing of the planet. These emissions had grown with industrialization, particularly 
from the burning of fossil fuels, such as coal and petroleum, to power industry; to 
heat, cool, and light homes and offices; and to transport goods and passengers. 
Deforestation is the second largest source of carbon dioxide emissions to the 
atmosphere after fossil fuel combustion.1 
Several factors have made it difficult to reach an agreement on a global warm­
ing mitigation strategy. 
First, there is still substantial scientific uncertainty about the link between 
global warming and the so-called greenhouse gases. To many it seems obvious that 
the planet is warming. Proof comes in the form of receding polar ice caps and the 
14 warmest years in recorded history all happening within the last two decades 
(temperatures have been recorded since 1866). However, it is still unclear whether 
warming is a long-term trend and to what extent the build up of greenhouse gases 
is contributing to it. The scientific models of climate change are so complex and 
sensitive that small and plausible differences in assumptions could significantly 
alter predictions about future temperatures. 
Second, the benefits of preventing global warming are in dispute. Concerned 
scientists forecast that rising temperatures will lead to massive coastal flooding, 
dramatic changes in crop yields, more violent storms, the extinction of species due 
to habitat loss, and other terrible results.Yet others argue that the world may adapt 
to rising temperatures without enormous suffering or cost, particularly if the tem­
perature increase is not too extreme. Some models also indicate that global warm­
ing might help many parts of the world by increasing rainfall and extending grow­
ing seasons. 
Third, there is disagreement about how the burden of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions should be shared among the countries of the world. Historically, indus­
trialized countries have emitted the lion’s share of greenhouse gases; the United 
States alone has accounted for nearly 25%. However, the “business-as-usual” fore­
casts show that the proportion of emissions from developing countries will rise 
rapidly as they industrialize (see Table 1). Developing countries argue that they 
should not have to reduce their emissions below their current modest levels, and 
should be allowed some margin for growth. Industrialized nations are reluctant to 
bear the burden alone, however, or to make sacrifices that might encourage prof­
ligate emissions by others. 
The strategy debate has been further complicated by uncertainty as to how 
much it will cost to reduce emissions. Pessimists point out that sources of energy 
with low or no greenhouse gas emissions tend to be either fairly expensive (such 
as solar or wind power) or to present other environmental risks (such as nuclear 
power). Optimists argue that the costs of alternative energy sources and cleaner 
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Africa 192 341 2.3% 
Central and 
South America 194 574 4.4% 
World total 5,841 10,447 2.4% 
Selected countries 
United States 1,411 1,956 1.3% 









China 792 2.340 4.4% 
India 222 523 3.5% 
Brazil 64 208 4.9% 
Source: Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook, 1998 
technologies would decline rapidly once businesses and households were given 
incentives. 
The potentially high costs of reducing emissions make tradable emissions cred­
its more attractive. The basic idea is that every country will agree to reduce emis­
sions by a certain amount and if countries that can reduce emissions at a relatively 
low cost are able to exceed their reduction commitments, they would be allowed 
to sell “credits” for the excess to countries where emissions reduction is more 
expensive. The United States successfully established a domestic market for emis­
sions credits to help reduce sulfur dioxide emissions from power plants in the 
1990s. The hope is that a similar market for greenhouse gas emission credits could 
reduce the cost of slowing global warming. 
International conventions on climate change 
The countries of the world took a key step toward a global agreement on climate 
change in 1988 when they established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change () to assess the scientific, technical, and socioeconomic research on 
climate change. The ’ work helped convince many in the world community 
that the risk of global warming was serious enough to warrant action. This led to 
the United Nations’ Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The Parties to the Rio 
summit approved the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, which 
called for the rollback of greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels and was later rat­
ified by 165 countries. The Convention set no specific targets for individual coun­
tries, however, so its effect was more symbolic than practical. A subsequent 
summit in Berlin in 1994 also saw only limited progress. 
By 1997, however, concern about global warming had increased to the point 
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2 Argentina actually com­
mitted to a specific target,
Kazakhstan has only
promised to do so. 
3 The two that can be used 
among Annex I countries are
“international permit trad­
ing” (under Article 17) and
“joint implementation”
(under Article 6). The Clean
Development Mechanism is
described in Article 12. 
approved. In Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol the industrialized nations and many 
of the transition-economy countries of Eastern Europe committed to specific 
emissions reduction targets that averaged a 5.2% rollback from 1990 emissions 
levels. These targets were to be achieved by the year 2008 and sustained through 
2012. The developing countries did not commit to specific reduction targets at 
Kyoto because they were reluctant to incur expenses and they wanted to see 
whether technological progress would reduce the costs of cleaner technologies 
and development. Because of this, the Annex I countries hedged their commit­
ments by specifying that the Protocol would not be binding until it was ratified by 
at least 55 Annex I countries that were responsible for at least 55% of the Annex I 
greenhouse gas emissions. Since Kyoto, only two developing countries— 
Argentina and Kazakhstan—have agreed to emissions reduction targets.2 The 
process of ratification among the Annex I countries is also proceeding slowly, and 
many observers are of the opinion that the major emitters, such as the United 
States, are unlikely to ratify the Protocol until the rest of the developing countries 
have also committed to specific reduction targets. 
The Kyoto Protocol includes three provisions for trading emissions credits. 
Two apply only to trades between Annex I countries, but the third, the Clean 
Development Mechanism (), may be used for trades between Annex I coun­
tries and developing countries.3 To qualify for a  trade, a developing country 
must demonstrate that the emissions credits it intends to sell are “additional” to 
emissions reductions it might be expected to achieve under a business-as-usual 
scenario. Through the , Annex I countries can offset their commitments by 
financing projects in developing countries. 
Costa Rica’s economy and its forests 
Costa Rica is a Central American country with a population of 3.7 million and a 
landmass of 5.2 million hectares. It is one of the most stable democracies in Latin 
America, and has not suffered from the civil wars or unrest that have plagued many 
of its neighbors in recent decades. Perhaps as a result, Costa Rica has the highest per 
capita income in Central America and one of the highest in Latin America. 
Throughout most of the 1980s, Costa Rica’s economy was largely dependent on 
exports of coffee, bananas, and cattle and its domestic industry and farmers were 
protected by high tariffs. These policies led to slow economic growth, however, 
and the government began to run fiscal deficits in an effort to meet the popular 
demand for improved standards of living. By 1988, the financial situation had 
become so precarious that the government had to appeal to the International 
Monetary Fund () for loans. As a condition of the loans, the IMF required that 
Costa Rica reduce its import barriers and open its economy to foreign investment. 
These reforms helped to transform the Costa Rican economy over the next decade. 
Tourism to Costa Rica’s beautiful beaches and tropical forests increased and soon 
overtook agriculture as the leading source of foreign exchange. Foreign companies 
invested so much in local assembly plants that in 1998 electronics overtook 
tourism as the number one foreign exchange earner. With the opening of a new 
Intel computer chip plant, electronics is expected to be the primary foreign 
exchange source for the next decade. 
The 1990s also brought increased efforts by the Costa Rican government to pro­
tect its forests and wildlife (see Table 2). During the decades when agriculture was 
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plantations and ranches. This destruction prompted the government to expand its 
system of national parks and to create a national network of Wildlife Conserva­
tion Areas (WCAs) which covered 15% of the 
country’s land area. The WCAs were intended 
to preserve habitats for sensitive forest species 
and consisted either of publicly owned lands hectares 
or private lands where, for a fee, the owner (millions) percentage 
table 2 land use in costa rica, 1998 
Agriculture and forestryhad agreed to limit logging to levels that Coffee, banana, and other export crops 0.2 4 
would not harm wildlife. The national parks Beef cattle 1.0 19 
and WCAs helped to establish Costa Rica as	 Dairy and mixed use 1.0 20 
Private forest 0.8 15 one of the premier destinations for eco- Abandoned cropland 0.5 10 
tourism in the 1980s and 1990s. Subtotal for agriculture and forest 3.5 68 
In 1994, however, ecologists from various Parks and Wildlife Conservation Areas 1.3 25 
Othergovernmental and non-governmental con- Urban 0.3 5 
servation agencies determined that the WCAs Miscellaneous other 0.1 2 
should be expanded to cover an additional Subtotal for ‘other’ 0.4 7 
Total 5.2 10010% of the country’s land area in order to 
adequately protect Costa Rica’s wildlife.4 Source: René Castro Salazar,“Valuing the Environmental Service
Costa Rica has several different types of trop- of Permanent Forest Stands to the Global Climate:The Case of Costa Rica,” 
unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, June 1999. ical forest and, as a result, is home to an 
unusually large number of species. Some of 
these species are rare and endangered, including many that are thought to be 4 The expanded area is
called the Protected Areas unique to the forests of Costa Rica, and not as yet studied by scientists. In arguing 
Project. For the sake of sim­
for expansion of the protected areas, Costa Rican environmentalists stressed that plicity, it is referred to here as
the nation had an obligation to the world to preserve this biodiversity. Moreover, the WCAs expansion. 
many of the sylvan species had potential economic value as the source of new 
medicines, food, and cosmetics. In the early 1990s, for example, Costa Rica signed 
contracts with two international pharmaceutical companies to share in the prof­
its from medicines that might be developed from rare Costa Rican species. 
Expanding the WCAs would also protect the quality of Costa Rica’s drinking 
water. 
The desire to expand the  stimulated Costa Rica’s effort to develop carbon 
emissions reduction credits. Without the revenue from selling credits, the govern­
ment would have been hard pressed to find the funds either to purchase land out­
right or to pay landowners not to develop all the additional hectares that it wanted 
to add to the . Reforesting neighboring plantations and cattle ranches had 
the added benefit of carbon dioxide sequestration, however, and thus offset green­
house gas emissions. This meant that if the government could sell the credits for 
sequestering the carbon to Annex I countries, it could use the proceeds to buy or 
protect the hectares it wanted. 
The reforestation scheme was politically advantageous as well because it helped 
rural residents. The rural areas had been fairly much excluded from the country’s 
growing prosperity because most of the factories and other new economic activi­
ties were located around San José, the nation’s capital. Traditional rural agricul­
ture was declining because world prices for coffee, bananas, and beef remained low 
and because young people were finding better jobs in San José. Expanding the 
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table 3 estimates of the marginal cost of abatement with and without trading 
table 3 (in 1995 dollars per ton of carbon) 
trading no trading 
model or united annex i 









































Average 164 260 277 80 28 
Source: Table 1 in Richard Baron, "The Kyoto Mechanisms: How Much Flexibility do they Provide?" in Richard
Baron, Maratina Bosi, and Alessandro Lanza, Emissions Trading and the Clean Development Mechanism:
Resource Transfers, Project Costs and Investment Incentives, report by the International Energy Agency for the
Fifth Conference of the Parties, Bonn, October-November 1999. 
table 4 aggregate economic cost of kyoto commitments with and without trading 
table 4 (in 2020 as a percentage reduction in gross national or domestic product) 
trading among 
model or trading among global 
researcher country no trading annex i countries trading 
sgm United States 0.4% 0.28% 0.12% 
merge United States 1% 0.25% 
G-cubed United States 0.3% 0.2% 
Japan 0.8% 0.2% 
Other OECD 1.4% 0.5% 
gtem All industrialized 1.2% 0.3% 
green All industrialized 0.5% 0.1% 
aim United States 0.45% 0.3% 0.2% 
Japan 0.25% 0.15% 0% 
European Union 0.3% 0.17% 0.07% 
Source:Table 2 in Richard Baron, "The Kyoto Mechanisms: How Much Flexibility do They Provide?" in Richard
Baron, Maratina Bosi, and Alessandro Lanza, Emissions Trading and the Clean Development Mechanism:
Resource Transfers, Project Costs and Investment Incentives, report by the International Energy Agency for
the Fifth Conference of the Parties, Bonn, October-November 1999. 
5 The information and 
tables in this section are 
drawn from Richard Baron, The potential for emissions trading 
5 
“The Kyoto Mechanisms: Research suggests that, at least in theory, emissions trading could substantially 
How Much Flexibility do They reduce the cost of rolling back greenhouse gas emissions. Table 3 summarizes cost Provide?” in Richard Baron, 
Maratina Bosi, and Alessan- estimates for achieving Kyoto Protocol commitments based on eight economic 
dro Lanza, Emissions Trading models produced by researchers who were selected by the International Energy 
and the Clean Development Agency from several countries. The results vary somewhat because of differing Mechanism: Resource Trans­
fers, Project Costs and Invest- model assumptions about, for example, the rates at which the costs of cleaner 
ment Incentives, report by technologies will decline. Nevertheless, the eight models are fairly consistent in 
the International Energy predicting that trading can significantly reduce costs. For example, using the aver-Agency for the Fifth Confer­
ence of the Parties, Bonn, age results from the eight models, without trading, the marginal cost of a ton of 
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Europe, and $277 in Japan. If 
trading were allowed among the 
Annex I countries, the marginal 
cost could drop to us$80 per ton. emissions emissions emissions 
table 5 emissions reduction commitments and share potentially acquired 
table 5 through trading among industrialized and transition economies 
reduction reduction reductionIf trading were allowed with the 
(millions from trading from trading 
developing countries as well, the of tons (millions as a percentage 
marginal cost would drop even of carbon)	 of tons of total 
of carbon) reductionfurther, to $28 per ton.6 
Table 4 translates the results of Europe 338 213 63% 
these forecasts into effects on Japan (or oecd Pacific) 126 83 66% 
North America 567 221 39%Gross National Product (). 
Total 1,031 517 50% 
The “G-cubed” model is a fairly 
typical analysis. It predicts that 
Source: Adapted from Table 3 in Richard Baron, "The Kyoto Mechanisms: How Much Flexibility dowithout emissions trading, con-
They Provide?" in Richard Baron, Maratina Bosi, and Alessandro Lanza, Emissions Trading and the
trol measures would absorb the Clean Development Mechanism: Resource Transfers, Project Costs and Investment Incentives,
equivalent of 0.3% of the  , report by the International Energy Agency for the Fifth Conference of the Parties, Bonn, October-
November 1999. 0.8% of the  in Japan, and 
1.4% in the other industrialized 
countries that belong to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 6 The simulations assumed 
that developing countriesment ().7 With trading, emissions control would only absorb between 0.2 and 
would be able to sell credits for 
0.5% of the  in those same countries (see Table 5). any emissions reductions
Some researchers suspect, however, that the cost estimates represented in the	 beyond their business-as-usual
forecasts. models are optimistic, for two reasons. First, the models all assume that each coun­
try will choose the most cost-effective domestic emissions control strategy. If pol- 7 The members of the oecd 
icymakers chose to protect politically sensitive domestic industries and regions include Australia, Austria, Bel­
gium, Canada, Czech Republic,from adopting even low-cost measures, however, then the costs of abatement Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
without trading might be much higher than estimated. many, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Second, the models assume fully fluid markets for emissions credits with no	 Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Lux­
embourg, Mexico, the Nether-significant barriers or transaction costs. In practice, however, the fact that the lands, New Zealand, Norway,
developing countries have not committed to specific emissions targets is a source Poland, Portugal, Spain,
of concern among Annex I countries. In particular, they are concerned about leak- Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
United Kingdom, and theage and slippage. The Convention uses these terms to refer to the possibility that United States. 
the net benefits of a carbon sequestration project will be reduced if, for instance, 
landowners take the money earned from forest conservation and use it to convert 
forest to cropland in another area (leakage); or if they increase their CO2 emissions 
by, for example, buying more vehicles (slippage). These potential situations might 
prove to be major impediments to carbon reduction trading. At the very least it 
would mean that some neutral party would have to ensure that the additionality 
requirement was met—i.e., that the emissions reduction would not have occurred 
anyway in the absence of the project. Germany has emerged as the spokesperson 
for a number of industrialized countries that are opposed to allowing significant 
trading with developing countries until they commit to emissions reduction tar­
gets. Germany has argued that without emissions commitments, additionality 
would be difficult to determine and could be easily evaded. 
Even if developing countries do commit to specific emissions targets, some 
observers wonder whether the trade flows involved are realistic. Trading among 
the Annex I countries would involve payments of roughly $42 billion per year 
to the transition economies of Eastern Europe from Europe, Japan, and North 























8 Now British-Amoco. 
360    
 
If global trading were allowed, it is projected that industrialized countries would 
pay developing countries roughly us$9 billion per year for emissions credits. The 
amounts involved would be substantially larger than the foreign aid payments 
that many developing and transition-economy countries are currently receiving. 
Understandably, some developing and transition economies want assurances 
that industrialized countries will not simply cut their foreign aid budgets to 
compensate. 
tries would pay developing countries roughly $9 billion per year for emissions 
credits. The amounts involved would be substantially larger than the foreign aid 
payments that many developing and transition-economy countries are currently 
receiving. Understandably, some developing and transition economies want 
assurances that industrialized countries will not simply cut their foreign aid bud­
gets to compensate. Skeptics also wonder whether or not the emissions reductions 
implied for the transition and developing countries are realistic. If trade occurs at 
the scale predicted by the models, transition economies would be emitting 
roughly 50% less than under the business-as-usual scenario, while developing 
countries would be emitting only 20% to 30% less. 
Despite these concerns, trading emissions credits with developing countries is 
proceeding on a limited basis. The 1992 Rio Convention encouraged experimen­
tal trading in order to determine how such a system might work. The 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol approved the Clean Development Mechanism (), although it never 
defined how the additionality test would be met. This ambiguity exists, in part, due 
to differences between developing countries and the German-led critics. Some 
countries and large multinational businesses with high emissions control costs 
were interested in buying credits, however, even though the credits’ ultimate legal 
status was ambiguous. British Petroleum,8 a major international energy company, 
set up an experimental system to trade emissions credits among its plants in 
industrialized and developing countries. Through this trial the company discov­
ered that even with inter-plant trading, its marginal costs of abatement were likely 
to be close to $70 per ton. As such, buying some low-cost credits from other 
sources might be worthwhile as a method for BP to hedge its bets for future com­
mitments. It also does not hurt that purchasing credits generates favorable corpo­
rate publicity. 
Most of the proposed emission credit trades are for electric power generating 
projects. For example, a credit might be issued for installing wind turbines that 
generate electricity with no greenhouse gas emissions, or for converting a coal-
fired generating station to using cleaner-burning natural gas. However, there is 
also growing interest in credits for other types of emission reduction measures, 
including reforestation. Reforestation credits are typically offered for a limited 
period of time, say 20 years, with the idea that at the end the forest might be logged 
and replanted. This causes some environmental groups to oppose reforestation 
credits. Greenpeace, the international environmental group, has labeled credits for 
reforestation a “time bomb” that will cause serious problems when they expire. 
Environmentalists are also wary because the reforestation credits would have to be 
replaced when the forest was logged. Yet advocates of reforestation have pointed 
out that other credits are for limited periods also- a wind turbine, for example, can 
be expected to last just 20 years. Moreover, after 20 years technological progress 
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may have reduced the costs of emissions abatement significantly. 
Many models have been used to estimate an order of magnitude for sequestra­
tion and mitigation potentials. Early models calculated that around 500 million 
hectares were necessary (Sedjo and Solomon 1989) or available (Nordhaus 1991b) 
at the global level for carbon sequestration. All of the early models for Latin Amer­
ican and African countries consistently showed that they could provide at least 
50% of the needed land, with low preparation costs and high forest growth rates. 
These combined factors offered, especially to tropical countries, a highly compet­
itive position in any carbon market that includes forest projects. More recent stud­
ies, such as the Harvard University study for Central America and the National 
Autonomous University of Mexico () study for Mexico, compared carbon 
and fossil fuel options.9 The Harvard study calculated the carbon reduction from 
forests in Central America (via conservation, forest management, and reforesta­
tion) to be 54 million tons per year, compared to 6 million coming from potential 
fossil fuel emissions reduction. The  study estimated that the forest repre­
sents 87% of the 40 million tons of carbon available in Mexico for the year 2000. 
In economic terms, carbon sequestration through forestry or reduced defor­
estation may be a cost-effective approach to reducing global atmospheric concen­
trations of CO2. 
10 However, the countries participating in the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change () are still debating whether 
reducing carbon emission through projects that reduce deforestation will be an 
acceptable option for emissions reduction and trade under the treaty. This unre­
solved legality is likely to affect the carbon trade more than scientific concerns. If 
the  excludes the preservation of natural forests, it would encourage forest 
plantations, which do not constitute very rich ecosystems. A second effect is a bias 
toward options in countries that use CO2-intensive energy sources. For example, 
big developing countries like China and India that mainly use fossil fuels will ben­
efit because they will be able to provide cheaper and larger volumes of carbon 
emission reductions as a result of fuel switching or using cleaner energy sources. 
At the same time, countries like Costa Rica and Brazil, which are currently using 
mainly renewable energy sources, will not be able to participate as fully in the 
emerging carbon market. 
Costa Rica’s emissions credit program 
Costa Rica’s emissions credit program has gone through three stages. In the first 
stage, which lasted from 1994 to 1995, the government tried to facilitate trades 
between individual Costa Rican landowners and businesses and foreign govern­
ments or corporations. Although one trade was almost consummated, the gov­
ernment soon realized that individual emissions reduction projects would have to 
be consolidated if trading was to be viable. Negotiating a deal for a small refor­
estation project was almost as costly—in terms of translators, lawyers, and air­
fare—as negotiating a deal for a large one. 
During the second stage, from 1995 to 1997, the Ministry of Environment and 
Energy assumed responsibility for consolidating small projects and offering cred­
its for sale. This effort resulted in the first-ever sale of an emission credit based on 
reforestation. Two hundred and thirty eight individual reforestation projects, 
many bordering the existing WCAs, were consolidated to provide a credit for 
200,000 tons of carbon for 20 years. This credit was sold to the Norwegian gov­
ernment in 1996 for $10 per ton, a price the Ministry had calculated would 
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9 The Harvard study was
financed by the Central
American Bank and is forth­
coming; the UNAM study
was partially financed by the
Inter-American Development
Bank and was presented at
the Bank’s annual governor’s
meeting in March 2000. 
10 This is the conclusion for 
Costa Rica in the Costa Rican 
Dilemma (Castro and Cordero
1999). Omar Masera reached
the same conclusion for Mexico 
in his presentation at the Inter-
American Development Bank
meeting, held in New Orleans,
March 2000. A similar conclu­
sion was reached for the United 
States in an article called “Cli­
mate Change and Forest Sinks:
Factors Affecting the Costs of
Carbon Sequestration,” (Har­
vard University, November
1998) prepared by Professors
Robert Stavins and Richard 
Newell. This article stated, 
“...even for highly industrialized
countries such as the United 
States, carbon sequestration
through land-use changes
could arguably be part of a
cost-effective portfolio of short
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11 The firm, Société Générale de 
Surveillance Group, has estab­
lished a special Forestry Offset
Carbon Verification Service. 
recover the payments that it expected to make to cattle ranchers to induce them to 
convert their ranches into plantation forests. Despite its success, however, the 
Ministry was criticized by the Inspector General, a government watchdog agency, 
for having sold the credits at cost. The Inspector General argued that the Ministry 
could have gotten a much higher price. 
In the third stage, from 1997 to 1998, the Ministry of Environment and Energy 
decided to address the Inspector General’s concerns by auctioning credits to the 
highest bidder. This time it assembled enough projects to sequester 1,000,000 tons 
of carbon and offered them at a floor price of $20 per ton. Although a number 
of governments and multinational firms expressed interest in the auction, in the 
end there were no bidders. The Ministry was told privately by some bidders that 
the floor price had been too high. The Ministry also suspected that uncertainty 
about the new additionality requirements that had just been established under the 
Kyoto Protocol might have been a factor. To help address the additionality ques­
tion, in March 1998 the Ministry hired a well known French technical certification 
firm to audit the project and attest that the reforestation would take place as 
promised.11 However, following this, the Ministry opted to delay offering the cred­
its for auction again until after the national elections later that year. 
The new government 
The left-of-center Social Democrats lost the presidency to the right-of-center 
Christian Democrats in the 1998 elections. In his inauguration speech, incoming 
President Miguel Angel Rodriguez singled out emission credits as one of the few 
of his predecessor’s programs that he intended to retain. President Rodriguez has 
a doctorate in economics, which may have made him sympathetic to the rationale 
for the program. In addition, environmental protection has always been popular 
in Costa Rica, and part of the reason the Christian Democrats won the election 
was because of appeals to voters in the disaffected rural areas. 
When the new government assumed responsibility for the emissions credit 
program, it faced two decisions: (1) whether to offer the 1,000,000 tons for sale 
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figure 2 
estimate of the marginal cost of forest carbon sequestration
and energy carbon emissions reduction projects in the united states 
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note: The carbon squestration lines are estimates of marginal costs for reforestation

in the United States. The carbon abatement points are estimates of the marginal costs

for emissions reductions from U.S. power plants.
 
Source: Robert N. Stavins,“The Cost of Carbon Sequestration: A Revealed Preference Approach,”

American Economic Review, vol. 89, no. 4 (September 1999), p. 1004
 
It was tempting for the new government to delay the offering until the next 
major international conference on global warming, in hopes of some clarification 
of some of the uncertainties regarding emissions commitments and trading. 
However, the conference in Bonn in November 1999 saw little progress on these 
issues, and the next conference in The Hague in November 2000 is not expected 
to make much advancement either—partly due to the unlikelihood that the U.S. 
political ambivalence towards the Protocol will be resolved during its presidential 
elections. Should the Costa Rican government choose to wait, however, it might 
lose its position as a reforestation credit pioneer. Bolivia recently offered approx­
imately 4,000,000 tons of credits from reforestation projects, and Brazil and sev­
eral other countries are expected to follow suit. 
With regard to pricing, the Costa Rican Ministry of the Environment had new 
estimates of how much it would have to pay farmers to switch to forests. The new 
figures confirmed that the cost would be about $10 per ton for the first five mil­
lion tons, but would rise steadily thereafter due to increasing marginal cost when 
more expensive land was planted (see Figure 1) Bolivia was rumored to have 
potential buyers at $15 to $20 per ton for its new credits. New studies also sug­
gested that forest projects might be feasible in the United States at $20 per ton, 
only slightly more than the cost of emissions abatement from some U.S. power-
generating projects (see Figure 2). In July 1999, the World Bank Prototype Carbon 
Fund announced a price range of $20 to $30 per ton. 
To contribute to the ongoing Costa Rican evaluation, a study was developed to 
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The impact of the emerging CO2 market on forested and agricultural areas 
During 1998 and 1999 René Castro, the former Costa Rican Minister of Environ­
ment and Energy, conducted a study (partially financed by the ) of the value 
of forest stands to the global climate. The focus of the study was Costa Rica’s 
12 René Castro Salazar,“Valu- forested areas.12 The results strongly suggest that including forest options for trop­
ing the Environment Service of ical countries like Costa Rica would further reduce mitigation costs. For example, 
Permanent Forest Stands to the 
Castro calculated the amount of carbon generated on 260,000 hectares in Costa Global Climate:The Case of 
Costa Rica,” unpublished doc- Rica. To compare this with the amounts for other countries and regions, he esti­
toral dissertation, Harvard Uni­ mated the total amount of carbon produced at different prices. The results illus­
versity, June 1999. 
trate the importance of trade. If the carbon price is set at us$10 per ton, the Costa 
Rican  would be willing to sell 15% of their annual tons of carbon, the state 
of Wisconsin 9%, the Delta region 8%, and the United States as a whole 22%.When 
The study also suggests that considering carbon sequestration benefits will lead 
to larger areas of forest being protected than if only the need to protect biodiver­
sity or fragile ecosystems were considered.…Additionally, the study demon­
strated that if Costa Rican landowners were paid for carbon sequestration, many 
of them might switch from crops to planting forests. 
the carbon price increases to us$50 per ton, the Costa Rican  would sell 88%, 
while the landowners surveyed in the Delta study would sell only 42%, and those 
in the U.S. study 74%.As the price increases, each supplier would be willing to offer 
a larger percentage of its carbon, with the Costa Rican  offering propor­
tionally more carbon than all the domestic U.S. options at any given price because 
Costa Rica usually has a lower marginal cost. 
The study also suggests that considering carbon sequestration benefits will lead 
to larger areas of forest being protected than if only the need to protect biodiver­
sity or fragile ecosystems were considered. For example, at prices between $50 
and $100 per ton the Costa Rican protected areas of La Amistad, Barbilla, and 
Palo Verde might expand further than proposed. Moreover, with prices closer to 
$100, the objective of consolidating and expanding protected areas to up to 25% 
of the national territory seems feasible. 
Additionally, the study demonstrated that if Costa Rican landowners were paid 
for carbon sequestration, many of them might switch from crops to planting 
forests. For example, if the carbon price was at least $83 per ton, a farmer pro­
ducing, or with potential to produce, the average agricultural mix for Costa Rica, 
might switch to a pine plantation (Pinus patula). Forest projects would probably 
first replace traditional activities, such as raising cattle and rice, which require con­
siderable land. Forests are less likely to replace the more profitable export-oriented 
crops such as coffee, bananas, and pineapples. 
Finally, carbon sequestration payments would also induce landowners to pro­
tect their natural forests outside the protected areas. For example, if a private 
owner of natural forest were considering whether to preserve a natural forest or to 
use it to raise beef cattle or rice, he would find that preserving the natural forest 
was the more profitable option if the price were set at $20 per ton (see Table 6). 
On the other hand, if that same owner had natural forestland that was suitable for 
growing export-oriented crops, he might well use it for those crops unless the 
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table 6 carbon indifference price between private natural 
table 6 forest protection and competing agricultural activities 
crops or 
activity 
region or private natural forest (cost estimates in $/ton) 
La Rincón de Palo Piedras Barra Guana- Carara 
Amistad la Vieja 
Barbilla 



















Yams 251 305 350 346 335 314 368 327 
Avocados 245 298 342 338 327 307 360 320 















































































































Beans 27 25 35 20 28 29 36 33 
Melons 23 20 30 15 23 24 31 28 
Potatoes 22 19 29 14 22 23 30 27 
Rice 12 6 14 <0 8 10 14 14 



















* Tiquisque and yucca are roots similar to cassava. 
Source: René Castro Salazar, "Valuing the Environment Service of Permanent Forest Stands to the Global Cli­
mate:The Case of Costa Rica," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, June 1999. 
Conclusions 
Most researchers and policymakers agree that the overall cost of mitigating CO2 
and other greenhouse gases could be reduced if the carbon trading options pro­
posed in the Kyoto Protocol were implemented. For example, in the short run, the 
cost of carbon abatement could easily exceed us$100 per ton for energy projects in 
industrialized countries. However, if the forestry sector is included, the cost of 
reducing carbon emissions and sequestering carbon could be reduced to a range 
between us$10 and us$100 per ton of carbon. 
The findings for Costa Rica might also be relevant for other tropical countries 
in Latin America and Africa. For example, the World Bank and the United Nations 
Development Programme are financing the development of a network of pro­
tected areas called the Mesoamerican Corridor that will encompass 8 million 
hectares in Central America and 2 million in southern Mexico. This project is 
based on the idea that the eight participating countries share between 60% and 
80% of the same living species, which will be more likely to survive within large 
interconnected protected areas. It is reasonable to expect that the figures projected 
in the Castro study, both in terms of carbon productivity and land opportunity 
cost, are relevant to the much larger Mesoamerican protected areas network. The 
study’s estimates for the marginal cost of carbon might also apply to this larger 
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region.A second example is that cattle ranchers in many tropical African countries 
are currently earning less than $50 per hectare per year. If the carbon price were 
to reach at least $10 per ton, these ranchers would find it economically advan­
tageous to switch to forest-friendly activities. At the same time, the environment 
would be used in a more sustainable way. 
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Biomass: Energy and carbon emissions 
Carlos Américo Morato de Andrade 
Instituto de Eletrotécnica e Energia da Universidade de São Paulo 
Abstract 
Biomass was the primary source of energy for humankind until developed countries 
began the shift toward fossil fuels about 200 years ago. More recently, developing 
countries have been following in their footsteps. Today, biomass energy accounts for 
just 11% of total global energy. However, in recent years, developed countries have 
started to explore biomass fuel options as a cleaner alternative to fossil fuels. 
This paper is an overview of a model that breaks biomass down into four compo­
nents and calculates biomass energy in 122 countries, which are responsible for 95% 
of global energy consumption. The study shows that despite a significant shift to 
fossil fuels over the past century, biomass has been and will remain an important 
source of energy for decades to come. The study also examines carbon emissions 
from energy biomass sources and from all forest activities, and finds that biomass is 
responsible for a total global emissions of 300 to 400 million tons of carbon a year. 
At the same time, however, the carbon sequestration capacity of all forest activities 
is around 550 million tons per year, resulting in a net carbon sequestration effect,  
even when balanced with energy biomass. 
This article is not a discussion of policy tools or technological advancements. It is 
intended to serve as a methodological primer for non-scientists grappling with the 
science that is at the core of the policy debates that surround the issue of climate 
change. 
Introduction 
When used in its simplest form, the production of energy from biomass1 does not 
require sophisticated technology. Because of this, throughout the history of 
mankind biomass has played an important role as a basic source of energy. It was 
not until the beginning of the 19th century that a shift began to occur toward fossil 
fuels, eventually reducing the use of biomass energy to just 11% of the global total. 
Importantly, it has become evident that the shift away from biomass to fossil fuels 
generally occurs with economic growth. For the most part, developed countries 
made the transition to fossil fuels some time ago and developing countries have 
been following more recently. 
Biomass has developed a reputation as being inefficient, dirty, and unhealthy. 
Burning wood that is collected from community forests, for example, is time con­
suming, produces a low energy value, and tends to generate particulates which are 
1 Biomass is any plant matter
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2 Morato de Andrade, Flo­
restas, Madeira e suas Apli­
cações 2000, and Morato de 
Andrade and Bodinaud Modela­
mento de Cana-de-açúcar 
Brasileira, 2000 (both in Por­
tuguese). 
3 For a discussion of energy
policy, see Nilsson and Bailey,
this volume. 
4 A quad is a unit of energy
equal to a quadrillion (1015)
British thermal units (BTUs). It
is also equal to 293 billion (109)
kilowatt hours, or, for fuels of 
average heating values,
183,000,000 barrels of petro­
leum, 38,500,000 tons of coal, 
or 980,000,000,000 (1012)
cubic feet of natural gas.
(Source: www.britannica.com.) 
5 United States Census 
Bureau,‘World Population Pro­
file: 1998’, source: 
http://www.census.gov. 
6 Food and Agriculture Organi­
zation of the United Nations, 
‘State of the World’s Forests’, 
1999. 
7 INFOENER, Instituto de 
Eletrotécnica e Energia,
Universidade de São Paulo, 
Database published in
http://infoener.iee.usp.br. 
then breathed in by household members, frequently causing severe respiratory ill­
nesses. When biomass is used in its simplest form these characteristics are 
unavoidable. However, an interesting new trend has been developing in the past 
few years: Developed countries have begun exploring new uses for biomass energy. 
The research is concentrating on the development of low-emission technologies 
that use renewable and sustainable energy sources. The result of these new devel­
opments is that in recent years, despite the continued shift toward fossil fuels, the 
percentage of biomass energy has not decreased as rapidly as expected. These 
developments are especially significant in light of the international goal of arrest­
ing climate change. 
This article is based primarily on studies conducted by the author.2 The dis­
cussion is intended to be a scientific foundation for non-scientists, as well as a 
guide for science and policy professionals to the functioning of the modeling pro­
cedures used in this field. It is not intended to be a correlation of policy and sci­
ence, but rather an unadulterated look at the science and statistics of biomass 
energy production.3 
The model 
Categorization of biomass 
Of the 421 quads4 of global energy consumed in 1998, 376 were derived from fossil 
fuels and 45 from biomass. Thus, the contribution of biomass energy is still sig­
nificant and will remain so throughout the first few decades of the 21st century, 
especially for ‘less developed’ countries. 
For the purposes of this study, the 45 quads of global biomass energy consump­
tion were divided into four categories, which are then applied to three biomass 
energy-use scenarios in 122 countries. Despite the diverse energy biomass applica­
tions today, these four components embody all global biomass consumption: 
•	 Non-Forest Biomass (BNF): farm waste, animal waste, urban waste, and non-
forest wood; 
•	 Biomass from Collected Wood (BFC): manually collected native forest wood for 
domestic purposes; 
•	 Commercial Biomass from Forest Exploitation Activities (BLC): commercially 
produced firewood and charcoal; 
•	 Technological Biomass (BT): use of liquid fuels (biofuels) and cogeneration 
technologies. 
Data 
Unfortunately, the actual data available for biomass energy is scarce. However, it 
is possible to estimate energy consumption values with a certain degree of error 
using a combination of social and economic parameters and natural resource 
data. The basic data that were used for this study were: 
•	 Population: based on information from the United States Census Bureau.5 
•	 Percentage of rural population: extracted from the Food and Agriculture Orga­
nization () report, State of the World’s Forests.6 
•	 Rural population biomass: based on averages of data and energy indices from 
a number of sources that support the Instituto de Electrotácnica e Energia of 
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1 quad(equivalent to 2.1 firewood ) 108 inhab./year inhab./day 
•	 Forest data by country: based on information culled from State of the World’s 
Forests, including: 
•	 country area 
•	 total forest area 
•	 total forestation area 
•	 annual deforestation area 
•	 annual reforestation area 
•	 Commercial deforestation area (Ac): derived from annual commercial wood 
production information in the  publication, State of the World’s Forests. 
The actual calculation was based on the average rate of 120 t/ha of firewood 
produced.8 
•	 Non-commercial deforestation area (ADNC): based on the di›erence between 
the total annual deforestation and commercial deforestation. 
Structuring the model 
The foundation of the model is the premise that total biomass use is equal to the 
sum of non-forest biomass, non-commercial biomass from native forests, com­
mercial biomass from forest exploitation, and technological biomass. Thus, the 
basic equation used for this study is: 
B=BT +BNF +BFC +BLC 
The model was used to determine the individual values of the four components 
of biomass energy use in 122 countries, which are cumulatively responsible for 
95% of global energy consumption. The values of the four components are 
depicted for all 122 countries in Table 1 (page xx). These figures were determined 
using the methodology described below. 
Technological biomass (BT) 
Many developed countries and a few developing countries have well-established 
biomass energy production programs. A primary component of these programs 
is cogeneration of electricity.9 The category BT includes the entire output of liquid 
fuels (biofuels), including ethyl alcohol.10 Relatively accurate BT values can be 
obtained from the United States Department of Energy,11 from the International 
Energy Agency12 databases, and from information supplied by individual coun­
tries. Cumulatively, approximately seven quads of BT energy are currently being 
generated in eight countries: 
















8 Morato de Andrade, Carlos 
Américo,‘Florestas, Madeira e 
susa Aplicacoes,’ in-house pub­
lication IEE/USP, February 2000. 
9 Cogeneration is a process by
which industrial waste is used 
to produce heat or electricity. 
10 Also known as ethanol. In 
addition to being a fairly
common ingredient in indus­
trial chemicals and medicines, 
ethyl alcohol may be used both
as an additive to gasoline and
as a fuel by itself. 




12 IEA, International Energy
Agency,‘Key World Energy Sta­
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13 LPG is typically a mixture of
propane and butane. 
Commercial biomass from forest exploitation activities (BLC) 
BLC includes all biomass derived from commercial wood (MLC) used for firewood 
and charcoal production. Values for BLC are relatively easy to determine, since 
there are accurate data on MLC values for each country. 
figure 1 
world biomass energy (quads) – minimum values (b=42.69) 
Non-forest biomass (BNF) and biomass from collected wood (BFC) 
Because of insufficient accurate data, BNF and BFC are more difficult to determine 
than the other two biomass categories. In order to establish a value with a safe 
margin of error for these biomass energy components, the model used additional 
data on population, forest, and economics for the various countries. The follow­
ing data was established for each country: 
Rural Population Biomass (BR), measured in quads per year. The model used 
an estimated value for the basic needs of rural inhabitants, with the assump­
tion that they had no access to electrical power. This factor varied with avail­
ability of alternative fuel sources such as liquefied petroleum gas ().13 
Energy Obtained from Burning Entire Non-Commercial Deforested Areas 
(0.00157ADNC). Only countries with large forest areas and a high rate of 
deforestation have a free ADNC area from which to obtain fuel wood. 
The variables that were determined and applied using this data included: Bio­
mass Lost in Burned Areas (BQ) and A Portion of the Commercial Biomass 
Energy, Firewood and Charcoal Produced (BCP). 
Two basic equations were proposed in the model: 
BFC +BQ =0.00157ADNC: Collected wood biomass plus biomass lost in burned 
areas must be equal to biomass from non-commercial deforested areas. 
BR =BFC +BNF +BCP: Rural population biomass energy must be equal to col­
lected wood biomass energy plus non-forest biomass energy plus part of the com­
mercial biomass energy, firewood, and charcoal produced in the country. 
Firewood and charcoal biomass (BLC) are used in part for manufacturing and 
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supply, BLC biomass is the sole source of energy for the rural population (BCP = 
BLC). For the purposes of this model, industrial use of BLC can be ignored. 
There are three basic scenarios that can occur in BNF and BFC-consuming 
countries: 
Scenario 1: BLC>BR 
In this case, there is enough commercially produced charcoal and firewood to 
supply the rural population. The most probable situation will be: BNF =BFC =0.  
Excess BLC will be used by the urban population or by local manufacturing plants. 
Scenario 2: BLC<BR and 0.00157ADNC<BR–BLC 
In this case, the rural population is supplied by BLC +BFC +BNF, the values for 
which would be as follows: 
BFC =0.00157ADNC 
BLC, determined for each country based on the  forest report
BR –0.00157ADNC >BNF >BR –BLC –0.00157ADNC 
BNF is usually close to BR –BLC –0.00157ADNC and only approaches the other 
limit, BR –0.000157ADNC, when there is a significant manufacturing activity that 
uses firewood and/or charcoal. 
Scenario 3: BLC<BR and 0.00157ADNC=BR–BLC 
In this case, non-commercial forest is enough to supply BR –BLC, and there is 
no need for non-forest biomass BNF. Therefore: 
BNF =0 
BR >BFC> BR –BLC 
In this case, BFC should approximate BR –BLC and will approximate BR only 
when there is significant industrial activity that relies on firewood and/or char­
coal. 
These three scenarios provide the energy components in the various countries, 
since BT and BLC have already been calculated. 
If biomass from collected wood is less than the energy obtained from burning 
entire non-commercial deforested areas (BFC< 0.00157ADNC) there will be biomass 
burning and the di›erence between these energy outputs will be the energy lost. 
When BFC =0.00157ADNC, there will be no burning biomass, meaning that this is a 
better use of forest energy. Table 1 (see page xx) and Figures 1 and 2 show BT and 
BBLC values for all countries, as well as possible variations of BFC and BNF. The  
results obtained worldwide are the following: 
BT = 7.36 quads/year 
14.55 < BNF ≤ 18.82 quads/year 
4.89 ≤ BFC ≤ 5.48 quads/year
 
BLC = 15.89 quads/year
 
42.69 quads/year ≤ B ≤ 47.55 quads/year 
The unexpected result for non-forest biomass, which averaged about 16 quads, 
or 36% of the total, is closely related to activities in China and India, which 
together boast 37% of the global population. China and India use 6.43 quads and 
4.15 quads of non-forest biomass respectively. The high percentage of global non-
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Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Pakistan. The BNF values for these last three are 0.83 
quads in Bangladesh, 0.40 quads in Indonesia, and 0.71 quads in Pakistan. 
The projected trend for the foreseeable future is a quick growth of technologi­
cal biomass (BT) and a reduction of collected fuelwood (BFC) due to systematic 
worldwide campaigns to reduce deforestation of native forests. It should be 
expected that commercial biomass (BLC) will remain constant or decrease slightly 
, but activities of this nature are also expected to shift gradually from native forests 
to reforested plantations. Charcoal production has been shifting toward depen­
dence on reforested plantations to such an extent that in a few years no charcoal 
will be created from native forest wood. Substitution of natural gas or  for 
cooking firewood should further reduce BLC. Many governments have intensified 
e›orts to reduce domestic use of firewood because of the health hazards associ­
ated with it, which should result in faster substitution in some areas. However, for 
many rural populations, collected wood is still the only energy solution. 
Despite insufficient and inaccurate date, the model allows for a relative degree 
of certainty in the calculation of energy biomass and its four components for the 
122 countries selected. As new information on rural energy use becomes available 
for more developing countries, the accuracy of the model will obviously be 
improved. 
It will be extremely important to monitor the possible growth of BT and the 
reduction of BFC, which is expected to become negligible in approximately 20 
years. 
figure 2 
world biomass energy (quads) – maximum values (b=47.55) 
Carbon emissions 
The energy sector is the primary anthropogenic source of air pollution at the 
global level. It releases about 6.3 billion tons of carbon per year. These tons are gen­
erated during the production of about 376 quads of energy. Carbon is generated 
at the rate of 16.8 x 106 tons of carbon per quad of energy. 
Energy biomass produces 31.5 x 106 tons of carbon per quad of energy. There­
fore, in principle, this means that there will be 1.4 billion tons of carbon in the 
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figure 3 
carbon emissions from forest activity 
(millions of tons per year), minimum values 
atmosphere as a result of energy biomass use. It is important, however, to identify 
the origins of the various biomass sources that might be emitting this consider­
able amount of carbon. Table 2 and Figures 4 and 5 show probable biomass carbon 
emission values. 
The calculation of total carbon 
emissions, including all biomass 
table 2 
biomass energy carbon released source energy applications, is now as fol­
(quads/year) (106 t/year) 
lows: 
BBT = 7.36 CT = 232 Reforestation/Farming BT does not produce a net carbon 14.55 ≤ BNF ≤ 18.82 458 ≤ CNF ≤ 593 Farming and Cattle Raising 
emission, because it depends on 4.89 ≤ BFC ≤ 5.48 154 ≤ CFC ≤ 173 Native Forest 
reforestation/farming; BLC = 15.89 CLC = 501 Native Forest (partial) 
BNF does not produce a net Burned Areas 
carbon emission, since it is also 6.13 ≤ BQ ≤ 6.72 193 ≤ CQ ≤ 212 Native Forest 
Reforestation (177x106ha) CS = -1.106(4) Carbon sequestration by reforestation derived from farms; 
BFC comes from native forests 
and produces between 154 and 173 million tons of carbon per year 
BLC is comprised of BLCN and BLCR, which are derived from firewood and char-
coal,14 and typically produced with techniques that necessitate the destruction 14 Morato de Andrade, Carlos 
Américo, 2000. and reforestation of native forest areas. In a previous study, the following set of 
values were established for these two components:15 15 Morato de Andrade, Carlos 










BQ: burned areas cause emissions of 193 to 212 x 10
6 t of carbon.
 
The conclusion of this study is that the total carbon released by forest activity 
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figure 4 
carbon emissions from forest activity 
(millions of tons per year), maximum values 
According to this model, the total carbon released varies from 550 to 592 million 
tons per year. 
Given the limitations previously mentioned, energy activity is responsible for 
only BFC and BLCN, which adds up to between 338 and 399 x 10
6 tons of carbon. This 
value is much lower than the total 1.4 billion tons that might be attributable to the 
energy sector if all of the 45 quads of energy biomass were emitting carbon. As 
shown, only 25% of energy biomass energy production generates net carbon emis­
sions. Further, world reforestation, which is happening at a rate of 17 million 
hectares per year and spreads over 177 million hectares, also has the capacity to 
sequester some 1.106 million tons of carbon per year. Based on this information, 
an equation that accounts for all forest activities, including manufacturing, burn­
ing biomass, forest burning, and reforestation, ultimately reveals a net sequestra­
tion of 550 million tons of carbon per year. Thus, it should be concluded that the 
tactic for combating carbon emissions should concentrate on diminishing fossil 
fuel use, rather than decreasing forest activities. 
Latin America 
Table 3 depicts the biomass energy balance in Latin America. Latin America con­
tains several large tracts of forest, including the Amazon, which is the largest 
humid tropical forest in the world. Of the 45 quads of global biomass energy, Latin 
America is responsible for the following amounts shown on Table 3. 
What conclusions can we draw from this data? 
The primary implication of these figures is that the most significant technological 
biomass energy activity in the region is the Brazilian sugar cane and ethanol pro­
gram, which is responsible for 14% of technological biomass (BT) worldwide.
16 As 
defined previously, BT includes biomass and biofuel activities. Another trend that 
is demonstrated by Table 3 is that, unlike Asian countries, which tend to use their 
agricultural residues to the fullest extent possible, use of non-forest biomass, BNF, 
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table 3 biomass in south america 







0 – 0 
0 – 0 
0.01 – 0.01 
0 - 0.01 
0.05 
0 
0 - 0 
0 - 0.01 
Bolivia 0.04 0 0 – 0 0.02 – 0.03 0.01 0.86 - 0.87 
Brazil 1.93 1 0 – 0 0.14 – 0.14 0.79 0.16 - 0.16 
Chile 0.11 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0.11 0 - 0 
Colombia 0.18 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0.18 0.21 - 0.21 
Costa Rica 0.03 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0.03 0.02 - 0.02 







0 – 0 
0 – 0 
0.02 – 0.03 
0 – 0 
0.01 
0.06 
0 - 0.01 
0.19 - 0.19 
El Salvador 0.03 0 0.02 - 0.02 0.01 – 0.01 0 0 - 0 
Guatemala 0.13 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0.13 0 - 0 
Honduras 0.06 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0.06 0.09 - 0.09 







0 – 0 
0 – 0 
0.02 – 0.04 
0.01 – 0.03 
0 
0 
0.20 - 0.22 







0 – 0 
0 – 0 
0 – 0 
0.01 – 0.03 
0.06 
0.06 
0.41 - 0.41 







0 – 0 
0 – 0 
0 – 0 
0.02 – 0.03 
0.03 
0.01 
0 - 0 
0.74 - 0.75 
Total 3.3 1.02 0.02 - 0.02 0.37 – 0.57 1.76 3.57 - 3.77 
It is also important to note that Latin America is experiencing substantial prob­
lems with urban migration, resulting in massive depletion of rural populations in 
almost every country. This has limited the region’s biomass energy requirements 
almost entirely to commercial or manually collected firewood without any other 
type of energy generation. 
The figures for commercial firewood (BLC) indicate that 11% of the total global 
activity in this area is concentrated in Latin America, which is home to 8% of the 
global population. Considering the size of the forest in the region, and its tropical 
forest resources, one might expect far more intense forestry activities. The primary 
reason for this low activity level is most likely insufficient economic and financial 
resources.While the current extraction methods being used in the Amazon forest are 
far from sustainable, with the implementation of sustainable forestry management, 
countries like Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia could produce several 
times current BLC amounts in the long run. Some Central American countries, such 
as Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras have already shown begun significant com­
mercial timber harvesting. Unfortunately this production is not always sustainable, 
and which will require international financial support and ecological education. 
The amount of energy produced with non-commercially collected wood from 
native forests (BFC) is approximately 0.37 to 0.57 quads per year, which is approx­
imately 10% of the international total. It is estimated that of the 481 million people 
living in Latin America, between 40 and 60 million still use manually collected 
firewood as a primary source of energy. This means that this relatively inefficient, 
generally environmentally detrimental activity is still strong in the region, espe­
cially in Brazil and Mexico, the two most populous countries in the region. 
Together, the rural populations of these two countries are responsible for over half 
of the burning of manually collected firewood. Considering that BFC is undeniably 
non-sustainable, and that the amount of collected wood in Latin America is com­
paratively high, this activity must decrease significantly in the next decade. 
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With regard to energy biomass and forestry activities, the primary issue that 
must be addressed is extensive burned areas that stem, primarily, from the expan­
17 For a more detailed discus­ sion of farming and cattle-raising areas. Approximately 60% of the burned areas 
sion, see Morato de Andrade, 
'Florestas, Madeira e suas Apli- all over the world are located on the Latin American continent, mirroring the 
cações,' 2000 (in Portuguese). urgent need for measures to reduce deforestation.17 
Due to its economic strength, the size of 
its population, and the fact that it is home 
table 4 
Total Average Biomass 3.30 quads 7% of the total worldwide to the largest tracts of forest in the region, 
BT 1.02 quads 14% of the total worldwide Brazil’s activities will be critical in address-
BNF practically zero ing current energy and forestry problems. BFC 0.37 - 0.57 quads 10% of the total worldwide 
1.76 quads 11% of the total worldwide For this reason, the following section BLC
 
Q approximately 3.7 quads 60 % of the total worldwide focuses specifically on Brazil.
 
18 Official Brazilian Statistical 
Institute (IBGE). 
19 Official Energy Balance for
Brazil, BEM 1998, Ministry of
Mines and Energy. 
20 Bagasse is the crushed fiber
that is left over after the juice
has been extracted from sugar 
cane. 
21 The complete production
model and the Brazilian use of 
sugar cane are described in
Morato de Andrade, and Bodin­
aud,‘Modelamento de Cana-de­
açúcar Brasileira,’ 2000 (in Por­
tuguese). The same publication
also contains comprehensive
technical indexes regarding
sugar cane processing in Brazil. 
Brazil 
As the largest, most populous nation in Latin America, Brazil will play an impor­
tant role in addressing the current energy and forestry problems. With approxi­
mately 5.5 million km2 of forest area, Brazil has the largest tract of tropical forests 
in the region. The population of Brazil is 166 million,18 33 million of whom live in 
rural areas. The country consumes approximately 10 quads19 of energy per year, of 
which 20% is produced with biomass. The two quads of biomass energy being 
consumed annually in Brazil are divided more or less evenly between forest and 
sugar cane activities. This latter is especially significant because the Pro-Alcool 
Program, established almost 30 years ago, is the biggest biomass transportation 
fuel experiment ever conducted. Approximately 4 million hectares in Brazil cur­
rently produce about 300 million tons of sugar cane per year. According to 1997 
data, 9.7 billion liters of hydrated alcohol, 5.6 billion liters of anhydrous alcohol, 
87 million tons of wet bagasse,20 and 14.8 million tons of sugar are obtained from 
21sugar cane.
Over the past 30 years, due to agricultural advances, the sucrose content of 
Brazilian sugar cane went from 8% to 15%. This practically doubled the ethyl alco­
hol and sugar production. The amount of revenue-producing sugar cane products 
increased from 40 liters to 80 liters of alcohol/ton of sugar cane and from 80kg to 
140kg sugar/ton of sugar cane between 1970 and 1999. This is attributable to sig­
nificant improvements in sugar cane production and byproduct processing. 
Brazilian sugar cane generates approximately 0.3 quads of energy in the form 
of alcohol (equal to 7.5 million tons of oil), and approximately 0.7 quads of energy 
as sugar cane bagasse, which is partially used in alcohol and sugar production. 
There is enormous potential for electricity cogeneration, which is beginning to 
make some headway at the national level. Estimates indicate that the available 
bagasse could produce more than 2 of energy using cogeneration. 
Deforestation 
The portion of Brazil that is forested is approximately 549x106ha. The area of 
reforestation is 4.9x106ha. Deforestation has varied significantly from year to year, 
but is currently about 1.5x106ha per year. According to State of the World’s Forests 
( 1999), Brazilian firewood and charcoal production uses 85x106m3 and indus­
trial wood uses 135x106m3, resulting in a deforestation rate of 1.31x106ha. Added to 
that is approximately 0.19x106ha in which non-commercial activities like slash and 
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total average deforestation rate of about 
1.5x106 ha. 
table 5 
Reforestation industrial timber up to 150x103ha 
Native forest industrial timber between 653 x103ha and 803x103haReforestation 
Native forest firewood and charcoal between 356 x103ha and 506x103ha 
Table 5 shows an annual 0.25% decrease of Reforestation firewood and charcoal up to 150x103ha 
Hand collected firewood 89x103haBrazilian forest area, due mainly to deforesta-
Burned areas	 102x103ha
tion in the Amazon region. Reforestation in 
Deforestation Total 1.500x103haBrazil is still very limited, and a good portion 
of the commercial timber activities are still 
carried out in native forests. Commercial activities clear about 150x103 reforested 
hectares per year, compared to 1,150x103ha in native forests. Non-commercial 
activities in Brazil are conducted on 191x103ha per year. The total area where fire­
wood is manually collected is 89 x103ha/year, and slash-and-burn agriculture 
destroys about 102x103ha/year. These last two activities are conducted only in 
native forests. 
There has been some progress, however. An important pulp and paper indus­
try sector, and a steel mill industrial area that produces approximately 50 million 
tons of iron and steel per year, have both begun stimulating reforestation and 
charcoal production almost exclusively from 
reforestation firewood. It is also predicted 
that the consumption of firewood will origin annual carbon balance 
decrease in the future. 
table 6 balance of carbon emissions and sequestration in brazil 
506 x 103ha for native forest firewood 
and charcoal production Emission of 25 x 106t 
Carbon emissions from forest activities 191 x 103ha for hand collected firewood and 
burned areas Emission of 9.4 x 106t 
Despite poor management of forestry activi- 4.9 x 103ha total reforestation area Capture of 30.6 x 106t 
ties in the Amazon, forestry and associated 4 x 103ha sugar cane Capture of 8 x 106t 
energy activities in Brazil are fairly balanced Global Result	 Capture of 4.2 x 106t 
with regard to carbon emissions. Table 6 
depicts a rough estimation of the current balance between carbon emissions and 
sequestration in Brazil.22	 22 For further information, see 
Morato de Andrade, Florestas, 
‘Madeira e suas Aplicações,’
Brazil and the Clean Development Mechanism 2000, and Morato de Andrade 
and Bodinaud ‘Modelamento Fundamentally, the Clean Development Mechanism () is a component of the 
de Cana-de-açúcar Brasileira,’ 
Kyoto Protocol that allows industrialized countries to meet their emissions reduc­ 2000 (both in Portuguese). 
tion commitments by investing in projects in developing countries. The goal of the 
 is to reduce CO2 emissions while engendering sustainable economic growth 
in the host country. Brazil is especially qualified for such ventures, due to its size, 
its unique forest environment, and the stability of its agricultural sector. Several 
proposals that will fulfill the emissions abatement and development requirements 
of the  clause have already been put forth regarding the Amazon forest, the 
plains, and the Atlantic forest in Brazil. 
The ethanol program will also probably be a candidate  project, since there 
is considerable room for further development and expansion of this initiative. 
This program is very compatible with climate change mitigation goals, as it has 
already replaced the equivalent of 200,000 barrels fossil fuel per day with ethanol. 
No CO2 is emitted during the complete cycle of production and use of ethanol for 
transportation. It is even possible to demonstrate that sugarcane production and 
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Conclusion 
With the development of advanced biomass technologies, this previously 
frowned-upon form of energy has the potential to be a key component of climate 
change mitigation. However, there is a dearth of precise information on current 
biomass uses, which could easily impede its advancement as an integral part of 
emissions abatement strategies. The model discussed in this paper was specifically 
designed to determine the values for the four di›erent types of biomass energy by 
extrapolating information from various related, but often non-specific, sources. 
The values that were determined using this procedure are compatible with the 
overall energy consumption patterns and the social and economic status of the 122 
countries examined in the study. 
Even considering the uncertainties of the available data, the model established 
value ranges for the non-commercial uses of biomass. It also demonstrated that 
between 43 and 48 quads of biomass energy are consumed globally each year. Of 
this, 7.4 quads per year are attributable to technological biomass (BT) and 15.9 
quads per year are composed of biomass from commercial forest exploitation 
activities (BLC). The model also targeted ranges for two important components of 
biomass, which have been very difficult to determine accurately due to insufficient 
data: non-forest biomass (BNF), which produces 15 to 19 quads of energy per year, 
and collected wood (BFC), which generates between 4.9 and 5.5 quads per year. 
Overall, the model indicates that non-commercial biomass constitutes around 
50% of the global biomass total. This category includes non-forest biomass, which 
is responsible for about 37% of the global total, and collected wood, which 
accounts for about 13% of the global total. 
The implication of the discussion and figures presented in the Latin America 
case is that most biomass activities in the region are not sustainable. At this point, 
this is primarily attributable to insufficient funding for environmentally positive 
projects or initiatives such as reforestation and improved natural resources man­
agement. 
Due to its geopolitical, ecological, and agricultural attributes, Brazil is likely to 
play an important role in the areas of both forest and non-forest biomass activi­
ties. Several reforestation projects are already being conducted and the ethanol 
program has been an extraordinary success, with excellent potential as a vehicle 
for the . 
It can be expected that  activities will help the region expand sustainable 
energy availability, while improving natural resource management. Brazil has the 
potential to be a trailblazer on this front, and the projects that have already been 
developed for and within Brazil may even be considered pilots for other technol­
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United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
The Parties to this Convention, 
Acknowledging that change in the Earth’s climate and its adverse e›ects are a 
common concern of humankind, 
Concerned that human activities have been substantially increasing the atmos­
pheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, that these increases enhance the nat­
ural greenhouse e›ect, and that this will result on average in an additional warm­
ing of the Earth’s surface and atmosphere and may adversely a›ect natural 
ecosystems and humankind, 
Noting that the largest share of historical and current global emissions of 
greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries, that per capita emissions 
in developing countries are still relatively low and that the share of global emis­
sions originating in developing countries will grow to meet their social and devel­
opment needs, 
Aware of the role and importance in terrestrial and marine ecosystems of sinks 
and reservoirs of greenhouse gases, 
Noting that there are many uncertainties in predictions of climate change, par­
ticularly with regard to the timing, magnitude and regional patterns thereof, 
Acknowledging that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest 
possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an e›ective and 
appropriate international response, in accordance with their common but 
di›erentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and eco­
nomic conditions, 
Recalling the pertinent provisions of the Declaration of the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment, adopted at Stockholm on 16 June 1972, 
Recalling also that States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their 
own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies, 
and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control 
do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction, 
Reaffirming the principle of sovereignty of States in international cooperation 
to address climate change, 
Recognizing that States should enact e›ective environmental legislation, that 
environmental standards, management objectives and priorities should reflect the 
environmental and developmental context to which they apply, and that standards 
applied by some countries may be inappropriate and of unwarranted economic 
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Recalling the provisions of General Assembly resolution 44/228 of 22 Decem­
ber 1989 on the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 
and resolutions 43/53 of 6 December 1988, 44/207 of 22 December 1989, 45/212 of 
21 December 1990 and 46/169 of 19 December 1991 on protection of global climate 
for present and future generations of mankind, 
Recalling also the provisions of General Assembly resolution 44/206 of 22 
December 1989 on the possible adverse e›ects of sea-level rise on islands and 
coastal areas, particularly low-lying coastal areas and the pertinent provisions of 
General Assembly resolution 44/172 of 19 December 1989 on the implementation 
of the Plan of Action to Combat Desertification, 
Recalling further the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 
1985, and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1987, 
as adjusted and amended on 29 June 1990, 
Noting the Ministerial Declaration of the Second World Climate Conference 
adopted on 7 November 1990, 
Conscious of the valuable analytical work being conducted by many States on 
climate change and of the important contributions of the World Meteorological 
Organization, the United Nations Environment Programme and other organs, 
organizations and bodies of the United Nations system, as well as other interna­
tional and intergovernmental bodies, to the exchange of results of scientific 
research and the coordination of research, 
Recognizing that steps required to understand and address climate change will 
be environmentally, socially and economically most e›ective if they are based on 
relevant scientific, technical and economic considerations and continually re­
evaluated in the light of new findings in these areas, 
Recognizing that various actions to address climate change can be justified eco­
nomically in their own right and can also help in solving other environmental 
problems, 
Recognizing also the need for developed countries to take immediate action in 
a flexible manner on the basis of clear priorities, as a first step towards compre­
hensive response strategies at the global, national and, where agreed, regional 
levels that take into account all greenhouse gases, with due consideration of their 
relative contributions to the enhancement of the greenhouse e›ect, 
Recognizing further that low-lying and other small island countries, countries 
with low-lying coastal, arid and semi-arid areas or areas liable to floods, drought 
and desertification, and developing countries with fragile mountainous ecosys­
tems are particularly vulnerable to the adverse e›ects of climate change, 
Recognizing the special difficulties of those countries, especially developing 
countries, whose economies are particularly dependent on fossil fuel production, 
use and exportation, as a consequence of action taken on limiting greenhouse gas 
emissions, 
Affirming that responses to climate change should be coordinated with social 
and economic development in an integrated manner with a view to avoiding 
adverse impacts on the latter, taking into full account the legitimate priority needs 
of developing countries for the achievement of sustained economic growth and 
the eradication of poverty, 
Recognizing that all countries, especially developing countries, need access to 
resources required to achieve sustainable social and economic development and 
























consumption will need to grow taking into account the possibilities for achieving 
greater energy efficiency and for controlling greenhouse gas emissions in general, 
including through the application of new technologies on terms which make such 
an application economically and socially beneficial, 
Determined to protect the climate system for present and future generations, 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article 1 
Definitions* 
For the purposes of this Convention: 
1	 “Adverse e›ects of climate change” means changes in the physical environment 
or biota resulting from climate change which have significant deleterious 
e›ects on the composition, resilience or productivity of natural and managed 
ecosystems or on the operation of socio-economic systems or on human health 
and welfare. 
2	 “Climate change” means a change of climate which is attributed directly or 
indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmos­
phere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over 
comparable time periods. 
3 “Climate system”means the totality of the atmosphere, hydrosphere, biosphere 
and geosphere and their interactions. 
4 “Emissions”means the release of greenhouse gases and/or their precursors into 
the atmosphere over a specified area and period of time. 
5 “Greenhouse gases” means those gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both 
natural and anthropogenic, that absorb and re-emit infrared radiation. 
6	 “Regional economic integration organization” means an organization consti­
tuted by sovereign States of a given region which has competence in respect of 
matters governed by this Convention or its protocols and has been duly autho­
rized, in accordance with its internal procedures, to sign, ratify, accept, approve 
or accede to the instruments concerned. 
7 “Reservoir” means a component or components of the climate system where a 
greenhouse gas or a precursor of a greenhouse gas is stored. 
8 “Sink” means any process, activity or mechanism which removes a greenhouse 
gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere. 
9 “Source” means any process or activity which releases a greenhouse gas, an 
aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas into the atmosphere. 
* Titles of articles are included solely to assist the reader. 
Article 2 
Objective 
The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that 
the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the rel­
evant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentra­
tions in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a 
time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to 
ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic develop­
ment to proceed in a sustainable manner. 


























   




In their actions to achieve the objective of the Convention and to implement its 
provisions, the Parties shall be guided, INTER ALIA, by the following: 
1	 The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and 
future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance 
with their common but di›erentiated responsibilities and respective capabili­
ties. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in com­
bating climate change and the adverse e›ects thereof. 
2	 The specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties, 
especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse e›ects of climate 
change, and of those Parties, especially developing country Parties, that would 
have to bear a disproportionate or abnormal burden under the Convention, 
should be given full consideration. 
3	 The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or min­
imize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse e›ects. Where there 
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures, taking into 
account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-
e›ective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost. To achieve 
this, such policies and measures should take into account di›erent socio-eco­
nomic contexts, be comprehensive, cover all relevant sources, sinks and reser­
voirs of greenhouse gases and adaptation, and comprise all economic sectors. 
E›orts to address climate change may be carried out cooperatively by inter­
ested Parties. 
4	 The Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable development. Poli­
cies and measures to protect the climate system against human-induced change 
should be appropriate for the specific conditions of each Party and should be 
integrated with national development programmes, taking into account that 
economic development is essential for adopting measures to address climate 
change. 
5	 The Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international 
economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and devel­
opment in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling 
them better to address the problems of climate change. Measures taken to 
combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a 




1 All Parties, taking into account their common but di›erentiated responsibili­
ties and their specific national and regional development priorities, objectives 
and circumstances, shall: 
(a)	 Develop, periodically update, publish and make available to the Confer­
ence of the Parties, in accordance with Article 12, national inventories of 
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all green­
house gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, using comparable 




















(b) Formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where 
appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to mitigate cli­
mate change by addressing anthropogenic emissions by sources and 
removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal 
Protocol, and measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate 
change; 
(c)	 Promote and cooperate in the development, application and di›usion, 
including transfer, of technologies, practices and processes that control, 
reduce or prevent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases not con­
trolled by the Montreal Protocol in all relevant sectors, including the 
energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry and waste management 
sectors; 
(d) Promote sustainable management, and promote and cooperate in the con­
servation and enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of all 
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, including bio­
mass, forests and oceans as well as other terrestrial, coastal and marine 
ecosystems; 
(e)	 Cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change; 
develop and elaborate appropriate and integrated plans for coastal zone 
management, water resources and agriculture, and for the protection and 
rehabilitation of areas, particularly in Africa, a›ected by drought and 
desertification, as well as floods; 
(f)	 Take climate change considerations into account, to the extent feasible, in 
their relevant social, economic and environmental policies and actions, 
and employ appropriate methods, for example impact assessments, for­
mulated and determined nationally, with a view to minimizing adverse 
e›ects on the economy, on public health and on the quality of the envi­
ronment, of projects or measures undertaken by them to mitigate or adapt 
to climate change; 
(g)	 Promote and cooperate in scientific, technological, technical, socio-eco­
nomic and other research, systematic observation and development of 
data archives related to the climate system and intended to further the 
understanding and to reduce or eliminate the remaining uncertainties 
regarding the causes, e›ects, magnitude and timing of climate change and 
the economic and social consequences of various response strategies; 
(h) Promote and cooperate in the full, open and prompt exchange of relevant 
scientific, technological, technical, socio-economic and legal information 
related to the climate system and climate change, and to the economic and 
social consequences of various response strategies; 
(i)	 Promote and cooperate in education, training and public awareness 
related to climate change and encourage the widest participation in this 
process, including that of non- governmental organizations; and 
(j)	 Communicate to the Conference of the Parties information related to 
implementation, in accordance with Article 12. 
2	 The developed country Parties and other Parties included in Annex I commit 
themselves specifically as provided for in the following: 
(a)	 Each of these Parties shall adopt national1 policies and take corresponding 
measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its anthro­
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greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs. These policies and measures will 
demonstrate that developed countries are taking the lead in modifying 
longer-term trends in anthropogenic emissions consistent with the objec­
tive of the Convention, recognizing that the return by the end of the pre­
sent decade to earlier levels of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide 
and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol 
would contribute to such modification, and taking into account the 
di›erences in these Parties’ starting points and approaches, economic 
structures and resource bases, the need to maintain strong and sustainable 
economic growth, available technologies and other individual circum­
stances, as well as the need for equitable and appropriate contributions by 
each of these Parties to the global e›ort regarding that objective. These 
Parties may implement such policies and measures jointly with other Par­
ties and may assist other Parties in contributing to the achievement of the 
objective of the Convention and, in particular, that of this subparagraph; 
(b) In order to promote progress to this end, each of these Parties shall com­
municate, within six months of the entry into force of the Convention for 
it and periodically thereafter, and in accordance with Article 12, detailed 
information on its policies and measures referred to in subparagraph (a) 
above, as well as on its resulting projected anthropogenic emissions by 
sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases not controlled by the 
Montreal Protocol for the period referred to in subparagraph (a), with the 
aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels these anthro­
pogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases not con­
trolled by the Montreal Protocol. This information will be reviewed by the 
Conference of the Parties, at its first session and periodically thereafter, in 
accordance with Article 7; 
(c)	 Calculations of emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse 
gases for the purposes of subparagraph (b) above should take into account 
the best available scientific knowledge, including of the e›ective capacity of 
sinks and the respective contributions of such gases to climate change. The 
Conference of the Parties shall consider and agree on methodologies for 
these calculations at its first session and review them regularly thereafter; 
(d) The Conference of the Parties shall, at its first session, review the adequacy 
of subparagraphs (a) and (b) above. Such review shall be carried out in the 
light of the best available scientific information and assessment on climate 
change and its impacts, as well as relevant technical, social and economic 
information. Based on this review, the Conference of the Parties shall take 
appropriate action, which may include the adoption of amendments to the 
commitments in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above. The Conference of the 
Parties, at its first session, shall also take decisions regarding criteria for 
joint implementation as indicated in subparagraph (a) above. A second 
review of subparagraphs (a) and (b) shall take place not later than 31 
December 1998, and thereafter at regular intervals determined by the Con­
ference of the Parties, until the objective of the Convention is met; 
(e)	 Each of these Parties shall : 
(i)	 Coordinate as appropriate with other such Parties, relevant economic 




































(ii) Identify and periodically review its own policies and practices which 
encourage activities that lead to greater levels of anthropogenic emis­
sions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol 
than would otherwise occur; 
(f)	 The Conference of the Parties shall review, not later than 31 December 
1998, available information with a view to taking decisions regarding such 
amendments to the lists in Annexes I and II as may be appropriate, with 
the approval of the Party concerned; 
(g)	 Any Party not included in Annex I may, in its instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession, or at any time thereafter, notify the 
Depositary that it intends to be bound by subparagraphs (a) and (b) 
above. The Depositary shall inform the other signatories and Parties of any 
such notification. 
3	 The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex 
II shall provide new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full 
costs incurred by developing country Parties in complying with their obliga­
tions under Article 12, paragraph 1. They shall also provide such financial 
resources, including for the transfer of technology, needed by the developing 
country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs of implementing mea­
sures that are covered by paragraph 1 of this Article and that are agreed between 
a developing country Party and the international entity or entities referred to 
in Article 11, in accordance with that Article. The implementation of these com­
mitments shall take into account the need for adequacy and predictability in 
the flow of funds and the importance of appropriate burden sharing among the 
developed country Parties. 
4	 The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex 
II shall also assist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnera­
ble to the adverse e›ects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to 
those adverse e›ects. 
5	 The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex 
II shall take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropri­
ate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and 
know-how to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties, to enable 
them to implement the provisions of the Convention. In this process, the devel­
oped country Parties shall support the development and enhancement of 
endogenous capacities and technologies of developing country Parties. Other 
Parties and organizations in a position to do so may also assist in facilitating the 
transfer of such technologies. 
6	 In the implementation of their commitments under paragraph 2 above, a cer­
tain degree of flexibility shall be allowed by the Conference of the Parties to the 
Parties included in Annex I undergoing the process of transition to a market 
economy, in order to enhance the ability of these Parties to address climate 
change, including with regard to the historical level of anthropogenic emis­
sions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol chosen as a 
reference. 
7	 The extent to which developing country Parties will e›ectively implement their 
commitments under the Convention will depend on the e›ective implementa­
tion by developed country Parties of their commitments under the Convention 
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account that economic and social development and poverty eradication are the 
first and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties. 
8	 In the implementation of the commitments in this Article, the Parties shall give 
full consideration to what actions are necessary under the Convention, includ­
ing actions related to funding, insurance and the transfer of technology, to 
meet the specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties arising 
from the adverse e›ects of climate change and/or the impact of the implemen­
tation of response measures, especially on: 
(a)	 Small island countries; 
(b) Countries with low-lying coastal areas; 
(c)	 Countries with arid and semi-arid areas, forested areas and areas liable to 
forest decay; 
(d) Countries with areas prone to natural disasters; 
(e)	 Countries with areas liable to drought and desertification; 
(f)	 Countries with areas of high urban atmospheric pollution; 
(g)	 Countries with areas with fragile ecosystems, including mountainous 
ecosystems; 
(h) Countries whose economies are highly dependent on income generated 
from the production, processing and export, and/or on consumption of 
fossil fuels and associated energy-intensive products; and 
(i) Land-locked and transit countries.
 
Further, the Conference of the Parties may take actions, as appropriate, with
 
respect to this paragraph.
 
9	 The Parties shall take full account of the specific needs and special situations of 
the least developed countries in their actions with regard to funding and trans­
fer of technology. 
10 The Parties shall, in accordance with Article 10, take into consideration in the 
implementation of the commitments of the Convention the situation of Par­
ties, particularly developing country Parties, with economies that are vulnera­
ble to the adverse e›ects of the implementation of measures to respond to cli­
mate change. This applies notably to Parties with economies that are highly 
dependent on income generated from the production, processing and export, 
and/or consumption of fossil fuels and associated energy-intensive products 
and/or the use of fossil fuels for which such Parties have serious difficulties in 
switching to alternatives. 
Article 5 
Research and systematic observation 
In carrying out their commitments under Article 4, paragraph 1(g), the Parties 
shall: 
(a)	 Support and further develop, as appropriate, international and intergovern­
mental programmes and networks or organizations aimed at defining, con­
ducting, assessing and financing research, data collection and systematic 
observation, taking into account the need to minimize duplication of e›ort; 
(b) Support international and intergovernmental e›orts to strengthen sys­
tematic observation and national scientific and technical research capaci­
ties and capabilities, particularly in developing countries, and to promote 
access to, and the exchange of, data and analyses thereof obtained from 

















(c)	 Take into account the particular concerns and needs of developing coun­
tries and cooperate in improving their endogenous capacities and capa­
bilities to participate in the e›orts referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) 
above. 
Article 6 
Education, training and public awareness 
In carrying out their commitments under Article 4, paragraph 1(i), the Parties 
shall: 
(a)	 Promote and facilitate at the national and, as appropriate, subregional and 
regional levels, and in accordance with national laws and regulations, and 
within their respective capacities: 
(i)	 The development and implementation of educational and public 
awareness programmes on climate change and its e›ects; 
(ii) Public access to information on climate change and its e›ects; 
(iii) Public participation in addressing climate change and its e›ects and 
developing adequate responses; and 
(iv) Training of scientific, technical and managerial personnel. 
(b)	 Cooperate in and promote, at the international level, and, where appro­
priate, using existing bodies: 
(i)	 The development and exchange of educational and public awareness 
material on climate change and its e›ects; and 
(ii) The development and implementation of education and training 
programmes, including the strengthening of national institutions and 
the exchange or secondment of personnel to train experts in this field, 
in particular for developing countries. 
Article 7 
Conference of the Parties 
1	 A Conference of the Parties is hereby established. 
2	 The Conference of the Parties, as the supreme body of this Convention, shall 
keep under regular review the implementation of the Convention and any 
related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt, and 
shall make, within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote the e›ective 
implementation of the Convention. To this end, it shall: 
(a)	 Periodically examine the obligations of the Parties and the institutional 
arrangements under the Convention, in the light of the objective of the 
Convention, the experience gained in its implementation and the evolu­
tion of scientific and technological knowledge; 
(b)	 Promote and facilitate the exchange of information on measures adopted 
by the Parties to address climate change and its e›ects, taking into account 
the di›ering circumstances, responsibilities and capabilities of the Parties 
and their respective commitments under the Convention; 
(c)	 Facilitate, at the request of two or more Parties, the coordination of mea­
sures adopted by them to address climate change and its e›ects, taking into 
account the di›ering circumstances, responsibilities and capabilities of the 
Parties and their respective commitments under the Convention; 
(d) Promote and guide, in accordance with the objective and provisions of the 
Convention, the development and periodic refinement of comparable 
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methodologies, to be agreed on by the Conference of the Parties, inter alia, 
for preparing inventories of greenhouse gas emissions by sources and 
removals by sinks, and for evaluating the e›ectiveness of measures to limit 
the emissions and enhance the removals of these gases; 
(e)	 Assess, on the basis of all information made available to it in accordance 
with the provisions of the Convention, the implementation of the Con­
vention by the Parties, the overall e›ects of the measures taken pursuant 
to the Convention, in particular environmental, economic and social 
e›ects as well as their cumulative impacts and the extent to which progress 
towards the objective of the Convention is being achieved; 
(f)	 Consider and adopt regular reports on the implementation of the Con­
vention and ensure their publication; 
(g)	 Make recommendations on any matters necessary for the implementation 
of the Convention; 
(h) Seek to mobilize financial resources in accordance with Article 4, para­
graphs 3, 4 and 5, and Article 11; 
(i)	 Establish such subsidiary bodies as are deemed necessary for the imple­
mentation of the Convention; 
(j)	 Review reports submitted by its subsidiary bodies and provide guidance to 
them; 
(k)	 Agree upon and adopt, by consensus, rules of procedure and financial 
rules for itself and for any subsidiary bodies; 
(l)	 Seek and utilize, where appropriate, the services and cooperation of, and 
information provided by, competent international organizations and 
intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies; and 
(m) Exercise such other functions as are required for the achievement of the 
objective of the Convention as well as all other functions assigned to it 
under the Convention. 
3	 The Conference of the Parties shall, at its first session, adopt its own rules of pro­
cedure as well as those of the subsidiary bodies established by the Convention, 
which shall include decision-making procedures for matters not already covered 
by decision- making procedures stipulated in the Convention. Such procedures 
may include specified majorities required for the adoption of particular decisions. 
4	 The first session of the Conference of the Parties shall be convened by the 
interim secretariat referred to in Article 21 and shall take place not later than 
one year after the date of entry into force of the Convention. Thereafter, ordi­
nary sessions of the Conference of the Parties shall be held every year unless 
otherwise decided by the Conference of the Parties. 
5	 Extraordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties shall be held at such 
other times as may be deemed necessary by the Conference, or at the written 
request of any Party, provided that, within six months of the request being 
communicated to the Parties by the secretariat, it is supported by at least one 
third of the Parties. 
6	 The United Nations, its specialized agencies and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, as well as any State member thereof or observers thereto not 
Party to the Convention, may be represented at sessions of the Conference of 
the Parties as observers. Any body or agency, whether national or international, 
governmental or non-governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by 







   






















resented at a session of the Conference of the Parties as an observer, may be so 
admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present object. The admission 
and participation of observers shall be subject to the rules of procedure 
adopted by the Conference of the Parties. 
Article 8 
Secretariat 
1 A secretariat is hereby established. 
2 The functions of the secretariat shall be: 
(a)	 To make arrangements for sessions of the Conference of the Parties and its 
subsidiary bodies established under the Convention and to provide them 
with services as required; 
(b)	 To compile and transmit reports submitted to it; 
(c)	 To facilitate assistance to the Parties, particularly developing country Par­
ties, on request, in the compilation and communication of information 
required in accordance with the provisions of the Convention; 
(d) To prepare reports on its activities and present them to the Conference of 
the Parties; 
(e)	 To ensure the necessary coordination with the secretariats of other rele­
vant international bodies; 
(f)	 To enter, under the overall guidance of the Conference of the Parties, into 
such administrative and contractual arrangements as may be required for 
the e›ective discharge of its functions; and 
(g)	 To perform the other secretariat functions specified in the Convention and 
in any of its protocols and such other functions as may be determined by 
the Conference of the Parties. 
3	 The Conference of the Parties, at its first session, shall designate a permanent 
secretariat and make arrangements for its functioning. 
Article 9 
Subsidiary body for scientific and technological advice 
1	 A subsidiary body for scientific and technological advice is hereby established 
to provide the Conference of the Parties and, as appropriate, its other sub­
sidiary bodies with timely information and advice on scientific and technolog­
ical matters relating to the Convention. This body shall be open to participa­
tion by all Parties and shall be multidisciplinary. It shall comprise government 
representatives competent in the relevant field of expertise. It shall report reg­
ularly to the Conference of the Parties on all aspects of its work. 
2	 Under the guidance of the Conference of the Parties, and drawing upon exist­
ing competent international bodies, this body shall: 
(a)	 Provide assessments of the state of scientific knowledge relating to climate 
change and its e›ects; 
(b) Prepare scientific assessments on the e›ects of measures taken in the 
implementation of the Convention; 
(c)	 Identify innovative, efficient and state-of-the-art technologies and know­
how and advise on the ways and means of promoting development and/or 
transferring such technologies; 
(d) Provide advice on scientific programmes, international cooperation in 
research and development related to climate change, as well as on ways and 
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means of supporting endogenous capacity-building in developing coun­
tries; and 
(e)	 Respond to scientific, technological and methodological questions that 
the Conference of the Parties and its subsidiary bodies may put to the 
body. 
3 The functions and terms of reference of this body may be further elaborated by 
the Conference of the Parties. 
Article 10 
Subsidiary body for implementation 
1	 A subsidiary body for implementation is hereby established to assist the Con­
ference of the Parties in the assessment and review of the e›ective implemen­
tation of the Convention. This body shall be open to participation by all Par­
ties and comprise government representatives who are experts on matters 
related to climate change. It shall report regularly to the Conference of the Par­
ties on all aspects of its work. 
2	 Under the guidance of the Conference of the Parties, this body shall: 
(a)	 Consider the information communicated in accordance with Article 12, 
paragraph 1, to assess the overall aggregated e›ect of the steps taken by the 
Parties in the light of the latest scientific assessments concerning climate 
change; 
(b) Consider the information communicated in accordance with Article 12, 
paragraph 2, in order to assist the Conference of the Parties in carrying out 
the reviews required by Article 4, paragraph 2(d); and 
(c)	 Assist the Conference of the Parties, as appropriate, in the preparation and 
implementation of its decisions. 
Article 11 
Financial mechanism 
1	 A mechanism for the provision of financial resources on a grant or conces­
sional basis, including for the transfer of technology, is hereby defined. It shall 
function under the guidance of and be accountable to the Conference of the 
Parties, which shall decide on its policies, programme priorities and eligibility 
criteria related to this Convention. Its operation shall be entrusted to one or 
more existing international entities. 
2	 The financial mechanism shall have an equitable and balanced representation 
of all Parties within a transparent system of governance. 
3	 The Conference of the Parties and the entity or entities entrusted with the oper­
ation of the financial mechanism shall agree upon arrangements to give e›ect 
to the above paragraphs, which shall include the following: 
(a)	 Modalities to ensure that the funded projects to address climate change are 
in conformity with the policies, programme priorities and eligibility crite­
ria established by the Conference of the Parties; 
(b) Modalities by which a particular funding decision may be reconsidered in 
light of these policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria; 
(c)	 Provision by the entity or entities of regular reports to the Conference of 
the Parties on its funding operations, which is consistent with the require­
ment for accountability set out in paragraph 1 above; and 

























funding necessary and available for the implementation of this Conven­
tion and the conditions under which that amount shall be periodically 
reviewed. 
4	 The Conference of the Parties shall make arrangements to implement the 
above-mentioned provisions at its first session, reviewing and taking into 
account the interim arrangements referred to in Article 21, paragraph 3, and 
shall decide whether these interim arrangements shall be maintained. Within 
four years thereafter, the Conference of the Parties shall review the financial 
mechanism and take appropriate measures. 
5	 The developed country Parties may also provide and developing country Par­
ties avail themselves of, financial resources related to the implementation of the 
Convention through bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels. 
Article 12 
Communication of information related to implementation 
1	 In accordance with Article 4, paragraph 1, each Party shall communicate to the 
Conference of the Parties, through the secretariat, the following elements of 
information: 
(a)	 A national inventory of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals 
by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, 
to the extent its capacities permit, using comparable methodologies to be 
promoted and agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties; 
(b)	 A general description of steps taken or envisaged by the Party to imple­
ment the Convention; and 
(c)	 Any other information that the Party considers relevant to the achieve­
ment of the objective of the Convention and suitable for inclusion in its 
communication, including, if feasible, material relevant for calculations of 
global emission trends. 
2	 Each developed country Party and each other Party included in Annex I shall 
incorporate in its communication the following elements of information: 
(a)	 A detailed description of the policies and measures that it has adopted to 
implement its commitment under Article 4, paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b); and 
(b) A specific estimate of the e›ects that the policies and measures referred to 
in subparagraph (a) immediately above will have on anthropogenic emis­
sions by its sources and removals by its sinks of greenhouse gases during 
the period referred to in Article 4, paragraph 2(a). 
3	 In addition, each developed country Party and each other developed Party 
included in Annex II shall incorporate details of measures taken in accordance 
with Article 4, paragraphs 3, 4 and 5. 
4	 Developing country Parties may, on a voluntary basis, propose projects for 
financing, including specific technologies, materials, equipment, techniques or 
practices that would be needed to implement such projects, along with, if pos­
sible, an estimate of all incremental costs, of the reductions of emissions and 
increments of removals of greenhouse gases, as well as an estimate of the con­
sequent benefits. 
5	 Each developed country Party and each other Party included in Annex I shall 
make its initial communication within six months of the entry into force of the 
Convention for that Party. Each Party not so listed shall make its initial com­
munication within three years of the entry into force of the Convention for that 
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Party, or of the availability of financial resources in accordance with Article 4, 
paragraph 3. Parties that are least developed countries may make their initial 
communication at their discretion. The frequency of subsequent communica­
tions by all Parties shall be determined by the Conference of the Parties, taking 
into account the di›erentiated timetable set by this paragraph. 
6	 Information communicated by Parties under this Article shall be transmitted by 
the secretariat as soon as possible to the Conference of the Parties and to any 
subsidiary bodies concerned. If necessary, the procedures for the communica­
tion of information may be further considered by the Conference of the Parties. 
7	 From its first session, the Conference of the Parties shall arrange for the provi­
sion to developing country Parties of technical and financial support, on 
request, in compiling and communicating information under this Article, as 
well as in identifying the technical and financial needs associated with pro­
posed projects and response measures under Article 4. Such support may be 
provided by other Parties, by competent international organizations and by the 
secretariat, as appropriate. 
8	 Any group of Parties may, subject to guidelines adopted by the Conference of 
the Parties, and to prior notification to the Conference of the Parties, make a 
joint communication in fulfilment of their obligations under this Article, pro­
vided that such a communication includes information on the fulfilment by 
each of these Parties of its individual obligations under the Convention. 
9	 Information received by the secretariat that is designated by a Party as confi­
dential, in accordance with criteria to be established by the Conference of the 
Parties, shall be aggregated by the secretariat to protect its confidentiality 
before being made available to any of the bodies involved in the communica­
tion and review of information. 
10 Subject to paragraph 9 above, and without prejudice to the ability of any Party 
to make public its communication at any time, the secretariat shall make com­
munications by Parties under this Article publicly available at the time they are 
submitted to the Conference of the Parties. 
Article 13 
Resolution of questions regarding implementation 
The Conference of the Parties shall, at its first session, consider the establishment 
of a multilateral consultative process, available to Parties on their request, for the 
resolution of questions regarding the implementation of the Convention. 
Article 14 
Settlement of disputes 
1	 In the event of a dispute between any two or more Parties concerning the inter­
pretation or application of the Convention, the Parties concerned shall seek a 
settlement of the dispute through negotiation or any other peaceful means of 
their own choice. 
2	 When ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the Convention, or at any 
time thereafter, a Party which is not a regional economic integration organiza­
tion may declare in a written instrument submitted to the Depositary that, in 
respect of any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Con­
vention, it recognizes as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, 


































(a) Submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice, and/or 
(b) Arbitration in accordance with procedures to be adopted by the Confer­
ence of the Parties as soon as practicable, in an annex on arbitration. 
A Party which is a regional economic integration organization may make a dec­
laration with like e›ect in relation to arbitration in accordance with the proce­
dures referred to in subparagraph (b) above. 
3	 A declaration made under paragraph 2 above shall remain in force until it 
expires in accordance with its terms or until three months after written notice 
of its revocation has been deposited with the Depositary. 
4	 A new declaration, a notice of revocation or the expiry of a declaration shall not 
in any way a›ect proceedings pending before the International Court of Justice 
or the arbitral tribunal, unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree. 
5	 Subject to the operation of paragraph 2 above, if after twelve months following 
notification by one Party to another that a dispute exists between them, the Par­
ties concerned have not been able to settle their dispute through the means 
mentioned in paragraph 1 above, the dispute shall be submitted, at the request 
of any of the parties to the dispute, to conciliation. 
6	 A conciliation commission shall be created upon the request of one of the par­
ties to the dispute. The commission shall be composed of an equal number of 
members appointed by each party concerned and a chairman chosen jointly by 
the members appointed by each party. The commission shall render a recom­
mendatory award, which the parties shall consider in good faith. 
7	 Additional procedures relating to conciliation shall be adopted by the Confer­
ence of the Parties, as soon as practicable, in an annex on conciliation. 
8	 The provisions of this Article shall apply to any related legal instrument which 
the Conference of the Parties may adopt, unless the instrument provides oth­
erwise. 
Article 15 
Amendments to the Convention 
1	 Any Party may propose amendments to the Convention. 
2	 Amendments to the Convention shall be adopted at an ordinary session of the 
Conference of the Parties. The text of any proposed amendment to the Con­
vention shall be communicated to the Parties by the secretariat at least six 
months before the meeting at which it is proposed for adoption. The secretariat 
shall also communicate proposed amendments to the signatories to the Con­
vention and, for information, to the Depositary. 
3	 The Parties shall make every e›ort to reach agreement on any proposed amend­
ment to the Convention by consensus. If all e›orts at consensus have been 
exhausted, and no agreement reached, the amendment shall as a last resort be 
adopted by a three-fourths majority vote of the Parties present and voting at the 
meeting. The adopted amendment shall be communicated by the secretariat to 
the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all Parties for their acceptance. 
4	 Instruments of acceptance in respect of an amendment shall be deposited with 
the Depositary. An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 3 above 
shall enter into force for those Parties having accepted it on the ninetieth day 
after the date of receipt by the Depositary of an instrument of acceptance by at 
least three fourths of the Parties to the Convention. 
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after the date on which that Party deposits with the Depositary its instrument 
of acceptance of the said amendment. 
6	 For the purposes of this Article,“Parties present and voting” means Parties pre­
sent and casting an affirmative or negative vote. 
Article 16 
Adoption and amendment of annexes to the Convention 
1	 Annexes to the Convention shall form an integral part thereof and, unless oth­
erwise expressly provided, a reference to the Convention constitutes at the same 
time a reference to any annexes thereto. Without prejudice to the provisions of 
Article 14, paragraphs 2(b) and 7, such annexes shall be restricted to lists, forms 
and any other material of a descriptive nature that is of a scientific, technical, 
procedural or administrative character. 
2	 Annexes to the Convention shall be proposed and adopted in accordance with 
the procedure set forth in Article 15, paragraphs 2, 3 and 4. 
3	 An annex that has been adopted in accordance with paragraph 2 above shall 
enter into force for all Parties to the Convention six months after the date of the 
communication by the Depositary to such Parties of the adoption of the annex, 
except for those Parties that have notified the Depositary, in writing, within 
that period of their non-acceptance of the annex. The annex shall enter into 
force for Parties which withdraw their notification of non-acceptance on the 
ninetieth day after the date on which withdrawal of such notification has been 
received by the Depositary. 
4	 The proposal, adoption and entry into force of amendments to annexes to the 
Convention shall be subject to the same procedure as that for the proposal, 
adoption and entry into force of annexes to the Convention in accordance with 
paragraphs 2 and 3 above. 
5	 If the adoption of an annex or an amendment to an annex involves an amend­
ment to the Convention, that annex or amendment to an annex shall not enter 




1	 The Conference of the Parties may, at any ordinary session, adopt protocols to 
the Convention. 
2	 The text of any proposed protocol shall be communicated to the Parties by the 
secretariat at least six months before such a session. 
3	 The requirements for the entry into force of any protocol shall be established 
by that instrument. 
4	 Only Parties to the Convention may be Parties to a protocol. 
5	 Decisions under any protocol shall be taken only by the Parties to the protocol 
concerned. 
Article 18 
Right to vote 
1	 Each Party to the Convention shall have one vote, except as provided for in 
paragraph 2 below. 




























tence, shall exercise their right to vote with a number of votes equal to the 
number of their member States that are Parties to the Convention. Such an 
organization shall not exercise its right to vote if any of its member States exer­
cises its right, and vice versa. 
Article 19 
Depositary 
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of the Con­
vention and of protocols adopted in accordance with Article 17. 
Article 20 
Signature 
This Convention shall be open for signature by States Members of the United 
Nations or of any of its specialized agencies or that are Parties to the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice and by regional economic integration organizations 
at Rio de Janeiro, during the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, and thereafter at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 
20 June 1992 to 19 June 1993. 
Article 21 
Interim arrangements 
1	 The secretariat functions referred to in Article 8 will be carried out on an 
interim basis by the secretariat established by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations in its resolution 45/212 of 21 December 1990, until the comple­
tion of the first session of the Conference of the Parties. 
2	 The head of the interim secretariat referred to in paragraph 1 above will coop­
erate closely with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to ensure 
that the Panel can respond to the need for objective scientific and technical 
advice. Other relevant scientific bodies could also be consulted. 
3	 The Global Environment Facility of the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme, the United Nations Environment Programme and the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development shall be the international entity 
entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism referred to in Article 
11 on an interim basis. In this connection, the Global Environment Facility 
should be appropriately restructured and its membership made universal to 
enable it to fulfil the requirements of Article 11. 
Article 22 
Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession 
1	 The Convention shall be subject to ratification, acceptance, approval or acces­
sion by States and by regional economic integration organizations. It shall be 
open for accession from the day after the date on which the Convention is 
closed for signature. Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or acces­
sion shall be deposited with the Depositary. 
2	 Any regional economic integration organization which becomes a Party to the 
Convention without any of its member States being a Party shall be bound by 
all the obligations under the Convention. In the case of such organizations, one 
or more of whose member States is a Party to the Convention, the organization 
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performance of their obligations under the Convention. In such cases, the 
organization and the member States shall not be entitled to exercise rights 
under the Convention concurrently. 
3 In their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, regional 
economic integration organizations shall declare the extent of their compe­
tence with respect to the matters governed by the Convention. These organiza­
tions shall also inform the Depositary, who shall in turn inform the Parties, of 
any substantial modification in the extent of their competence. 
Article 23 
Entry into force 
1	 The Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of 
deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or acces­
sion. 
2	 For each State or regional economic integration organization that ratifies, 
accepts or approves the Convention or accedes thereto after the deposit of the 
fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, the Con­
vention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit by 
such State or regional economic integration organization of its instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. 
3	 For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2 above, any instrument deposited by a 
regional economic integration organization shall not be counted as additional 
to those deposited by States members of the organization. 
Article 24 
Reservations 
No reservations may be made to the Convention. 
Article 25 
Withdrawal 
1	 At any time after three years from the date on which the Convention has 
entered into force for a Party, that Party may withdraw from the Convention by 
giving written notification to the Depositary. 
2	 Any such withdrawal shall take e›ect upon expiry of one year from the date of 
receipt by the Depositary of the notification of withdrawal, or on such later 
date as may be specified in the notification of withdrawal. 
3	 Any Party that withdraws from the Convention shall be considered as also 
having withdrawn from any protocol to which it is a Party. 
Article 26 
Authentic texts 
The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, 
Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secre­
tary-General of the United Nations. 
   the undersigned, being duly authorized to that e›ect, 
have signed this Convention. 








Annex I and Annex II countries 
Annex I United Kingdom of Great Britain 
Australia and Northern Ireland 
Austria United States of America 
Belarus * 
Belgium * Countries that are undergoing the pro-
Bulgaria * cess of transition to a market economy. 
Canada 
Czechoslovakia * 
Denmark Annex II 
European Economic Community Australia 




Greece European Economic Community 





Latvia * Ireland 
Lithuania * Italy 
Luxembourg Japan 
Netherlands Luxembourg 
New Zealand Netherlands 
Norway New Zealand 
Poland * Norway 
Portugal Portugal 
Romania * Spain 
Russian Federation * Sweden 
Spain Switzerland 
Sweden Turkey 
Switzerland United Kingdom of Great Britain 
Turkey and Northern Ireland 




















Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 
The Parties to this Protocol,
 
Being Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
 
Change, hereinafter referred to as “the Convention”,
 
In pursuit of the ultimate objective of the Convention as stated in its Article 2,
 
Recalling the provisions of the Convention,
 
Being guided by Article 3 of the Convention,
 
Pursuant to the Berlin Mandate adopted by decision 1/.1 of the Conference
 
of the Parties to the Convention at its first session,
 
Have agreed as follows:
 
Article 1 
For the purposes of this Protocol, the definitions contained in Article 1 of the 
Convention shall apply. In addition: 
1 “Conference of the Parties” means the Conference of the Parties to the Con­
vention. 
2 “Convention” means the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, adopted in New York on 9 May 1992. 
3 	 “Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change” means the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change established in 1988 jointly by the World Meteorolog­
ical Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme. 
4 	 “Montreal Protocol” means the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete 
the Ozone Layer, adopted in Montreal on 16 September 1987 and as subse­
quently adjusted and amended. 
5 	 “Parties present and voting” means Parties present and casting an affirmative 
or negative vote. 
6 “Party” means, unless the context otherwise indicates, a Party to this Protocol. 
7 “Party included in Annex I” means a Party included in Annex I to the Conven­
tion, as may be amended, or a Party which has made a notification under Arti­
cle 4, paragraph 2(g), of the Convention. 
Article 2 
1	 Each Party included in Annex I, in achieving its quantified emission limitation 
and reduction commitments under Article 3, in order to promote sustainable 
development, shall: 
(a) Implement and/or further elaborate policies and measures in accordance 
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(i)	 Enhancement of energy efficiency in relevant sectors of the 
national economy; 
(ii) Protection and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs of green­
house gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, taking 
into account its commitments under relevant international 
environmental agreements; promotion of sustainable forest 
management practices, a›orestation and reforestation; 
(iii) Promotion of sustainable forms of agriculture in light of cli­
mate change considerations; 
(iv) Research on, and promotion, development and increased use 
of, new and renewable forms of energy, of carbon dioxide 
sequestration technologies and of advanced and innovative 
environmentally sound technologies; 
(v)	 Progressive reduction or phasing out of market imperfections, 
fiscal incentives, tax and duty exemptions and subsidies in all 
greenhouse gas emitting sectors that run counter to the objec­
tive of the Convention and application of market instruments; 
(vi) Encouragement of appropriate 	reforms in relevant sectors 
aimed at promoting policies and measures which limit or 
reduce emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the 
Montreal Protocol; 
(vii)Measures to limit and/or reduce emissions of greenhouse gases 
not controlled by the Montreal Protocol in the transport sector; 
(viii)Limitation and/or reduction of methane emissions through 
recovery and use in waste management, as well as in the pro­
duction, transport and distribution of energy; 
(b) Cooperate with other such Parties to enhance the individual and combined 
e›ectiveness of their policies and measures adopted under this Article, 
pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 2(e)(i), of the Convention. To this end, 
these Parties shall take steps to share their experience and exchange infor­
mation on such policies and measures, including developing ways of 
improving their comparability, transparency and e›ectiveness. The Con­
ference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol 
shall, at its first session or as soon as practicable thereafter, consider ways 
to facilitate such cooperation, taking into account all relevant informa­
tion. 
2 	 The Parties included in Annex I shall pursue limitation or reduction of emis­
sions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from avia­
tion and marine bunker fuels, working through the International Civil Avia­
tion Organization and the International Maritime Organization, respectively. 
3 	 The Parties included in Annex I shall strive to implement policies and measures 
under this Article in such a way as to minimize adverse e›ects, including the 
adverse e›ects of climate change, e›ects on international trade, and social, 
environmental and economic impacts on other Parties, especially developing 
country Parties and in particular those identified in Article 4, paragraphs 8 and 
9, of the Convention, taking into account Article 3 of the Convention. The Con­
ference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol may 
take further action, as appropriate, to promote the implementation of the pro­












   
  
  






   
 








4 	 The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Pro­
tocol, if it decides that it would be beneficial to coordinate any of the policies 
and measures in paragraph 1(a) above, taking into account di›erent national 
circumstances and potential e›ects, shall consider ways and means to elaborate 
the coordination of such policies and measures. 
Article 3 
1 	 The Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their 
aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the green­
house gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned amounts, calculated 
pursuant to their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments 
inscribed in Annex B and in accordance with the provisions of this Article, with 
a view to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5 per cent 
below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012. 
2 	 Each Party included in Annex I shall, by 2005, have made demonstrable 
progress in achieving its commitments under this Protocol. 
3 	 The net changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks 
resulting from direct human-induced land-use change and forestry activities, 
limited to a›orestation, reforestation and deforestation since 1990, measured 
as verifiable changes in carbon stocks in each commitment period, shall be used 
to meet the commitments under this Article of each Party included in Annex I. 
The greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks associated with 
those activities shall be reported in a transparent and verifiable manner and 
reviewed in accordance with Articles 7 and 8. 
4 	 Prior to the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting 
of the Parties to this Protocol, each Party included in Annex I shall provide, for 
consideration by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, 
data to establish its level of carbon stocks in 1990 and to enable an estimate to 
be made of its changes in carbon stocks in subsequent years. The Conference 
of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its 
first session or as soon as practicable thereafter, decide upon modalities, rules 
and guidelines as to how, and which, additional human-induced activities 
related to changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by 
sinks in the agricultural soils and the land-use change and forestry categories 
shall be added to, or subtracted from, the assigned amounts for Parties 
included in Annex I, taking into account uncertainties, transparency in report­
ing, verifiability, the methodological work of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, the advice provided by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice in accordance with Article 5 and the decisions of the Con­
ference of the Parties. Such a decision shall apply in the second and subsequent 
commitment periods. A Party may choose to apply such a decision on these 
additional human-induced activities for its first commitment period, provided 
that these activities have taken place since 1990. 
5 	 The Parties included in Annex I undergoing the process of transition to a 
market economy whose base year or period was established pursuant to deci­
sion 9/.2 of the Conference of the Parties at its second session shall use that 
base year or period for the implementation of their commitments under this 
Article. Any other Party included in Annex I undergoing the process of transi­
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munication under Article 12 of the Convention may also notify the Conference 
of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol that it 
intends to use an historical base year or period other than 1990 for the imple­
mentation of its commitments under this Article. The Conference of the Par­
ties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall decide on the 
acceptance of such notification. 
6	 Taking into account Article 4, paragraph 6, of the Convention, in the imple­
mentation of their commitments under this Protocol other than those under 
this Article, a certain degree of flexibility shall be allowed by the Conference of 
the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol to the Parties 
included in Annex I undergoing the process of transition to a market economy. 
7 	 In the first quantified emission limitation and reduction commitment period, 
from 2008 to 2012, the assigned amount for each Party included in Annex I shall 
be equal to the percentage inscribed for it in Annex B of its aggregate anthro­
pogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in 
Annex A in 1990, or the base year or period determined in accordance with 
paragraph 5 above, multiplied by five. Those Parties included in Annex I for 
whom land-use change and forestry constituted a net source of greenhouse gas 
emissions in 1990 shall include in their 1990 emissions base year or period the 
aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions by sources 
minus removals by sinks in 1990 from land-use change for the purposes of cal­
culating their assigned amount. 
8	 Any Party included in Annex I may use 1995 as its base year for hydrofluoro­
carbons, perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride, for the purposes of the 
calculation referred to in paragraph 7 above. 
9	 Commitments for subsequent periods for Parties included in Annex I shall be 
established in amendments to Annex B to this Protocol, which shall be adopted 
in accordance with the provisions of Article 21, paragraph 7. The Conference of 
the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall initiate the 
consideration of such commitments at least seven years before the end of the 
first commitment period referred to in paragraph 1 above. 
10 Any emission reduction units, or any part of an assigned amount, which a Party 
acquires from another Party in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 or 
of Article 17 shall be added to the assigned amount for the acquiring Party. 
11 Any emission reduction units, or any part of an assigned amount, which a Party 
transfers to another Party in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 or of 
Article 17 shall be subtracted from the assigned amount for the transferring 
Party. 
12 Any certified emission reductions which a Party acquires from another Party in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 12 shall be added to the assigned 
amount for the acquiring Party. 
13 If the emissions of a Party included in Annex I in a commitment period are less 
than its assigned amount under this Article, this di›erence shall, on request of 
that Party, be added to the assigned amount for that Party for subsequent com­
mitment periods. 
14 Each Party included in Annex I shall strive to implement the commitments 
mentioned in paragraph 1 above in such a way as to minimize adverse social, 
environmental and economic impacts on developing country Parties, particu­




























with relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties on the implementation 
of those paragraphs, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first session, consider what actions are nec­
essary to minimize the adverse e›ects of climate change and/or the impacts of 
response measures on Parties referred to in those paragraphs.Among the issues 
to be considered shall be the establishment of funding, insurance and transfer 
of technology. 
Article 4 
1	 Any Parties included in Annex I that have reached an agreement to fulfil their 
commitments under Article 3 jointly, shall be deemed to have met those com­
mitments provided that their total combined aggregate anthropogenic carbon 
dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not 
exceed their assigned amounts calculated pursuant to their quantified emission 
limitation and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B and in accor­
dance with the provisions of Article 3. The respective emission level allocated 
to each of the Parties to the agreement shall be set out in that agreement. 
2 	 The Parties to any such agreement shall notify the secretariat of the terms of the 
agreement on the date of deposit of their instruments of ratification, accep­
tance or approval of this Protocol, or accession thereto. The secretariat shall in 
turn inform the Parties and signatories to the Convention of the terms of the 
agreement. 
3 	 Any such agreement shall remain in operation for the duration of the commit­
ment period specified in Article 3, paragraph 7. 
4 	 If Parties acting jointly do so in the framework of, and together with, a regional 
economic integration organization, any alteration in the composition of the 
organization after adoption of this Protocol shall not a›ect existing commit­
ments under this Protocol. Any alteration in the composition of the organiza­
tion shall only apply for the purposes of those commitments under Article 3 
that are adopted subsequent to that alteration. 
5 	 In the event of failure by the Parties to such an agreement to achieve their total 
combined level of emission reductions, each Party to that agreement shall be 
responsible for its own level of emissions set out in the agreement. 
6 	 If Parties acting jointly do so in the framework of, and together with, a regional 
economic integration organization which is itself a Party to this Protocol, each 
member State of that regional economic integration organization individually, 
and together with the regional economic integration organization acting in 
accordance with Article 24, shall, in the event of failure to achieve the total com­
bined level of emission reductions, be responsible for its level of emissions as 
notified in accordance with this Article. 
Article 5 
1 	 Each Party included in Annex I shall have in place, no later than one year prior 
to the start of the first commitment period, a national system for the estima­
tion of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all green­
house gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol. Guidelines for such 
national systems, which shall incorporate the methodologies specified in para­
graph 2 below, shall be decided upon by the Conference of the Parties serving 
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2 	 Methodologies for estimating anthropogenic emissions by sources and 
removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Pro­
tocol shall be those accepted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change and agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties at its third session. 
Where such methodologies are not used, appropriate adjustments shall be 
applied according to methodologies agreed upon by the Conference of the Par­
ties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol at its first session. 
Based on the work of, inter alia, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change and advice provided by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Techno­
logical Advice, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Par­
ties to this Protocol shall regularly review and, as appropriate, revise such 
methodologies and adjustments, taking fully into account any relevant deci­
sions by the Conference of the Parties. Any revision to methodologies or 
adjustments shall be used only for the purposes of ascertaining compliance 
with commitments under Article 3 in respect of any commitment period 
adopted subsequent to that revision. 
3 	 The global warming potentials used to calculate the carbon dioxide equiva­
lence of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of green­
house gases listed in Annex A shall be those accepted by the Intergovernmen­
tal Panel on Climate Change and agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties 
at its third session. Based on the work of, inter alia, the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change and advice provided by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific 
and Technological Advice, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting 
of the Parties to this Protocol shall regularly review and, as appropriate, revise 
the global warming potential of each such greenhouse gas, taking fully into 
account any relevant decisions by the Conference of the Parties. Any revision 
to a global warming potential shall apply only to commitments under Article 3 
in respect of any commitment period adopted subsequent to that revision. 
Article 6 
1 	 For the purpose of meeting its commitments under Article 3, any Party 
included in Annex I may transfer to, or acquire from, any other such Party 
emission reduction units resulting from projects aimed at reducing anthro­
pogenic emissions by sources or enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks of 
greenhouse gases in any sector of the economy, provided that: 
(a)	 Any such project has the approval of the Parties involved; 
(b) Any such project provides a reduction in emissions by sources, or an 
enhancement of removals by sinks, that is additional to any that would 
otherwise occur; 
(c)	 It does not acquire any emission reduction units if it is not in compliance 
with its obligations under Articles 5 and 7; and 
(d) The acquisition of emission reduction units shall be supplemental to 
domestic actions for the purposes of meeting commitments under Article 3. 
2 The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol 
may, at its first session or as soon as practicable thereafter, further elaborate guide­
lines for the implementation of this Article,including for verification and reporting. 
3 A Party included in Annex I may authorize legal entities to participate, under 
its responsibility, in actions leading to the generation, transfer or acquisition 
under this Article of emission reduction units.
 
   
 
 
    























4 	 If a question of implementation by a Party included in Annex I of the require­
ments referred to in this Article is identified in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of Article 8, transfers and acquisitions of emission reduction units 
may continue to be made after the question has been identified, provided that 
any such units may not be used by a Party to meet its commitments under Arti­
cle 3 until any issue of compliance is resolved. 
Article 7 
1 	 Each Party included in Annex I shall incorporate in its annual inventory of 
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases 
not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, submitted in accordance with the rel­
evant decisions of the Conference of the Parties, the necessary supplementary 
information for the purposes of ensuring compliance with Article 3, to be 
determined in accordance with paragraph 4 below. 
2 	 Each Party included in Annex I shall incorporate in its national communica­
tion, submitted under Article 12 of the Convention, the supplementary infor­
mation necessary to demonstrate compliance with its commitments under this 
Protocol, to be determined in accordance with paragraph 4 below. 
3 	 Each Party included in Annex I shall submit the information required under 
paragraph 1 above annually, beginning with the first inventory due under the 
Convention for the first year of the commitment period after this Protocol has 
entered into force for that Party. Each such Party shall submit the information 
required under paragraph 2 above as part of the first national communication 
due under the Convention after this Protocol has entered into force for it and 
after the adoption of guidelines as provided for in paragraph 4 below. The fre­
quency of subsequent submission of information required under this Article 
shall be determined by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of 
the Parties to this Protocol, taking into account any timetable for the submission 
of national communications decided upon by the Conference of the Parties. 
4 	 The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Pro­
tocol shall adopt at its first session, and review periodically thereafter, guide­
lines for the preparation of the information required under this Article, taking 
into account guidelines for the preparation of national communications by 
Parties included in Annex I adopted by the Conference of the Parties. The Con­
ference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall 
also, prior to the first commitment period, decide upon modalities for the 
accounting of assigned amounts. 
Article 8 
1 	 The information submitted under Article 7 by each Party included in Annex I 
shall be reviewed by expert review teams pursuant to the relevant decisions of 
the Conference of the Parties and in accordance with guidelines adopted for 
this purpose by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Par­
ties to this Protocol under paragraph 4 below. The information submitted 
under Article 7, paragraph 1, by each Party included in Annex I shall be 
reviewed as part of the annual compilation and accounting of emissions inven­
tories and assigned amounts. Additionally, the information submitted under 
Article 7, paragraph 2, by each Party included in Annex I shall be reviewed as 
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2 	 Expert review teams shall be coordinated by the secretariat and shall be com­
posed of experts selected from those nominated by Parties to the Convention 
and, as appropriate, by intergovernmental organizations, in accordance with 
guidance provided for this purpose by the Conference of the Parties. 
3 The review process shall provide a thorough and comprehensive technical 
assessment of all aspects of the implementation by a Party of this Protocol. The 
expert review teams shall prepare a report to the Conference of the Parties serv­
ing as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, assessing the implementation 
of the commitments of the Party and identifying any potential problems in, 
and factors influencing, the fulfilment of commitments. Such reports shall be 
circulated by the secretariat to all Parties to the Convention. The secretariat 
shall list those questions of implementation indicated in such reports for fur­
ther consideration by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of 
the Parties to this Protocol. 
4 	 The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Pro­
tocol shall adopt at its first session, and review periodically thereafter, guide­
lines for the review of implementation of this Protocol by expert review teams 
taking into account the relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties. 
5 	 The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Pro­
tocol shall, with the assistance of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and, 
as appropriate, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, 
consider: 
(a)	 The information submitted by Parties under Article 7 and the reports of 
the expert reviews thereon conducted under this Article; and 
(b) Those questions of implementation listed by the secretariat under para­
graph 3 above, as well as any questions raised by Parties. 
6 	 Pursuant to its consideration of the information referred to in paragraph 5 
above, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this 
Protocol shall take decisions on any matter required for the implementation of 
this Protocol. 
Article 9 
1 	 The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Pro­
tocol shall periodically review this Protocol in the light of the best available sci­
entific information and assessments on climate change and its impacts, as well 
as relevant technical, social and economic information. Such reviews shall be 
coordinated with pertinent reviews under the Convention, in particular those 
required by Article 4, paragraph 2(d), and Article 7, paragraph 2(a), of the Con­
vention. Based on these reviews, the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall take appropriate action. 
2 	 The first review shall take place at the second session of the Conference of the 
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. Further reviews 
shall take place at regular intervals and in a timely manner. 
Article 10 
All Parties, taking into account their common but di›erentiated responsibilities 
and their specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and cir­
cumstances, without introducing any new commitments for Parties not included 


























the Convention, and continuing to advance the implementation of these com­
mitments in order to achieve sustainable development, taking into account Arti­
cle 4, paragraphs 3, 5 and 7, of the Convention, shall: 
(a)	 Formulate, where relevant and to the extent possible, cost-e›ective national 
and, where appropriate, regional programmes to improve the quality of 
local emission factors, activity data and/or models which reflect the socio­
economic conditions of each Party for the preparation and periodic updat­
ing of national inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and 
removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal 
Protocol, using comparable methodologies to be agreed upon by the Con­
ference of the Parties, and consistent with the guidelines for the preparation 
of national communications adopted by the Conference of the Parties; 
(b) Formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where 
appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to mitigate cli­
mate change and measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate 
change: 
(i)	 Such programmes would, inter alia, concern the energy, trans­
port and industry sectors as well as agriculture, forestry and 
waste management. Furthermore, adaptation technologies and 
methods for improving spatial planning would improve adap­
tation to climate change; and 
(ii) Parties included in Annex I shall submit information on action 
under this Protocol, including national programmes, in accor­
dance with Article 7; and other Parties shall seek to include in 
their national communications, as appropriate, information on 
programmes which contain measures that the Party believes 
contribute to addressing climate change and its adverse 
impacts, including the abatement of increases in greenhouse 
gas emissions, and enhancement of and removals by sinks, 
capacity building and adaptation measures; 
(c)	 Cooperate in the promotion of e›ective modalities for the development, 
application and di›usion of, and take all practicable steps to promote, 
facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environ­
mentally sound technologies, know-how, practices and processes perti­
nent to climate change, in particular to developing countries, including 
the formulation of policies and programmes for the e›ective transfer of 
environmentally sound technologies that are publicly owned or in the 
public domain and the creation of an enabling environment for the pri­
vate sector, to promote and enhance the transfer of, and access to, envi­
ronmentally sound technologies; 
(d) Cooperate in scientific and technical research and promote the mainte­
nance and the development of systematic observation systems and devel­
opment of data archives to reduce uncertainties related to the climate 
system, the adverse impacts of climate change and the economic and social 
consequences of various response strategies, and promote the develop­
ment and strengthening of endogenous capacities and capabilities to par­
ticipate in international and intergovernmental e›orts, programmes and 
networks on research and systematic observation, taking into account 
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(e)	 Cooperate in and promote at the international level, and, where appropri­
ate, using existing bodies, the development and implementation of educa­
tion and training programmes, including the strengthening of national 
capacity building, in particular human and institutional capacities and the 
exchange or secondment of personnel to train experts in this field, in par­
ticular for developing countries, and facilitate at the national level public 
awareness of, and public access to information on, climate change. Suit­
able modalities should be developed to implement these activities through 
the relevant bodies of the Convention, taking into account Article 6 of the 
Convention; 
(f)	 Include in their national communications information on programmes 
and activities undertaken pursuant to this Article in accordance with rele­
vant decisions of the Conference of the Parties; and 
(g)	 Give full consideration, in implementing the commitments under this 
Article, to Article 4, paragraph 8, of the Convention. 
Article 11 
1 	 In the implementation of Article 10, Parties shall take into account the provi­
sions of Article 4, paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9, of the Convention. 
2 	 In the context of the implementation of Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Conven­
tion, in accordance with the provisions of Article 4, paragraph 3, and Article 11 
of the Convention, and through the entity or entities entrusted with the oper­
ation of the financial mechanism of the Convention, the developed country 
Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II to the Convention 
shall: 
(a)	 Provide new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full 
costs incurred by developing country Parties in advancing the implemen­
tation of existing commitments under Article 4, paragraph 1(a), of the 
Convention that are covered in Article 10, subparagraph (a); and 
(b) Also provide such financial resources, including for the transfer of tech­
nology, needed by the developing country Parties to meet the agreed full 
incremental costs of advancing the implementation of existing commit­
ments under Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention that are covered by 
Article 10 and that are agreed between a developing country Party and the 
international entity or entities referred to in Article 11 of the Convention, 
in accordance with that Article. 
The implementation of these existing commitments shall take into account the 
need for adequacy and predictability in the flow of funds and the importance 
of appropriate burden sharing among developed country Parties. The guidance 
to the entity or entities entrusted with the operation of the financial mecha­
nism of the Convention in relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties, 
including those agreed before the adoption of this Protocol, shall apply mutatis 
mutandis to the provisions of this paragraph. 
3 The developed country Parties and other developed Parties in Annex II to the 
Convention may also provide, and developing country Parties avail themselves 
of, financial resources for the implementation of Article 10, through bilateral, 



























1	 A clean development mechanism is hereby defined. 
2 	 The purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to assist Parties not 
included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in contributing 
to the ultimate objective of the Convention, and to assist Parties included in 
Annex I in achieving compliance with their quantified emission limitation and 
reduction commitments under Article 3. 
3 	 Under the clean development mechanism: 
(a) 	 Parties not included in Annex I will benefit from project activities result­
ing in certified emission reductions; and 
(b) Parties included in Annex I may use the certified emission reductions 
accruing from such project activities to contribute to compliance with part 
of their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under 
Article 3, as determined by the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. 
4 	 The clean development mechanism shall be subject to the authority and guid­
ance of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to 
this Protocol and be supervised by an executive board of the clean development 
mechanism. 
5 	 Emission reductions resulting from each project activity shall be certified by 
operational entities to be designated by the Conference of the Parties serving 
as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, on the basis of: 
(a) 	 Voluntary participation approved by each Party involved; 
(b) Real, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of cli­
mate change; and 
(c) 	 Reductions in emissions that are additional to any that would occur in the 
absence of the certified project activity. 
6 The clean development mechanism shall assist in arranging funding of certi­
fied project activities as necessary. 
7 	 The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Pro­
tocol shall, at its first session, elaborate modalities and procedures with the 
objective of ensuring transparency, efficiency and accountability through inde­
pendent auditing and verification of project activities. 
8 	 The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Pro­
tocol shall ensure that a share of the proceeds from certified project activities is 
used to cover administrative expenses as well as to assist developing country 
Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse e›ects of climate change 
to meet the costs of adaptation. 
9 	 Participation under the clean development mechanism, including in activities 
mentioned in paragraph 3(a) above and in the acquisition of certified emission 
reductions, may involve private and/or public entities, and is to be subject to 
whatever guidance may be provided by the executive board of the clean devel­
opment mechanism. 
10 Certified emission reductions obtained during the period from the year 2000 
up to the beginning of the first commitment period can be used to assist in 
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Article 13 
1 The Conference of the Parties, the supreme body of the Convention, shall serve 
as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. 
2 	 Parties to the Convention that are not Parties to this Protocol may participate 
as observers in the proceedings of any session of the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. When the Conference of 
the Parties serves as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, decisions under 
this Protocol shall be taken only by those that are Parties to this Protocol. 
3 When the Conference of the Parties serves as the meeting of the Parties to this 
Protocol, any member of the Bureau of the Conference of the Parties repre­
senting a Party to the Convention but, at that time, not a Party to this Protocol, 
shall be replaced by an additional member to be elected by and from amongst 
the Parties to this Protocol. 
4 	 The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Pro­
tocol shall keep under regular review the implementation of this Protocol and 
shall make, within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote its e›ective 
implementation. It shall perform the functions assigned to it by this Protocol 
and shall: 
(a) 	 Assess, on the basis of all information made available to it in accordance 
with the provisions of this Protocol, the implementation of this Protocol 
by the Parties, the overall e›ects of the measures taken pursuant to this 
Protocol, in particular environmental, economic and social e›ects as well 
as their cumulative impacts and the extent to which progress towards the 
objective of the Convention is being achieved; 
(b) Periodically examine the obligations of the Parties under this Protocol, 
giving due consideration to any reviews required by Article 4, paragraph 
2(d), and Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Convention, in the light of the 
objective of the Convention, the experience gained in its implementation 
and the evolution of scientific and technological knowledge, and in this 
respect consider and adopt regular reports on the implementation of this 
Protocol; 
(c)	 Promote and facilitate the exchange of information on measures adopted 
by the Parties to address climate change and its e›ects, taking into account 
the di›ering circumstances, responsibilities and capabilities of the Parties 
and their respective commitments under this Protocol; 
(d) Facilitate, at the request of two or more Parties, the coordination of mea­
sures adopted by them to address climate change and its e›ects, taking into 
account the di›ering circumstances, responsibilities and capabilities of the 
Parties and their respective commitments under this Protocol; 
(e)	 Promote and guide, in accordance with the objective of the Convention 
and the provisions of this Protocol, and taking fully into account the rele­
vant decisions by the Conference of the Parties, the development and peri­
odic refinement of comparable methodologies for the e›ective imple­
mentation of this Protocol, to be agreed on by the Conference of the 
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol; 
(f)	 Make recommendations on any matters necessary for the implementation 
of this Protocol; 





































(h) Establish such subsidiary bodies as are deemed necessary for the imple­
mentation of this Protocol; 
(i)	 Seek and utilize, where appropriate, the services and cooperation of, and 
information provided by, competent international organizations and 
intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies; and 
(j)	 Exercise such other functions as may be required for the implementation 
of this Protocol, and consider any assignment resulting from a decision by 
the Conference of the Parties. 
5 	 The rules of procedure of the Conference of the Parties and financial proce­
dures applied under the Convention shall be applied mutatis mutandis under 
this Protocol, except as may be otherwise decided by consensus by the Confer­
ence of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. 
6 	 The first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to this Protocol shall be convened by the secretariat in conjunction with 
the first session of the Conference of the Parties that is scheduled after the date 
of the entry into force of this Protocol. Subsequent ordinary sessions of the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol 
shall be held every year and in conjunction with ordinary sessions of the Con­
ference of the Parties, unless otherwise decided by the Conference of the Par­
ties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. 
7 	 Extraordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting 
of the Parties to this Protocol shall be held at such other times as may be 
deemed necessary by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to this Protocol, or at the written request of any Party, provided that, 
within six months of the request being communicated to the Parties by the sec­
retariat, it is supported by at least one third of the Parties. 
8 	 The United Nations, its specialized agencies and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, as well as any State member thereof or observers thereto not 
party to the Convention, may be represented at sessions of the Conference of 
the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol as observers. 
Any body or agency, whether national or international, governmental or non­
governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by this Protocol and which 
has informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session of the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol 
as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least one third of the Parties pre­
sent object. The admission and participation of observers shall be subject to the 
rules of procedure, as referred to in paragraph 5 above. 
Article 14 
1 	 The secretariat established by Article 8 of the Convention shall serve as the sec­
retariat of this Protocol. 
2 	 Article 8, paragraph 2, of the Convention on the functions of the secretariat, and 
Article 8, paragraph 3, of the Convention on arrangements made for the func­
tioning of the secretariat, shall apply mutatis mutandis to this Protocol. The sec­
retariat shall, in addition, exercise the functions assigned to it under this Protocol. 
Article 15 
1 	 The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Sub­
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vention shall serve as, respectively, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Tech­
nological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation of this Protocol. 
The provisions relating to the functioning of these two bodies under the Con­
vention shall apply mutatis mutandis to this Protocol. Sessions of the meetings 
of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Sub­
sidiary Body for Implementation of this Protocol shall be held in conjunction 
with the meetings of, respectively, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Tech­
nological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation of the Conven­
tion. 
2 	 Parties to the Convention that are not Parties to this Protocol may participate as 
observers in the proceedings of any session of the subsidiary bodies. When the 
subsidiary bodies serve as the subsidiary bodies of this Protocol, decisions 
under this Protocol shall be taken only by those that are Parties to this Protocol. 
3 	 When the subsidiary bodies established by Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention 
exercise their functions with regard to matters concerning this Protocol, any 
member of the Bureaux of those subsidiary bodies representing a Party to the 
Convention but, at that time, not a party to this Protocol, shall be replaced by 
an additional member to be elected by and from amongst the Parties to this 
Protocol. 
Article 16 
The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Proto­
col shall, as soon as practicable, consider the application to this Protocol of, and 
modify as appropriate, the multilateral consultative process referred to in Article 
13 of the Convention, in the light of any relevant decisions that may be taken by 
the Conference of the Parties. Any multilateral consultative process that may be 
applied to this Protocol shall operate without prejudice to the procedures and 
mechanisms established in accordance with Article 18. 
Article 17 
The Conference of the Parties shall define the relevant principles, modalities, rules 
and guidelines, in particular for verification, reporting and accountability for 
emissions trading. The Parties included in Annex B may participate in emissions 
trading for the purposes of fulfilling their commitments under Article 3. Any such 
trading shall be supplemental to domestic actions for the purpose of meeting 
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under that Article. 
Article 18 
The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Proto­
col shall, at its first session, approve appropriate and e›ective procedures and 
mechanisms to determine and to address cases of non-compliance with the pro­
visions of this Protocol, including through the development of an indicative list of 
consequences, taking into account the cause, type, degree and frequency of non­
compliance. Any procedures and mechanisms under this Article entailing binding 
consequences shall be adopted by means of an amendment to this Protocol. 
Article 19 
The provisions of Article 14 of the Convention on settlement of disputes shall 









   
   
  




















1 	 Any Party may propose amendments to this Protocol. 
2 	 Amendments to this Protocol shall be adopted at an ordinary session of the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. 
The text of any proposed amendment to this Protocol shall be communicated 
to the Parties by the secretariat at least six months before the meeting at which 
it is proposed for adoption. The secretariat shall also communicate the text of 
any proposed amendments to the Parties and signatories to the Convention 
and, for information, to the Depositary. 
3 	 The Parties shall make every e›ort to reach agreement on any proposed 
amendment to this Protocol by consensus. If all e›orts at consensus have been 
exhausted, and no agreement reached, the amendment shall as a last resort be 
adopted by a three-fourths majority vote of the Parties present and voting at 
the meeting. The adopted amendment shall be communicated by the secre­
tariat to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all Parties for their acceptance. 
4 	 Instruments of acceptance in respect of an amendment shall be deposited with 
the Depositary. An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 3 above 
shall enter into force for those Parties having accepted it on the ninetieth day 
after the date of receipt by the Depositary of an instrument of acceptance by at 
least three fourths of the Parties to this Protocol. 
5 	 The amendment shall enter into force for any other Party on the ninetieth day 
after the date on which that Party deposits with the Depositary its instrument 
of acceptance of the said amendment. 
Article 21 
1 	 Annexes to this Protocol shall form an integral part thereof and, unless otherwise 
expressly provided, a reference to this Protocol constitutes at the same time a ref­
erence to any annexes thereto. Any annexes adopted after the entry into force of 
this Protocol shall be restricted to lists, forms and any other material of a descrip­
tive nature that is of a scientific, technical, procedural or administrative character. 
2 	 Any Party may make proposals for an annex to this Protocol and may propose 
amendments to annexes to this Protocol. 
3 	 Annexes to this Protocol and amendments to annexes to this Protocol shall be 
adopted at an ordinary session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. The text of any proposed annex or 
amendment to an annex shall be communicated to the Parties by the secretariat 
at least six months before the meeting at which it is proposed for adoption. The 
secretariat shall also communicate the text of any proposed annex or amend­
ment to an annex to the Parties and signatories to the Convention and, for 
information, to the Depositary. 
4 	 The Parties shall make every e›ort to reach agreement on any proposed annex 
or amendment to an annex by consensus. If all e›orts at consensus have been 
exhausted, and no agreement reached, the annex or amendment to an annex 
shall as a last resort be adopted by a three-fourths majority vote of the Parties 
present and voting at the meeting. The adopted annex or amendment to an 
annex shall be communicated by the secretariat to the Depositary, who shall 
circulate it to all Parties for their acceptance. 
5 	 An annex, or amendment to an annex other than Annex A or B, that has been 
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all Parties to this Protocol six months after the date of the communication by 
the Depositary to such Parties of the adoption of the annex or adoption of the 
amendment to the annex, except for those Parties that have notified the 
Depositary, in writing, within that period of their non-acceptance of the annex 
or amendment to the annex. The annex or amendment to an annex shall enter 
into force for Parties which withdraw their notification of non-acceptance on 
the ninetieth day after the date on which withdrawal of such notification has 
been received by the Depositary. 
6 	 If the adoption of an annex or an amendment to an annex involves an amend­
ment to this Protocol, that annex or amendment to an annex shall not enter 
into force until such time as the amendment to this Protocol enters into force. 
7 	 Amendments to Annexes A and B to this Protocol shall be adopted and enter 
into force in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 20, provided that 
any amendment to Annex B shall be adopted only with the written consent of 
the Party concerned. 
Article 22 
1 	 Each Party shall have one vote, except as provided for in paragraph 2 below. 
2 	 Regional economic integration organizations, in matters within their compe­
tence, shall exercise their right to vote with a number of votes equal to the 
number of their member States that are Parties to this Protocol. Such an orga­
nization shall not exercise its right to vote if any of its member States exercises 
its right, and vice versa. 
Article 23 
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of this Pro­
tocol. 
Article 24 
1 	 This Protocol shall be open for signature and subject to ratification, acceptance 
or approval by States and regional economic integration organizations which 
are Parties to the Convention. It shall be open for signature at United Nations 
Headquarters in New York from 16 March 1998 to 15 March 1999. This Protocol 
shall be open for accession from the day after the date on which it is closed for 
signature. Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall 
be deposited with the Depositary. 
2 	 Any regional economic integration organization which becomes a Party to this 
Protocol without any of its member States being a Party shall be bound by all 
the obligations under this Protocol. In the case of such organizations, one or 
more of whose member States is a Party to this Protocol, the organization and 
its member States shall decide on their respective responsibilities for the per­
formance of their obligations under this Protocol. In such cases, the organiza­
tion and the member States shall not be entitled to exercise rights under this 
Protocol concurrently. 
3 In their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, regional 
economic integration organizations shall declare the extent of their compe­
tence with respect to the matters governed by this Protocol. These organiza­
tions shall also inform the Depositary, who shall in turn inform the Parties, of 






    
 
  
    
 
 






1 	 This Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date on which 
not less than 55 Parties to the Convention, incorporating Parties included in 
Annex I which accounted in total for at least 55 per cent of the total carbon 
dioxide emissions for 1990 of the Parties included in Annex I, have deposited 
their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. 
2 	 For the purposes of this Article, “the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of 
the Parties included in Annex I” means the amount communicated on or 
before the date of adoption of this Protocol by the Parties included in Annex I 
in their first national communications submitted in accordance with Article 12 
of the Convention. 
3 	 For each State or regional economic integration organization that ratifies, 
accepts or approves this Protocol or accedes thereto after the conditions set out 
in paragraph 1 above for entry into force have been fulfilled, this Protocol shall 
enter into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of its instru­
ment of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. 
4 	 For the purposes of this Article, any instrument deposited by a regional eco­
nomic integration organization shall not be counted as additional to those 
deposited by States members of the organization. 
Article 26 
No reservations may be made to this Protocol. 
Article 27 
1 	 At any time after three years from the date on which this Protocol has entered 
into force for a Party, that Party may withdraw from this Protocol by giving 
written notification to the Depositary. 
2 	 Any such withdrawal shall take e›ect upon expiry of one year from the date of 
receipt by the Depositary of the notification of withdrawal, or on such later 
date as may be specified in the notification of withdrawal. 
3 	 Any Party that withdraws from the Convention shall be considered as also 
having withdrawn from this Protocol. 
Article 28 
The original of this Protocol, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russ­
ian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations. 
 at Kyoto this eleventh day of December one thousand nine hundred and 
ninety-seven. 
   the undersigned, being duly authorized to that e›ect, 
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Absorption of Radiation: The uptake of radiation by a solid body, liquid or gas. The 
absorbed energy may be transferred or re-emitted. 
Activities implemented jointly (aij): Under a pilot phase that ends by 2000, AIJ activ­
ities can be carried out through partnerships between an investor from a devel­
oped country and a counterpart in a host country. The purpose is to involve pri­
vate-sector money in the transfer of technology and know-how. See also Joint 
Implementation. 
Ad hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (agbm): A subsidiary body created by cop-1 to 
conduct the talks that led to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol; the agbm con­
cluded its final meeting on 30 November 1997. 
Aerosols: Particles of matter, solid or liquid, larger than a molecule but small enough 
to remain suspended in the atmosphere. Natural sources include salt particles 
from sea spray and clay particles as a result of weathering of rocks, both of which 
are carried upward by the wind. Aerosols can also originate as a result of human 
activities and in this case are often considered pollutants. See also Sulfate 
Aerosols. 
Albedo: The ratio of reflected to incident light; albedo can be expressed as either a 
percentage or a fraction of 1. Snow covered areas have a high albedo (up to about 
0.9 or 90%) due to their white color, while vegetation has a low albedo (generally 
about 0.1 or 10%) due to the dark color and light absorbed for photosynthesis. 
Clouds have an intermediate albedo and are the most important contributor to 
the Earth’s albedo. The Earth’s aggregate albedo is approximately 0.3. 
Alliance of Small Island States (aosis): The Alliance of Small Island States is an ad 
hoc coalition of low-lying and island countries. These countries are particularly 
vulnerable to sea-level rise and share common positions on climate change. The 
42 members and observers are American Samoa, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belize, Cape Verde, Comoros, Cook Islands, Cuba, Cyprus, Dominica, Fed­
erated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Grenada, Guam,Guinea-Bissau,Guyana, Jamaica, 
Kiribati,Maldives,Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Nauru,Netherlands Antilles, 
Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Singa­
pore, Solomon Islands, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Suriname, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, US Virgin Islands, and Vanuatu. 
Annex I Parties: Industrialized countries that, as parties to the Framework Conven­
tion on Climate Change, have pledged to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions 
by the year 2000 to 1990 levels. Annex I Parties consist of countries belonging to 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (oecd) and coun­
tries designated as Economies-in-Transition. 
1 This glossary was compiled





and the UN Framework Con­
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Annex II Parties: The rich countries listed in this annex to the Convention have a spe­
cial obligation to help developing countries with financial and technological 
resources. They include the 24 original OECD members plus the European Union. 
Anthropogenic: Derived from human activities. 
Atmosphere: The mixture of gases surrounding the Earth. The Earth’s atmosphere 
consists of about 79.1% nitrogen (by volume), 20.9% oxygen, 0.036% carbon diox­
ide and trace amounts of other gases. The atmosphere can be divided into a 
number of layers according to its mixing or chemical characteristics, generally 
determined by its thermal properties (temperature). The layer nearest the Earth 
is the troposphere, which reaches up to an altitude of about 8 km (about 5 miles) 
in the polar regions and up to 17 km (nearly 11 miles) above the equator. The 
stratosphere, which reaches to an altitude of about 50 km (31 miles) lies atop the 
troposphere. The mesosphere which extends up to 80-90 km is atop the stratos­
phere, and finally, the thermosphere, or ionosphere, gradually diminishes and 
forms a fuzzy border with outer space. There is relatively little mixing of gases 
between layers. 
Article 4.1: This Convention article contains general commitments for all Parties ­
developing and developed. 
Article 4.2: This Convention article contains specific commitments for developed 
country (Annex I) Parties only, notably to take measures aimed at returning 
greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. 
Baseline Emissions: The emissions that would occur without policy intervention (in 
a business-as-usual scenario). Baseline estimates are needed to determine the 
e≠ectiveness of emissions reduction programs (often called mitigation strate­
gies). 
Berlin Mandate: Adopted at cop-1, the Berlin Mandate launched the talks that led to 
the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Biogeochemical Cycle: The chemical interactions that take place among the atmos­
phere, biosphere , hydrosphere, and geosphere. 
Biomass: Organic nonfossil material of biological origin. For example, trees and 
plants are biomass. 
Biomass Energy:Energy produced by combusting renewable biomass materials such 
as wood. The carbon dioxide emitted from burning biomass will not increase 
total atmospheric carbon dioxide if this consumption is done on a sustainable 
basis (i.e., if in a given period of time, regrowth of biomass takes up as much 
carbon dioxide as is released from biomass combustion). Biomass energy is often 
suggested as a replacement for fossil fuel combustion which has large green­
house gas emissions. 
Biosphere: The region on land, in the oceans, and in the atmosphere inhabited by 
living organisms. 
Carbon Cycle: The global scale exchange of carbon among its reservoirs, namely the 
atmosphere, oceans, vegetation, soils, and geologic deposits and minerals. This 
involves components in food chains, in the atmosphere as carbon dioxide, in the 
hydrosphere and in the geosphere. 
Carbon Dioxide (CO2): The greenhouse gas whose concentration is being most 
a≠ected directly by human activities. CO2 also serves as the reference to compare 
all other greenhouse gases (see carbon dioxide equivalents). The major source of 
CO2 emissions is fossil fuel combustion. CO2 emissions are also a product of forest 













production. Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 have been increasing at a rate of 
about 0.5% per year and are now about 30% above preindustrial levels. 
Carbon Dioxide Equivalent (cde): A metric measure used to compare the emissions 
from various greenhouse gases based upon their global warming potential 
(gwp). Carbon dioxide equivalents are commonly expressed as “million metric 
tons of carbon dioxide equivalents (mmtcde)” or “million short tons of carbon 
dioxide equivalents (mstcde)”The carbon dioxide equivalent for a gas is derived 
by multiplying the tons of the gas by the associated gwp . 
Carbon Dioxide Fertilization: An expression (sometimes reduced to ‘fertilization’) 
used to denote increased plant growth due to a higher carbon dioxide concen­
tration. 
Carbon Equivalent (ce). A metric measure used to compare the emissions of the 
di≠erent greenhouse gases based upon their global warming potential (gwp). 
Greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. are most commonly expressed as “million 
metric tons of carbon equivalents”(mmtce). Global warming potentials are used 
to convert greenhouse gases to carbon dioxide equivalents. Carbon dioxide 
equivalents can then be converted to carbon equivalents by multiplying the 
carbon dioxide equivalents by 12/44 (the ratio of the molecular weight of carbon 
to carbon dioxide). Thus, the formula to derive carbon equivalents is: 
Carbon Sequestration. The uptake and storage of carbon. Trees and plants, for exam­
ple, absorb carbon dioxide, release the oxygen and store the carbon. Fossil fuels 
were at one time biomass and continue to store the carbon until burned. 
Carbon Sinks: Carbon reservoirs and conditions that take in and store more carbon 
(carbon sequestration) than they release. Carbon sinks can serve to partially 
o≠set greenhouse gas emissions. Forests and oceans are common carbon sinks. 
Chlorofluorocarbons and Related Compounds: This family of anthropogenic com­
pounds includes chlorofluorcarbons (cfcs), bromofluorcarbons (halons), methyl 
chloroform, carbon tetrachloride, methyl bromide, and hydrochlorofluorcarbons 
(hcfcs). These compounds have been shown to deplete stratospheric ozone, and 
therefore are typically referred to as ozone depleting substances.The most ozone-
depleting of these compounds are being phased out under the Montreal Protocol. 
Clean Development Mechanism (cdm): The Kyoto Protocol establishes the cdm to 
enable industrialized countries to finance emissions-avoiding projects in devel­
oping countries and receive credit for doing so. 
Climate: The average weather (usually taken over a 30-year time period) for a partic­
ular region and time period. Climate is not the same as weather, but rather, it is 
the average pattern of weather for a particular region. Weather describes the 
short-term state of the atmosphere. Climatic elements include precipitation, 
temperature, humidity, sunshine, wind velocity, phenomena such as fog, frost, 
and hail storms, and other measures of the weather. 
Climate Change (also referred to as ‘global climate change’): The term ‘climate 
change’ is sometimes used to refer to all forms of climatic inconsistency, but 
because the Earth’s climate is never static, the term is more properly used to 
imply a significant change from one climatic condition to another. In some cases, 
‘climate change’ has been used synonymously with the term, ‘global warming’; 
scientists however, tend to use the term in the wider sense to also include nat­
ural changes in climate. See also Enhanced Greenhouse E≠ect. 
Climate Change Action Plan. Unveiled in October, 1993 by President Clinton, the ccap 
is the U.S. plan for meeting its pledge to reduce greenhouse gas emissions under 
MMTCDE= (million metric tons
of a gas) * (GWP of the gas) 
MMTCDE= (million metric tons
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the terms of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (fccc). The goal of 
the ccap is to reduce U.S. emissions of anthropogenic greenhouse gases to 1990 
levels by the year 2000. The ccap , which consists of some 50 voluntary federal 
programs that span all sectors of the economy, uses a win-win approach by help­
ing program partners save energy, save money, and gain access to clean technol­
ogy while also reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
Climate Feedback: An atmospheric, oceanic, terrestrial, or other process that is acti­
vated by the direct climate change induced by changes in radiative forcing. Cli­
mate feedbacks may increase (positive feedback) or diminish (negative feedback) 
the magnitude of the direct climate change. 
Climate Model: A quantitative way of representing the interactions of the atmos­
phere, oceans, land surface, and ice. Models can range from relatively simple to 
quite comprehensive. Also see General Circulation Model. 
Climate Modeling:The simulation of the climate using computer-based models. Also 
see General Circulation Model. 
Climate System (or Earth System): The atmosphere, the oceans, the biosphere, the 
cryosphere, and the geosphere, together make up the climate system. 
Cogeneration: The process by which two di≠erent and useful forms of energy are 
produced at the same time. For example, while boiling water to generate elec­
tricity, the leftover steam can be sold for industrial processes or space heating. 
Conference of the Parties (cop): The cop is the collection of nations that have ratified 
the Framework Convention on Climate Change (fccc), currently over 150 strong, 
and about 50 Observer States. The primary role of the cop is to keep the imple­
mentation of the Convention under review and to take the decisions necessary for 
the e≠ective implementation of the Convention.The first cop (cop 1) took place in 
Berlin,Germany from March 28th to April 7th,1995,and was attended by over 1000 
observers and 2000 media representatives; cop-2 was in Geneva from 8 to 19 July 
1996, cop-3 was in Kyoto, Japan from 1 to 11 December 1997, cop-4 was in Buenos 
Aires, Argentina from 2–13 November 1998, cop-5 was from 25 October to 5 
November 1999, and cop -6 will be in the Hague from 13 to 14 November 2000. 
cop/mop: The Kyoto Protocol’s supreme body will be the cop , which will serve as 
the Protocol’s meeting of the Parties. The sessions of the cop and the cop/mop 
will be held during the same period.This will improve cost-e≠ectiveness and coor­
dination with the Convention. 
Deforestation: Those practices or processes that result in the change of forested 
lands to non-forest uses. This is often cited as one of the major causes of the 
enhanced greenhouse e≠ect for two reasons: 1) the burning or decomposition of 
the wood releases carbon dioxide; and 2) trees that once removed carbon dioxide 
from the atmosphere in the process of photosynthesis are no longer present and 
contributing to carbon storage. 
Desertification: The progressive destruction or degradation of existing vegetative 
cover to form desert. This can occur due to overgrazing, deforestation, drought, 
and the burning of extensive areas. Once formed, deserts can only support a 
sparse range of vegetation. Climatic e≠ects associated with this phenomenon 
include increased albedo, reduced atmospheric humidity, and greater atmos­
pheric dust (aerosol) loading. 
Economies in Transition (eit): Those Central and East European countries and former 
republics of the Soviet Union that are in transition to a market economy. 
El Niño: A climatic phenomenon occurring irregularly, but generally every 3 to 5 years. 
 





El Niños often first become evident during the Christmas season (El Niño means 
Christ child) in the surface oceans of the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean. The phe­
nomenon involves seasonal changes in the direction of the tropical winds over 
the Pacific and abnormally warm surface ocean temperatures.The changes in the 
tropics are most intense in the Pacific region, these changes can disrupt weather 
patterns throughout the tropics and can extend to higher latitudes, especially in 
Central and North America. The relationship between these events and global 
weather patterns are currently the subject of much research in order to enhance 
prediction of seasonal to interannual fluctuations in the climate. 
Emissions: The release of a substance (usually a gas when referring to the subject of 
climate change) into the atmosphere. 
Emissions Trading: The Kyoto Protocol establishes a mechanism whereby Parties 
with emissions commitments may trade their emission allowances with other 
Parties. The aim is to improve the overall flexibility and economic e≤ciency of 
making emissions cuts. 
Enhanced Greenhouse Effect: The natural greenhouse e≠ect has been enhanced by 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. Increased concentrations of 
carbon dioxide, methane,and nitrous oxide, cfcs, hfcs, pfcs ,SF6,NF3, and other 
photochemically important gases caused by human activities such as fossil fuel 
consumption and adding waste to landfills, trap more infra-red radiation, 
thereby exerting a warming influence on the climate. See Climate Change and 
Global Warming. 
Entry into Force: Intergovernmental agreements, including protocols and amend­
ments, are not legally binding until they have been ratified by a certain number 
of countries; the Climate Change Convention required 50 and enters into force for 
each new Party 90 days after it ratifies. 
Evapotranspiration: The sum of evaporation and plant transpiration. Potential evap­
otranspiration is the amount of water that could be evaporated or transpired at 
a given temperature and humidity, if there was plenty of water available. Actual 
evapotranspiration can not be any greater than precipitation, and will usually be 
less because some water will run o≠ in rivers and flow to the oceans. If potential 
evapotranspiration is greater than actual precipitation, then soils are extremely 
dry during at least a major part of the year. 
Financial Mechanism: As defined by the Convention, its role is to transfer funds and 
technologies to developing countries on a grant or consessional basis, under the 
guidance of the cop . The Global Environment Facility is “operating” the mecha­
nism on an interim basis. 
Fluorocarbons: Carbon-fluorine compounds that often contain other elements such 
as hydrogen, chlorine, or bromine. Common fluorocarbons include chlorofluoro­
carbons and related compounds (also know as ozone depleting substances), 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), and perfluorcarbons (pfcs). 
Forcing Mechanism: A process that alters the energy balance of the climate system, 
i.e. changes the relative balance between incoming solar radiation and outgoing 
infrared radiation from Earth. Such mechanisms include changes in solar irradi­
ance, volcanic eruptions, and enhancement of the natural greenhouse e≠ect by 
emission of carbon dioxide. 
Fossil Fuel: A general term for combustible geologic deposits of carbon in reduced 
(organic) form and of biological origin, including coal, oil, natural gas, oil shales, 
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phere when burnt, thus significantly contributing to the enhanced greenhouse 
e≠ect. 
Fossil Fuel Combustion: Burning of coal, oil (including gasoline), or natural gas. This 
burning, usually to generate energy, releases carbon dioxide, as well as combus­
tion by products that can include unburned hydrocarbons, methane, and carbon 
monoxide.Carbon monoxide,methane,and many of the unburned hydrocarbons 
slowly oxidize into carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Common sources of fossil 
fuel combustion include cars and electric utilities. 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (fccc): The landmark international 
treaty unveiled at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop­
ment (unced , also known as the “Rio Summit”), in June 1992. The fccc commits 
signatory countries to stabilize anthropogenic (i.e., human-induced) greenhouse 
gas emissions to ‘levels that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interfer­
ence with the climate system’. The fccc also requires that all signatory parties 
develop and update national inventories of anthropogenic emissions of all green­
house gases not otherwise controlled by the Montreal Protocol. Out of 155 coun­
tries that have ratified this accord, the U.S. was the first industrialized nation to 
do so. 
General Circulation Model (GCM): A global, three-dimensional computer model of 
the climate system which can be used to simulate human-induced climate 
change. GCMs are highly complex and they represent the e≠ects of such factors 
as reflective and absorptive properties of atmospheric water vapor, greenhouse 
gas concentrations, clouds, annual and daily solar heating, ocean temperatures 
and ice boundaries. The most recent GCMs include global representations of the 
atmosphere, oceans, and land surface. 
Geosphere: The soils, sediments, and rock layers of the Earth’s crust, both continen­
tal and beneath the ocean floors. 
Global Environment Facility (gef): The multi-billion-dollar gef was established by 
the World Bank, the UN Development Programme, and the UN Environment Pro-
gramme in 1990. It operates the Convention’s “financial mechanism” on an 
interim basis and funds developing country projects that have global climate 
change benefits. 
Global Warming: An increase in the near surface temperature of the Earth. Global 
warming has occurred in the distant past as the result of natural influences, but 
the term is most often used to refer to the warming predicted to occur as a result 
of increased emissions of greenhouse gases. Scientists generally agree that the 
Earth’s surface has warmed by about 1 degree Fahrenheit in the past 140 years.The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (ipcc) recently concluded that 
increased concentrations of greenhouse gases are causing an increase in the 
Earth’s surface temperature and that increased concentrations of sulfate aerosols 
have led to relative cooling in some regions, generally over and downwind of heav­
ily industrialized areas. Also see Climate Change and Enhanced Greenhouse E≠ect. 
Global Warming Potential (gwp): The index used to translate the level of emissions 
of various gases into a common measure in order to compare the relative radia­
tive forcing of di≠erent gases without directly calculating the changes in atmos­
pheric concentrations. gwps are calculated as the ratio of the radiative forcing 
that would result from the emissions of one kilogram of a greenhouse gas to that 
from emission of one kilogram of carbon dioxide over a period of time (usually 








been assigned gwps due to complications that 
arise. Greenhouse gases are expressed in terms of 
Carbon Dioxide Equivalent. The International gas gwp 1990 gwp 1996 
Panel on Climate Change (ipcc) has presented Carbon Dioxide 1 1 
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gwps for greenhouse gases 
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Greenhouse Effect: The e≠ect produced as green- SF6	 NA* 23,900 
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pass through the Earth’s atmosphere, but prevent **This figure is an average GWP for the two PFCs, CF4 and C2F6. 
most of the outgoing infra-red radiation from the 
surface and lower atmosphere from escaping
 
into outer space. This process occurs naturally and has kept the Earth’s tempera­
ture about 59 degrees F warmer than it would otherwise be. Current life on Earth
 
could not be sustained without the natural greenhouse e≠ect.
 
Greenhouse Gas (ghg). Any gas that absorbs infra-red radiation in the atmosphere. 
Greenhouse gases include water vapor, carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), 
nitrous oxide (N2O), halogenated fluorocarbons (hcfcs) , ozone (O3), perfluori­
nated carbons (pfcs), and hydrofluorocarbons (hfcs). 
Group of 77 and China: The g-77 was founded in 1967 under the auspices of the 
United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (unctad). It seeks to har­
monize the negotiating positions of its 132 developing-country members. 
Hot Air: Refers to the concern that some governments will be able to meet their com­
mitment targets with minimal e≠ort and could then flood the market for emis­
sions credits, reducing the incentive for other countries to cut their own domes­
tic emissions. 
Hydrocarbons: Substances containing only hydrogen and carbon. Fossil fuels are 
made up of hydrocarbons. Some hydrocarbon compounds are major air pollu­
tants. 
Hydrofluorocarbons (hfcs). These chemicals (along with perfluorocarbons) were 
introduced as alternatives to ozone depleting substances in serving many indus­
trial, commercial, and personal needs. HFCs are emitted as by-products of indus­
trial processes and are also used in manufacturing. They do not significantly 
deplete the stratospheric ozone layer, but they are powerful greenhouse gases 
with global warming potentials ranging from 140 (hfc-152a) to 12,100 (hfc-23). 
Hydrosphere: The part of the Earth composed of water including clouds, oceans, 
seas, ice caps, glaciers, lakes, rivers, underground water supplies, and atmospheric 
water vapor. 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (ipcc): The ipcc was established jointly 
by the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Meteorological 
Organization in 1988. The purpose of the ipcc is to assess information in the sci­
entific and technical literature related to all significant components of the issue of 
climate change. The ipcc draws upon hundreds of the world’s expert scientists as 
authors and thousands as expert reviewers. Leading experts on climate change 
and environmental, social, and economic sciences from some 60 nations have 
helped the ipcc to prepare periodic assessments of the scientific underpinnings 
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for reporting on climate change, its consequences, and the viability of adaptation 
and mitigation measures, the ipcc is also looked to as the o≤cial advisory body to 
the world’s governments on the state of the science of the climate change issue. 
For example, the ipcc organized the development of internationally accepted 
methods for conducting national greenhouse gas emission inventories. 
Joint Implementation: Agreements made between two or more nations under the 
auspices of the Framework Convention on Climate Change to help reduce green­
house gas emissions. 
Lifetime (Atmospheric): The lifetime of a greenhouse gas refers to the approximate 
amount of time it would take for the anthropogenic increment to an atmos­
pheric pollutant concentration to return to its natural level (assuming emissions 
cease) as a result of either being converted to another chemical compound or 
being taken out of the atmosphere via a sink. This time depends on the pollu­
tant’s sources and sinks as well as its reactivity.The lifetime of a pollutant is often 
considered in conjunction with the mixing of pollutants in the atmosphere; a 
long lifetime will allow the pollutant to mix throughout the atmosphere. Aver­
age lifetimes can vary from about a week (sulfate aerosols) to more than a cen­
tury (CFCs, carbon dioxide). 
Mechanisms: The Kyoto Protocol establishes three mechanisms to increase the flex­
ibility and reduce the costs of making emissions cuts; these are the Clean Devel­
opment Mechanism, emissions trading, and joint implementation. 
Methane (CH4): A hydrocarbon that is a greenhouse gas with a global warming 
potential most recently estimated at 24.5. Methane is produced through anaero­
bic (without oxygen) decomposition of waste in landfills, animal digestion, 
decomposition of animal wastes, production and distribution of natural gas and 
oil, coal production ,and incomplete fossil fuel combustion.The atmospheric con­
centration of methane has been shown to be increasing at a rate of about 0.6% 
per year and the concentration of about 1.7 parts per million by volume (ppmv) is 
more than twice its preindustrial value. However, the rate of increase of methane 
in the atmosphere may be stabilizing. 
Metric Ton:Common international measurement for the quantity of greenhouse gas 
emissions. A metric ton is equal to 2205 lbs or 1.1 short tons. 
National communications: A central requirement of the Convention (and the Proto­
col) is that each Party must inform the others about its national climate change 
activities. Many developed countries have submitted their second reports and 
developing countries have started to submit their first. 
National Delegation: One or more o≤cials who are empowered to represent and 
negotiate on behalf of their government. 
Nitrogen Oxides (NOx): Gases consisting of one molecule of nitrogen and varying 
numbers of oxygen molecules. Nitrogen oxides are produced in the emissions of 
vehicle exhausts and from power stations. In the atmosphere, nitrogen oxides 
can contribute to formation of photochemical ozone (smog), can impair visibility, 
and have health consequences; they are thus considered pollutants. 
Non-Governmental Organizations (ngos): Many relevant ngos attend the climate 
talks as observers in order to interact with delegates and the press and provide infor­
mation. ngos must be non-profit and can include environmental groups, research 
institutions, business groups, and associations of urban and local governments. 














Observer: The cop and its subsidiary bodies normally permit observers to attend 
their sessions. Observers may include the United Nations and its specialized 
agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, non-Party states, and other rel­
evant governmental or non-governmental organizations. 
oecd: The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development consists of 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Republic of Korea, Japan, Luxem­
bourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the uk , and the us . 
Ozone (O3): Ozone consists of three atoms of oxygen bonded together in contrast to 
normal atmospheric oxygen which consists of two atoms of oxygen. Ozone is an 
important greenhouse gas found in both the stratosphere (about 90% of the 
total atmospheric loading) and the troposphere (about 10%). Ozone has other 
e≠ects beyond acting as a greenhouse gas. In the stratosphere, ozone provides a 
protective layer shielding the Earth from ultraviolet radiation and subsequent 
harmful health e≠ect on humans and the environment. In the troposphere, 
oxygen molecules in ozone combine with other chemicals and gases (oxidiza­
tion) to cause smog. 
Particulates: Tiny pieces of solid or liquid matter, such as soot, dust, fumes, or mist. 
Party: A state (or regional economic integration organization such as the eu) that 
agrees to be bound by a treaty and for which the treaty has entered into force. 
Perfluorocarbons (pfcs). A group of human-made chemicals composed of carbon 
and fluorine only: CF4 and C2F6. These chemicals, specifically CF4 and C2F6, (along 
with hydrofluorocarbons) were introduced as alternatives to the ozone depleting 
substances. In addition, they are emitted as by-products of industrial processes 
and are also used in manufacturing. pfcs do not harm the stratospheric ozone 
layer, but they are powerful greenhouse gases: CF4 has a global warming poten­
tial (gwp) of 6,300 and C2F6 has a gwp of 12,500. 
Photosynthesis: The process by which green plants use light to synthesize organic 
compounds from carbon dioxide and water. In the process oxygen and water are 
released. Increased levels of carbon dioxide can increase net photosynthesis in 
some plants. Plants create a very important reservoir for carbon dioxide. 
Policies and Measures: Countries must decide what policies and measures to adopt 
in order to achieve their emissions targets. Some possible policies and measures 
which Parties could implement are listed in the Kyoto Protocol and could o≠er 
opportunities for intergovernmental cooperation. 
Precautionary Approach: The approach promoted under the Framework Convention 
of Climate Change to help achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas concentra­
tions in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous interference 
with the climate system. 
Protocol: A protocol is linked to an existing convention, but it is a separate and addi­
tional agreement that must be signed and ratified by the Parties to the conven­
tion. Protocols typically strengthen a convention by adding new, more detailed 
commitments. 
Quantified Emissions Limitation and Reduction Commitments: Legally-binding tar­
gets and timetables under the Kyoto Protocol for the limitation or reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions for developed countries. 
Radiation. Energy emitted in the form of electromagnetic waves. Radiation has 
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from the Sun is relatively energetic, it has a short wavelength (ultra-violet, visible, 
and near infra-red) while energy re-radiated from the Earth’s surface and the 
atmosphere has a longer wavelength (infra-red radiation) because the Earth is 
cooler than the Sun. 
Radiative Forcing: A change in the balance between incoming solar radiation and 
outgoing infra-red radiation. Without any radiative forcing, solar radiation 
coming to the Earth would continue to be approximately equal to the infra-red 
radiation emitted from the Earth. The addition of greenhouse gases traps and 
increased fraction of the infra-red radiation, reradiating it back toward the sur­
face and creating a warming influence (i.e., positive radiative forcing because 
incoming solar radiation will exceed outgoing infra-red radiation). 
Ratification: After signing the Convention or the Protocol, a country must ratify it, 
often with the approval of its parliament or other legislature. The instrument of 
ratification must be deposited with the depositary (in this case the UN Secretary-
General) to start the 90-day countdown to becoming a Party. 
Regional Groups: The five regional groups meet privately to discuss issues and nom­
inate bureau members and other o≤cials. They are Africa, Asia, Central and East­
ern Europe (cee), Latin America and the Caribbean (grulac), and the Western 
Europe and Others Group (weog). 
Residence Time: The average time spent in a reservoir by an individual atom or mol­
ecule. Also, the age of a molecule when it leaves the reservoir. With respect to 
greenhouse gases, residence time usually refers to how long a particular mole­
cule remains in the atmosphere. 
Second Assessment Report (sar): Also known as Climate Change 1995, the ipcc’s 
sar was written and reviewed by some 2,000 scientists and experts world-wide. 
It concluded that “the balance of evidence suggests that there is a discernible 
human influence on global climate” and confirmed the availability of “no-regrets” 
options and other cost-e≠ective strategies for combating climate change. 
Secretariat: Sta≠ed by international civil servants and responsible for servicing the 
cop and ensuring its smooth operation, the secretariat makes arrangements for 
meetings, compiles and prepares reports, and coordinates with other relevant 
international bodies. The Climate Change secretariat is institutionally linked to 
the United Nations. 
Signature: The head of state or government, the foreign minister, or another desig­
nated o≤cial indicates his or her country’s agreement with the adopted text of 
the Convention or the Protocol and its intention to become a Party by signing. 
Sink: A reservoir that uptakes a pollutant from another part of its cycle. Soil and trees 
tend to act as natural sinks for carbon. 
Short Ton. Common measurement for a ton in the United States. A short ton is equal 
to 2,000 lbs or 0.907 metric tons. 
Solar Radiation. Energy from the Sun. Also referred to as short-wave radiation. Of 
importance to the climate system, solar radiation includes ultra-violet radiation, 
visible radiation, and infra-red radiation. 
Stratosphere: The part of the atmosphere directly above the troposphere. See 
Atmosphere. 
Subsidiary Body: A committee that assists the Conference of the Parties. Two per­
manent ones are defined by the Convention: the Subsidiary Body for Implemen­
tation and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice. COP-1 also 











date, which concluded its work on 30 November 1997, and the Ad hoc Group on 
Article 13. Additional subsidiary bodies may be established as needed. 
Sulfur Dioxide (SO2): A compound composed of one sulfur and two oxygen mole­
cules. Sulfur dioxide emitted into the atmosphere through natural and anthro­
pogenic processes is changed in a complex series of chemical reactions in the 
atmosphere to sulfate aerosols.These aerosols result in negative radiative forcing 
(i.e., tending to cool the Earth’s surface). 
Sulfur Hexafluoride (SF6). A very powerful greenhouse gas used primarily in electri­
cal transmission and distribution systems. SF6 has a global warming potential of 
24,900. 
Sulfate Aerosol: Particulate matter that consists of compounds of sulfur formed by 
the interaction of sulfur dioxide and sulfur trioxide with other compounds in the 
atmosphere. Sulfate aerosols are injected into the atmosphere from the com­
bustion of fossil fuels and the eruption of volcanoes like Mt. Pinatubo. Recent 
theory suggests that sulfate aerosols may lower the earth’s temperature by 
reflecting away solar radiation (negative radiative forcing). Global Climate 
Models which incorporate the e≠ects of sulfate aerosols more accurately predict 
global temperature variations. 
Third Assessment Report (tar): The ipcc’s Third Assessment Report is expected to 
be finalized in late 2000 and published in early 2001. 
Trace Gas: Any one of the less common gases found in the Earth’s atmosphere. Nitro­
gen, oxygen, and argon make up more than 99 percent of the Earth’s atmosphere. 
Other gases, such as carbon dioxide, water vapor, methane, oxides of nitrogen, 
ozone, and ammonia, are considered trace gases. Although relatively unimpor­
tant in terms of their absolute volume, they have significant e≠ects on the Earth’s 
weather and climate. 
Troposphere: The lowest layer of the atmosphere.The troposphere extends from the 
Earth’s surface up to about 10-15 km. See also Atmosphere. 
Tropospheric Ozone (O3). Ozone that is located in the troposphere and plays a signifi­
cant role in the greenhouse gas e≠ect and urban smog. See Ozone for more details. 
Tropospheric Ozone Precursor: Gases that influence the rate at which ozone is cre­
ated and destroyed in the atmosphere. Such gases include: carbon monoxide 
(CO), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and nonmethane volatile organic compounds 
(NMVOCs). 
Voluntary Commitments: During the Kyoto negotiations, a draft article that would 
have permitted developing countries to voluntary adhere to legally binding emis­
sions targets was dropped in the final hours. This issue remains important for 
some negotiators and may be discussed in Buenos Aires. 
Water Vapor: The most abundant greenhouse gas, it is the water present in the 
atmosphere in gaseous form. Water vapor is an important part of the natural 
greenhouse e≠ect. While humans are not significantly increasing its concentra­
tion, it contributes to the enhanced greenhouse e≠ect because the warming 
influence of greenhouse gases leads to a positive water vapor feedback. In addi­
tion to its role as a natural greenhouse gas, water vapor plays an important role 
in regulating the temperature of the planet because clouds form when excess 
water vapor in the atmosphere condenses to form ice and water droplets and pre­
cipitation. 
Weather: Weather is the specific condition of the atmosphere at a particular place 
and time. It is measured in terms of such things as wind, temperature, humidity, 
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atmospheric pressure, cloudiness, and precipitation. In most places, weather can 
change from hour-to-hour, day-to-day, and season-to-season. Climate is the aver­
age of weather over time and space. A simple way of remembering the di≠erence 
is that ‘climate’ is what you expect (e.g., cold winters) and ‘weather’ is what you 
get (e.g., a blizzard). 
